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Abstract
Human mental workload has gained importance, in the last few decades, as a fundamental design concept
in human-computer interaction. It can be intuitively defined as the amount of mental work necessary for
a person to complete a task over a given period of time. For people interacting with interfaces, computers
and technological devices in general, the construct plays an important role. At a low level, while processing
information, often people feel annoyed and frustrated; at higher level, mental workload is critical and
dangerous as it leads to confusion, it decreases the performance of information processing and it increases
the chances of errors and mistakes. It is extensively documented that either mental overload or underload
negatively affect performance. Hence, designers and practitioners who are ultimately interested in system or
human performance need answers about operator workload at all stages of system design and operation. At
an early system design phase, designers require some explicit model to predict the mental workload imposed
by their technologies on end-users so that alternative system designs can be evaluated. However, human
mental workload is a multifaceted and complex construct mainly applied in cognitive sciences. A plethora of
ad-hoc definitions can be found in the literature. Generally, it is not an elementary property, rather it emerges
from the interaction between the requirements of a task, the circumstances under which it is performed and
the skills, behaviours and perceptions of the operator. Although measuring mental workload has advantages
in interaction and interface design, its formalisation as an operational and computational construct has not
sufficiently been addressed. Many researchers agree that too many ad-hoc models are present in the literature
and that they are applied subjectively by mental workload designers thereby limiting their application in
different contexts and making comparison across different models difficult.
This thesis introduces a novel computational framework for representing and assessing human mental
workload based on defeasible reasoning. The starting point is the investigation of the nature of human
mental workload that appears to be a defeasible phenomenon. A defeasible concept is a concept built upon
a set of arguments that can be defeated by adding additional arguments. The word ‘defeasible’ is inherited
from defeasible reasoning, a form of reasoning built upon reasons that can be defeated. It is also known as
non-monotonic reasoning because of the technical property (non-monotonicity) of the logical formalisms
that are aimed at modelling defeasible reasoning activity. Here, a conclusion or claim, derived from the
application of previous knowledge, can be retracted in the light of new evidence. Formally, state-of-the-art
defeasible reasoning models are implemented employing argumentation theory, a multi-disciplinary paradigm
that incorporates elements of philosophy, psychology and sociology. It systematically studies how arguments
can be built, sustained or discarded in a reasoning process, and it investigates the validity of their conclusions.
v
Since mental workload can be seen as a defeasible phenomenon, formal defeasible argumentation theory
may have a positive impact in its representation and assessment. Mental workload can be captured, analysed,
and measured in ways that increase its understanding allowing its use for practical activities. The research
question investigated here is whether defeasible argumentation theory can enhance the representation of
the construct of mental workload and improve the quality of its assessment in the field of human-computer
interaction.
In order to answer this question, recurrent knowledge and evidence employed in state-of-the-art mental
workload measurement techniques have been reviewed in the first place as well as their defeasible and
non-monotonic properties. Secondly, an investigation of the state-of-the-art computational techniques for
implementing defeasible reasoning has been carried out. This allowed the design of a modular framework
for mental workload representation and assessment. The proposed solution has been evaluated by comparing
the properties of sensitivity, diagnosticity and validity of the assessments produced by two instances of the
framework against the ones produced by two well known subjective mental workload assessments techniques
(the Nasa Task Load Index and the Workload Profile) in the context of human-web interaction. In detail,
through an empirical user study, it has been firstly demonstrated how these two state-of-the-art techniques can
be translated into two particular instances of the framework while still maintaining the same validity. In other
words, the indexes of mental workload inferred by the two original instruments, and the ones generated by
their corresponding translations (instances of the framework) showed a positive and nearly perfect statistical
correlation. Additionally, a new defeasible instance built with the framework showed a better sensitivity and
a higher diagnosticity capacity than the two selected state-of-the art techniques. The former showed a higher
convergent validity with the latter techniques, but a better concurrent validity with performance measures.
The new defeasible instance generated indexes of mental workload that better correlated with the objective
time for task completion compared to the two selected instruments. These findings support the research
question thereby demonstrating how defeasible argumentation theory can be successfully adopted to support
the representation of mental workload and to enhance the quality of its assessments.
The main contribution of this thesis is the presentation of a methodology, developed as a formal modular
framework, to represent mental workload as a defeasible computational concept and to assess it as a numerical
usable index. This research contributes to the body of knowledge by providing a modular framework built
upon defeasible reasoning and formalised through argumentation theory in which workload can be optimally
measured, analysed, explained and applied in different contexts.
Keywords: Mental Workload, Defeasible Reasoning, Argumentation Theory, Human-Computer Interaction
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The increase in use of computers and web-based technologies has led to human activity becoming more cogni-
tively focused. As a result, the objective measurement of Mental Workload (MWL) has become increasingly
important, for instance, in the development of digital interfaces, in the design of activities and in understanding
human performance within complex systems. If people could accomplish everything they are expected to do
quickly, accurately, and reliably using the available resources, this concept would be of little practical impor-
tance. However, this is not the case, as other factors such as system and task complexity, multitasking contexts,
external influences and inputs, as well as individual fatigue, stress, motivation, skills and knowledge, all influ-
ence operator performance and make it difficult to maintain such performance at an optimal level. It has been
extensively documented that either overload or underload negatively affect performance (Xie and Salvendy,
2000b). Hence, designers and practitioners who are ultimately interested in system or human performance
need solutions to issues that may arise in matters relating to operator workload at all stages of system design
and operation (Hart, 2006). In particular, at an early system design phase, designers need some explicit model
to predict the mental workload imposed by their technologies on end-users so that system design alternatives
can be evaluated. Modern computer-based technologies may impose severe or non-optimal requirements on
information-processing capabilities. For instance, modern web-based systems are becoming more complex
and interactive, adapting themselves to end-users’ preferences and providing them with personalised visual
interfaces and contents (Steichen et al., 2011). Designers are becoming increasingly concerned with reduc-
ing complexity and maintaining the mental workload imposed on end-users by their systems at an optimal
level; evidence of this can be seen in some of the ergonomic principles which have been developed relating
to the design of work systems (Nachreiner, 1995). This will, in turn, improve operator satisfaction, promote
work efficiency, increase perceived usability and will ultimately lead to increased performance reliability and
system success. Additionally, the ability to assess mental workload has a great impact on the investigation
of user experience in interacting with computer-based systems. Although MWL has been mainly applied in
the automobile and aviation industries, and has been investigated in particular by psychologists, ergonomists
and neuroscientists, it can be applied across a much broader domain, where its future impact is likely to be
highly significant. This thesis focuses on the challenge of viewing MWL as a defeasible phenomenon and
modelling it by building a framework for its representation and assessment with the goal of being applicable
in the multi-disciplinary field of human-computer interaction.
1
1.1 The construct of human mental workload
Despite over 40 years of research, there is still no clearly defined, universally accepted definition of human
mental workload (Cain, 2007). The lack of a formal theory of mental workload has led to a proliferation
of disparate methods of measurement, with little chance of reconciliation. The operational definitions of
MWL from various fields are not consonant on such matters as its sources, methods, consequences as
well as measurements. Yet in spite of this lack of agreement about its nature and definition, it remains an
important, practical, relevant and measurable entity. The principal reason for measuring mental workload is
to quantify the mental cost of performing a task in order to predict operator and system performance (Cain,
2007). Defining human mental workload is a non-trivial problem: the literature suggests it is hard to define
due to its multifaceted and multidimensional nature which is dependent on the capabilities and effort of the
operators in the context of specific situations. In the mid-1980s Gopher and Dochin noted that no single,
representative measure of mental workload existed or was likely to be of general use (Gopher and Donchin,
1986). Nowadays, this point of view seems to still be valid (Cain, 2007). A general intuitive definition is that
mental workload is the amount of mental or cognitive work necessary for a person to complete a task over a
period of time. Unfortunately, this is a simplistic view of the concept. Additionally, the construct of mental
workload is often described by terms such as ‘mental strain’, ‘mental effort’, ‘cognitive load’, ‘cognitive
effort’ and ‘emotional strain’, making its definition even more confusing.
Despite the plethora of definitions, the literature suggests that mental workload involves the interaction
of two principal components: a task and a person. However, this interaction might be mediated by several
other elements such as available cognitive resources, the ability and skill of a person, the effort exerted as
well as time, context and external factors. Gopher and Dochin consider MWL to be an intervening variable
rather than a hypothetical construct. The former is a theoretical concept that is simply a quantity inferred
by aggregating the values carried by empirical variables. The latter involves terms that are not reducible to
empirical terms and that are not directly observable (Gopher and Donchin, 1986). Xie and Salvendy also
believe that mental workload is an intervening variable because it can be measured by other means, such as
indicators of performance, psychophysiological measures and subjective ratings which show high correlation
to MWL. Therefore, the general consensus among scholars in the field of MWL is that there is no definitive
absolute truth in designing, measuring and predicting workload; rather there is only the perception of truth
(Xie and Salvendy, 2000b). It is unlikely that anyone would take issue with this stance, in particular because
MWL is frequently experienced by humans. However, because mental workload means different things to
different researchers, this generates problems for applied research. Unless a universal definition, or at least
a general structure, is proposed, each field and perhaps each investigator will continue with their culturally
preferred definition of human mental workload.
1.2 Issues in modelling and formalising human mental workload
According to state-of-the-art research on mental workload, developing a general model is a multifaceted prob-
lem that must take stock of a broad range of situations, time scales, influences and applications. Researchers
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have attempted to represent the construct in several ways, influenced by their knowledge-bases and the con-
text of application. This has led to proposals computational models with different workload attributes and
features manipulated and aggregated in various ways. Some of these models fail to consider individual dif-
ferences, while others do not take into account external factors. In addition, some workload attributes might
be affected by other attributes or other variables that could be expressed by a hierarchical structure or a graph
(Xie and Salvendy, 2000b). Empirical models are the type which tend to be most frequently proposed: these
gather subjective psycho-physiological measures from users that are aggregated in distinct ways. In the Nasa
Task Load Index (NASA-TLX), for instance, six attributes are gathered after the execution of a task, and a
weighted average is computed considering the subjective preference of attributes provided by the user. In the
Subjective Workload Assessment Technique (SWAT), three dimensions are described by three discrete val-
ues and users are required to sort each of the 27 possible combinations from the one representing the lowest
mental workload to the one that represents the highest (Reid and Nygren, 1988). Correlation coefficients are
subsequently used to aggregate partial results to obtain a final workload scale. The complexity of this pro-
cedure has prompted other researchers to focus on ways of simplifying it (Luximon and Goonetilleke, 2001)
by introducing a pair-wise comparison procedure among the dimensions, with both discrete and continuous
scales. In a more recent multidimensional subjective assessment instrument - the Workload Profile, based on
multiple resource theory (originally proposed by Wickens and recently reviewed in (Wickens, 2002)) - a sim-
ple computational mechanism adds up workload attributes to provide an overall workload score (Tsang and
Velazquez, 1996). Another class of computational models have been developed from analytical techniques
that do not involve end-users, but rather require inputs from experts. Examples are mathematical models,
task analyses and computer simulations mainly based on information, control or queuing theories (Xie and
Salvendy, 2000b). However, the limitations of these models are that they need a sophisticated design and
great understanding because usually they require well-defined input parameters to fully operate. Furthermore,
the compulsory inputs which are very often required for these models, can be partial or not available at all, as
in the case of human-computer interactive systems, thereby reducing the applicability of analytical models.
According to (Young and Stanton, 2002b) there are other issues associated with the representation, for-
malisation and assessment of mental workload. These include subjectivity in the interpretation, the perception
as well as the measurement of the construct. Young and Stanton, along with many other researchers, have
proposed their own definition of mental workload according to their interpretation of the available literature:
their own knowledge-bases, background and experience served for the construction of an ad-hoc computa-
tional model. The second issue is the introduction of subjectivity into the definition of mental workload by
allowing such a definition to be influenced by personal goals that might vary between individuals and across
situations. This issue makes mental workload a context-specific and user-centred construct. The third issue
is the complex problem of the measurement of MWL. Several authors, notably (Hart and Staveland, 1988),
maintain that subjective ratings represent the only index of ‘true’ human mental workload and are preferred
over physiological or performance measures. Subjective scores have been proved sensitive to perceived diffi-
culty, demand for multiple resources and changes in effort. However, despite the extensive use of subjective
ratings, there is the problem of validating them against objective demands or by correlation with other mea-
sures.
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1.3 Assuming human mental workload as a defeasible phenomenon
The literature suggests that modelling the construct of mental workload not only involves a consideration of
the context of use, the state of the user, as well as the complexity and demands of the task under consideration.
It also involves the interpretation of the available workload literature for the selection of those attributes which
are believed to influence mental workload, and for the analysis of their interaction in a given context. In
addition, each attribute can be vaguely defined, introducing a form of uncertainty. Eventually, these attributes
can be aggregated in various ways and each can have a different impact on the workload prediction. To clarify
these difficulties, consider the following illustrative reasoning that a designer might follow to represent and
assess the workload imposed by a web-based interface on a skilled user after interaction:
The mental demand of the task to which the user is exposed has been rated as low; thus the designer
can infer a low workload. If the ‘mental demand’ attribute is the only evidence available, the majority
of mental workload designers would be likely to infer the same conclusion. However, if it is also known
that the user interrupted the execution of the task a number of times, then the previous conclusion could
be retracted, inferring a higher workload. Since new evidence has entered the reasoning process, the
conclusion is now different. Yet, if it is also known that the user was highly knowledgeable on the task,
additional evidence is available from which a lower degree of workload could be inferred, retracting
again the previous prediction. However, if the overall performance on the task was perceived as being
poor, an inconsistency now arises and the conclusion could be revised upwards to indicate a higher
workload. Although the task was not demanding and the user was skilled, external distractions might
play a role in increasing the task completion time, minimising performance. The designer might even-
tually infer a relatively high degree of mental workload because the attributes ‘time’ and ‘distractions’
are preferred over ‘skill’ and ‘task complexity’.
The above example shows how mental workload can be seen as a defeasible phenomenon, starting with
the reasonable assumption that it is a complex construct built upon a network of pieces of evidence. The
second assumption is that the understanding of the interactions among these pieces of evidence is essential in
defining and assessing it. These assumptions are the key components of a defeasible phenomenon: a concept
built upon a set of arguments that can be defeated by adding additional arguments. The word ‘defeasible’ is
inherited from Defeasible Reasoning (DR), a form of reasoning built upon reasons that can be defeated. Here,
a conclusion or claim, derived from the application of previous knowledge, can be retracted in the light of new
evidence. Defeasible reasoning is also known as Non-Monotonic Reasoning (NMR) because of the technical
property (non-monotonicity) of the logical formalisms that are aimed at modelling defeasible reasoning activ-
ity (Baroni et al., 1997). NMR differs from standard deductive reasoning because in the former, a conclusion
can be retracted in light of new evidence while in the latter, a conclusion follows from a set of strictly true
premises. Clearly, the previous illustrative reasoning has the property of non-monotonicity as the tentative
inference of the degree of mental workload is retracted several times in the light of new information. The
pieces of evidence considered in the example are heterogeneous and evidently characterised by uncertainty
and vagueness. Each attribute (demand, distraction, skill, time) might be interpreted and defined subjectively
by two different designers, according to their backgrounds and knowledge-bases. Interaction of attributes
might generate contradictions that have to be considered for a final inference of mental workload.
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1.4 Defeasible argumentation theory
State-of-the-art defeasible and non-monotonic reasoning models are formally implemented by Argumentation
Theory (AT), an important topic in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). It is a multi-disciplinary paradigm
that incorporates elements of philosophy, psychology and sociology. It systematically studies how arguments
can be built, maintained or discarded in a reasoning process, and the validity of the conclusions reached. That
is to say, it studies how people reason and express their arguments. Argumentation theory has gained impor-
tance in computer science, with the introduction of formal and computable models of human-like reasoning.
These models have extended classical reasoning models based on deductive logic that become increasingly
inadequate for tackling many knowledge representation problems. In particular, the study of non-monotonic
reasoning, commonly used by humans, has generated several formal models of logical systems. Examples in-
clude default logic and explanatory reasoning, successfully applied in IT applications. Argumentation theory
has proven useful for modelling defeasible reasoning as proposed by (Dung, 1995) and (Bondarenko et al.,
1997). Furthermore, argumentation can be seen as a particularly useful and intuitive paradigm for doing
non-monotonic reasoning, with the advantage that the reasoning process is composed of modular and quite
intuitive steps, in contrast to the monolithic approach of many traditional logics for defeasible reasoning. The
hypothesis behind this thesis is that mental workload can be reasonably viewed as a defeasible phenomenon,
and it can be represented and shaped using defeasible reasoning and formally modelled with argumentation
theory.
1.5 Problem statement and research question
Since mental workload may be referred to as a defeasible phenomenon, formal defeasible argumentation
theory may have a positive impact on its representation and assessment. Mental workload can be captured,
analysed, and measured in ways that increase its understanding, enabling it to be used for practical activities.
In this thesis it is argued that the concept could be optimally defined from a different perspective using a
framework that permits defeasible reasoning over multiple workload attributes, the vagueness associated
with their definition, as well as the conflicts and contradictions that might arise from their interaction. The
framework allows different designers to define mental workload according to their expertise, the influence of
their various fields of research, as well as their knowledge-bases, intuitions, assumptions, beliefs and contexts
of application.
This thesis aims to investigate how non-monotonic techniques, developed in the field of defeasible ar-
gumentation theory by AI researchers, could be effective in modelling and assessing mental workload. We
contend that there is a gap between theoretical cognitive models and the current landscape of computational
models of human mental workload. Theoretical approaches have been introduced over the last 40 years,
but their intrinsic high-level and ad-hoc view of mental workload has often been criticised due to their non-
extensibility and comparability. These approaches have been mainly used by psychologists and ergonomists in
the aviation and automobile industry, with sporadic applications in the more general field of human-computer
interaction. For this reason the aim is to design a more extensible framework for representing and predict-
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ing mental workload in the field of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI). We reject any reductionist approach
in which rigid formulas are encoded in dedicated infrastructures; instead we present a modular defeasible
reasoning framework in which a workload designer’s knowledge-base can be formally translated into inter-
active arguments and employed for representing and assessing mental workload. This solution is modular
in the sense that it is built upon layers aimed at guiding designers in mental workload representation and
assessment. The framework should offer a practical alternative solution to those scholars interested in en-
gaging with the multi-disciplinary field of mental workload and human-computer interaction. This proposal
was firstly acknowledged by the reviewing committee at a doctoral consortium of a top-tier conference in the
field of HCI (Longo, 2011) and was encouraged at another top-tier doctoral symposium in the field of user
modelling (Longo, 2012). The rationale behind the proposal of such a qualitative framework is:
• to provide a lightweight methodology, based upon defeasible argumentation theory, to facilitate the
development of future computational models for representing and assessing mental workload in HCI;
• to encompass and abstract existing and future mental workload assessment models in order to facilitate
their comparison and evaluation;
• to move the community towards a more robust definition of human mental workload;
• to account for the uncertainty and vagueness in defining and assessing mental workload;
• to allow a workload designer to deal with the potential conflicts that might arise from the interaction of
those pieces of evidence believed to influence mental workload;
• to promote the proposal of technologies and solutions that take stock of mental workload in the field of
HCI.
The research question investigated is:
Can defeasible argumentation theory enhance the representation of the construct of mental work-
load and improve the quality of its assessment in the field of human-computer interaction?
Mental workload
Defeasible argumentation Human-computer interaction
Fig. 1.1: The scope of the research
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1.6 Research methodology and contribution
Figure 1.1 shows the scope of the thesis and in order to answer the research question, the following objectives
are set:
1. to define the recurring concepts employed in mental workload measurement techniques;
2. to define the notions of non-monotonic, defeasible reasoning and formal argumentation theory;
3. to design a modular framework for representing the complex construct of mental workload as a defea-
sible phenomenon by employing argumentation theory and argument-based computations;
4. to investigate the capacity of the designed framework to reproduce and abstract state-of-the-art work-
load assessment techniques and to show how these are particular instances of the framework;
5. to investigate the quality of the assessments produced by a brand new instance of the defeasible frame-
work in the field of HCI.
The research methodology adopted is mixed. Firstly, there is a literature review to identify theoretical
knowledge in mental workload modelling. The output of the review has led the author to the formulation
of the research question and the design of the framework. The instantiation of the framework follows an
inductive theoretical approach: the subjective theoretical knowledge-base and expertise of a MWL designer
is required and then translated into a particular instance of the framework. This qualitative approach is
followed by a more quantitative method: different instances built with the framework are subsequently
quantitatively evaluated. An empirical user study is designed to accomplish objectives 4 and 5 involving
40 participants who are required to fill in questionnaires, providing the numerical inputs to the previously
constructed instances. Statistical methods are then employed to analyse the quality of the mental workload
assessments produced by these instances. In detail, analysis of variance, multinomial logistic regression
and correlation coefficients are adopted to investigate different properties of the mental workload assessments.
The main contribution of this thesis is the introduction of a methodology, developed as a formal frame-
work, to represent mental workload as a defeasible computational concept and to assess it as a numerical
usable index. This research contributes to the body of knowledge by providing a modular framework built
upon defeasible argumentation theory in which mental workload can be robustly modelled, defined, measured
and applied in different contexts. The thesis concretely tries to put together the field of Human-Centred Com-
puting, where Human-Computer Interaction is a central part, and Computing Methodologies, where Artificial
Intelligence is a major paradigm, and non-monotonic reasoning a part of it1. The thesis aims to be appreciated
both by scholars familiar in the applications of non-monotonic reasoning as well as HCI informaticians, in
particular end-user design experts.
1According to the Computing Classification System, 2012 Revision by the Association for Computing Machinery.
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1.7 Thesis outline
State-of-the-art: human mental workload - Chapter 2 is devoted to accomplish objective 1, with a
literature review of state-of-the-art approaches for modelling, defining and measuring mental workload as
well as computational techniques for assessing it, with applications in HCI. This chapter highlights the issues
in modelling human mental workload and it introduces why it can be seen as a defeasible phenomenon.
State-of-the-art: defeasible argumentation theory - Chapter 3 is aimed at achieving objective 2 by
reviewing state-of-the-art solutions for modelling defeasible reasoning activities and introducing the basic
building blocks of non-monotonic logics, notions that stand at the core of this thesis. Subsequently, formal
Argumentation theory (AT), based upon these notions, is described with a particular emphasis on its role for
knowledge representation.
Design - Chapter 4 is aimed at accomplishing objective 3 by designing a computational framework,
based on AT, for mental workload representation and assessment. This framework is built considering the
issues and properties of state-of-the-art approaches for modelling and assessing mental workload, emerged in
chapter 2, and state-of-the-art computational techniques of argumentation theory, as emerged in chapter 3.
Implementation and instantiation - Chapter 5 describes how the previously designed framework
has been implemented in practice and can be actually employed by a MWL designer. The aim is to
accomplish objective 4 by instantiating the framework. Specifically, the chapter firstly shows how two
state-of-the-art subjective mental workload assessment techniques - namely the NASA Task Load In-
dex and the Workload Profile - can be replicated and translated into two computational instances of the
framework. Secondly, it describes how a brand new instance of the framework can be developed from scratch.
Evaluation - Chapter 6 addresses objective 5 by evaluating the assessment capacity of previously
developed instances in the field of human-computer interaction. An experimental study is set requiring
human participants to perform a set of web-based tasks. The evaluation strategy includes a comparison of the
degree of sensitivity, diagnosticity and validity of the mental workload assessments produced by the brand
new computational instance, against the two selected state-of-the-art subjective assessment techniques.
Discussion and application - Chapter 7 is devoted to a critical examination and discussion of findings,
highlighting advantages and limitations of the application of defeasible argumentation theory for modelling
and assessing human mental workload. In addition, it illustrates, through examples, how the mental workload
assessments produced by the brand new instance evaluated in chapter 6, can be practically employed for
supporting and enhancing the design of HCI-based systems and applications.
Conclusions Chapter 8 summarises this thesis underlying the achievements, the major and minor contri-
butions to the body of knowledge, strengths and weaknesses, as well as illustrating open research issues and
delineating future directions.
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Chapter 2
Literature review of mental workload
This chapter is a review of the construct of mental workload, starting with a presentation of the relevant
theories, definitions and reasons for its measurement. A list of criteria for developing and selecting work-
load assessment techniques is introduced, followed by a description of the available typologies of measures.
A detailed section subsequently introduces the computational strategies employed by state-of-the-art tech-
niques, for the assessment of an index of mental workload. Fields of application of workload-based models
are briefly presented with particular emphasis on human-computer and human-web interactive domains, these
being the contexts of application of this thesis. The goal of the review is to identify those recurrent dimen-
sions and arguments employed by state-of-the-art representation and assessment techniques, as well as the
computational techniques for aggregating these towards a numerical representation of workload. A critical
discussion highlights the gaps and limitations of the current state-of-the-art research in mental workload. In
turn, a list of properties of an ideal framework for workload representation and assessments is presented. This
supports the research question, which shows how the construct of mental workload can be seen as a defeasible
phenomenon, which is the core premise of this thesis.
Human mental workload
The construct Measurement
criteria
Measurement
typologies
Computational
strategies
Fields of
applications
Reasons for
measurement
Relevant
theories
Definitions
Sensitivity
Diagnosticity
Intrusiveness
Acceptability
Selectivity
Reliability
Validity
Self-report
Performance
Physiological
Simple
aggregation
Weighted
preferences
Ranking &
correlations
Ad-hoc
Transportation
Critical
environments
Automation &
manufacturing
Medicine &
health-care
HCI
Fig. 2.1: Structure of the literature review of human mental workload
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2.1 The construct of human mental workload
The concept of human Mental Workload (MWL) has a long history in the fields of ergonomics and psychol-
ogy, with several applications in the aviation and automobile industry. Although the concept has been under
investigation for the last four decades, there is no clear definition of mental workload that has a general valid-
ity, and that is universally accepted. Most of the work concerning mental workload was done in the seventies
and eighties when the proliferation of computer-based systems was not as extended as it is nowadays. Until
the early nineties, definitions of mental workload in different research fields seemed to conflict with each
other in relation to their sources and mechanisms, as well as their consequences and measurements (Huey and
Wickens, 1993). Unfortunately, the situation today, is little different , and although several practical applica-
tions have been created in the last few years, these are still based on earlier findings and theories, without a
proper re-investigation into emerging fields, such as the multidisciplinary domain of human-computer inter-
action HCI. This state-of-the-art research is also justified by the fact that defining human mental workload is a
non-trivial problem. This complexity was earlier acknowledged by Gopher and Dochin (Gopher and Donchin,
1986) who felt that no representative measure of mental workload exists, or is likely to have a general use.
In fact, in their contributions to the field, the authors were not capable of indicating how many workload di-
mensions are necessary or sufficient for a strong assessment. This complexity is also acknowledged in a more
recent review confirming that mental workload is difficult to be uniquely defined, due to its multi-faceted
and multi-dimensional nature, as it depends on ‘the capabilities and effort of the operators in the context of
specific situations’ (Cain, 2007).
2.1.1 Reasons for measuring MWL
The main reason for assessing mental workload, is to measure the mental cost associated with performing a
certain task, with the objective of predicting operator and system performance (Cain, 2007). Modern tech-
nologies and human-computer interactive systems, have become increasingly complex, with augmentations
in the degree of increased workload on operators. In turn, this has increased the likelihood of exceeding
the limitations of the information-processing capacity of human operators, increasing the need for reliable
computational models to assess the mental workload, resulting from alternative design options (Eggemeier
and O’Donnell, 1998). According to Xie and Salvendy, these computational models need to be built for the
prediction of workload levels, mainly when a system is at an early design phase, when it is conceptualised
and early operationalised. At this stage, the system can not only be optimised in relation to workload, but
can also be a form of guidance for designers, who can better interpret predictions and assessments, thus
making suitable structural system changes to benefit the user (Xie and Salvendy, 2000b). Assessing mental
workload is also aimed at improving user engagement and satisfaction by designing, for instance, more
intuitive interfaces, or creating more effective procedures. Yet, the construct can be applied for legal reasons:
it can be adopted to enhance the usability assessment of user interfaces that need to be legally certified.
It has been proved extensively that both underload and overload can degrade performance (Lysaght
et al., 1989; Young and Stanton, 2002a), and as a consequence, affect the efficiency of a system as a
whole (Xie and Salvendy, 2000b), as well as having a negative impact on human performance (Huey and
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Wickens, 1993, Ch. 2). For instance, in present human-computer interactive domains, such as the World
Wide Web (WWW), situations of underload or overload can cause websurfers to leave the website, with
evident repercussions on the success of the website itself. The assumption in design approaches is that as
task difficulty increases, perhaps due to a complex interface, workload increases, and performance usually
decreases. In turn, errors are more frequent, response times increase, and fewer tasks can be completed
within a unit of time, with changes in performance strategy, and with a smaller mental residual capacity for
dealing with other tasks (Huey and Wickens, 1993). On the other hand, when task difficulty is negligible,
as in monitoring technologies, interfaces can impose a low amount of workload on operators: this situation
should also be avoided, as it leads to difficulties in maintaining attention and increases reaction time (Cain,
2007). Human factors and ergonomic scholars, as well as engineers and researchers, in human-computer
interaction, agree that physical workload should be minimal, but mental workload should be optimised.
It is generally accepted that human performance achieves its highest level when the demands of a task
are matched to the mental capacities available to the operator. In addition, designers of complex systems
agree that removing as many tasks as possible from operators, by automation of tasks, does resolve the
problem of decreasing mental workload, but it generates other effects such as underload. Rather than
implementing automation, and decreasing imposed demands on operators, mental workload practitioners
should design tasks, and use available systems and technologies in a way that allows exploitation of the
unique characteristics of individuals, such as their skills, knowledge and flexibility (Young and Stanton, 2006).
In summary, mental workload is an important factor to take into consideration in system design (Longo
et al., 2012b), and its formalisation as a computational concept is useful for optimising system performance
with manipulable numerical values (Diane Kuhl, 2000). This optimisation can support and increase
productivity as well as operator satisfaction and user engagement, whilst minimising human errors, and also
improving system safety. Figure 2.2 shows the disadvantages behind underload and overload situations, as
well as the advantages offered by optimal workload.
Underload Optimal Workload Overload
low sustained attention
high reaction time
low performance
high user satisfaction
high system success
low error rate
high productivity/safety
high response time/error rate
small mental residual capacity
low performance
Fig. 2.2: Disadvantages associated with low and high mental workload levels and advantages of optimal
workload
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2.1.2 Relevant theories
In order to understand the construct of human mental workload, it is essential to briefly introduce a few related
concepts and relevant theories, most notably the concepts of limited cognitive processing capacity and per-
formance. Kahneman, in the early seventies, referred to this using the metaphor of a ‘single undifferentiated
capacity, the modal view’, from which a limited pool of resources are available to humans to perform tasks
(Kahneman, 1973). His theory, the so-called single resource theory, is in contrast to the Multiple Resource
Theory (MRT) proposed in the early nineties, by professor Wickens. MRT suggests that capacity is the upper
or maximum limit of the cognitive processing capability and resource represents the mental effort exerted for
the improvement of processing efficiency (Wickens, 1991). This view has been refined, in the last decade, by
the same author, and nowadays it is the most prevalent theory in the field of mental workload (Wickens, 2002).
In more detail, single resource theory assumes that the capacity of the information-processing system, and the
availability of resources are not static concepts, rather they have a certain degree of elasticity. To support this,
resources might be increasingly allocated and employed as a consequence of an increase in processing load.
A linear relationship is supposed to exist between their allocation and task performance,up to the moment that
all resources are allocated and employed, and performance remains stable (Kahneman, 1973). For instance,
the additions of a secondary visual task to a primary auditory task can leave performance at the same level,
even if time-sharing between the two tasks is very successful. Although the theory can be applied across
different scenarios, it is not capable of explaining the reasons that lead to unaffected performance, even if
time-sharing is effective, for instance: why trained operators can manage time sharing of multiple different
tasks. The limitations of the single resource theory are overwhelmed by the multiple resource theory, which is
based on the assumption that a pool of resources exists for different modalities (Wickens, 1984). According to
Wickens, human operators do not only have one single source of information processing that can be adopted,
but rather different pools of resources that can be tapped into concurrently. His model, depicted in figure 2.3
(each box corresponds to a cognitive resource) is built on 4 dichotomies 1 of information processing:
• the stages of processing (perceptual, central and response)
• the codes of processing (verbal and spatial)
• the modalities of the input (visual and auditory), and output (speech and manual)
• responses (manual, spatial, vocal, verbal)
The stages of processing dimension refers to those perceptual and cognitive activities (for example involv-
ing working memory), that use different resources than those activities that denote the selection and execution
of actions (response). An operational example from aviation can clarify this stage. Consider an air traffic
controller that is required to manually or vocally acknowledge each change of the aircraft state. That is a
response demand. This activity would not disrupt or mitigate the capability to maintain an accurate view of
the airspace, which is a perceptual/cognitive demand. The codes of processing dimension denotes that spatial
activity employs a different pool of resources than verbal or linguistic activity. It underlines the distinction
between analogue/spatial processes and categorical/symbolic processes (usually linguistic or verbal). For
1A dichotomy is any splitting of an element or set into exactly two non-overlapping parts. It is a partition of an element, or a set
divided into two sub-parts or subsets that are both jointly extensive and mutually exclusive. The former refers to the idea that everything
must belong to either one part or another, while the latter refers to the property that nothing can belong to both parts simultaneously. A
dichotomy is frequently called a bipartition.
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Perception
Cognition
Responding
Processing stage
Spatial
Verbal
Coding format
Visual Auditory
Perceptual modality
Ambient
Focal
(Manual)
(Vocal)
Fig. 2.3: The 4-D Wickens Multiple-resource model
instance, while driving a car, it can be useful to predict the potential dangers of manually dialling mobile
phones, considering the visual, spatial and manual demands that are required to drive a vehicle, which would
conflict with those similar demands required to dial a mobile phone and thus suggesting the benefits of using
voice dialling. This dichotomy also refers, for instance, to the larger disruption of background music when it
has words, as opposed to when it does not, in a typical office environment where verbal processing frequently
occurs. The modalities dimension, included within perception but not within cognition or response, denotes
that auditory perception employs a different pool of resources than the one used by visual perception. In other
words, this suggests that a human can split their attention between eyes and ears better than between two
auditory or two visual channels: cross-modal time-sharing is easier than intra-modal time sharing. In other
words, listening to someone whilst simultaneously watching something cause less interference to one another
than listening to two conversations simultaneously do. The fourth dimension, the visual channel, is aimed at
distinguishing between focal and ambient vision, and is a nested dimension within visual resources. Focal
vision is needed for pattern recognition, such as identifying small objects, or reading text and fine details. Am-
bient vision is required for sensing ego motion and orientation, that is, the direction and the speed employed
to move through the environment. For example, walking in a corridor while reading a book, represents the
distinction between ambient vision (walking) and focal vision (reading). Similarly, driving a car in the middle
of a lane (ambient vision) while reading a road sign, or an unusual object in the middle of the road (focal
vision). Wickens proposed that each dimension has two discrete levels, and as long as two tasks use different
levels along each of the proposed dimension, time-sharing is better. In other words, maintaining few things
equal, for instance,the same resource demand or the same task difficulty, two tasks that both require one level
of a given dimension will have a higher interference to each other than two tasks that require separate levels
on the same dimension. For further details, as well as scientific and empirical explanations of the choices
of the four dichotomies, we refer the reader to (Wickens, 1991, 2002). Task demand, allocation policy and
resource overlap represent mental workload determinants within the scope of the MRT. In addition, this the-
ory is relevant to the scope of this thesis, human-computer interaction, this being a multi-tasking environment
that often requires the elicitation of different cognitive resources by human operators. For instance, an oper-
ator interacting with a web-based system might concurrently watch a video or listen to streaming music,read
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news or interact with e-mails systems. In turn, the four dichotomies of the MRT might all be elicited, and
mental workload might be influenced accordingly. This suggests that, for the problem of formalising mental
workload, as a computational concept, within HCI, these workload determinants should be taken into account.
2.1.3 Definitions
A general intuitive definition is that ‘mental workload (MWL) is the amount of mental work necessary for an
individual, or group of people, to complete a task over a period of time’. Unfortunately, this is a simple view
of the concept and, as described in a recent review with Cain, several more complex and complete definitions
of mental workload exist (Cain, 2007). Gopher and Dochin’s definition states that ‘mental workload may
be viewed as the difference between the capacities of the information processing system that are required
for task performance to satisfy performance expectations and the capacity available at any given time’.
This definition supports previous theories regarding the limitation of the human information processing
system, which cannot be fully used in the execution of a target task. It also refers to mental workload as a
construct used to describe the aspects of an interaction between a person and an assigned task (Gopher and
Donchin, 1986). The authors initially referred to MWL as a ‘mental construct, a latent variable, or perhaps
an intervening variable, reflecting the interaction of mental demands on operators by task they attend to’.
However, they finally suggested to see MWL as a hypothetical construct rather than an intervening variable,
because the concept cannot be described and fully summarised in empirical terms 2 (Gopher and Donchin,
1986). A similar point of view is supported by O’ Donnell and Eggemeier: ‘workload refers to that portion
of the operator’s limited capacity actually required to perform a particular task’ (Eggemeier et al., 1991;
O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986). Again, the authors’ assumption was that a person has a limited capacity
to process information and respond to it. In this case, the task response, and the processing demands exceed
the personO˜s limited available capacity; the overload that results can be manifested in decrements in terms
of performance. For O’ Donnell and Eggemeier the principal objective of assessing and measuring mental
workload was to specify the amount used by this limited capacity (Eggemeier et al., 1991).
Always in line with the reasonable assumption of the limited capacity of the information processing
system, Kramer, Sirevaag, and Braune have described ‘mental workload as the cost of performing a task
in terms of a reduction in the capacity to perform additional tasks that use the same processing resource’
(Kramer et al., 1987). Their definition was driven by their studies in the aviation industry, where dual-task
experiments were conducted in order to provide information concerning the mental workload of subjects and
their mental residual capacity. Similarly, Lysaght et al. referred to mental workload as, ‘the relative capacity
to respond, the emphasis is on predicting what the operator will be able to accomplish in the future’. Their
working and operational definition was aimed at being general, and not at explaining individual factors that
influence the performance of individuals or their perception of the workload of a task. It implies the amount
of spare capacity, and also the ability of a person to use that spare capacity in a specific context, and in
specific personal situations (Lysaght et al., 1989).
2In scientific theories, particularly in the field of psychology, a hypothetical construct is an explanatory variable that is not directly
observable, and it differs from an intervening variable because it has properties and implications that have not been demonstrated in
empirical terms. On the other hand, an intervening variable can be summarised by findings empirically observed.
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Hart suggested that ‘mental workload is not an inherent property, but rather it emerges from the
interaction between the requirements of a task, the circumstances under which it is performed, and the skills,
behaviours and perceptions of the operator’ (Hart and Staveland, 1988). This definition does not explicitly
refer to the limitation of the cognitive processing system, rather it highlights the multi-faceted nature of
the construct of mental workload. It embeds notions related to the task involved by the interaction with a
person, its complexity, the situation and the conditions under which the user performs it, as well as individual
differences such as skills, background, subjective perception and behaviour. This multi-faceted view is also
supported in (Cain, 2007) where ‘workload can be characterised as a mental construct that reflects the mental
strain resulting from performing a task under specific environmental and operational conditions, considering
capabilities of the operator to respond to those demands’. Yet, in line with the assumption that mental
workload is a multi-dimensional construct, Young and Stanton suggested that ‘the mental workload of a
task represents the level of attentional resources required to meet both objective and subjective performance,
which may be mediated by task demands, external support and past experience’ (Young and Stanton, 2002b,
2006). In this definition, the authors assumed that the level of attentional resources has a finite capacity,
thus beyond it, any increase in terms of task demand is reflected in terms of performance decrease. They
also introduced external factors and individual features as moderators of human mental workload. This
multidimensionality is also acknowledged by Vidulich and Tsang (Tsang and Vidulich, 2006) who separated
influencing workload factors into two main categories: exogenous task demands, and endogenous supply of
attentional resources. The former refers to those factors such as task difficulty, situational contingencies and
task priority, while the latter refers to those processing resources aimed at supporting information processing,
such as planning, decision making, perceiving, updating memory and response processing. In addition, this
supply is mitigated and affected by individual differences such as expertise, knowledge, background and
skills (Tsang and Vidulich, 2006).
In summary, a general and commonly accepted definition is not present in literature on mental workload,
as agreed in different reviews (Cain, 2007; Gopher and Donchin, 1986; Xie and Salvendy, 2000b). However,
according to the aforementioned definitions provided by several practitioners, it is reasonable to view mental
workload as a multi-dimensional construct that can be influenced by various factors. Some of these factors
can be found in Huey and Wickens (Huey and Wickens, 1993) who provided an overview of many tasks and
external variables which contribute to mental workload. Similarly, Xie and Salvendy presented an analy-
sis of factors affecting mental workload, both in single and multi-tasking environments (Xie and Salvendy,
2000b). While in (Tsang and Vidulich, 2006), the authors investigated mental workload against the construct
of situational awareness. The multi-dimensional interpretation of mental workload seems to include:
• task (exogenous factors - those that are inherent in the situation such as task demands, situation com-
plexity and uncertainty);
• operator (endogenous factors - those that are inherent in a person’s ability and skill);
• context and situation (exogenous factors);
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2.2 Criteria for measurement methods
Methodologies for measuring mental workload can be performed either in experimental or operational set-
tings. In the former, there are generally more options than in the latter, and they are usually adopted. How-
ever, there exist concerns regarding the application of workload measures, which are practically conducted
and based on laboratory studies. For instance, users performing web-based tasks in a laboratory can behave
differently than performing the same task in their familiar environments (home, office or other contexts),
with assessments of workload differing. This suggests that the context is an important factor that should be
accounted for in any measurement method, above all, if applied in the field of human-computer interaction
where users can be physically located in different heterogeneous environments. According to this, several
criteria exist and have been proposed as a guidance for selecting and developing measurement techniques
(O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986):
• sensitivity: the methodology must have a high reliability in terms of sensitivity to changes in resource
demand or task difficulty and in terms of discrimination capacity between significant variations in
workload;
• diagnosticity: the method should be highly diagnostic, that means being capable of indicating the
sources that cause variations in workload and to quantify the contributions by the type or resource
demand;
• intrusiveness: the methodology should not be intrusive and interfere with the performance of the task
of the operator, becoming an important source of workload itself; (this property is referred to as obtru-
siveness by Wickens in (Wickens and Hollands, 1999, Ch. 11));
• requirements: the methodology should require equipment as minimal as possible to avoid impact on
operator’s performance. (Muckler and Seven, 1992) refers to this as resource requirements;
• acceptability: the method should have high operator acceptance showing at least face validity 3, without
being onerous. (Muckler and Seven, 1992) refers to this as relative simplicity.
Wickens et al. (Wickens and Hollands, 1999, Ch. 11) extended these criteria with two further categories:
• selectivity: the method should be selectively sensitive only to differences in resource demand, and not
to changes in other factors unrelated to mental workload;
• bandwidth and reliability: the assessment procedure should be reliable both within and across tests,
and it should be capable of rapidly detecting transient changes in workload levels. (Muckler and Seven,
1992; Wierwille and Eggemeier, 1993) respectively refers to this as transferability, and sufficient relia-
bility highlights the importance of the capability of a technique to be used in different applications.
Other criteria are worth mentioning:
• construct validity: a property aimed at really assessing whether an instrument is measuring mental
workload. This is inherently difficult to be verified because of the complexity of the construct itself,
3Face validity refers to what a concept superficially appears to measure, mainly testing if it looks valid. It is in contrast with content
validity that is a more strict property that requires the use of recognised tests or subject experts for evaluating whether evaluated items
assess defined content. This includes statistical tests which are in general more rigorous than methodologies applied in face validity tests.
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thus two variations have been proposed: concurrent validity and predicting validity (also referred to as
convergent validity). The former is when the metrics correlate with operational measures for validation,
while the latter is when different workload metrics correlate to each other (Tsang, 2006).
• generalisability: a measurement technique should meet formal constraints (Cain, 2007) and it should
allow comparisons with different techniques, aimed at increasing the understanding of the construct of
mental workload (Muckler and Seven, 1992).
The above criteria are all important for the development and evaluation of an assessment technique. How-
ever, some of them, such as acceptability, are difficult to be achieved at the beginning of the development of
a technique, and can only be obtained after several experiments and user studies. For this reason, some of
them are carefully applied to evaluate the proposed defeasible computational framework for mental workload
representation and assessment: sensitivity, diagnosticity, concurrent and convergent validity. In the following
subsections details of each individual criterium are provided.
2.2.1 Sensitivity
Sensitivity refers to the capability of an assessment technique to reflect changes in mental workload imposed
by task performance. O’ Donnell and Eggemeier suggest that the theoretical relationship between operator
performance and workload can guide the evaluation of the sensitivity of an assessment procedure. This hypo-
thetical relationship is depicted in figure 2.4, where three regions are identified by the relative workload levels
imposed on the operator (O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986). In region A, low to moderate levels of operator
workload are reflected in high and adequate operator performance. In this area, increments of workload do not
influence the performance of the operator, who has enough spare information processing capacity to handle
increments in workload. In region B, higher levels of workload reflect changes in operator performance be-
cause they exceed the capability of the operator to compensate. In this area, a monotonic relationship between
the workload and the performance of the operator exists, with primary-task performance decrementing with
increments in workload levels. In region C workload is extremely, high and as a consequence the performance
of the operator is exceptionally low.
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Fig. 2.4: Hypothetical relationship between demand and performance
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Formally, sensitivity has been assessed in different ways. (Tsang and Velazquez, 1996) et al. used multiple
regression to predict performance objective measures through combinations of subjective ratings related to a
set of tasks executed by humans. (Rubio et al., 2004) used analysis of variance (ANOVA) to investigate the
sensitivity of different workload assessment instruments. The aim was to investigate to what extent mental
workload indexes, computed by different assessment instruments, varied as a function of objective changes of
a set of tasks executed by humans. These changes included single/dual-tasks and manipulation of difficulty.
However, a set of tasks might be designed in different ways, manipulating mental demands, required cognitive
resources, temporal constraints or even the context of execution. If there are two different tasks, T-tests are
usually used to find a significant difference between the two. If more tasks are designed, ANOVA is preferred
and Post-hoc comparisons of workload means, such as Tukey or Duncan, tests are used. An assessment
procedure with high sensitivity should be able to spot statistically significant differences between the different
tasks under examination (Zhang and Luximon, 2005).
2.2.2 Diagnosticity
The property of diagnosticity refers to the capacity of a workload assessment procedure in discriminating
between demands on specific resources. In other words, this criterion specifies the ability to discern the cause
or typology of workload, and or the capability to attribute it to a specific aspect, or a characteristic of the task
performed by an operator (O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986). This characteristic relies upon the multiple-
resource theory (MRT described in section 2.1.2, page 12) that considers the capacity of the information-
processing system being limited and built upon as a set of independent resources, or capacities, which are not
interchangeable (Wickens, 1991, 2002, 2008). The approach of multiple-resources holds that the processing
capacity devoted to task performance is not unitary, rather it is drawn from a pool of resources that cannot be
exchanged with other resources. A workload assessment procedure, in the context of the MRT, is said to be
diagnostic if it shows sensitivity to certain demands of resources and not to others. For instance, measures can
be, on one hand, extremely diagnostic and reflect a specific variation at a certain stage or position of demand,
or on the other hand, can be very low on diagnostic and express general demands. Formally, diagnosticity has
been assessed in various ways. (Tsang and Velazquez, 1996) used canonical analysis to study the relationship
between a set of predictor workload attributes and a set of criterion variables (the different tasks conditions).
(Rubio et al., 2004) proposed to measure it with stepwise discriminant analysis, to investigate to what extent
workload profiles allowed discrimination of tasks.
2.2.3 Intrusiveness
Intrusiveness refers to the degree of a measurement method to influence the performance of a primary task.
In other words, the goal for a good measure is to minimise the disruption in ongoing task performance as
a result of its application. For instance, the addition of a secondary task may influence the performance on
a primary task, by being intrusive. In some settings, such as laboratory environments, this addition might
be more intrusive, with influence on the primary task, but it can still be acceptable. In other settings, such
as field test situations or simulations, a higher intrusiveness cannot be accepted. Not only does the property
of intrusiveness influence performance on a primary task, but it also introduces problems in interpreting the
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data and outcomes produced by a measurement technique. The outcomes of a procedure that has a high
degree of intrusiveness cannot accurately represent the level of mental workload required by the primary task
(O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986). Formally, intrusiveness is usually the difference between the performance
on the primary task alone, and the performance of the primary task when the mental workload measure is
administered. A significant difference is synonymous of high intrusiveness, thus the assessment method
should be avoided.
2.2.4 Requirements
The requirements of a measurement technique, in terms of its implementation, refers to those practical con-
straints such as the training of operators or the need of specific equipment or software for data collection and
analysis. The property mainly deals with the complexity of the measurement procedures and apparatus that
have to be considered in the choice of the appropriate workload technique. For example, too much equipment
might influence the execution of the primary task, and its intrusiveness can generate degradations in terms
of performance. Furthermore, sometimes subjects need to be trained specifically and extensively in order to
achieve a reasonable and stable level of performance. However, this might not represent an important issue,
but it influences the time necessary before a measure can be taken (O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986).
2.2.5 Acceptability
The property of operator acceptance refers to the degree of approval of the measurement procedure by the
operator. In particular, those workload measurement methods that consider operational questions must be
evaluated to the perception of the subject of the utility and validity of the procedure. This issue is extremely
important when the subject population includes an operator with a high degree of experience in the system
being evaluated. As a matter of fact, a procedure that is perceived as being artificial or extremely intrusive
might be ignored or even worse, performed at substandard levels. In turn, this non-optimality in performing
the procedure affects the potential accuracy, effectiveness and correctness of the technique being evaluated.
In general, the operator acceptance is higher in the case where the technique is less intrusive, while the
face validity may increase acceptance. In other words, acceptance varies among subject populations, and
generally the rejection of measurement techniques that lack face validity will increase when experimental
situations closely approximate operational environments, familiar to operators. O’ Donnell and Eggemeier
suggest that if the usefulness of some measure is not fully clear to a subject, explaining its use in details can
help the operator to accept it (O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986). Acceptability is related to the criteria of
relative simplicity proposed in (Muckler and Seven, 1992) in which it is suggested that a method should be
simple, showing understandability, and directness in order to minimise the interpretation needs and to help
designers in achieving accuracy of the definition of the measure. Operator acceptance, as well as face validity
are, of course, important factors to consider, but alone they do not guarantee that a technique will reflect the
objective level of mental workload. However, the capability to adhere to these criteria can assure that the full
potential of an assessment procedure is achieved, above all in operational systems.
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2.2.6 Selectivity
The property of selectivity refers to the selective sensitivity to mental workload, rather than to changes of other
factors such as physical workload, which might not be related to mental workload, as well as information-
processing ability. Selectivity represents the validity of an assessment procedure for mental workload. A
measure can be only sensitive to mental workload, or it can be sensitive to other factors as well, such as
physical workload. In the case where the assessment procedure is sensitive to other factors, it might be a
reason to discard it for mental workload assessment purposes, depending upon the test environment and the
task. In other words, if a procedure is sensitive either to mental workload or physical workload, it can be
adopted as an indicator for mental workload when physical effort is not required (Wickens and Hollands,
1999, Ch. 11). Formally, selectivity of a measure can be obtained by providing the same task under different
physical workload situations which are physical demanding; for instance, an attribute believed not to influence
mental workload. If there is a significant difference between the values computed by a workload instrument,
then the measure is said to lack selectivity (Zhang and Luximon, 2005).
2.2.7 Bandwidth and reliability
An assessment procedure of mental workload, as any other assessment method of behaviours, should be
reliable. This property refers to the estimate of mental workload that needs to be reliable, both across tests
and within tests. In particular, measurement procedures deployed in laboratories do not necessarily have
to behave as well as operational settings. A workload index should produce the same estimate for a given
task and operator, that means it should show repeatability, with small variance compared to the main effects
(Cain, 2007). Reliability, as proposed by (Wickens and Hollands, 1999, Ch. 11) is similar to the sufficient
reliability definition proposed in (Muckler and Seven, 1992) where authors, in addition, indicated that one
potential source of unreliability is the changing nature of the process being measured, and not always the
measuring technique. If the task, for which subjects are called to interact with, is not stable over time, then
the reliability of a measure is compromised. The bandwidth property, instead, refers to the capacity of an
assessment procedure to respond quickly to changes in mental workload (Wickens and Hollands, 1999, Ch.
11). The method should be applied sufficiently and timely quick to capture temporary workload changes
(Cain, 2007). Strictly, comparisons of workload levels obtained in different contexts with samples obtained
from the same population, should provide a good assessment of reliability.
2.2.8 Validity
The criteria of validity is the extent to which a mental workload assessment instrument is measuring the at-
tribute in question, that being mental workload itself. Different typologies of validity have been proposed:
construct, content, predictive, face, concurrent and convergent (Zhang and Luximon, 2005). However, two
of these variations have mainly been used: convergent and concurrent validity. The former is assessed by
studying the correlation between different mental workload scores, while the latter is by investigating the cor-
relation between mental workload scores and objective performance measures. Formally, Pearson Correlation
coefficients have been adopted to study validity and the positive they are, the higher the measure is assumed
to be valid.
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2.2.9 Summary of characteristics
The aforementioned criteria are valuable factors for evaluating a mental workload measurement instrument.
Although they refer to specific properties, they are not independent of each other. For instance, diagnosticity
might reduce sensitivity and presuppose the property of selectivity. In general, a desirable mental workload
assessment method would have high sensitivity, better if in a high bandwidth, low intrusiveness on the primary
task and high reliability, as well as showing concurrent and convergent validity. The property of diagnosticity
is important, as well, mainly if there is evidence that a specific stage of information processing is affected
(De Waard, 1996). The others are more guidelines for implementing measures in different contexts (simula-
tions or laboratories). In addition, a measure should be used across many research and test settings, leading
to the development of standards, and probably, to a better understanding and definition of the measure itself.
Sensitivity, diagnosticity, concurrent validity, and convergent validity will be subsequently used to evaluate
the defeasible framework proposed in this thesis.
2.3 Measures
Mental workload measurement is as vast and heterogeneous topic as its related theoretical counterpart. Sev-
eral assessment techniques have been proposed in the last 40 years, and researchers in applied settings have
tended to prefer the use of ad-hoc measures or pools of measures, rather than any one measure. This tendency
is reasonable given the multi-dimensional property that characterises mental workload. Several reviews have
attempted to collate the enormous amount of knowledge behind measurement procedures. According to the
review of Gopher and Donchin (Gopher and Donchin, 1986), measurements can be divided into subjective
measures, performance measures (primary-task), arousal measures, specific measures and psychophysiolog-
ical measures. Young and Stanton proposed three broader classes of measures: primary and secondary task
measures, physiological measures, and subjective measures (Young and Stanton, 2006). This is also supported
by O’Donnell and Eggemeier (O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986), as well as Wickens and Hollands (Wickens
and Hollands, 1999). Vidulich and Tsang proposed four categories: performance, subjective and physio-
logical measures, as well as multiple measures of workload (Tsang and Vidulich, 2006). Xie and Salvendy
introduced a further classification based on empirical and analytical methods (Xie and Salvendy, 2000b). In
general, measurement techniques are organised into three broad categories, which have emerged in recent
scientific articles (Cain, 2007; Tsang, 2006; Wilson and Eggemeier, 2006; Young and Stanton, 2004):
• self-assessment measures: these includes self-report measures and subjective rating scales;
• performance measures: these consider both primary and secondary task measures;
• physiological measures: those derived from the physiology of the operator.
These three categories will be individually described in the following sections, highlighting which of the
measurement criteria (previously described in section 2.2) they meet, and their fields of application, outlining
the advantages and limitations in relation to their potential use in the field of human-computer interaction,
this being the focus of this thesis. More qualitative measures such as open questionnaires and interview
techniques, although they are informative, will not be described. The attention is only on those quantitative
measures that can be and have been validated empirically.
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2.3.1 Self-report measures
The class of self-report measures is often referred to as subjective measures. The former term is preferred
to the latter term, for essentially reducing confusion with other categories, such as physiological assessment
methods, which can also be subjective. This class is obtained from the direct estimation of task difficulty
through subject analysis, and it relies on subjective perceived experience of the interaction operator-system.
Subjective measures are appealing to many workload practitioners and researchers because it is strongly
believed that no one, but the person concerned with the task, can provide an accurate and precise judgement
with respect to the mental workload experienced. In addition, these measures are easily administered, thus
they can scale to several subjects. Potentially, in the field of human-computer interaction, these are the most
promising techniques to gather behavioural information of users executing tasks. They are relevant to the the-
sis because they have been adopted in the user studies aimed at evaluating the proposed defeasible framework.
Various dimensions of workload are considered in self-report measures; these include effort and per-
formance, as well as individual differences such as the operatorO˜s emotional state, attitude and motivation
(De Waard, 1996). The majority of self-report assessment techniques have shown high sensitivity to situations
of underload and overload, but do not have high predictive capacity to predict optimal workload. In addition,
they can detect changes in region C (loss of performance, figure 2.4, page 17), when severe situations of
overload occur, and they are apparent due to extremely low performance or because the operator quit the task
(De Waard, 1996; Tsang and Vidulich, 2006) have identified three variables for classifying subjective rating
assessment procedures: dimensionality, evaluation style and immediacy. The property of dimensionality
refers to the dimensions considered in the assessment procedure. Subjects might be asked to rate their
experience using single or multiple dimensions (Young and Stanton, 2006). The evaluation style indicates
the way the rating of the experience is provided. This can either be on an absolute rating or a relative rating
in which one experience is compared against another. The property of immediacy refers to the time period
the subjective rating is provided. This can be done immediately after the execution of a task, a set of tasks or
even after an entire experiment. (Tsang and Vidulich, 2006) note that, despite the fact that it is theoretically
possible to combine the three properties in different ways, for classifying self-report measures, in practical
settings, only two combinations are important . The most adopted techniques combine multi-dimensionality,
immediacy and the absolute evaluation style. However, another typical choice is the opposite configuration
that is based on a uni-dimensional assessment method, employing a relative comparison evaluation style with
ratings collected retrospectively and not immediately after the execution of a task. According to the authors,
the assessment of the operator, provided immediately after the completion of a task, should take advantage
of the freshest memory related to the experience of executing the trial. In turn, the property of immediacy
minimises the potential negative and damaging effect of the guessed answers of the operator, in the case
where they are not provided immediately after the trial. In addition, an absolute scale design supports the
consideration of the individual workload of each trial, rather than the workload relating to other conditions.
Eventually, a multi-dimensional assessment procedure should support and increase diagnosticity, due to the
fact that subjects can be more accurate in providing ratings and describing those experimental conditions and
factors that have influenced their experience (Tsang and Vidulich, 2006).
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Two subjective workload assessment procedures have emerged in the last three decades: the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) (Hart and Staveland, 1988) and
the Subjective Workload Assessment Technique (SWAT) (Reid and Nygren, 1988). Both the techniques are
multi-dimensional, they adopt an absolute scale design, and are based on immediate rating scales. They have
been compared several times by various researchers and practitioners (Rubio et al., 2004; Vidulich and Tsang,
1986) and they have been demonstrated to have good concurrent validity with performance as well as high
diagnosticity and sensitivity to manipulation of difficulty of tasks. A third, more recent subjective assessment
procedure was proposed in (Tsang and Velazquez, 1996): the Workload Profile (WP). This is a relatively
new multi-dimensional assessment tool, thus, ithas not been as extensively tested as the NASA-TLX and the
SWAT procedures have. It is based on the multiple-resource theory (MRT, page 12) of Wickens (Wickens,
2008; Wickens and Hollands, 1999), and the assumption is that the mental workload dimensions could be
represented by the resources dimensions hypothesised in the multiple-resource theory (Tsang and Velazquez,
1996). NASA-TLX, SWAT, and WP are multi-dimensional absolute immediate ratings in contrast with uni-
dimensional approaches such as the Cooper-Harper Scale (CH) (Cooper and Harper, 1969) and its modified
versions (Modified Cooper-Harper scale (MCH) (Wierwille and Casali, 1983; Wierwille and Eggemeier,
1993)), the Rating Scale Mental Effort (RSME) (Zijlstra, 1993), the Subjective Workload Dominance
technique (SWORD) (Vidulich and Ward Frederic G., 1991) and the Bedford Scale (BS) (Roscoe and
Ellis, 1990). These measures are usually easily applicable and investigable, but they only provide a general
workload score. For this reason, although being sensitive and having low implementation requirements,
their diagnostic degree is very poor. In general, as suggested in (De Waard, 1996), diagnosticity is higher in
multi-dimensional scales, and sensitivity to task demands is larger in unidimensional mental workload ratings.
In the following paragraphs, the aforementioned subjective assessment procedures are briefly described,
highlighting the workload attributes they incorporate. Some of these procedures are re-introduced in section
2.4 for a more detailed description of the computational strategy for aggregating their workload attributes.
Nasa Task Load Index (NASA-TLX)
The NASA-TLX has gained a lot of acknowledgments from different researchers, and it is widely adopted in
different contexts, fields and environments (Hart, 2006). It is based on six-sub-scales:
• mental demand;
• physical demand;
• temporal demand;
• performance level;
• effort level;
• frustration level.
Hart et Al. believed that the various dimensions used for assessing mental workload could be clustered
together by the six proposed sub-scales, and the assumption is that some combination of these dimensions is
likely to represent the mental workload experience by the majority of subjects performing most tasks. These
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six dimensions were the result of a multi-year research program aimed at identifying those factors that were
mainly responsible for changes in subjective workload between, and within different types of tasks (Hart and
Staveland, 1988). The aggregation of the dimensions follows a weighted procedure. In detail, each dimension
is weighted according to their relative importance, provided by the subject, and a final overall workload rating,
from 0 to 100, is computed. Further details of the computational model behind the NASA-TLX, as well as
some computational properties, are described in section 2.4 (page 32). Appendix A.1 shows the questionnaire
associated with the procedure.
Subjective Workload Assessment Technique (SWAT)
The SWAT procedure is based on three sub-scales:
• time load;
• mental effort load;
• psychological stress load.
Reid’s works suggested that just three components could largely explain mental workload (Reid and Nygren,
1988). Each dimension is weighted according to the subject’s ratings of the workload delivered by every
combination of the various levels of workload (1-3) in each of the three scales. Subsequently, a conjoint
analysis is performed to generate a look-up table aimed at translating the ordinal ratings into ratings with
interval-scale properties. The original procedure was recently simplified, and the resulting model was shown
to have higher sensitivity for low mental workloads (Luximon and Goonetilleke, 2001). The computational
counterpart of this model, as well as some computational aspects, are described in section 2.4 (page 32).
Appendix A.2 shows the questionnaire associated with the procedure.
Workload Profile (WP)
The Workload Profile (WP) assessment method is a self-report measure based upon the multiple-resource
theory of Wickens (page 12) (Wickens, 2008; Wickens and Hollands, 1999). The workload dimensions con-
sidered in this method are those hypothesised in the multiple-resource theory and it is these diverse demands
that can be inflicted by a task. They include perceptual/central processing, response selection/execution of
both considered stages of processing, spatial and verbal processing, referred to as codes of processing, visual
and auditory input processing, and manual and speech output. WP is similar to Workload Index (W/INDEX),
another multi-dimensional subjective procedure (North and Riley, 1989). The main difference is that in the
former procedure, subjects are asked to estimate the proportion of attentional resources for a task or multiple
tasks, on different dimensions, while in the latter experts provide a priori estimates used to predict eventual
performance. WP is an assessment technique, while W/INDEX is a projective technique. In WP the diag-
nosticity of the multi-dimensional post-task ratings is examined, and subjects are not necessarily expert or
familiar with the theory behind the model. On the other hand, in W/INDEX, researchers employed for pro-
viding estimates are experts in the field of mental workload, and they have previous knowledge about the
task to be performed. Experiments done with the WP technique have been shown to have a good degree of
diagnosticity in terms of the nature of task demands (Rubio et al., 2004). Its sensitivity to task demands is
as good as other measurement techniques, as well as its validity of performance and reliability. The work
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of Tsang and Velazquez suggests that mental workload is a multi-dimensional construct and subjects, who
performed their WP questionnaire, were able to rate task demands on separate mental workload dimensions
(Tsang and Velazquez, 1996). Computational properties of the WP instrument and the aggregation of the
dimensions considered in it are examined in section 2.4 (page 32). Appendix A.3 shows the questionnaire
associated with the procedure.
Copper-Harper scale
The Copper-Harper Scale (CH) is a unidimensional rating scale that uses a structure in the form of a decision-
tree for assessments of mental workload. It is based upon the concept of performance, and subjects are guided
along the tree, through questions that lead to an overall workload value in the scale 0 to 10 (Cooper and
Harper, 1969). Although applied in aviation, its tree-based structure is simple, with high operator acceptance.
However its format lacks diagnostic capacity, similar to other unidimensional measures (Cooper and Harper,
1969). Appendix A.4 shows the questionnaire associated with the procedure along with its functioning.
Rating Scale Mental Effort
The Rating Scale Mental Effort (RSME) is another unidimensional procedure, developed in the Netherlands,
which also assesses mental workload. This procedure considers the exerted subject’s effort, and subjective
ratings are indicated across a continuous line, within the interval 0 to 150 with ticks each 10 units. Labels such
as ‘absolutely no effort’, ‘considerable effort’ and ‘extreme effort’ are used along the line. The final mental
workload of a subject is related to the exerted effort indicated on the line by the subject, from the origin of
the scale (zero). Although the procedure is relatively simple and quick, it shows a good degree of sensitivity.
However, on the other hand, it has demonstrated to be a poor diagnostic capacity (Zijlstra, 1993). For details
about the scale, its history, and development, we refer the reader to (Zijlstra, 1993).
Subjective Workload Dominance technique
The Subjective Workload Dominance Technique (SWORD) is also a unidimensional technique and is aimed
at assessing mental workload of different tasks using relative subjective judgements that are compared against
each other (Vidulich and Ward Frederic G., 1991). An operator is required to provide ratings using a structured
evaluation form in which multiple tasks are listed, and compared in terms of workload imposed. Specifically,
each of the possible paired combinations of the selected tasks to be compared, is presented on a row with
the descriptions of the two tasks in the opposite extremities. Along the row, workload descriptors are used
to indicate the level of imposed workload with a label ‘equal’ in the centre, indicating that the two tasks
induced the same level of mental workload. On the other hand, other rating expressed by the subject indicates
a workload dominance of a task over the other. All the ratings are then organised into a judgement matrix,
which is further checked for consistency and aimed at providing the overall mental workload value imposed
by the tasks, on an operator. For further information, the reader is referred to (Vidulich and Ward Frederic G.,
1991).
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Bedford scale
The BS is another unidimensional rating scale conceived for identifying the spare mental capacity of an oper-
ator whilst performing a task (Roscoe and Ellis, 1990). One dimension is used to estimate mental workload,
and it is based upon a hierarchical decision tree aimed at guiding a subject through the rating scale. This is
composed by ten points, each of them labelled by a descriptor and with a numerical associated level of mental
workload (from 1 to 10). The assessment procedure is relatively simple, quick to be executed, and easy to
apply straight after the completion of a task. It is suitable for assessing mental task load in environments
characterised by high mental workload. However, it does not have diagnostic capability, limiting its use. For
a detailed description of the Bedford Scale the reader is referred to (Roscoe and Ellis, 1990). Appendix A.5
shows the scale associated with the procedure.
2.3.2 Performance measures
Mental workload practitioners and, more generally, system designers, are typically concerned with the per-
formance of their systems and technologies. The assumption is that the mental workload of an operator, inter-
acting with a system, acquires importance only if it influences system performance. As a consequence, it is
believed that performance-based techniques are the most valuable options for designers (Tsang and Vidulich,
2006). According to various reviews (Cain, 2007; O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986; Tsang and Vidulich,
2006; Wickens and Hollands, 1999; Wilson and Eggemeier, 2006; Young and Stanton, 2004) performance
measures can be summarised using two categories:
• primary task measures;
• secondary task measures.
In primary-task methods, the performance of the operator is monitored and analysed according to changes
in primary-task demands. In secondary-task assessments procedures, there are two tasks involved and the
secondary task performance might not have a practical use, rather it servers to measure the operator’s mental
workload during the primary task. A further class of measures, less well-known but classifiable under the
secondary-task approaches class, is the reference task measure, in which reference tasks are performed be-
fore or after the primary task. In the following paragraphs, these two categories are further described using
theoretical explanations and practical applications. Potentially, in the field of human-computer interaction,
performance measures are promising techniques to gather objective information of users’ behaviour related to
their interaction with a computer. Performance measures are relevant to this thesis because they are adopted,
along with subjective measures, to evaluate the designed defeasible framework.
Primary-task performance measures
Primary-task performance assessment methodologies are built on a simple assumption: as task demands
increase, the performance on the task or the design option of interest are expected to decrease. This
hypothetical relation is due because of the limited information-processing capacity of humans to handle
and deal with the task demands. Example of commons measures are Response and Reaction Time (RT),
accuracy and Errors Rate (ER), speed and signal detection performance, Estimation Time (ET) and Tapping
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Regularity (TR) (Tsang and Vidulich, 2006). There is not a prevalent measure and, outside laboratory
settings, primary-task performance is intrinsically task specific (De Waard, 1996). However, since these
measures directly reflects the outcome of the effort exerted by an operator interacting with a system, they are
frequently used as mental workload assessments techniques (O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986).
According to O’Donnell and Eggemeier (O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986), the performance during a
primary-task is an index of the success of the interaction between human and machine. However, there are
issues associated with this statement. For example, if one operator is be able to deal with an additional task,
while another is not able to, this difference in performance can not be determined. This issue is supported
also by Gopher et al (Gopher and Donchin, 1986) who suggested that mental workload is not the unique
influencer of performance. Also, measures of direct performance do not reflect changes in the investment of
resources. For example, the degree of performance of two individuals during the same task might be the same,
however, as they can have different skills, their experienced workload may differ. As a consequence, their
spare capacity for executing a further task would also be different. Assessment methodologies that incorporate
a person’s attitude, personality and skills have been demonstrated to have a higher predictive accuracy (Xie
and Salvendy, 2000a,b). Another example is that, in modern technologies, if a system interface is poorly
designed, or the data presented is qualitatively weak, performance could be limited. As a consequence, a
subject does not need to try hard to understand that the system is poorly designed, limiting its comprehension
and interaction. This suggests that, despite the fact that primary-task performance measures are extremely
important to system designers and evaluators, individually they do not provide an accurate metric of the
mental workload of an operator. This view is also supported in (Gopher and Donchin, 1986). In addition,
the performance during a primary task might be not diagnostic of the source of mental workload or simply, it
might not be available (Tsang and Vidulich, 2006). We refer the reader to (O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986)
for a detailed view of primary-task measures.
Secondary-task performance measures
Secondary-task methodologies is another frequently used category of procedures aimed at assessing mental
workload. The main characteristic is that they require an operator to concurrently perform two, and
sometimes, multiple tasks. However, the focus is on the primary task, and an assessment of the mental
workload is derived from the performance of the operator on the secondary task (O’ Donnel and Eggemeier,
1986). Applications designed around this category are aimed at measuring the operator’s presumed spare
capacity exerted to the primary task. This is inferred by analysing the performance on the secondary task,
which is an index of the operator’s spare capacity, during primary task execution, and that which can be
used for the secondary task. The assumption is that since primary and secondary tasks would compete
for the finite pool of information-processing resources, an alteration of demands of primary task should
result in an alteration of performance of the secondary task, because more or less of those resources can be
employed in the secondary task. The most frequently adopted techniques within this category include time
estimation and interval production, memory-search, choice reaction-time and mental arithmetic tasks. For a
detailed overview of secondary task-based measurement techniques, the reader is referred to (O’ Donnel and
Eggemeier, 1986) and (Eggemeier and Wilson, 1991).
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According to O’Donnell and Eggemeier (O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986) this class of measures is
more sensitive to discerning differential capacity expenditures than primary-task measures, having high
diagnosticity of demands of the primary task. Tsang suggests how procedures based upon these measures
are the prototypical mental workload assessments procedures (Tsang and Vidulich, 2006). In one respect,
primary task measures can be used to assess performance, even if they are not considered indicators of mental
workload. In another respect, the secondary-task paradigm is believed to be an assessment technique highly
appropriate to describe the construct of human mental workload (Tsang and Vidulich, 2006). Although
secondary-task performance measures are highly diagnostic with a high degree of sensitivity, they lack
operator acceptance (Eggemeier and Wilson, 1991). It is argued that adding an extraneous secondary task
to the environment under consideration, can actually change levels of workload, and also radically influence
the processing of the primary task. This in turn, as mentioned in (Tsang and Vidulich, 2006), would be
nothing more than an experimental artefact. For this reason, their application in the heterogeneous field of
human-computer interaction seems not to be appropriate. In order to circumvent this problem, the so-called
embedded secondary-task technique has been adopted, for instance, in (Shingledecker, 1983). This technique
is based on the hypothesis that, to maximise operator acceptance and minimise task intrusion, the secondary
task can be designed in a way that fully integrates it with the system in use. A natural part that occurs
within the primary task can be used as a secondary task, however, their performance can be manipulated
and collected individually. Usually the priority of the embedded secondary task is smaller than the priority
associated with the primary task. As a consequence, the intrusion on the primary task is expected to be
limited with a significant increment of operator acceptance (Eggemeier and Wilson, 1991).
A further technique employed in secondary-task approaches is known as reference task. This technique
considers standard tasks that need to be executed both before and after the primary task under evaluation.
These tasks are mainly employed to investigate whether the instruments have trend effects, and as they repre-
sent standard secondary tasks, the changes in performance on them can be employed as indexes of the mental
workload on the primary task. If the reference task is built on physiological or subjective measures, then it is
possible to infer the costs used by an operator to maintain performance on the primary task. In turn, this is
useful for analysing the state of the operator, and whether it has been affected (Gopher, 1984). Although the
secondary-task paradigm can be adopted to predict the mental workload on the primary-task, the main draw-
back is that the method entails experience and background knowledge, both to properly execute the evaluation
of the secondary task and to interpret the outcomes. Additionally, the approach might also require further re-
sources for developing the software and the hardware to be used in practical experimentations (Tsang and
Vidulich, 2006), therefore limiting its application in real-life human-computer interactive settings.
2.3.3 Physiological measures
Several physiological measures of bodily responses, derived from the physiology of an operator, have been
adopted for assessing human mental workload with the assumption that they correlate with it. They are
aimed at interpreting psychological processes by analysing their influence on the state of the body and not by
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measuring perceptual subjective ratings or task performance. The principal reason for adopting physiological
measures is because they are not based upon an overt response by the operator, and the majority of cognitive
tasks do not require this type of behaviour4. These measures can be collected continuously, within an interval
of time, representing an objective way of measuring the operatorO˜s state. Generally, physiological measures
tend to be systematic indicators of stress, and have extremely high sensitivity to certain aspects of mental
workload, above all for situations of underload (O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986). However, this high
sensitive capacity might represent a misleading indicator of mental workload; in this case, an inappropriate
technique is used (Lysaght et al., 1989, p. 137). The intrusiveness of the measures is low because they
do not tend to influence the execution of the primary task. Alongside this, a common disadvantage is that
they use specialised equipment, as well as trained operators, with technical expertise, to use this equipment.
As a result, this has reduced the acceptance of physiological-based assessment procedures. However, the
problem of invasive equipment is nowadays mitigated by the miniaturisation of tools and sensors available
to researchers and practitioners that might favour their future application in emerging human-computer
interactive systems.
From a design perspective, although physiological measures approaches might be sensitive to a number
of advantageous applications, they are ‘... one conceptual step removed from the inference that the system
designer would like to make’ (Wickens and Hollands, 1999, ch. 6). In other words, the differences of
workload provided by physiological-based techniques must be used to infer breakdowns in performance, or
how the operator feels about the task performed. Physiological measurements may be extremely appealing in
the case where performance measures, or subjective ratings, are not sensitive to covert changes in operator
strategies, or when there is dissociation between them. Moreover, it is believed that they should only be
applied if they have low intrusiveness, and are actually reliable (Fairclough, 1993), and associated with other
measures of mental workload (Young and Stanton, 2006).
In summary, in one respect, most of the drawbacks related to physiological measurement techniques, from
an operator’s perspective, are technological, and are mainly concerned with improvements in the equipment
provided, or in the methodology adopted. In another respect, from a designerO˜s and analystO˜s perspective,
the main issue is the lack of a clear and robust link between physiological measures and performance (Kramer,
1991). According to O’Donnel and Eggemeier (O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986), physiological measures
can be organised into four classes: brain, eye, cardiac and muscle functions. Although physiological-based
measurement techniques have not been adopted for the evaluation of the defeasible framework proposed in
this thesis, for the completeness of this mental workload review, the following paragraphs will briefly describe
these categories. Here citations might not always be referring to state-of-the-art research; the objective is only
to highlight their strengths and limitations.
4Overt behaviour refers to any type of behaviour that can be observable by others, as opposed to covert behaviour which cannot be
observable by others. For instance, writing is an example of overt behaviour, while thinking is an example of covert behaviour.
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Brain functions measures
The most attractive procedure employed in physiological assessments of human mental workload is probably
the Electroencephalography (EEG). In this procedure the brain’s activity is recorded using surface electrodes
placed on the scalp of the operator, while performing a certain task. Various attempts to analyse and extract
a potential index of workload from the various bands5 (alpha, beta, etc.) of the EEG spectrum have shown
to generally be inaccurate and imprecise, with a considerable variability and low reliability (O’ Donnel and
Eggemeier, 1986). In addition, the fact that they require trained operators to use specific equipment, result
in them not really being suitable for easily assessing mental workload in modern human-computer interactive
environments. For a detailed overview of these brain functions measures, the reader is referred to (O’ Donnel
and Eggemeier, 1986) and (Kramer, 1991).
Eye function measures
Since the eye is a substantial input channel of information to the human and is directly accessible for observa-
tion, it has gained importance in the assessment of mental workload. Several procedures have been developed
for analysing eye movements and other parameters, as reviewed earlier in (Young and Sheena, 1975). In par-
ticular, the Electrooculography (EOG) 6 has been extensively adopted for studying eye movements with the
assumption that it is an index of mental workload. EOG-based assessment techniques have been demonstrated
to have low intrusiveness, higher operator acceptance and minimal implementation requirements, compared
to other physiological measures (O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986). Pupillary response, in particular Pupil
Dilation (PD), is another eye based technique. As stated in (O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986), in general, eye
function-based procedures have the capacity of making fine distinctions between workload levels, thus show-
ing high sensitivity. However, they have severe implementation requirements, and although commercial tools
are available, it is very difficult to adopt them in applied environments, and non-laboratory settings. Here, dif-
ferent levels of luminosity or emotional effects can significantly influence the pupil response, thus invalidating
their application for workload assessments in more natural, human-computer interactive environments.
Cardiac measures
The Electrocardiogram (EKG), and blood pressure, its volume as well as its oxygen concentration, have
all been used as physiological measures of performance, stress and workload (Wilson and Schlegel, 2004).
Cardiac rate has frequently been used since it can be obtained by employing non-invasive techniques, and
easily administrative procedures. Empirical evidence suggests that Heart Rate Variability (HRV) observed
in subjects at rest, may be an index of mental workload, with high sensitivity (Castor, 2003). However,
as mentioned in (O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986) and (Wilson and Schlegel, 2004, section 4 page 7), the
absolute heart rate is influenced by several subtle psychological processes, thus there is scepticism of its value
as a workload measure. Blood pressure has been demonstrated to be highly correlated to mental demand, an
attribute of workload. Blood Pressure Variability (BPV) is closely related to HRV; decrements in HRV will
5 A band in Electroencephalogram procedures is a range of frequencies, typically expressed in hertz (HZ), of the EEG signal. For
instance, Delta waves are up to 4 Hz, Theta waves are from 4 to 8 Hz, Alpha waves from 8 to 13 Hz and Beta waves are above 13 Hz.
6Electrooculography (EOG) is a technique used for the measurement of the resting potential of the retina and its output signal is
called the electrooculogram. One of the main applications is eye movements.
30
be reflected in decrements in BPV. However, its sensitivity is not convincing (Castor, 2003). Respiration Rate
Variability (RRV) has been considered as a promising measure which increases under conditions of stress and
attention (Wilson and Eggemeier, 1991). In turn, increments in respiration rate correspond to increments in
memory load or mental demands. However, the intrusiveness of the equipment for measuring respiration, as
well as cardiac rate and blood pressure, is high, thus not suitable for easily assessing mental workload in more
natural human-computer interactive systems. For further details on general methodologies and techniques
based upon cardiac measures, the reader is referred to (O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986) and (Wilson and
Schlegel, 2004).
Muscle measures
Human mental workload can also be assessed by monitoring the relative static tension of a muscle not directly
involved in the execution of a task. For example, electrodes may be placed on a limb which is not being used
in the task as well as on the neck or forehead. This measurement is usually implemented using Electromyo-
graphy (EMG)7. As mentioned in (O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986), an increment in mental workload or
stress corresponds to an increment in the EMG tension level. However, muscle measures have produced con-
tradictory results, thus there is skepticism in its applicability as a predictor of mental workload (O’ Donnel
and Eggemeier, 1986). In addition, they require intrusive equipment mitigating their applicability in modern
human-computer interactive systems.
2.3.4 Advantages and disadvantages of measurement techniques
Each typology of measurement technique, as just reviewed, has its own advantages and disadvantages for
being more or less suitable for modern human-computer interactive environments HCI.
Subjective measures are in general easy to administer and analyse. They provide an index of perceived
strain, and multi-dimensional measures can determine the source of mental workload. However, the
main drawback is that they can only be administered post-task, meaning after task completion, and as a
consequence, they can influence the reliability of long tasks. In addition, meta-cognitive limitations can
diminish the accuracy of reporting, and it is difficult to perform comparisons among participants on an
absolute scale. Despite this, they appear the most appropriate candidates for assessing mental workload in
modern human-computer interactive environments, because they can be easily administered, and they have
demonstrated high sensitivity and diagnosticity (Rubio et al., 2004).
Performance measures can be divided into primary task and secondary task measures. Primary task
measures represent a direct index of performance and they are accurate in measuring long periods of mental
workload. They are capable of discriminating between individual differences in resource competition.
However, the main limitation is that they cannot distinguish between performance of multiple tasks; in
this case these are executed in parallel by an operator. If taken in isolation, performance measures do not
7 Electromyography is a technique for recording the electrical activity generated by skeletal muscles and it is performed using a tool
called an electromyograph and produces a record called an electromyogram. The electromyograph is aimed at detecting the electrical
potential produced by the cells of a muscle, when these cells are neurologically activated.
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represent reliable measures, thus they are not really appropriate for real-world settings and conditions of
modern human-computer interactive contexts. Although, if used in conjunction with other measures, such as
subjective ratings, they can be useful. Secondary task measures, instead, have the capacity of discriminating
between tasks when no differences are detected in primary performance. They are useful for quantifying
the individual’s spare attentional capacity, as well as short periods of workload. Nonetheless, they are only
sensitive to large changes in mental workload and they might be highly intrusive, influencing the behaviours
of users when they are carrying out the primary task. This intrusiveness represents the main disadvantages
that make them unsuitable procedures to adopt for assessing mental workload, in more natural and modern
human-computer interactive contexts.
Physiological measures are extremely good at monitoring data on a continuous interval, thus having high
sensitivity in measurement. In addition, they do not interfere with the performance on the primary task. Yet,
the main drawback is that they can be easily confounded by external and extraneous interference. Moreover,
they require equipment and tools which are, most of the time, physically obtrusive, and the analysis of data
is complex, requiring well trained experts. These disadvantages represent the main reasons for excluding
physiological measure for assessing mental workload in modern and natural human-computer interactive
systems, where the behaviour of operators need to be gathered as naturally as possible.
Having introduced the state-of-the-art measurement techniques for human mental workload assessment,
highlighting their advantages and disadvantages, the goal is now to review the strategies employed by state-
of-the-art models towards the computation of a numerical representative index of mental workload.
2.4 Aggregation strategies and computational aspects
Several mental workload assessment procedures have been described, which show how non-trivial the
assessment problem itself is. For those uni-dimensional procedures, the problem of aggregating the attributes
believed to influence mental workload, does not exist: the unique attribute considered here is believed to
entirely represent mental workload. As a consequence, the numerical representation of this unique attribute
is not important. Still, for multi-dimensional procedures, there is the issue of how to numerically represent
multiple attributes, as well as how to aggregate them towards a representative meaningful index of mental
workload.
In the NASA-TLX (Hart, 2006), for example, subjective ratings are expressed as natural numbers within
the range 0 to 100 ([0..100] ∈ ℵ), while in the SWAT (Reid and Nygren, 1988) model, as natural numbers
within the discrete range 1 to 3 ([1..3] ∈ ℵ). These ranges and scales are commonly adopted but they do
not represent the only choice for expressing an operator subjective judgement. For example, Moray (Neville
et al., 1988) proposed the use of Fuzzy Sets (FS)8, borrowed from Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) (Zadeh, 1965) as
8 Fuzzy sets are sets containing elements that have degrees of membership. In classical set theory, the membership of an element in a
set is assessed in binary terms, meaning it can either belong, or not belong, to the set. Contrarily, fuzzy set theory allows the assessment
of the membership of an element in a set in a gradual way. This gradual membership is described with the use of a membership function,
bounded in the real unit interval from 0 to 1 ([0..1] ∈ℜ).
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a means for humans to express judgements in a qualitative way but at the same time precisely, formalising
the use of verbal judgements. In (Longo and Barrett, 2010a) and (Longo and Barrett, 2010b) the authors
attempted a proposal of an ad-hoc formalisation of various attributes believed to influence mental workload.
For example, the dimension of ‘cognitive ability’, as well as the dimension of ‘context bias’ are modelled
as functions requiring three parameters and returning a value in [0..1] ∈ ℜ. The concept of ‘arousal’ is
designed as a taxonomy of sub-factors organised as a unidirectional tree where leaf nodes represent subjective
judgements, and internal nodes indicate aggregation clusters. Unidirectional weighted edges link child nodes
to parent nodes, towards a root node which represents the final value indicating the final degree of arousal.
All the values are bounded in the range [0..1] ∈ ℜ. The dimension of ‘intention’ is described as a single
value in [−1..1] ∈ℜ while the dimension of ‘perceived difficulty’ and ‘time pressure’ are bounded in [0..1] ∈
ℜ. The use of different scales and methods evidently complicates the aggregation of attributes towards a
representative index of mental workload. In the last 4 decades, several computational aggregation strategies
have emerged. In the following sections these are reviewed, highlighting their advantages and their limitations.
2.4.1 Simple aggregation
In the Workload Profile (WP) assessment procedure, (as described in section 2.3.1, page 24), the accounted
workload dimensions are based upon the multiple resource theory proposed by Wickens (Wickens, 2008;
Wickens and Hollands, 1999) (as described in section 2.1.2, page 12). Each dimension is quantified through
subjective rates (as in appendix A.3, page 175). Subjects, after task completion, are required to rate the pro-
portion of attentional resources used for performing a given task, answering each question with a value within
the discrete range 0 to 1 ([0..1] ∈ ℜ). A rating of 0 means that the task placed no demand on the dimension
being rated, while a rating of 1 indicates that the task required maximum attention on that dimension (Tsang
and Velazquez, 1996).
The aggregation strategy employed in the WP method is relatively simple as it only sums each of the 8
rates provided by a subject for each workload dimension d:
MWLWP : [0..8] ∈ℜ
MWLWP =
8
∑
i=1
di
Although, this aggregation method is extremely simple, it implies that each dimension has the same
strength in affecting overall mental workload. Additionally, it does not consider external factors affecting
the execution of the task, nor the state of the operator and his/her previous knowledge of the task being
executed.
2.4.2 Weighted aggregation and preferences
In the NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) instrument (section 2.3.1, page 23), the combination of the
factors believed to influence mental workload is not based on a simple sum, rather, on a weighted average.
Each factor is quantified through a subjective judgement formally bounded in [0..1] ∈ ℵ whose weight is
computed via a paired comparison procedure. Subjects are required to decide, for each possible pair (binomial
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coefficient) of the 6 attributes (see appendix A.1, 173 ), ‘which of the two contributed more to their workload
during the task’, such as ‘Mental or Physical Demand?’, ‘Physical Demand or Performance?’, and so forth,
giving a total of 15 preferences.
(
6
2
)
=
6!
2!(6−2)! = 15
The weights w are the number of preferences, for each dimension, in the 15 answer set. In other words, the
number of times that each dimension was selected. In this case, the range is from 0 (not relevant) to 5 (more
important than any other attribute). Eventually, the final human mental workload score (MWL) is computed
as a weighted average, considering the subjective rating of each attribute di (for the 6 dimensions) and the
correspondingcorrespondent weights wi.
MWLNasaT LX : [0..1] ∈ℜ
MWLNasaT LX =
(
6
∑
i=1
di×wi
)
1
15
The main issue associated with this aggregation approach is that, in the case where a new dimension has
to be added, the paired comparison procedure will be more tedious, as it requires more judgements by the
subjects. With only 9 or 10 dimensions, the comparisons required are respectively 36 and 45 which can be
too burdensome for an operator to perform. This issue has been acknowledged by various authors who have
proposed a modified version of the NASA-TLX. These do not require the paired comparison procedure, thus
reducing the aggregation strategy to a simple average of the 6 dimensions (Thomas E., 1991). For further and
detailed explanations about the Nasa Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) and its modified versions, the reader is
referred to (Thomas E., 1991) and (Hart, 2006).
2.4.3 Ranking-based and correlation-based aggregation
In the Subjective Workload Assessment Technique (SWAT), as described in section 2.3.1, page 24) three
workload attributes: (time, effort and stress), are modelled using discrete numbers from 1 to 3 ([1..3] ∈ ℵ).
Each number has an associated description (as in table A.2, appendix A, 174). A pre-task procedure requires
subjects to rank 27 cards, yielded from the combinations of the three dimensions at the three discrete levels,
beginning with the card representing the lowest workload, and ending with the card representing the highest
workload. The main reason for executing the card sort procedure is to build data useful to producing a scaling
solution which is tailored to the perception of workload by the group of subjects, or an individual. This step
is very important as it differentiates SWAT from other subjective assessment techniques. The subsequent
step, called prototyping, analyses the sorted card data in order to determine the degree of agreement among
the participants (raters), for a certain experiment on a given task. In this step, the Kendall’s coefficient
of concordance (W ) is employed: a non-parametric statistic9 used for assessing agreement among raters.
Kendall’s W ranges from 0 (no agreement) to 1 (complete agreement). Assuming that card i is given the rank
Ri, j by the subject number j, where there are in total n cards (27 in the SWAT model) and m subjects, then the
9A non-parametric statistic is a statistical method in which the data is not required to follow a normal distribution, or any other
particular probability distribution.
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total rank given to card i is:
Ri =
m
∑
j=1
ri, j
and the mean value of these total ranks is
R =
1
2
m(n+1)
The sum of squared deviations, S, is defined as:
S =
m
∑
i=1
(Ri−R)2
and then Kendall’s W is defined as:
W =
12S
m2(n3−n)
If the statistic W is 1, then all the subjects (raters) have been unanimous, meaning each respondent has
assigned the same order to the list of cards. If W is 0, then there is no overall trend of agreement among the
subjects. Intermediate values of W indicate a greater or lesser degree of unanimity. In the SWAT procedure,
a single scale is developed by averaging data if W > 0.75. However, depending on the typology of the study
being conducted, scales for individual subjects can be developed, in the case where individual differences
have to be considered her, for example when W < 0.75, homogeneous subgroup scales can be developed. In
the original SWAT (Reid and Nygren, 1988), the authors developed six hypothetical orderings, based on the
relative importance of each attribute, as depicted in table A.3 (appendix A, page 174). For instance, T ES is
the ordering in which the greatest emphasis is on T (time), the second greatest is on E (effort) and the third on
S (stress). The same principle is applied for T SE, ET S, EST , ST E, as well as SET weighting schemes. The
subsequent step is devoted to the application of the Spearman correlation coefficient 10 between the sorting
provided by the subject and the hypothetical ordering. This is aimed at deciding which of the six subgroups
is more suitable, that means which group a subjects belongs to. For instance, a subject that correlates to the
SET group, can be considered a stress subject.
In the SWAT assessment technique, once the number of groups has been determined, a conjoint analysis is
performed in order to generate a final workload scale bounded between 0 and 100 ([0..100]∈ℵ). Specifically,
after task completion, a subject is required to rate the three dimensions, providing for each one a natural value
from 1 to 3, thus generating a 3-tuple. Each combination in the rank associated with the subject in the previous
phase, had to previously be rescaled in the range 0 to 100 ([0..100] ∈ℵ), indicating the corresponding mental
workload level for each combination. Finally, the last step consists of extracting the workload value associated
with the 3-tuple in the rank associated with the subject that matches the 3-tuple provided by the subject, after
task completion. Formally the mental workload provided by SWAT is:
MWLSWAT : [0..100] ∈ℵ
10 In statistics, the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (ρ), is a non-parametric measure of statistical dependence between two
variables. It is aimed at assessing how good the relationship between two variables can be described, using a monotonic function. The
Spearman correlation coefficient is similar to the Pearson correlation coefficient but it is applied between ranked variables. A correlation
of +1 or −1 indicates that each variable is described by a perfect monotone function of the other, positive or negative. Values tending to
0 indicate a non-correlation between the two variables being measured.
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It is worth noting that although it has been demonstrated that the SWAT procedure has high diagnosticity
and content validity (Rubio et al., 2004) (Vidulich and Tsang, 1986), it relies on a very burdensome and
tedious procedure for subjects to obtain the workload ratings. Similarly, it might not be straightforward to
understand even by different mental workload designers. For further and more detailed explanations, and for
the rationale behind the design choices of the SWAT, the reader is referred to (Reid and Nygren, 1988).
2.4.4 Ad-hoc aggregations and frameworks
The growing use of human-computer interactive systems has caused an increasing interest in the development
of interfaces, these being the direct contact between a computer and an operator. In order to minimise the
complexity of these systems, adaptive strategies have been proposed to improve the efficiency of the human-
computer interaction. Hancock and Chignell employed the construct of mental workload as a means for
investigating the capability of operators interacting with machine through interfaces (Hancock and Chignell,
1988). Their theoretical formulation of mental workload includes the ideas of the skill of the operators, and the
time pressure they are exposed to, as well as the effort exerted for the execution of the task. Psychology being
their main research field, the authors were inspired by the proposal of a computational model that included a
power function to represent and assess mental workload, formalism widely applied for fitting psychological
data. Their approximation of overall workload may be described by the following formula:
MWLHC =
1
ets−1
where MWLHC (Hancock and Chignell) is the overall workload level, e is the effort exerted by an indi-
vidual operator, t is the actual time available for action and s indicates the operator’s degree of skill. The
issues associated with this formulation of workload, are various. Firstly, as also agreed with by the authors
(Hancock and Chignell, 1988), the use of the function does not solve the problem of workload assessment
since the degree of effort (e), skill (s) and temporal constraint (t) should be quantified and scaled using the
same data range. Secondly, the formalism is not extensible: it is difficult to be expanded if further factors are
considered. Finally, it does not account for the potential interactions that might occur between workload fac-
tors and their theoretical relationships. In a more recent work, it has been argued that human mental workload
could be better defined in a framework consisting of multiple-indexes of workload, instead of a single-index
such as overall mental workload (Xie and Salvendy, 2000b). In their work, Xie and Salvendy have introduced
theoretical indexes:
• instantaneous workload;
• peak workload;
• average workload;
• accumulated workload;
• overall workload.
Figure 2.5 describes the meaning of each index. Instantaneous workload is aimed at measuring the dy-
namics of workload which have been defined as a dynamic and not a static process (Rouse et al., 1993). In
the figure, the curve is an indication of the instantaneous workload versus time. The majority of physio-
logical measures are examples of instantaneous indexes of mental workload. Subjective measurement and
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performance measurement techniques do not usually consider instantaneous workload, since an overall in-
dex is usually computed after the completion of the task under examination. Nonetheless, some studies have
shown that it is possible to measure instantaneous workload even when using these measurement techniques,
in particular short-period workload (Verwey and Veltman, 1996). By employing the idea of instantaneous
workload, it is possible to measure the mental workload at any given time during the task execution. This is
the basic and most important index from which the other indexes can be derived.
Time
Instantaneous workload
Peak Workload
Average Workload
Accumulated Workload
Fig. 2.5: Attributes of mental workload in the framework of (Xie and Salvendy, 2000b)
The peak workload is the maximum degree of instantaneous workload identified during the execution of
the task. This value can be obtained by comparisons of all the instantaneous workload values. If this value
exceeds the assumed maximum mental workload limit, as defined by the redline threshold (section 2.2.1, page
17), the operator may be affected by a consequence on performance which starts degrading. The accumulated
workload is a measure of the overall amount of mental workload experienced by the operator during task
execution. In figure 2.5 this is represented by the area below the instantaneous-workload curve. The aver-
age workload is a measure of the intensity of workload, and it is the average of the instantaneous workload
values that coincide with the accumulated workload per unit time. Intuitively, a limit is assumed for the av-
erage workload, and if the latter exceeds the former, performance suffers. Since mental workload is related
to the duration of a task, both the accumulated workload and the average workload are needed. Their com-
bination allows to accurately measure the workload of both long-term and short-term tasks. Eventually the
overall mental workload can be derived from the previous indexes and it describes the individual’s experience
of mental workload. Xie and Salvendy suggest that the overall workload coincides with the instantaneous
workload or the accumulated and average workload in the brain of the operator (Xie and Salvendy, 2000b).
The relationship between instantaneous and overall workload can be described by a mapping function f1.
Similarly, the relationship between the average, accumulated workload and the overall workload can be rep-
resented by a further mapping function f2. In the case where the time interval of the task is fixed, accumulated
and average workload should be proportional to overall workload. These relationships among the indexes of
mental workload, are depicted in figure 2.6, and are formally defined as:
Wpeak = Max{Winst(t)}
Wacc(t) =
∫ t
0
Winst(u) du
Wavg(t) =
1
t
Wacc(t)
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MWLXStot = f1[Winst(t)] = f2[Wacc(t),Wavg(t)]
where t indicates time, Winst is the instantaneous workload, Wpeak indicates the peak workload, Wacc is the
accumulated workload, Wavg indicates the average workload and finally MWLXStot (Xie and Salvendy) is the
overall workload. f1 and f2 are the mapping functions and they depend both upon the given task, and the
particular individual.
Instantaneous workload
Average workloadPeak workload Accumulated workload
Overall workload
Fig. 2.6: Relationships among the indexes of workload within the framework of (Xie and Salvendy, 2000b)
Xie and Salvendy agree that the incorporation and the consideration of individual factors in the assessment
of mental workload plays an important role. As a consequence they proposed an extension of the aforemen-
tioned model in order to make its predictive capacity consistent with an individual’s subjective experience
of mental workload. People are not able to accomplish a given task with ful efficiency and they often make
errors, or are distracted. This suggests that all the effort a subject exerts to accomplish the task, does not fully
contribute to its fulfilment. For this reason mental workload has been divided into ineffective and effective
parts. Effective workload contributes to the fulfilment of the task directly, and it coincides with the amount of
workload people deliver when they execute the task correctly and most efficiently. Ineffective workload does
not contribute positively to the fulfilment of the task, and it is part of the workload that people can signifi-
cantly reduce through training and learning. As a consequence, this factor is individual-dependent, meaning
two different subjects may generate different degrees of ineffective workload. According to these two new
typologies of workload, accumulated workload and average workload could be updated as:
Wacc =We f f + Wine f f
Wavg =
Wacc
T
where T is the time available to perform the task, We f f is the effective workload, and Wine f f is the inef-
fective workload. The approach assumes that people fully concentrate on the given task, but in reality this is
often not the case. So even if a task is very difficult to be executed, a subject can still decide not to do any-
thing to accomplish it, thus the workload might be null. In turn, this implies that there must be another reason
that influences the overall workload. In their model, Xie and Salvendy related to this issue as a degrading
factor (DF) which is a number bounded in the range 0 to 1 ([0..1] ∈ ℜ) where 0 indicates the total lack of
willingness to perform the task and 1 the full concentration devoted to it. Intermediate values represent partial
degrees of concentration or full attention only applied to a certain part of the given task. According to this,
the accumulated workload can be redefined as:
Wacc = DF× (We f f + Wine f f )
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where DF is the degrading factor. The implication behind the effective/ineffective classification, is the possi-
bility to reduce mental workload and, as a consequence, the efficiency (EFC) can be enhanced by controlling
those factors that yield ineffective workload.
EFC =
We f f
We f f + Wine f f
Effective workload, as well as ineffective workload and the degrading factor can be influenced by other factors
such as stress, fatigue, knowledge, task importance, motivation, attitude and task complexity, task uncertainty
and task duration. These factors are domain-specific as well as user-specific and they are important for the
implementation of a model for each particular case. Finally, in order to define a task in a precise way, the
typology of the environment in which the task is executed should be taken into account. So far the model was
suitable for single-task environments, but it could be easily extended for multi-task environments. Here, each
task might not only influence the other tasks, but the operator has a further mental effort which is devoted to
the management of the simultaneous tasks to be executed. This management load (ML) is needed to control
the concurrent tasks, their scheduling and switching. The previous model applied in single-task environments
can be defined, for multi-task environments, as:
We f f =
n
∑
i=1
We f f f or task i
Wine f f =
n
∑
i=1
Wine f f f or task i+ML
where n is the number of tasks simultaneously performed and MN is the management load. The final
workload level is redefined as:
MWLXStot−multi−t =
n
∑
i=1
HMW XStot f or task i +EFC+ML
where HMW XStot−multi−t is the overall multi-task workload, EFC is the efficiency and ML is the management
load. The implication behind this model is that the mental workload exerted during execution of simulta-
neous tasks always generates a higher degree of workload than the sum of the workloads of the same tasks
performed individually. A practical experimentation of this model can be found in (Xie and Salvendy, 2000a).
Although Xie and Salvendy’s proposal is an important step towards a better definition of mental workload
(Xie and Salvendy, 2000b), it is a theoretical implementation for modelling it that needs to be validated em-
pirically. In addition, although it is a more complete model for better describing mental workload, allowing a
designer to embed in it user-specific, task-specific and context-aware factors, it does not take into considera-
tion how to formally model each of these factors. As mentioned in (Xie and Salvendy, 2000b), another issue
is the representation of the two mapping functions that are unknown in the literature, and they represent only
a theoretical proposal. Additionally, their framework does not consider theoretical relationships and potential
interactions between these factors believed to influence workload, and the inconsistencies that might emerge
from their interactions.
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2.5 Fields of application
In the last 4 decades, the concept of human mental workload has been applied in many different fields.
Earlier applications were in transportation, in particular in the aviation and automobile industry. Use of MWL
was subsequently extended to adaptive automation and manufacturing systems. In recent years, it has been
increasingly employed in medicine and health-care. Eventually, with the proliferation of computer-based
systems and web-based applications, that drove the work of humans more cognitive, the construct was also
adopted in the field of human-computer interaction (HCI). In this section, several applications, based on
MWL measurement, are briefly described. The main objective is to complete the review of mental workload,
showing how the construct has been practically employed so far and used in different environments.
2.5.1 Transportation
One of the first fields of application of mental workload was transportation. In particular, in aviation, several
studies have been carried out for testing the mental workload of pilots interacting with cockpit interfaces. One
of the reasons for analysis in this area, is to avoid pilot overload, by performing interface structural changes or
introducing automation. Similarly, as aircraft and other systems are becoming more automated, the problem
is also to avoid underload situations in which a pilot’s attention can be at minimal levels. Wierwille et al
have evaluated 16 different measures of mental workload, in terms of sensitivity and intrusiveness, using a
simulated flight task for meditational activity11. These measures included performance and physiological as-
sessment techniques, as well as subjective ratings and opinions (Wierwille et al., 1985). Similar studies were
aimed at evaluating HRV as a physiological index of mental workload in complex flight scenarios (Veltman
and Gaillard, 1993) or a terminal radar approach control simulator through a simulated task with increasing
difficulty employing the NASA-TLX, the RRV and the HRV (Brookings et al., 1996). A study, commissioned
by the Swedish Air Force, was aimed at analysing the performance and effects of the complexity of the in-
formation provided to pilots through a head down display, on their mental workload, according to different
tactical situations (Svensson et al., 1997). Applications of HRV, the NASA-TLX, the SWAT and the Bedford
Scale (BS) showed how even a small increment in information complexity corresponded to a higher increment
in mental workload, with negative effect on performance. Besides aviation, the automobile sector gained ben-
efit from the application of the concept of MWL. Several studies were devoted to analysing the performance
of drivers (De Waard, 1996) under various psychological states in order to enhance automotive safety. These
employed physiological measures (Reimer and Mehler, 2011) and primary/secondary task measures jointly
with gaze tracking (Zhang et al., 2004), or performance measures jointly with the SWAT subjective procedure
(Baldauf et al., 2009). MWL has also been applied in the rail industry (Pickup et al., 2005), in this caseto
improve the efficiency and safety of system performance (Macdonald, 1999), as well as the workload imposed
on train control officers (Pretorius and Cilliers, 2012).
11Mediational activity include activities such as reasoning, logic, judgement as well as decision-making.
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2.5.2 Critical environments
The construct of mental workload plays an important role in critical environments, such as Nuclear Power
Plants (NPP). In this context, it was adopted to evaluate interfaces of simulators of shutdown tasks and alarm
reset tasks, as well as human performance employing primary/secondary task measures, subjective rating
procedures and physiological assessment techniques (Hwang et al., 2007; Jou et al., 2009a,b; Vitorio et al.,
2012). Similarly, in military operations and tasks which are performed in extreme settings and environments
such as oceanic and space exploration, and disaster search-and-rescue, measures of mental workload have
been shown to be extremely useful. In these contexts, the use of robots allows personnel to perform tasks that
were previously thought impossible or life-threatening. However, they might impose high levels of mental
workload on the human operators who control them. Indexes of MWL can allow the detection of these
situations of overload and can be used to optimise operator performance (Prewett et al., 2010).
2.5.3 Automation, adaptive and manufacturing systems
Complex systems, in some cases, incorporate automative and adaptive procedures aimed at moderating the
balance of work between the machine and the human. In these systems, measures of workload can be adopted
to trigger adaptive automation in order to decrease the cognitive burden on the operator and, as a consequence,
to improve the performance both of the operator and the system itself (De Greef et al., 2009). For instance,
in the work of Her and Hwang (Her and Hwang, 1980), the objective was to individuate the limits of a
supervisory manufacturing control system by analysing the workload levels of operators, by employing a
model based upon Queueing Theory (QT)12 Measures of mental workload were adopted to inform designers
about when to introduce automation during the use of agricultural sprayers (Dey and Mann, 2010).
2.5.4 Medicine and health-care
In the last few years, the evolution of paper-based to digital-based systems has negatively impacted the work-
load of health-care clinicians and practitioners that are now required to interact with new technologies, such
as Electronic Health Records (EHR), during their daily activities. Unfortunately,they are mostly not computer
experts, and the burden caused by this interaction might have negative consequences on their performance,
leading to errors, and reducing patient care, as well as decreasing safety and human satisfaction (Byrne, 2011).
For these reasons, the construct of mental workload has been employed to design better systems and interfaces
in health-care and medicine. In (France et al., 2005; Gaba and Lee, 1990) and (Leedal and Smith, 2005), sub-
jective ratings and primary-task measures were employed to assess workload of physicians whilst interacting
with an integrated electronic whiteboard or anaesthetists working in operating theatres. The purpose was to
test their spare mental-capacity in order to handle additional tasks. Measures of mental workload associated
with clinicians respectively during simulated and clinical practice were employed with the aim of improving
safety (Byrne et al., 2010; Davis et al., 2009), or improving the quality of care provided to patients (Bertram
et al., 1990, 1992). Similarly, MWL was used for the evaluation and initial development of novel technolo-
gies, applied to training and performance of laparoscopic surgery (Carswell et al., 2005; Stefanidis et al.,
12Queueing theory is a mathematical study concerned with waiting queues. This theory assumes that a model is constructed for the
prediction of queue lengths and waiting times.
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2006), for the evaluation of the usability of an Electronic Health Record interface (EHR) (Longo and Kane,
2011), in enhancing medication administration processes (Kataoka et al., 2011) and perianaesthesia nursing
(Young et al., 2008). Over time, as new technologies and computer-based systems have driven the work of
humans to be more cognitive and less physical, situations of high mental workload accumulations have be-
come more frequent, and if recovery from these do not occur, health problems such as burnout, chronic stress
or even depression can occur. Regular assessment of mental workload might offer new ways of supporting
and preventing such mental disorders and maintaining mental health (Cinaz et al., 2011).
2.5.5 Human-Computer interactive and web-based environments
Human mental workload, as reviewed so far, appears to be a key concept for analysing people’s interaction
with machines and new technological devices. Cook and Salvendy’s approaches provide a methodology for
designing computer-based jobs in industry, accommodating individual’s preferences, such as enhancing the
degree of job enrichment and mental workload, in order to increase job satisfaction (Cook and Salvendy,
1997). Chaouachi et al proposed a methodology based on EEG features for the assessment of mental work-
load in intelligent systems, with focused applications in educational contexts and user modelling (Chaouachi
et al., 2011). Mental workload has been employed in the design of Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) systems
13 and to prevent fatigue and increase performance of both able-bodied and motor-disabled people during
brain-computer interface training (Felton et al., 2012). With the advent of human-web interactive systems,
information can be presented to end-users in the form of text, video, audio and other forms of multimedia,
eliciting different cognitive modalities and resources, sometime overloading the limited capacity of the
human information-processing system. If web-sites and web-interfaces are not optimally designed, the risk
is that tasks performed over them can lead to situations of overload. In turn, this may affect objective and
perceived usability as well as user satisfaction and engagement.
Mental workload and perception of usability were jointly employed to measure the cognitive obstacles
imposed by a particular design (Albers, 2011; Kokini et al., 2012; Tracy and Albers, 2006; Tremoulet et al.,
2009) and to enhance current usability design practices (Longo et al., 2012b). Gwizdka’s studies were aimed
at identifying those factors that influence mental workload of users during search tasks, for the identification
of search system features and search task types that imposed increased levels of load on end-users (Gwizdka,
2009, 2010). Other studies in the World Wide Web (WWW) include the application of mental workload for
investigating its effect on user satisfaction in eCommerce systems (Schmutz et al., 2009), in adaptive hyper-
media systems (Schultheis and Jameson, 2004), learning (Berka et al., 2007) and multimedia environments
(Wiebe et al., 2010).
13 A BCI is a direct communication system between the brain and an external device, and it is designed for assisting or repairing
human cognitive or sensory-motor functions. For example, a speller, based upon a BCI, enables the system to spell letters by using the
only brain activity. This typology of interface offers the promise to provide functionality as well as independence to people affected by
severe motor disabilities, because it allows them to directly interact with computers or assistive devices.
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2.6 Discussion in modelling human mental workload
The construct of Human Mental Workload (MWL), as reviewed in the previous sections, is certainly com-
plex and multi-dimensional, and its assessment is not a trivial issue. Several definitions have been proposed
by various researchers, with different backgrounds and influences, and they appear to be intuitively appeal-
ing. However, most of the current state-of-the art definitions all lack to demonstrate quantitative validation,
as well as widespread acceptance. Gopher and Donchin argued that mental workload can be regarded as
a hypothetical construct14 and not an intervening variable 15 (Gopher and Donchin, 1986). Not only is it
difficult to define workload precisely, but also to measure and assess it. Several measurement techniques
exist, which are mainly classified into performance, subjective or physiological measures. However, each of
them considers a different pool of workload factors, sometimes influenced by the context of application, other
times affected by the designer’s background, knowledge and choices, or simply driven by intuition. In some
contexts not all the factors believed to influence mental workload, can be quantified, in other contexts they
can only be gathered partially and incompletely, thus introducing uncertainty. Yet, to further complicate this,
each assessment technique aggregates attributes in a different way, using different scales, weights and ad-hoc
computational methods. Some studies have also attempted to propose hybrid models combining subjective
and objective metrics together. Regardless of the chosen mental workload methodology, designing a general
theory aimed at putting measures into context, requires several and heterogeneous experiments (Wierwille,
1988). Workload attributes can be static or dynamic, reflecting the mental workload within an interval of time
or at a single moment. In addition, these attributes might be related, and sometimes not independent of each
other. These relationships can be theoretical, such as the one between demand and performance (2.4, page
17), or empirically demonstrated through experiments, such as the U-shaped relationship between arousal and
performance, as depicted in figure 2.7 (page 44), derived by the Yerkes-Dodson’s law and widely accepted
(Yerkes and Dodson, 1908).
However, none of the present state-of-the-art assessment techniques include a way of handling these
theoretical relationships among workload attributes and the inconsistencies that might emerge from their
interaction. According to Annett, the validity of individual attributes and, more generally complex constructs
such as mental workload, lies especially in their relationships with the other attributes of interest, in the context
of a specific situation (Annett, 2002a). In other words, he suggested that the validity of measures, especially
subjective ratings, in a given context, is essentially the determination of the relationships with other measures
of interest. These may be either behavioural or physiological, subjective or objective, as well as the expression
of intentions or opinions. A measure is rarely valid in isolation, but as a predictor of some other measures
or observations. Intuitively, more workload attributes and their interaction should provide more insights than
one single non-interactive attribute. On the other hand, if interaction of attributes is acknowledged by a given
assessment technique, a method for resolving inconsistencies that might arise from their interaction is needed.
14 A hypothetical construct is an explanatory variable that is not directly observable, and it differs from an intervening variable because
it has properties and implications that have not been demonstrated in empirical terms.
15 An intervening variable can be summarised by findings observed empirically.
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2.6.1 Mental workload core tenets
To facilitate the understanding of the construct of mental workload and the issues associated with representing
and modelling it as a computational concept, the core tenets found are summarised as follows.
1. Multi-dimensionality: empirical evidence and several researchers suggest that mental workload is be-
lieved to be a multi-dimensional construct influenced by many factors (Eggemeier and Wilson, 1991;
Hart and Staveland, 1988; O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986; Reid and Nygren, 1988; Tsang and Ve-
lazquez, 1996; Wierwille and Eggemeier, 1993; Xie and Salvendy, 2000b; Young and Stanton, 2004).
These factors have both static and dynamic properties. The former reflect mental workload within an
interval of time while the latter within a single moment. Some factors can be related to a particular
cognitive resource of the limited pool of expendable resources, of the human processing capacity. The
requirement for individual resources can be unbalanced while performing a task. This means that some
resources may remain unaffected, some overloaded and some underloaded (Xie and Salvendy, 2000b).
2. Context-awareness: mental workload is a context-aware construct, meaning that it is influenced by the
context of application. For instance, it can be considered in a single or in a multi-task environment
and, as a consequence, it might be affected by external factors, or by other concurrent tasks (Addie
and Widyanti, 2011; Cain, 2007; Eggemeier and Wilson, 1991; Tsang and Vidulich, 2006; Xie and
Salvendy, 2000a). The same assessment technique applied in two different contexts, can generate
different workload assessments (Noyes and Bruneau, 2007).
3. User-specificity: workload is a user-specific construct, influenced by individual factors. These include,
for instance, previous knowledge, skills and experience (Damos, 1988), but also the state of the indi-
vidual (Xie and Salvendy, 2000b), as well as intention, motivation, effort manifested (Hancock, 1988),
and subjective perception (Hancock, 1989; Meshkati and Loewenthal, 1988).
4. Task-specificity: mental workload is task-specific, influenced by task-related factors. These include, for
example, task demands in terms of resources (Hart and Staveland, 1988; Tsang and Velazquez, 1996),
objective task difficulty (Hancock, 1989), and its perception (Hancock, 1989; Hart and Staveland, 1988;
Reid and Nygren, 1988).
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5. Relationality: the factors considered within a workload assessment technique might be related mono-
tonically or not, influencing each other and mitigating or enhancing each otherO˜s strengths (Annett,
2002a,b) (examples of relationships in (Yerkes and Dodson, 1908) and (O’ Donnel and Eggemeier,
1986)).
6. Preferentiality: a dimension considered within a workload assessment technique might be preferred
than another dimension, thus having a greater influence on overall mental workload. Preferences can
be modelled, for instance, by a ranked order between dimensions (Reid and Nygren, 1988) or with
numerical weights (Hart and Staveland, 1988), either computed objectively or provided subjectively by
raters.
7. Subjectivity: assessments of mental workload are characterised by a degree of subjectivity. This lies in
the gathered measures, regardless if they are subjective ratings such as in (Hart and Staveland, 1988;
Reid and Nygren, 1988; Tsang and Velazquez, 1996) or physiological such as in (Fairclough, 1993;
Kramer et al., 1987; Wilson and Eggemeier, 1991). In addition, subjectivity refers to the design choices
adopted for the development of an assessment technique, by a certain designer, thus outlining which
factors to include and how to aggregate them (Annett, 2002b; Young and Stanton, 2002a).
8. Uncertainty: mental workload is a construct characterised by uncertainty. This is intrinsic in the concept
and in its definition, but also in the values carried by each workload attribute. The former is due to
the disagreement amongst researchers about how to define mental workload and how to measure it
(Annett, 2002b; Cain, 2007). The latter refers to the accuracy of the measurement of each attribute.
In particular, in the case of subjective measures, judgments are often made under uncertainty: often
raters, not familiar with the concept of workload and associated factors, might have difficulty in even
understanding the questions aimed at quantifying each dimension.
9. Partiality: the quantification of the factors employed within a workload assessment technique may be
partial and incomplete. This mainly refers to objective measures (example is physiological), that can be
gathered incompletely by employed devices and sensors. Partiality may also refer to the environment
and context in which the assessment procedure is applied. The factors considered by a model might be
correctly measured in laboratory settings, yet partially measured in practical settings, thus invalidating
the theoretical model (Wierwille and Eggemeier, 1993) in the case it strictly requires them.
10. Hypotheticality: mental workload is believed to be a hypothetical construct. In other words, it cannot be
detected directly but through the measurement and aggregation of other factors believed to have a high
correlation with it (Gopher and Donchin, 1986; Xie and Salvendy, 2000b). In addition the relationship
between these dimensions might be hypothetical/theoretical and not empirically demonstrated.
2.6.2 Mental workload as a defeasible phenomenon
Human mental workload is a complex and multi-dimensional construct built upon a network of pieces of
evidence, as have emerged so far. This network can vary according to the knowledge-base of a workload
designer considered in a given context. It is composed of the workload factors and their hypothetical or
empirically-demonstrated relationships, assumed to be useful for predicting the mental workload of a user
performing a given task, in a given context. Different workload factors, as suggested in the example in
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section 1.3 (page 4), might support different and sometimes contradictory assessments of workload, creating
inconsistent scenarios. In summary, it is reasonable to assume that:
• Assumption 1: human mental workload is a complex construct built over a network of pieces of evi-
dence;
• Assumption 2: accounting and understanding the relationships of pieces of evidence as well as resolving
the inconsistencies arising from their interaction is essential in modelling human mental workload.
In formal logics, these assumptions are the key components of a defeasible concept: a concept built upon
a set of interactive pieces of evidence, called arguments, which can be defeated by additional arguments. The
term ‘defeasible’ comes from the multi-disciplinary fields of defeasible reasoning (DR) and argumentation
theory (AT), aimed at studying the way humans reason under uncertainty and with contradictory and incom-
plete knowledge. A reasoning process is defeasible when accounted arguments are rationally compelling but
not deductively valid. In other words, DR is a form of reasoning built upon reasons that are defeasible, not
infallible and a conclusion or claim, derived from the application of previous knowledge, can be retracted in
the light of new evidence. DR is also known as non-monotonic reasoning (NMR), because of the technical
property (non-monotonicity) of the logical formalisms that are aimed at modelling defeasible reasoning activ-
ity (Baroni et al., 1997). A formal implementation of DR is provided by AT, a recent multi-disciplinary topic
in AI based on elements borrowed from psychology, philosophy and sociology. This topic investigates how
people reason, and how arguments can be constructed, supported or neglected in a defeasible reasoning pro-
cess. Additionally, AT studies the validity of the conclusions of a reasoning process via resolution of potential
inconsistencies that might emerge from the interaction of arguments. Argumentation theory has been proved
appealing for knowledge representation in various fields, thanks to its simplicity and modularity as compared
to other approaches of reasoning, and has delivered an interesting explanatory capacity for tackling and de-
scribing complex constructs (Toni, 2010). These features seem to be appealing for creating a framework for
mental workload representation and an assessment that matches the ideal requirements proposed in the pre-
vious section: flexibility, falsifiability, replicability, simplicity, inconsistency-awareness. As a consequence,
these features have lead to the definition of the research question behind this thesis:
Can defeasible argumentation theory enhance the representation of the construct of mental work-
load, and improve the quality of its assessment in the field of human-computer interaction?
As anticipated in the introductory chapter, a framework based on defeasible reasoning, and implemented
with argumentation theory will be designed in order to represent and assess human mental workload, and
tested in the field of human-computer interaction. However, before formally designing this framework, the
next chapter is aimed at providing the reader with the basic principles of defeasible reasoning and non-
monotonic logics, whilst describing state-of-the-art works in the field of argumentation theory, relevant to
this thesis.
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Chapter 3
Defeasible reasoning and argumentation
theory
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the basic building blocks of defeasible reasoning and non-monotonic
logics, notions that stand at the core of this thesis, through a review of state-of-the-art works in the field.
Subsequently argumentation theory, based upon these notions, is introduced with particular emphasis on its
role for knowledge representation. The starting assumptions behind this thesis is that the multi-dimensional
construct of mental workload can be reasonably seen as a defeasible phenomenon, built upon a set of
pieces of evidence, the arguments, that might interact and defeat each other creating inconsistent scenarios.
State-of-the-art argument-based models are described highlighting how a single argument can be represented
and the ways it can interact in terms of conflicts and defeats relations with other arguments. A meaning of the
dialectical status of arguments is described, aimed at defining a non-monotonic notion of logical consequence
for resolving potential inconsistent scenarios of conflicting arguments. The notions provided throughout this
chapter are mainly formal definitions articulated with illustrative examples in relation to workload modelling.
Defeasible reasoning and argumentation theory
Relevant logics
& theories
Monological
models
Conflicts of
arguments
Defeat of
arguments
Dialogical models
Defeasible
reasoning &
non-monotonic
logics
Argumentation
theory
Toulmin’s
argument
structure
Walton’s
argumentation
scheme
Undermining
Rebutting
Undercutting
Preferentiality
Strength of
attack
relations
Dung’s
abstract
argumentation
Argumentation
frameworks
Acceptability
semantics
Fig. 3.1: Structure of the literature review of defeasible reasoning and argumentation theory
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3.1 Relevant logics and theories
3.1.1 Defeasible reasoning and non-monotonic logics
The capability of delineating defeasible conclusions with partial information is an important aspect of any
intelligent behaviour. In order to achieve such a capability, humans make use of a particular typology of
knowledge, named default knowledge. The main property of this kind of knowledge, in a reasoning process, is
that it can be exploited even if the preconditions used to its application are partial. In the case new information
becomes available and the falsity of such preconditions can be deduced, then the conclusion derived from the
application of the default knowledge can be retracted. This form of reasoning that employs default knowledge
is referred to as defeasible reasoning (Baroni et al., 1997). In default logic, default knowledge is represented
by using defaults that are specific inference rules. These are expressions of the form:
p(x) : j1(x), ..., jn(x)
c(x)
with p(x) is the pre-requisite of the default, j(x) is the justification and c(x) is the consequent. If p(x) is
known and if j(x) is consistent with what is known, then c(x) can be possibly deduced. In other words, if it is
believed that the pre-requisite is true, and each of the n consistency conditions (justifications) are consistent
with current beliefs, this leads to believe that the conclusion is true.
Example 1
A classical example of a default is:
bird(Tweety) : f ly(Tweety)
f ly(Tweety)
that in natural language is: if Tweety is a bird and it is consistent with other available information to assume
that Tweety flies (for example all birds fly), then it is assumed (inferred) that Tweety flies.
Default logic is a form of non-monotonic logic conceived to formalise reasoning with default assumptions.
Non-monotonic reasoning is different from standard deductive reasoning: in the latter a conclusion follows
from a set of true premises while in the former this is not always the case. To clarify this important property,
consider again example 1: Tweety is a bird and all birds fly, so following a syllogistic reasoning, Tweety flies.
If A is the set of premises and p is the conclusion, the deductive reasoning is:
i f A ` p, then A,B ` p
If any additional set of information B is added to the set of evidence A, the conclusion p is still valid. This
property is called monotonicity and conclusions do not change if new evidence is added to the existing
set of premises, since the validity of the conclusions is all embedded in the premises. On the other hand,
non-monotonic reasoning is not based on the monotonicity property and conclusions can be retracted when
new evidence is available. Consider again example 1. If, in addition to the fact that Tweety is a bird, it is
known that Tweety is a penguin, then the conclusion that Tweety flies can be retracted, as a special exception
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raised. Non-monotonic logic relies on the idea that the pieces of knowledge employed in a reasoning activity
such as birds fly may admit exceptions and that is impossible to include a detailed list of exceptions within
the reasoning rules (Baroni et al., 1997). In these cases, the premise of a certain rule is only partially specified
and a conclusion can be derived from the premises. In the case an exception subsequently arises then the
derived conclusion has to be retracted. In other terms, the basic idea of non-monotonic inferences is that,
when more information is obtained, some inference that were earlier reasonable may be no longer so.
The reasonable assumption behind this thesis, as emerged from the review of chapter 2, is that the repre-
sentation of the construct of mental workload is a reasoning activity with the property of non-monotonicity.
As a consequence, defeasible reasoning and non-monotonic logics seem to be plausible candidates for rep-
resenting and modelling it. However, mental workload is a complex and ill-defined construct, subjectively
considered by different researchers and practitioners of different fields. Its multi-dimensional and abstract
nature make its definition, representation and assessment a non-trivial problem. For these reasons, mental
workload designers call for a methodology able to improve the representation of such a multi-dimensional
construct in a more intuitive way and at the same time having a precise framework for investigating its com-
plexity. In the last two decades, a new field within artificial intelligence (AI), named argumentation theory
(AT) has emerged as a useful paradigm for capturing and expressing the way humans reason in the form of
formal arguments. The following sections are entirely devoted to the introduction of this new emerging field
with a particular emphasis on its important role for Knowledge Representation (KR) and with a precise review
of the state-of-the-art argument-based models proposed so far.
3.1.2 Argumentation theory
Argumentation theory has acquired importance in artificial intelligence and computer science, emerging as a
multi-disciplinary approach that intersects the fields of law and philosophy, with aspects borrowed from psy-
chology and sociology. It studies how pieces of evidence, seen as arguments, can be represented, supported
or discarded in a defeasible reasoning process, and it investigates the validity of the conclusions achieved
(Toni, 2010). Argumentation theory has gained interest with the introduction of computable models inspired
by the way humans reason. These models extended classical reasoning approaches, based on deductive logic,
that were increasingly inadequate for problems requiring non-monotonic reasoning, commonly adopted by
humans, and explanatory reasoning, not available in standard non-monotonic logics such as default logic
(Dung, 1995). Argumentation theory is different from standard deductive reasoning because it implements
non-monotonic reasoning. In non-monotonic reasoning a conclusion can be retracted in the light of new
evidence, whereas in standard deductive reasoning the set of conclusions always grows. Additionally, argu-
mentation is a form of explanatory reasoning because it is built upon modular and intuitive steps that differ
from the monolithic approach followed by many traditional logics for non-monotonic reasoning. Argumenta-
tion provides a useful paradigm for dealing with incomplete and possibly inconsistent information, and thus
being fundamental for resolving conflicts and difference opinions of different parties or contradicting pieces
of evidence or arguments. Furthermore, it is a powerful mechanism for explaining the outcomes generated
automatically of an inference process. These features have enabled the introduction and the application of
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argumentation theory in many fields, especially for inference, decision support, decision-making as well as
dialogue, negotiation and practical reasoning (Bench-Capon and Dunne, 2007; Rahwan and McBurney, 2007;
Toni, 2010). For example, thanks to the increasingly prominence of medical applications, early expert sys-
tems evolved towards more complex systems incorporating argumentative capabilities. As a consequence
several works in health-care were proposed, such as applications devoted to support decision-making and to
advise doctors on best specific medications or best treatment for breast cancers (Fox et al., 1993; Longo et al.,
2012a). Argumentation has been used for conflict resolution in multi-agent systems with different and some-
times incomplete beliefs (Amgoud and Kaci, 2005) and also for trust computing (Matt et al., 2010; Parsons
et al., 2010; Prade, 2007).
A general view of argumentation logics
In a simplistic view, argumentation focuses on interactions where different parties or different pieces of evi-
dence argue for and against some conclusions (Matt et al., 2010). In argumentation theory arguments can be
seen as ‘tentative proofs for propositions’ (Fox et al., 1993; Krause et al., 1995). Here knowledge is usually
expressed in a logical language and its axioms correspond to premises according to the domain under consid-
eration. Theorems in the chosen language are identical to claims, in the underlying domain, derivable from
the premises by applying some rules of inference (Prakken and Vreeswijk, 2002). In general, the premises are
not consistent because they might lead to contrary propositions. Arguments for propositions (claims) coin-
cide with proofs, in a deductive logic but with the difference that the premises, on which these proofs are built
upon, are not all known to be true. Viewing an argument as a tentative proof is related to the understanding of
its internal structure. Various formalisms aimed at addressing the internal structure of arguments have been
proposed in the literature, originated by the philosophical works of Toulmin (Toulmin, 1958). These models
are mainly focused on the logical connection between the different elements of an argument and how a set
of premises is linked to a conclusion in a monological structure. They are often referred to as monological
models (Bentahar et al., 2010). A second branch of artificial intelligence, on the other hand, has investigated
the relationships among arguments, sometimes not considering their internal structure, and treating them as
abstract entities. These models emphasise the structure of arguments within a dialogical framework and thus
they are often classified as dialogical models. Example of these models are proposed in (Dung, 1995) and in
(Atkinson et al., 2006). In general, dialogical models are related to the process of arguing whereas monolog-
ical models concerns the production and construction of arguments. The former consider the external, macro
structure of arguments whereas the latter consider the internal, micro structure of arguments. In addition,
dialogical models have driven argument-based approaches to be referred to as defeasible reasoning systems
incorporating defeasible arguments: an argument is not a final absolute reason for the conclusion it supports,
instead it is open to attacks by other arguments. In other words, a reasoning, in which a rule that supports
a certain conclusion, might be defeated by new evidence, is called defeasible (Pollock, 1974, 1987). In the
case defeasible reasons are connected and chained to reach a certain conclusion, arguments have place instead
of proofs. As mentioned before, defeasible reasoning stands on the non-monotonicity property: conclusions
previously drawn may be later withdrawn in the light of new information. Example of systems, based on non-
monotonic reasoning, are the works of (Dung, 1995; Pollock, 1994; Prakken and Vreeswijk, 2002; Vreeswijk,
1993) and (Toni, 2008). A third classification of argument-based models have been proposed in which neither
50
the monological nor the dialogical structure is considered. These models are called rhetorical models and
the rhetorical structure of arguments is stressed (Bentahar et al., 2010). The main characteristics of these
models is the consideration of the audience’s perception of arguments and they are aimed at investigating
how arguments can be employed as a means of persuasion and not for establishing the truth of a conclusion.
Example of these models are in (Grasso, 2002) and in (Pasquier et al., 2006). Table 3.1 summaries the three
main categories of argumentation models.
Monological models
Structure Micro structure of arguments
Foundation Arguments as tentative proofs
Linkage Connecting a set of premises to a claim at the level of each argument
Dialogical models
Structure Macro structure of arguments
Foundation Defeasible reasoning
Linkage Connecting a set of arguments in a dialogical structure
Rhetorical models
Structure Rhetorical structure of arguments
Foundation Audience’s perception of arguments
Linkage Connecting arguments in a persuasion structure
Table 3.1: Classification of argumentation models
In the literature of argumentation theory, models belonging to one category difficultly belong to the
other categories. For instance, dialogical models do not address the internal representation of an argument
and do not consider their perception by an audience. However, according to (Bentahar et al., 2010), in
order to design and create intelligent systems that incorporate powerful argumentative capabilities, the
micro-structure of an argument, its relation with other arguments as well as the rhetorical structure should
be addressed. In other words, the internal representation of an argument should clearly relate premises to
conclusions, and at an external levels, the argument should be considered within the set of other arguments it
interacts with. Eventually, the perception by an audience is important because in real life implementations,
arguments are built to achieve predefined objectives, according to the participating agents’ believes. In the
specific case of mental workload modelling, single arguments should be built around each individual factor
believed to influence workload. The internal structure should clearly link one or more factors to a certain
level of mental workload. Once each argument is internally built, it might be linked and related to some
of the other arguments a designer is wiling to implement for shaping the construct of mental workload,
creating a macro-structure. Eventually, when the macro-picture is conceived, the rhetorical structure should
be addressed for producing convincing arguments for the audience. Indeed, if the micro-structure of an
argument is not considered, it is difficult to generate meaningful and convincible arguments for an audience.
Similarly, if the rhetorical structure is not addressed, the macro-structure cannot be efficient enough. Micro,
macro and rhetorical structures are strongly related (Bentahar et al., 2010).
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In summary, the general idea of argumentation systems is that they formalise non-monotonic reasoning as
the internal construction of arguments (micro-structure) as well as their comparisons for and against certain
conclusions (macro-structure). The construction of arguments, based on a theory, is monotonic that means
an argument remains the same even if the theory is expanded with new information. On the other hand,
non-monotonicity is expressed in terms of interaction between conflicting arguments. This is because the
additional information may generate stronger arguments that in turn defeat previous arguments. Argumen-
tation systems and the notion of an argument are typically constructed upon an underlying logical language
and around an associated notion of logical consequence. As mentioned before, this notion of consequence is
monotonic. New information can not invalidate existing arguments as constructed, but can only be responsi-
ble for the generation of new counterarguments. Some argument-based applications assume a particular and
well-defined logic whereas other leave the underlying logic part of the context of application or even totally
undefined. In the case the logic is left unspecified, the system can be instantiated with different alternative log-
ics, thus they are often referred to as frameworks rather then systems. Beside the chosen underlying language,
argumentation systems generally incorporate four elements:
• definition of an argument
• definition of conflicts among arguments
• definition of defeat relations among arguments
• definition of the dialectical status of arguments.
The literature of argumentation logics is really vast and it would be impossible to review all the research
studies conducted for each element as well as all the applications appeared in the field of law, philosophy
and computer science. For these reasons, the remaining of this chapter is devoted to the introduction of those
essential concepts and formalisms necessary for orientating the reader towards the understanding of the rest
of this thesis.
3.2 Internal structure of arguments and monological models
The internal representation of arguments is addressed by monological models which do not take into consider-
ation the relationships that might exist between other arguments. In logical proofs, a conclusion follows from
a set of premises and many argumentation systems do not make any distinction between them. However, when
arguments are expressed in natural language, premises might play different roles, and their understanding can
make the argument itself more understandable. In addition, the identification of the role of each premise can
support the investigation of the different ways an argument can be accepted or defeated. In the literature of
argumentation theory, this way of structuring and representing an argument is defined as argument scheme.
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3.2.1 Toulmin’s argument structure
Probably, one of the most widely argument scheme adopted in artificial intelligence is represented by the
model proposed by Toulmin (Toulmin, 1958). Conceived in the context of law and philosophy, Toulmin in-
troduced a diagrammatic representation of legal arguments as a theoretical model of argumentation composed
by six distinct elements, as depicted in figure 3.2:
1. Claim (C) - an assertion or a claim (conclusion) that has a potentially controversial nature and that
might not meet the initial beliefs of the audience;
2. Data (D) - statements specifying facts or beliefs previously established related to a certain situation in
which the claim is made;
3. Warrant (W) - statement that justifies the inference of the conclusion from the data;
4. Backing (B) - a set of information that assure the trustworthiness of a warrant. It is the ground underly-
ing the reason. A backing is invoked as soon as the warrant is challenged;
5. Qualifier (Q) - a statement that expresses the degree of certainty associated to the claim;
6. Rebuttal (R) - a statement introducing a situation in which the conclusion might be defeated.
Fact (D) So (probably) (Q) Conclusion (C)
Warrant (W)
since
Backing (B)
because
Rebuttal (R)
unless
Fig. 3.2: An illustration of Toulmin’s argument representation
The time spent on the
task was high (D - Data)
presumably (Q - Qualifier)
the workload exerted by the
user was high (C - Claim)
Generally, when the time spent on a
task is high, the user’s mental work-
load is high as well (W - Warrant)
There is empirical evidence supporting the fact that when
the objective time spent on a task is high, generally, the
user’s exerted mental workload is high too (B - Backing)
The user was really skilled,
thus the mental workload ex-
erted is low (R - Rebuttal)
Fig. 3.3: An illustrative argument for mental workload using the Toulmin’s structure
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Figure 3.3 illustrates an example using the Toulmin’s way of representing an argument in the context of
mental workload. This argument claims that the mental workload exerted by a user during the execution of a
task was high (conclusion) because execution time was high as well. This conclusion (claim) is presumably
true since, in general, when execution time is high the user’s mental workload is high as well (warrant). In
turn, this is due because there is empirical evidence supporting the fact that when the objective time spent on
a task is high, generally the user’s exerted mental workload is high too (backing). However, exceptions to this
rule might exist such as when the user is really skilled thus likely to exert low mental workload (rebuttal).
The Tulmin’s model plays a significant role in highlighting the elements that might form a natural language
argument. However, in real world scenario, arguments might not consider all these elements, making the
argument itself weaker and less expressive. Toulmin’s structure has been extended in several works and
applied in various ways such as for facilitating the construction of text-based arguments resulting from a
dialogue or for dialectical and legal reasoning (Prakken, 2005). Here, counterarguments can occur: these
are also arguments that may defeat (attack) any of the first four elements of another argument (claim, data,
warrant, backing). For instance, a debate can be visualised by chaining diagrams of arguments (Bentahar et al.,
2010). Once the single representation of an argument is extended with the consideration of its relations with
other external arguments, its monological structure is expanded towards a dialogical structure. The Toulmin’s
contribution has several advantages but also some limitations. Firstly, as mentioned before, it explicitly
considers the various components of an argument and how they are linked, providing a very useful means
for knowledge representation. Moreover, arguments represent the inference rules used to infer a conclusion
from a set of premises. The main disadvantage of the Toulmin’s representation is that it does not specify the
way different argument structures can be combined for illustrating the dynamics of an argumentation process.
It is uniquely aimed at emphasising the internal representation without accounting the participants and their
knowledge-bases as well as not specifying any criteria for accepting an argument.
3.2.2 Walton’s argument scheme
Another well-known monological paradigm has been proposed by Reed and Walton to model the notion of
arguments as product (Reed and Walton, 2003; Walton, 1996). It is based upon the notion of argumentation
scheme and it is useful for identifying and evaluating common and different types of argumentation in every-
day discourses, having its strength in representing knowledge used for arguing and explaining (Bentahar et al.,
2010). This type of argumentation scheme is aimed at capturing common stereotypical patterns of reasoning
that are non-monotonic and defeasible in nature. In order to understand their way of structuring an argument,
consider example 2, taken from (Reed and Walton, 2003).
Example 2
Suppose that Bob and Helen are discussing about tipping, and that Helen is not in favour of tipping because
she thinks that it is a bad practice and it should be discontinued. Also suppose Dr. Phil is an expert in
psychology. Her argument is: Dr. Phil says that tipping lowers self-esteem.
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From example 2 it appears that Helen’s argument is implicitly an appeal to expert opinion. In addition,
it is evidently an instance of argument from consequences. Helen is sustaining that lowering self-esteem is
a bad consequence of an action. The argument is based upon the assumption that, since the bad outcome
is a consequence of tipping, therefore tipping itself is a bad thing. This way of reasoning is a chain of
argumentation reconstructable as follows:
• Dr. Phil, an expert psychologist, says that tipping lowers self-esteem, because he has knowledge about
self-esteem.
• tipping lowers self-esteem
• lowering self-esteem is a bad thing
• anything that leads to bad consequences is a bad practice
• tipping is a bad practice
Argumentation schemes can be used to link premises each other and to conclusions in a chain that
represents the argument provided by Helen. Walton identified and proposed 25 different argumentation
schemes that can be used to construct valid and robust arguments. For instance, as mentioned before, in
example 2 two argumentation schemes are taken into account and they can be generalised, in line with
(Walton, 1996) as follows:
Argument from expert opinion:
• major premise: source E is an expert in subject S containing proposition A
• minor premise: E asserts that proposition A (in the domain S) is true (or false)
• conclusion: A may plausibly be considered true (or false)
Argument from consequences:
• major premise: if an argument leads to good (or bad) consequences, it should (should not) be brought
about
• minor premise: if action A is brought about, a good (or bad) consequence will occur
• conclusion: therefore A should (should not) be brought about.
These two schemes can be used by Helen to build her point of view. The argument can be built by firstly
populating the implicit premises that are necessary to support the requirement of the appeal to expert opinion,
and subsequently to give a reason to backup the conclusion that an action should not be taken. Each scheme
proposed by (Walton, 1996) comes with a set of critical questions such as ‘is the expert E in the position
to know about the proposition A?’. Such questions have to be answered to assess whether their application
is warranted or not in a specific context and case. Intuitively, the possibility to use critical questions makes
argument schemes defeasible as open to counterarguments. The main advantage of the paradigm proposed
by Reed and Walton is the capacity to illustrate an argument’s structure using real cases as examples. They
represent the inference process and the defeasible rules by using critical questions and they consider various
criteria for accepting an argument related to the nature of the schema. However, as the Toulmin’s model,
55
it only emphasises the individual structure of arguments, without considering the participant’s knowledge-
bases. The interaction with other argumentation schemes as well as with other arguments is not specified. In
summary, in argumentation logics, the notion of argument coincides with a tentative proof in the underlying
logic. Sometimes arguments are defined as inference trees that are grounded in the premises, and some other
times as deduction that means as consequence of such inferences (Prakken, 2011). Simpler systems might be
constructed with arguments being premises-conclusion pairs, and being the underlying logic left to implicitly
validate a proof of the conclusion from the premises. Other monological paradigms have been proposed in
the literature of argumentation theory: the reader can refer to (Bentahar et al., 2010) for further information
about monological models of arguments. The notions provided so far were aimed at identifying the possible
ways arguments can be internally constructed. However, in the reminder of this thesis, the Toulmin’s and the
Walton’s approaches are left in favour of a simpler representation of an argument in the form of premises-
conclusion using the notion of logical consequence.
3.3 Conflicts between arguments
Monological models, aimed at internally represent an argument can be complemented by dialogical models,
focused on the relationships among arguments. The latter investigates the issue of invalid arguments that
appear to be valid (fallacious arguments). Conflict is an important notion in argumentation theory, often
replaced by the terms attack or counterargument. In the literature of AT three types of conflict have emerged
(Prakken, 2011): undermining, rebutting and undercutting attacks. In general, any typology of argument can
be attacked on their premises, however just defeasible arguments can be attacked on their inference link or
on their conclusion. The reason that does not allow deductive arguments to be rebutted or undercut is that
they, by definition, have a deductive inference that is truth-preserving, thus the truth of their conclusion is
guaranteed by the truth of their premises. The only way to disagree with them is to deny one of its premises.
In contrast, the conclusions of defeasible arguments might be rejected even if all its premises are accepted.
3.3.1 Undermining attack
The first typology of attack is referred to as undermining attack (figure 3.4): an argument can be attacked on
one of its premises by another argument having a conclusion that negates that premise. This can be observed
in the extended version of example 1 where an argument ‘Tweety flies because it is a bird’ can be attacked by
another argument ‘Tweety is not a bird’.
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Fig. 3.4: Undermining attack
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3.3.2 Rebutting attack
The second type of attack is called rebutting attack (figure 3.5) and it happens when an argument negates the
conclusions of another arguments. For instance, ‘Tweety flies because it is a bird’ can be negated by ‘Tweety
does not fly because it is a penguin’.
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Fig. 3.5: Rebutting attack
3.3.3 Undercutting attack
The third type of attack (figure 3.6) occurs when an argument uses a defeasible inference rule and it can be
therefore attacked on its inference by arguing that there is a special case that does not allow the application of
the defeasible inference rule. After the important contribution of Pollock (Pollock, 1974, 1987) this type of
attack is referred to as undercutting attack. In contrast to a rebutting attack, an undercutting attack does not
negate the conclusion of its target argument, rather it argues that the target’s conclusions is not supported by
its premises and, as a consequence, cannot be drawn.
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Fig. 3.6: Undercutting attack
3.4 Defeat between arguments
Conflicting arguments is an important characteristics of argumentation systems, however it does not embody
any approach for evaluating an attack. The determination of the success of an attack from one argument to
its target is another important aspect of argument-based systems. In the literature of argumentation theory,
an attack has generally a form of a binary relation between two arguments and usually terms such as ‘defeat’
or ‘interference’ are interchangeably used to indicate a proper successful attack. Some work distinguish a
defeat relation in a weak form (attacking another argument and not weaker) or in a strong form (attacking
another argument and stronger). The former is generally referred to as ‘defeat’ whereas the latter as ‘strict
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defeat’ (Prakken, 2011). Defeat relations are determined in various ways, depending on the argumentation
system. Often, they are influenced by the domain of application and are usually defeasible. For instance, in
those domains where observations are important, defeat relations might depend on the reliability of tests as
well as on observers. In consultancy, defeats might be influenced by the level of expertise of consultants,
whereas in legal applications, legal hierarchies among statutes, level of authorities or moral values all might
have a different role in determining defeat relations. Evaluating an attack can occur through the notion of
preferentiality or introducing the concept of strength of an attack relation. These two types of evaluation have
been emerged in the literature of argumentation theory and as they are relevant to the rest of this thesis, they
are described in the following sections.
3.4.1 Preferentiality between arguments
To establish whether an attack can be considered a successful attack (defeat relation between two arguments),
a trend in argumentation theory is devoted to the consideration of the strength or arguments. In this respect
a key concept is represented by the inequality of the strength of arguments that has to be accounted in the
computation of extensions of arguments and counter arguments (Dunne et al., 2011). Several works have
adopted the notion of preferentiality of arguments (Modgil, 2009). For example, in (Pollock, 1987) and
(Prakken and Sartor, 1997), the authors formalised the role of preferences and if an arguments X undercuts
another argument Y , then X is a successful attack (defeat) if Y is not stronger than X . Other approaches adopt
preferentiality at a more abstract level. For instance, in the Preference-based Argumentation Framework
(PAF) proposed by (Amgoud and Cayrol, 2002), an attack from X to Y is successful only if Y is not preferred
to X . (Bench-Capon, 2003) proposed a Value-based Argumentation Framework (VAF) in which an attack
from X to Y is successful only if the value promoted by X is ranked higher or equal than the valued promoted
by Y , in accordance to a given ordering on values. Example 3 and figure 3.7 illustrates these various scenarios
of preferentiality, given an attack set and the resulting defeat (successful attack) set.
The information necessary to decide whether an attack between arguments is successful is often assumed
to be pre-specified and implemented as an ordering of values or a given partial preference. However, according
to (Modgil, 2007) and (Modgil, 2009), the information related to preferentiality might be contradictory, as the
preferences may vary depending on the context and on different subjects who can assign different strengths, to
different arguments, employing different criteria. As a consequence, a subject has to argue and reason about
defeasible and likely conflicting information about preferences. Motivated by this, Modgil has proposed the
concept of meta-level argument, a special argument about preferences. An argument expressing preferences
is a simple node in a graph of nodes, and preferentiality is abstractly defined, by creating a new attack relation
that comes from a preference argument. This new attack relation defeats another attack relation between those
arguments subject of the preference claim. A clarification is provided in example 4 and figure 3.8. Meta-
level arguments allow no commitment regarding the definition of the preferences within the argumentation
framework, rendering it simple as no preference list or strength need to be specified. The simple scenario of
example 4 can be extended considering preference arguments underlying preferences that are contradictory,
thus attacking each other, and also being open to be attacked by other preference arguments.
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Example 3
A B CAttack:
0.5 0.4 0.45
red blue blue
strength of arguments
arguments
values promoted
Preference of arguments: B > A >C
(Pollock, 1987):A B C
(Amgoud and Cayrol, 2002) (PAF):A B C
(Bench-Capon, 2003) (VAF)A B C
Fig. 3.7: Implementations of preferentiality between arguments
Example 4
Let us consider two arguments A, B, claiming two different contradicting conclusions, being subject of a
rebutting symmetrical attack. Suppose the existence of a pre-defined preference list in which argument A is
preferred to argument B (figure 3.8 - a). According to Modgil, this situation can be expressed as in figure 3.8
- (b) where another argument C is added, undercutting argument B.
A B
Preference list: A > B
(a) Standard preferentiality
A B
C
(b) Meta-level argument
Fig. 3.8: Standard preferentiality and meta-level arguments for expressing preferentiality
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3.4.2 Strength of attack relations
Preferentiality, as reviewed so far, is implemented by assigning to arguments an importance value. This is
usually pre-defined, in form of a full or partial priority list of available arguments, or in form of a numerical
value attached to each of them, explicitly provided or implicitly derived from the strength of the rules used
within the argument. In turn preferentiality allows to establish whether an attack can be considered success-
ful, thus formalising a proper defeat relation, or considered a weak/false attack, thus being disregarded. As
opposite to this approach, another branch of argumentation theory is devoted to associate weights to attack re-
lations instead to arguments. In (Dunne et al., 2011) the authors investigated the role of adding weights on the
attack links between arguments, introducing the notion of inconsistency budget. This quantifies the amount
of inconsistency a designer of an argumentation system is willing to tolerate. With an inconsistency budget
α , the designer is open to disregard attacks up to a total weight α . It turns out that, increasing this threshold,
more solutions can be achieved progressively as less attack would be disregarded. As a consequence, this
gives a preference order over solutions, and the solutions having a lower inconsistency budget are preferred.
A similar recent approach that considers the strength of attacks is incorporated in (Martı´nez et al., 2008). In
this proposal, referred to as Varied-Strength Attack Argumentation Framework (VSAAF), each attack relation
is assigned a type, and the argumentation framework is equipped with a partial ordering over the types. Let
us consider figure 3.9 where the type of attack from argument A to argument B is i and from argument B to
argument C is j. Intuitively, depending on whether the type j is higher, lower or equally ranked than the type
i, different ranges of solutions are possible.
A B C
i
j
Fig. 3.9: Varied-strength attacks
The classical binary relation of attack has been extended in (Janssen et al., 2008) with the notion of fuzzy
relation borrowed from Fuzzy Logic (FL). This approach allows the representation of the degree to which
an argument attacks another one, creating a Fuzzy Argumentation Framework (FAF). Similarly, in (Kaci and
Labreuche, 2010), a Fuzzy Preference-based Argumentation Framework (FAF) has been proposed in which
the notion of fuzzy has been used to model the preference relation among arguments. In other terms, a value
X attached to a preference relation between two arguments A, B corresponds to the degree of credibility by
which A is strictly preferred to B. Strength of arguments and defeat relation has been considered also in (Li
et al., 2011). Here, the authors assigned probabilities both to arguments and defeat, introducing the notion of
Probabilistic Argumentation Framework (PRAF). Here probabilities refer to the likelihood of the existence of
a specific argument or defeat relation, thus capturing the inherent uncertainties in the argumentation system.
In PRAF all possible arguments neither definitely are disregarded nor they definitely exist: they have differ-
ent chances of existing. Another interesting approach to assess the strength of a given argument has been
investigated delivering appealing properties. Here, two fictitious people have to be confronted, endorsing
respectively the roles of proponent and opponent of the argument. Such a situation of conflict between them
can subsequently be analysed employing the paradigm of game theory (Matt and Toni, 2008).
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3.5 The dialectical status of arguments and dialogical models
Defeat relations, as previously reviewed, are usually modelled as binary relations on the set of arguments.
However, this form of relationship does not tell yet what arguments, within this set, can be seen as justifiable.
Rather, it focuses on the relative strength of two individual arguments that are in conflict. The final ultimate
status of each individual argument depends on the interaction with the other arguments in the set. As a
consequence, a definition of the dialectical status of arguments, depending on their interaction, is needed.
This last step of the argumentative schema is usually aimed at determining the outcome of an argumentation
system and typically it splits the set of arguments in two classes: those arguments that allow a dispute to be
won or be lost. Sometimes a third class contains those arguments that leave the dispute in an undecided status.
The terminology used for the dialectical status of arguments varies and terms such as ‘justified’, ‘defensible’,
‘defeated’ or ‘overruled’ are usually adopted. The dialectical status of argument is investigated by dialogical
models. Modern and current implementations of dialogical arguments-based systems are built upon the theory
of (Dung, 1995). His work, historically speaking, derives from other more practical and concrete works on
argumentation and defeasible reasoning, such as (Pollock, 1987, 1994; Vreeswijk, 1993). In the following
sections, the Abstract Argumentation Theory (AAT) proposed by Dung is introduced and as it represents an
important element for the reminder of this thesis, related notions are formalised and clarified with illustrations
and examples.
3.5.1 Abstract Argumentation Theory
Dung’s implementation of abstract argumentation was and is still a success due to the fact that it provides
a way, applicable to all types of system that instantiate his framework, for assigning justification statuses
to arguments. It is useful to mention that Dung-style argumentation approaches, contrary to, for instance,
standard logic approaches, are not based on the notion of truth. These approaches formalise reasoning
processes that are defeasible in nature and are not concerned with truth of propositions, rather they focus
on accepting a proposition as true. Dung’s frameworks allow comparisons among different systems by
translating them into his abstract format (Vreeswijk, 1993). This property was a breakthrough because it
showed how several logics for non-monotonic defeasible reasoning could be translated into his abstract
framework.
The underlying idea that characterises abstract argumentation is that given a set of abstract arguments
and a set of defeat (attack) relations between them, a decision to determine which arguments can ultimately
be accepted has to be taken. Solely looking at an argument’s defeaters to decide the acceptability status of
an argument is not enough: it is also important to investigate whether the defeaters are defeated themselves.
Generally, an argument B defeats an argument A if and only if B is a reason against A. If the internal structure
of arguments and the reasons that lead to the definition of the defeat relation between them are not considered,
an Argumentation Framework (AF) takes place (Dung, 1995).
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3.5.2 Argumentation framework
An argumentation framework is a set of (abstract) arguments and binary attack (defeat) relations among these
arguments. It is a directed graph in which arguments are presented as nodes and the attacks as arrows (figure
3.10).
A B C
Fig. 3.10: Argument and reinstatement
Definition 1 (Argumentation Framework)
An argumentation framework is a pair
AF =< Ar,Attacks >
where Ar is a set of arguments and Attacks⊆ Ar×Ar. A Attacks B iff (A, B) ∈ Attacks. 
Given an abstract argumentation framework, the issue is to decide which arguments should ultimately
be accepted. The notion of attack of Dung is equivalent to the notion of defeat (section 3.4, page 57)
because all the attacks in an argumentation framework are implicitly considered proper defeats, and they
do not need to be evaluated. Therefore, for abstract argumentation frameworks, AF =< Ar,Attacks > and
AF =< Ar,De f eats > are equivalent definitions. In other words, in abstract argumentation frameworks, there
is no need to evaluate whether an attack is valid or not. In figure 3.10, A is attacked by B, and apparently A
should not be accepted since it has a counterargument. However, B is itself attacked by C that is not attacked
by anything, thus C should be accepted. But if C is accepted, then B is ultimately rejected and does not
form a reason against A anymore. Therefore A should be accepted as well. In this scenario it is said that C
reinstates A. This issue is referred to as reinstatement and in order to determine which arguments of an AF
can be accepted, a formal criterion is necessary. In argumentation theory, this criterion is known as semantics
(acceptability semantics), and given an AF, it specifies zero or more extensions (sets of acceptable arguments)
(Baroni et al., 2011).
3.5.3 Acceptability semantics
Various argument-based semantics have been proposed (Baroni et al., 2011; Baroni and Giacomin, 2009;
Caminada et al., 2012; Dung et al., 2007), but for the reminder of this thesis, the focus is on complete,
grounded and preferred semantics as proposed in (Dung, 1995). The issue of argument semantics is clarified
using the labelling approach by (Wu et al., 2010), as it follows.
Each Argument is either in, out or undec according to the following conditions:
• an argument is labelled in if and only if all its defeaters are labelled out, and
• an argument is labelled out if and only if it has at least one defeater labelled in.
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Informally speaking, an argument labelled in means that is has been accepted, out means rejected and
undec if it cannot be neither accepted nor rejected.
Definition 2 (Complete labelling)
Let < Ar,De f eats > be an argumentation framework and Lab : Ar→{in,out,undec} be a total function. Lab
is a complete labelling iff it holds:
• if Lab(A) = in, ∀B ∈ Ar : (B De f eats A⊃ Lab(B) = out)
• if Lab(A) = out, ∃B ∈ Ar : (B De f eats A∧Lab(B) = in)
• if Lab(A) = undec, ¬∀B ∈ Ar : (B De f eats A⊃ Lab(B) = out) and
¬∃B ∈ Ar : (B De f eatsA∧ lab(B) = in). 
Example 5
A concrete version of the argumentation framework of figure 3.10 could concern a reasoning process to predict
mental workload using three arguments:
• A: the user was really skilled in the given task, so there is a reason to believe the workload was low.
• B: the user took long time to complete the task therefore there is a reason to believe the workload was
high;
• C: the user was interrupted several times during the execution of the task, thus long execution time is
no longer a reason to believe workload was high;
This example can be interpreted as follows. For argument C it holds that all its defeaters are labelled out
(trivial as C is not defeated by any argument), thus C has to be labelled in. B has now a defeater labelled in
thus it has to be labelled out. For A, it holds that all its defeaters are labelled out, so it has to be labelled
in. As a consequence the resulting status of each argument is: Lab(A) =in, Lab(C) = in and Lab(B) = out.
Informally speaking, arguments A and C can be accepted, instead argument B has to be rejected. This means
that in the absence of further evidence, the mental workload was likely low.
Definition 3 (Abbreviations)
Let < Ar,De f eats > be an argumentation framework and let A ∈ Ar and Args⊆ Ar. For abbreviation:
• A+ as {B|A De f eats B}
• Args+ as {B|A De f eats B for some A ∈ Args}
• A− as {B|B De f eats A}
• Args− as {B|B De f eats A for some A ∈ Args} 
A+ indicates the arguments defeated by A, A− indicates the arguments that defeat A. Args+ refers to the
arguments that are defeated by the set of arguments Args while Args− refers to the arguments that defeat the
set of arguments Args.
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A set of arguments is called conflict-free if and only if it does not contain any argument A and B such that
A defeats B. A set of arguments Args is said to defend an argument C if and only if each defeater of C is
defeated by an argument in Args.
A1 A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
B1
B2
B3
C
Fig. 3.11: The set of arguments Args = [A1, ...,A6] defends argument C
Definition 4 (Conflict-freeness)
Let < Ar,De f eats > be an argumentation framework and let Args ⊆ Ar. Args is said to be conflict-free iff
Args∩Args+ = /0. 
Definition 5 (Defence)
Let < Ar,De f eats > be an argumentation framework and let Args⊆ Ar and B ∈ Ar. Args is said to defend B
iff B− ⊆ Args+. 
Definition 6 (Defence of arguments)
Let <Ar,De f eats> be an argumentation framework and let Args⊆Ar and B∈Ar. A function F is introduced
F : 2Ar→ 2Ar
such that F(Args) = {A|A is de f ended by Args}. 
F yields the arguments defended by a given set of arguments. It specifies the set of arguments that are
acceptable, in line with Dung’s definitions (Dung, 1995).
The aforementioned notions are the building blocks of abstract argumentation theory (AAT) useful for
the definition of acceptability semantics for the resolution of potential contradictions among arguments. The
basic semantic, as proposed in (Dung, 1995) is referred to as complete semantic aimed at computing complete
extensions.
Definition 7 (Complete extension)
Let < Ar,De f eats > be an argumentation framework and let Args be a conflict-free set of Arguments. Args is
said to be a complete extension iff Args = F(Args). 
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Example 6
In the AF of figure 3.10 there is just one complete extension, {A,C}, which is conflict-free and defends exactly
itself. Note {A,B,C} is also a fixpoint of F , but not a complete extension as it is not conflict-free.
The idea behind complete extensions is that a complete labelling might be viewed as a subjective and
reasonable point of view that a designer can consider with respect to which arguments are accepted, rejected
or considered undecided. Each subjective point of view is internally coherent and if contested, the designer
can use its own position to defend it. Although this position can be certainly questioned by someone, its
internal inconsistency cannot be pointed out. The set of all the complete labelings coincides with all the
possible and reasonable positions available to a designer (Wu et al., 2010). Complete semantics have an
important property: more than one complete extension might exist. However, sometimes it is advantageous
to consider a semantic that is guaranteed to generate exactly one extension: the grounded semantic. This is a
skeptical approach a designer can take for the evaluation and acceptance of designed arguments.
Skeptical approach
The idea behind the grounded semantic is to select the complete labelling Lab in which the set of in-labelled
arguments is minimal.
Definition 8 (Grounded Extension)
Let < Ar,De f eats > be an argumentation framework. The grounded extension is the minimal fixpoint of F. 
Note 1
The grounded extension coincides with the complete labelling in which in is minimised, out is min-
imised and undec is maximised.
Example 7
In the AF of figure 3.10, the grounded extension is {A,C}.
Grounded semantics are useful because they yield always one unique grounded extension (it can be the
empty set). However, this skeptical view might be replaced by a more credulous approach, available to a
designer, known under the name of preferred semantic.
Credulous approach
The idea behind preferred semantic is that, instead of maximising undec arguments, it maximises in arguments
(and also out). They are based on the concept of admissibility. A set of arguments is admissible if and only if
it is conflict-free and defends at least itself.
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Definition 9 (Admissibility)
Let < Ar,De f eats > be an argumentation framework and let Args⊆ Ar. Args is said to be admissible iff Args
is conflict-free and Args⊆ F(Args). 
Definition 10 (Preferred extension)
Let < Ar,De f eats > be an argumentation framework and Args⊆ Ar. Args is said to be a preferred extension
iff Args is a maximal admissible set. 
Note 2
The empty set is admissible in every AF as it is conflict-free and trivially defends itself against each of
its (none) defeaters. For any AF, there exist at least one preferred extension. Every grounded and every
preferred extension is a complete extension.
Example 8
The admissible sets are {C}, {A,C}. {B} and {A} are not admissible as they do not defend themselves
respectively against C and B. Only one preferred extension exists: {A,C}.
Grounded and preferred semantics represent respectively a skeptical and credulous approach for argu-
ments acceptability. The two notions are sufficient for the reminder of this thesis and the reader is referred to
(Baroni et al., 2011; Baroni and Giacomin, 2009) and (Dung et al., 2007) for further acceptability semantics.
In the following section, the multi-layer argumentative schema for knowledge representation, as emerged so
far, is summarised.
3.6 Summary
Argumentation theory (AT) has been proved useful for tackling many knowledge representation problems
characterised by partial and incomplete knowledge-base as well as uncertainty and contradictions of the
pieces of evidence in this knowledge-base (Toni, 2010). The theory is aimed at modelling defeasible
reasoning, a form of reasoning with the property of non-monotonicity. Non-monotonic activity occurs when
the conclusions, drawn with previous evidence, can be retracted in the light of new additional evidence:
fallibility and corrigibility of conclusions are acknowledged. This is in contrast to monotonic activity in which
conclusions do not change, even if evidence is added to the existing set of premises, because the validity of
the conclusions is all embedded in the premises. Argumentation theory has acquired importance because,
with the application of arguments, usually expressed as natural language propositions, knowledge-bases
can be represented more intuitively. In turn, this modus-operandi has demonstrated that the theory leads to
explanatory reasoning, increasing the understanding of the knowledge-base being modelled.
The process of argumentation towards the representation of a concept, a situation or a construct starts by
the identification of an underlying language, driven by the context and the domain of application. Usually,
the logic is left unspecified and the argumentative system under consideration is referred to as framework
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because it can be instantiated by alternative and different logics. The knowledge representation process
starts by the identification of the relevant pieces of evidence, the arguments. These arguments can be natural
language propositions claiming something or more structured arguments using an underlying language such
as first order logic. The internal structure of argument is addressed by monological models (top layer of
figure 3.12). Usually they are built in the form of inference rules that link a set of premises to a conclusion,
the claim. They can also be defined as inference trees that are grounded in the premises as well as deduction
that means as consequence of such inferences. Monological models are aimed at internally represent an
argument, and they can be complemented by dialogical models focused on the interaction among them and
aimed at investigating the issue of fallacious arguments, invalid arguments that appear to be valid. These
interactions are usually referred to as conflicts, attacks or counterarguments.
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Fig. 3.12: The multi-layer argumentative schema for knowledge representation
Three typologies of conflict are possible:
• undermining attack: an argument can be attacked on one of its premises, by another argument having a
conclusion that negates those premises;
• rebutting attack: an argument negating the conclusion of another argument;
• undercutting attack: an argument using a defeasible inference rule, thus open to challenge, can be
attacked by another one arguing a special case exists that does not allow the application of that rule.
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The second layer of the argumentative process for knowledge representation (figure 3.12) is focused on
the definition of those conflicts among the arguments defined in the first layer, forming an argumentation
framework. This level does not embodies yet any approach for evaluating defined attacks. The determination
of the success of an attack from one argument to its target is evaluated in the third layer of figure 3.12. Here
proper attacks are usually referred to as defeats and they are determined in various ways, depending on
the argumentation system and the context of application. To establish whether an attack can be considered
a proper defeat there is a trend in the literature of argumentation theory devoted to the consideration of
the strength of arguments. The underlying idea is that not all the arguments are equal in strength. As a
consequence the notion of preferentiality of arguments can be adopted. The simple form of implementation
is a preference list of arguments thus if an arguments X undercuts another argument Y , then X is a successful
attack (defeat) if Y is not stronger than X . Other approaches adopt preferentiality at a more abstract level so
an attack from X to Y is successful only if Y is not preferred to X . These are the most intuitive approaches,
easy to be implemented, but they are not the only ones that have been proposed. For instance, an attack from
X to Y can be successful only if the value promoted by X is ranked higher or equal than the value promoted
by Y , according to a given ordering on values. All these solutions assume that the information required to
determine whether an attack is successful (a proper defeat) is pre-specified as a given value ordering or a
given preference list, partial or not. However, the information related to preferentiality among arguments
might be contradictory as well. For this reason the notion of meta-level argument, a special argument about
preferences, has beed proposed. A meta-level argument is a simple argument (a node in the argumentation
framework) and the application of preferentiality is abstractly characterised by the definition of a new attack
relation that originates from this preference argument. The advantage is that this approach does not require
any commitment regarding the definition of a preference list or an orderings of values. As opposite to the
aforementioned approaches in which preferentially is considered between arguments, another branch of
argumentation theory associates weights to attack relations instead to arguments. Here each attack has a value
associated to it and, as a consequence, the consideration of all the attacks in the argumentation framework
determines which attacks are successful. This value might be a crisp value or a more fuzzy number that
allows the representation of the degree to which one arguments attack another one. Eventually, probabilities
can be applied both to arguments and attack relations and they refer to the likelihood of the existence of a
specific argument or a defeat relation, thus capturing the inherent uncertainties in the argumentation system.
The last layer of the argumentative process for knowledge representation (bottom layer of figure 3.12) is
addressed by dialogical models and it is aimed at investigating the dialectical status of arguments. In other
words, the layer is devoted to the determination of the final justification status of each individual argument.
This depends on the interaction with the other arguments and it usually represents the last step for the de-
termination of the outcome of an argumentation system. The terminology used for the dialectical status of
arguments includes terms as ‘justified’ or ‘defeated’ and they are computed by acceptability semantics. A
semantic specifies zero or more sets of acceptable arguments, called extensions. Modern implementations of
dialogical models are based upon the abstract argumentation theory proposed in (Dung, 1995). Here, multiple
extensions might exist coinciding with possible consistent points of view that can be taken into account for
describing the knowledge being modelled. However, sometimes for practical reasons, a single decision has
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to be taken. This might consider the strongest extension (according to a given criterion) or the aggregation of
the computed extensions of arguments in a way that just one single value is eventually produced. This might
be the case of mental workload, where a single index has to be inferred in order to take an action for system
design purposes. The modular multi-layer argumentative schema for knowledge representation, as described
so far, is appealing for representing and assessing the construct of human mental workload. Next section
investigates this point making the starting assumptions behind this thesis (section 2.6.2, page 45) reasonable
and valid.
3.7 Discussion on modelling mental workload as a defeasible construct
In order to clarify why defeasible reasoning and argumentation theory seem to be appropriate paradigms for
representing the multi-dimensional complex construct of human mental workload, consider the following
illustrative reasoning process that might be followed by a mental workload designer.
Example 9
A system designer wants to improve the design of a web-based interface to maximise its usability and
optimise user engagement. To do this the concept of human mental workload is applied along with user
studies that include the execution of tasks, on that web-interface, and the acquisition of subjective ratings
related to different mental workload influencing factors. The designer believes that temporal demand, task
mental demand, the psychological state of the user, the effort exerted to the task, his/her skills and the degree
of external context bias are all useful factors to represent mental workload. In particular, task mental demand,
temporal demand, psychological stress, exerted effort and context bias all have a direct relationship with
mental workload: the higher is the quantification of the factor, the higher is the mental workload. Skill,
instead, has an inverted relationship with workload: the higher the user’s skills, the lower is the mental
workload.
Now, assuming that the temporal demand required to complete a given task has been quantified as low
and the objective completion-time by the user as low too: the designer might infer that the resulting mental
workload imposed by the task was low. If the time dimension is the only evidence available, it is reasonable to
propose such an inference. However, if it is also known that the end-user interrupted the execution of the task
several times, due to high context bias, then the previous conclusion could be retracted. This new evidence
may cause the designer to retract the resulting mental workload by inferring a high degree. Yet, although
high context bias, if the user is known to be skilled, then the designer might assume that the execution of the
task imposed low mental workload, retracting again the previous workload inference. Similarly, if the user
has perceived a high degree of stress during the execution of the task, then the designer might prefer inferring
again high workload, giving more importance to stress and less to the skills of the user. The same reasoning
is applied to the factors mental demand and effort: the higher their quantification, the higher is the inferred
mental workload.
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Example 9 clearly emphasises the multi-dimensionality and complexity of the construct of mental
workload, being this influenced by heterogeneous factors. The reasoning process followed by the designer
is clearly defeasible, having the property of non-monotonicity because the potential representative index of
overall mental workload is retracted several times in the light of new information. Formal argumentation
logics appear to be useful for representing this kind of non-monotonic reasoning activity in form of interacting
arguments. The natural language propositions and statements that vaguely try to link a certain degree, of a
given workload factor (example temporal demand), to a certain degree of mental workload (example high)
can be translated into formal arguments in form of inference from premises to conclusion. This consideration
of the monological structure of arguments coincides withe the first layer of the argumentative multi-layer
schema (page 67). From example 9 it also emerges a form of preferentiality among the argument built for the
factor ‘psychological stress’ (a) and the argument built for the factor ‘skills’ (b). This preference could be
either implemented with a partial preference list (a > b) or in form of unidirectional attack relation from (a)
to (b). The union of designed arguments as well as designed attack relations coincides with the definition of
‘argumentation framework’ (second layer of figure 3.12, page 67). This framework is the formal translation
of the designer’s knowledge-base into interactive defeasible arguments. However, in practical settings,
some of the premises of designed arguments might not be fully quantifiable, thus invalidating the defeasible
argument itself. In turn, the designed argumentation framework can be fully or partially activated. This step
coincides with the third layer of the argumentative schema (page 67). Here, even if some designed argument
cannot be used for inferring mental workload, the overall reasoning process can still be carried out only with
the remaining activated arguments. Eventually, the activated argumentation framework can be evaluated with
acceptability semantics to extract consistent and conflict-free sets of arguments (extensions). The application
of these semantics coincides with the last layer of figure 3.12 (page 67)Considering the arguments within the
computed extension/s, an index of mental workload can be finally computed.
The aforementioned modular process is believed to be appealing for mental workload designers who can
have a more structured methodology for representing and assessing mental workload. Defeasible reasoning
(DR) and argumentation theory (AT) support the assumptions of section 2.6.2 (page 45) appearing now valid
candidates for modelling the construct of human mental workload as a defeasible computational concept. The
next chapter is devoted to the proposal of a formal defeasible framework, built in line with the aforementioned
multi-layer argumentative schema.
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Chapter 4
Design
This chapter is devoted to the design of a computational framework for representing the multi-dimensional
construct of mental workload (MWL) and for assessing it by employing formal argumentation theory (AT).
The word ‘computational’ refers to the fact that the framework employs numerical manipulable values and
delivers a crisp usable numerical index. The design process is informed with a list of the ideal properties
that such a framework should have, according to the author of this thesis, and his interpretation of the liter-
ature review of chapter 2. The design approach is in line with the multi-layer argumentative schema which
emerged from the review of defeasible reasoning models of chapter 3, and the core tenets of mental work-
load which emerged from the literature review of chapter 2. It is a methodology which guides a modeller
in how to represent mental workload, and which provides a tool for assessment. This methodology starts by
building formal, defeasible arguments from natural language propositions, adopting the notion of degree of
truth, borrowed from fuzzy logic, and the notion of logical consequence. These defeasible arguments can be
connected in a graph using the notion of ‘attack,O˜ which is useful for modelling inconsistencies. This graph
can be fully or partially activated through the quantification of the degrees of truth of each argument. The
resulting activated argumentation graph is subsequently abstractly evaluated by applying Dung-style accept-
ability semantics for the resolution of the potential inconsistencies that might have arisen from the interaction
of activated arguments. Eventually, a final index of mental workload is produced by aggregating the single
assessments, one for each argument, in the most credible, acceptable extension, as computed by the selected
acceptability semantics.
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Fig. 4.1: Summary of the process for representing and assessing human mental workload
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4.1 An ideal framework for modelling mental workload
According to what has been reviewed so far, it is clear that no single classification, definition or assess-
ment procedure is capable of providing full information and entirely describing mental workload in human-
computer interactive environments. Practitioners and designers have different knowledge-bases that influence
their view of the construct of mental workload, thus they tend to represent it accordingly, for their contexts of
application. In this thesis it is argued that mental workload could be better represented with a more complete
framework able to handle several workload factors, their interrelationships and resolving the potential incon-
sistencies that are derived from their interaction. This formalism should take into account the uncertainty that
characterises the definition of each workload factor as well as their aggregation, being as self-explanatory as
possible. Furthermore, it is argued that an ideal formal framework for defining and assessing mental workload
as a computational construct should have few properties, as proposed in the following paragraphs.
1. flexibility: an ideal framework should be open, enabling a designer to create an instance of mental
workload representation by incorporating those factors believed to be useful for representing mental
workload. This in turn would allow, for example, the extension or reduction of other instances built with
the same framework. This flexibility supports adaptability, especially in human-computer interactive
environments, characterised by heterogeneity and different constraints. In other words, an instance of
the framework should be open to adjustments and refinements (Popper, 1967, page 53), thus being
falsifiable (Popper, 1967, 1969).
2. falsifiability: flexibility would enable falsifiability. According to Popper, this is not a negative property,
rather it is a positive quality because it means that a hypothesis (a set of workload factors and a set of
relationships among them) is testable by empirical experimentations, conforming to the standards of
scientific methodologies. If something is falsifiable or refutable, it does not mean that it is false, but
rather, in the case where it is false, then the observations and experiments carried out will, at some
stage, demonstrate its falsehood (Popper, 1967). Given the same inputs, an instance of the framework
that leads to a certain workload index can be falsified by another instance which embeds different
factors whose aggregation leads to another workload index. Each proper test aimed at defining and
shaping/modelling mental workload is an attempt to falsify it.
3. replicability: an ideal framework should be replicable and duplicable. A mental workload index, com-
puted by an instance of the framework, regardless if expressed as a scalar number or as a vector value,
must be able to be repeated and duplicated. The replication of an instance of the framework, built over
the same set of workload attributes, their interrelationships, and activated with the same input set, must
always infer the same result (Popper, 1967, page 45). Replicability refers also to the application of an
instance of the framework in different contexts.
4. simplicity: an ideal framework should be simple and as intuitive as possible to be used even by non-
experts. It should allow practitioners, not fully familiar with the concept of mental workload, to design
each workload factor and to specify the relationships between them believed to be useful in representing
mental workload. As asserted by Popper, simplicity is better than complexity because it allows extreme
and multiple tests to be carried out (Popper, 1967, 1969). This in turn supports replicability, allowing
several applications to be tested in different settings and environments. Additionally, without attempting
72
a simple exploration of the concept of mental workload, little can be said about the result obtained.
Undoubtedly, a complex formalism based upon advanced mathematics concepts could be extremely
precise to model mental workload, but if it works in a particular context, there might be the issue of
explaining and justifying why it works. A simple framework, with a better self-explanatory capacity,
usually has a higher degree of testability than more complicated ones (Popper, 1969, page 61).
5. inconsistency-awareness: a framework should be able to handle contradictions of workload factors and
potential inconsistencies arising from their interaction. In other words, an explicit strategy for inferring
an index of mental workload from a set of workload factors, that can be contradictory in a given context,
should be embedded in the framework.
4.2 Top-down design approach
The design of the framework follows a top-down approach, firstly formulating a multi-layer overview, and
subsequently expanding each layer in greater detail. The assumptions behind this approach are:
• Assumption 1: the framework is to be used by an MWL modeller/designer
• Assumption 2: a prior existence of a knowledge-base of MWL, that means a set of attributes believed
to influence mental workload
• Assumption 3: a modeller has an expertise in relation to the construct of MWL, thus understanding
how accounted attributes interact with each other.
The process that allows a designer to represent and shape mental workload according to their own
knowledge-base, and the computational model that yields a mental workload assessment as a crisp numerical
index, is summarised in detail in the flow-chart of figure 4.2.
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Fig. 4.2: Multi-layer framework for human mental workload: a detailed view
The first two layers are devoted to the translation of a workload designer’s knowledge-base into interac-
tive defeasible arguments. The first layer focuses on the construction of arguments from natural language
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propositions in a monological structure. These propositions are based upon a set of attributes believed to
influence mental workload. An argument links a set of premises, built upon selected workload attributes,
to a workload dichotomy: a tentative assessment of mental workload for that argument. Four dichotomies
are possible: underload, fitting (lower and upper), and overload. These dichotomies are separated by two
redlines: special thresholds aimed at defining the limits for ‘too low’ and ‘too high’ workloads. Dichotomies
are mutual and jointly exclusive; a mental workload quantification must belong to one dichotomy and it can
not belong simultaneously to more than one. Constructed arguments can be elicited via quantification of their
premises, and activated with a certain degree of truth.
The second layer focuses on the dialogical structure of arguments, that meaning their interaction. Two
typologies of arguments are formalised: forecast arguments when in favour of a certain workload dichotomy,
and mitigating arguments, when challenging the information and knowledge employed to construct other
forecast or mitigating arguments. Interaction is implemented using the notion of attacks and it is aimed at
modelling logical inconsistencies of arguments. An attack uni-directionally or bi-directionally links two
arguments. A rebutting attack is always symmetrical and can be used with two arguments known to be
incompatible and which cannot coexist. An undercutting attack is unidirectional and can be employed to
highlight special cases in which an argument, if activated, invalidates another argument. The set of inter-
connected arguments through attack forms an argumentation graph: a formal representation of a designer’s
knowledge-base. The process of knowledge-base translation is coupled with a method for acknowledging
preferentiality, if any, of those workload attributes considered by an MWL designer.
The third and fourth layers are devoted to the elicitations of the knowledge-base previously translated
into an argumentation graph. Specifically, the third layer requires an MWL designer to define two reluctancy
thresholds that are used to activate just those arguments (and in turns attacks), with a certain degree of
truth. The resulting graph, a sub-set of the previously designed argumentation graph, is abstractly evaluated,
without considering the internal structure of arguments, by employing Dung-style acceptability semantics.
The output of these semantics is a set of extensions, sub-sets of arguments, that can be seen as different but
internally coherent points of view available to a designer for assessing mental workload. The fourth layer
focuses on the computation of the strength of each of these extensions, and on the extraction of the most
credible extension.
Eventually, the fifth, and last layer, is devoted to the final assessment of mental workload which is a crisp
numerical index that can be practically employed for design purposes. The following sections describe, in
greater details, each of the aforementioned layers.
4.3 Layer 1 - translation of knowledge-base
It is expected that designers intuitively have their own understanding of mental workload, being this influenced
by the their working field, background, beliefs as well as the context of application. Consider example 10
which illustrates a knowledge-base of a designer through a set of natural language propositions.
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Example 10
1. ‘the mental demand required by task T is linearly related to workload: the higher the demand, the
higher the mental workload’
2. ‘given a low degree of performance there is a reason to believe that the mental workload exerted by a
user on task T is high’
3. ‘although task T is highly mentally demanding, the user has a high degree of past knowledge so there
is a reason to believe the mental workload exerted on T is not high’
It is clear that mental workload is a multi-dimensional construct, influenced by many factors. In the above
example these are ‘mental demand’, ‘performance’ and ‘past knowledge’. These factors are now on referred
to as workload attributes.
4.3.1 Workload attributes
The first step for translating the knowledge-base of a designer is to define those factors believed to influence
mental workload: the workload attributes. These attributes might have a different influence on overall mental
workload, either linear or non-linear, positive or negative. In addition, these factors can either support and
influence mental workload individually, or as a combination of two or more factors.
Notation 1
The list of workload attributes believed to influence mental workload is a set of labels defined by a workload
designer. This set is now on referred to as the ATTR set.
In example 10 AT T R = {‘mental demand′, ‘per f ormance′, ‘past knowledge′}.
4.3.2 Translating natural language propositions into formal arguments
In the first proposition of example 10 it is implied that the mental demand of a task linearly relates to mental
workload; the higher the degree of mental demand the higher the mental workload elicited by a user for
performing a given task. This relation can computationally be formalised with a simple linear monotonic
function. However, the second natural language proposition can not be intuitively formalised like the first one.
The issue is that it contains linguistic variables such as ‘low’ performance and ‘high’ mental workload which
are vague terms; this adds complexity in formalising them as computational notions. The third proposition
is even more complex, because not only linguistic variables such as ‘highly mentally demanding’ and ‘high
degree of past knowledge’ are used, but also because the mental workload to be inferred depends on two
attributes: the ‘mental demand’ of the task and the ‘past knowledge’ of the user. The next section is devoted
to the resolution of the aforementioned issues. The natural language propositions of example 10 can be
seen as arguments, and, as mentioned in chapter 3, they can be seen as tentative proof for proposition. The
understanding of an argument as a tentative proof relates to its internal representation (as described in section
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3.2, page 52) and its monological structure. Generally, an argument is composed of a set of premises and a
claim which can be derived by the application of some inference rule→.
Argument : premises→ claim
This implication is intrinsically uncertain, and coherent with human reasoning that is uncertain rather than
exact. In this thesis, the proposal is to see a workload attribute (for instance the factor ‘performance’ of
example 10 - proposition 2) as the premise of an argument, followed by a claim which is a possible conclusion
a designer wishes to infer (for example ‘low/high workload’). Therefore a possible monological (internal)
informal structure of the arguments that can be built upon the natural language propositions of example 10
might be described as in example 11.
Example 11
• a : Low mental demand→Underload,
b : Medium mental demand→ Fitting load
c : High mental demand→ Overload
• d : Low per f ormance→ Overload
• e : High mental demand AND High past knowledge→Underload
In turn, the issue is how to computationally represent:
• the vague linguistic terms associated to each attribute in the premise of each informal argument
• the conclusion of each informal argument.
Formalising premises of arguments
In order to formalise the premise of argument, the proposal is to use Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) and degrees
of truth (Zadeh, 1965) (Zadeh, 1966). Degrees of truth can be computationally modelled using membership
functions: particular functions useful for formalising vaguely defined sets (fuzzy sets) and human reasoning
which is approximate rather than fixed and exact. Membership functions allow the mapping of an attribute’s
numerical quantification to the relative set with degrees of truth. This process is often referred to as fuzzifi-
cation; it transforms crisp values into grades of membership for linguistic terms. A membership function is
subsequently employed to associate a grade to each linguistic term.
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Definition 11 (Membership function)
For any set X, a membership function on X is any function
f : X → [0,1] ∈ℜ
Membership functions on X represent fuzzy subsets of X. For an element x of X, the value f (x) is called the
‘membership degree’ or ‘degree of truth’ of x in the fuzzy set and quantifies the grade of membership of x to
the fuzzy set X. The set of membership functions defined over X is defined as
MFX = { f | f : X → [0,1] ∈ℜ}

Note 3
For each fuzzy set X , zero or more membership functions can be defined and usually they can partially
overlap, sharing some values of X, but not necessarily returning the same degree of truth for the same
input x. A membership value of 0 and 1 indicates respectively non-membership and full membership:
intermediate values refer to fuzzy members partially belonging to X .
Example 12
The natural language expression ‘low performance’ might be expressed by the membership function
f LowPer f ormance(x) which quantifies the grade of membership of a level x of performance to the fuzzy subset
‘Low’ of the attribute (set) ‘Performance’. Various membership functions may be used to model the fuzzy
subset ‘Low’ of the fuzzy set ‘Performance’, as in figure 4.3. Here, a performance value quantified as 28, (on
a scale bounded from 0 to 100), has three different degrees of truth, according to the three different mem-
bership functions. For example, the straight line function (green) returns a degree of truth of 0.72. For the
same function, if the quantified performance would have been 1, then the degree of truth would have been 1,
meaning that the designer of the membership function would have been fully confident that a value of 1 for
‘performance’ fully belongs to the low set.
Performance
Degree of truth
1 28 100
0
0.24
0.5
0.72
1
f LowPer f ormance
Fig. 4.3: Possible membership functions for the fuzzy set ‘Performance’ and its fuzzy subset ‘Low’
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Note 4
A fuzzy membership function can be any function, from the classical straight line to the step-function,
or more complex such as sigmoidal functions, logarithmic functions or curves in general. A member-
ship function provides a designer with a flexible tool for modelling an attribute and relative sub-classes.
Each of the membership functions designed for a workload attribute maps an input space to an output
space of degrees of truth. In isolation or combined with other membership functions (of other workload at-
tributes), they form the premises of an argument. These premises have to be tentatively linked to a conclusion
representing the index of mental workload that is to be inferred (examples are underload, fitting workload or
overload.
Formalising the conclusion of arguments
In order to model the conclusion of an argument, the proposal is to design a function that, given a degree of
truth of the argument’s premise, it returns an index of workload. Consider possible translations of the natural
language proposition of example 11 as proposed in figure 4.4. The value returned by the function that models
a conclusion has to be unique; from a premise, one and only one index of workload must be inferred. This
property is clearly violated by argument b (figure 4.4) where two possible indexes of mental workload can be
inferred from a degree of truth of the premise. In order to solve this issue, the proposal is to force a designer to
use a strict monotonic function 1 for the conclusion of an argument. Clearly, the function associated with the
conclusion of argument b (fitting workload) is not a strict monotonic function. A possible solution is to split
the range of workload indexes, covered by the function fitting workload, into two non-overlapping ranges:
fitting lower and fitting upper. The set of functions used for the conclusion of arguments, aimed at covering
the range of possible mental workload indexes, contrarily to the premise of arguments, cannot overlap (sharing
part of the output space). For this reason from now on, they are referred to as workload dichotomies. These
dichotomies are both jointly exclusive and mutually exclusive; the premise of an argument must be associated
with one partition and it can not be associated simultaneously with more than one partition. The proposal is to
model the mental workload range of inferrable indexes with a continuous space bounded in the range 0 to 100
(as per definition 12) and to use 4 dichotomies to partition this space. The remaining issue is how to set the
boundaries of each dichotomy. As mentioned in section 2.2.1 (page 17), these are not static boundaries, rather
they depend on the context of application, the task and the operator. In the literature of mental workload,
these boundaries are sometimes referred to as redlines. They are aimed at defining the areas of low and high
mental workload, and separating these from the area of optimal workload (as in figure 2.2, page 11). The
proposal is to use the same terminology, and allow a designer to set them according to their own knowledge-
base applied to a given experimental context. The are two boundaries involved, as depicted in figure 4.5:
one that divides the dichotomies underload and f ittingLower, and one that separates the dichotomies fitting
upper and overload (definition 13). The following paragraphs provide the reader with the formal definitions
of overall mental workload, redlines and dichotomies.
1 A strict monotonic function has the property that for two different inputs, the former being greater than the latter, its output, given
the former input, is greater than its output, given the latter input. In other words, just one unique output corresponds to an input.
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Informal arguments:
a: (Low mental demand→Underload)
b: (Medium mental demand→ Fitting workload)
c: (High mental demand→ Overload)
Formal arguments:
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Informal argument: e: (High mental demand AND High past knowledge→Underload)
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Fig. 4.4: A possible translation of natural language propositions into formal arguments
Definition 12 (Overall mental workload)
The overall mental workload is a real number MWL : [0..100] ∈ℜ 
Definition 13 (Redlines)
Let MWL the overall mental workload space. The redlines used for separating MWL are two:
RedLine f ittingunderload ,RedLine
overload
f itting ∈MWL
with 0 < RedLine f ittingunderload < 50≤ RedLineoverloadf itting < 100 
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Definition 14 (Workload dichotomies)
Let MWL the overall mental workload space. Let RedLine f ittingunderload and RedLine
overload
f itting the two redlines. A
workload dichotomy is a sub-set A of MWL denoted as a function that takes a degree of truth:
f : [0..1]→ A⊂MWL
Four dichotomies are defined:
UNDERLOAD = fUNDERLOAD : [0..1]→ [0..RedLine f ittingunderload)
FIT T ING− = fFIT T ING− : [0..1]→ [RedLine f ittingunderload ..50)
FIT T ING+ = fFIT T ING+ : [0..1]→ [50..RedLineoverloadf itting ]
OV ERLOAD = fOV ERLOAD : [0..1]→ (RedLineoverloadf itting ..100] 
Property 1
The four functions are strictly monotonic thus it holds that:
• ∀x,y with x < y then f (x)< f (y)
Property 2
The sets follow a mutual exclusive property thus it holds that:
• UNDERLOAD ∩ FIT T ING− ∩ FIT T ING+ ∩ OV ERLOAD = /0 and
• UNDERLOAD ∪ FIT T ING− ∪ FIT T ING+ ∪ OV ERLOAD = MWL
1 50 100
0
0.5
1
UNDERLOAD FIT T ING− FIT T ING+ OV ERLOAD
RedLine f ittingunderload RedLine
overload
f itting
Fig. 4.5: Workload space separated into four dichotomies by redlines
Definition of argument
According to what has been designed so far, having a formal tool for representing a premise of an argument
(membership functions) and its conclusion (dichotomy), an argument can be formally defined as well.
Definition 15 (Argument)
An argument A is a tentative inference→ that links premises P1, ...,Pn to a claim C.
A : P1, ...,Pn→C
with PX : fX ∈MFX and C ∈ {UNDERLOAD,FIT T ING−,FIT T ING+,OV ERLOAD}. Each PX is a premise
built upon a given workload attribute X and it is modelled with a membership function fX . A claim C is the
conclusion of the argument and it is modelled with a workload dichotomy. 
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Modelling an argument as just described has some advantages:
• simplicity: it provides a simple way for representing vague natural language propositions and beliefs;
• structure: it affords a detailed structure for aggregating different beliefs and pieces of knowledge;
• quantification: it offers a method (membership functions) able to handle uncertainty in the definition of
workload attributes and the quantification of their degree of truth;
• inference: it deliveres a method for tentatively inferring a mental workload index from the degree of
truth of beliefs and knowledge computed in a given experimental context.
The notion of argument is already very powerful because it enables the translation of the uni-dimensional
Rating Scale Mental Effort (RSME) workload assessment procedure (Zijlstra, 1993). RSME considers the
workload attribute ‘effort’ as the unique source of information for predicting mental workload. The more the
effort devoted to a task, the more the mental workload exerted, as depicted in the original scale (figure 4.6).
Example 13 shows how the attribute ‘effort’ can be modelled using four membership functions (figure 4.7)
and how four arguments can be built upon these functions (figure 4.8).
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Fig. 4.6: Rating scale mental effort
Example 13
The arguments that might be designed for the translation of the RSME uni-dimensional workload assessment
procedure are:
• A: Low Effort→UNDERLOAD
• B−: Medium lower Effort→ FIT T ING−
• B+: Medium upper Effort→ FIT T ING+
• C: High Effort→ OV ERLOAD
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Fig. 4.7: Illustrative membership functions for attribute ‘effort’ of the Rating Scale Mental Effort instrument
81
x
0 30
0
0.5
1
D
eg
.t
ru
th
(y
)
Low effort
−→ y
0
0
0.5
1
D
eg
.t
ru
th
(x
)
Underload
RedLine f ittingunderload
x
20 50
0
0.5
1
D
eg
.t
ru
th
(y
)
Medium lower effort
−→ y
50
0
0.5
1
D
eg
.t
ru
th
(x
)
Fitting−
RedLine f ittingunderload
x
50 75
0
0.5
1
D
eg
.t
ru
th
(y
)
Medium upper effort
−→ y
50
0
0.5
1
D
eg
.t
ru
th
(x
)
Fitting+
RedLineoverloadf itting
x
65 100 150
0
0.5
1
D
eg
.t
ru
th
(y
)
High effort
−→ y
100
0
0.5
1
D
eg
.t
ru
th
(x
)
Overload
RedLineoverloadf itting
Fig. 4.8: Illustrative arguments for modelling the Rating Scale Mental Effort instrument
4.3.3 Computing the degree of truth of argument
In example 13, four arguments were designed, each having just one attribute embedded in their premise:
the ‘effort’. In turn, only one membership function needs to be evaluated to compute the degree of truth
of that attribute. This degree can also be employed as the representative degree of truth of the argument
itself. However, the premise of an argument can contain multiple attributes, resulting in multiple membership
functions, one for each attribute. It turns out that, in order to produce a unique representative degree of truth of
an argument, the single degrees of truth associated with each attribute in the premise have to be aggregated.
Several methods for aggregating degrees of truth exist in the literature of multi-valued logics such as the
fuzzy-AND 2, the fuzzy-OR3 or other simpler methods such as the sum or average. Deciding which method
is the most appropriate is a non-trivial problem. This decision might be influenced by the expertise of a
2Fuzzy-AND (intersection): given two membership functions with two input f1(a), f2(b), their fuzzy AND is the minimum degree
of truth min( f1(a), f2(b))
3Fuzzy-OR (union): given two membership functions with two inputs f1(a), f2(b), their fuzzy OR is the maximum degree of truth
max( f1(a), f2(b))
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designer and the context of application, along with other factors. For this reason, in this thesis the proposal is
to let a workload designer decide the most suitable operators for the unification of more attributes within an
argument’s premise.
Definition 16 (Argument’s degree of truth)
Let A be an argument. The degree of truth Adeg of A coincides with the aggregation of the degree of truth Pdeg
of each premise P, by employing one or more Φ operators.
Adeg = P
deg
1 Φ
1, ...,Φn Pdegn
with Pdegi = fX (α) and X a workload attribute, fX ∈MFX and α a crisp quantification of X. 
To clarify the computation of the degree of truth of an argument, consider example 14 that deals with the
illustrative arguments built for the RSME of example 13.
Example 14
Scenario 1
Given an ‘effort’ quantified as 90, the arguments designed in example 13 (and formalised in figure 4.8) have
the following degrees of truth:
• Adeg : f LowE f f ort(90) = 0
• B−deg : f MediumLowerE f f ort (90) = 0
• B+deg : f MediumU pperE f f ort (90) = 0
• Cdeg : f HighE f f ort(90) = 0.72
Scenario 2
Given an ‘effort’ quantified 25, the arguments designed in example 13 (and formalised in figure 4.8) have the
following degrees of truth:
• Adeg : f LowE f f ort(25) = 0.17
• B−deg : f MediumLowerE f f ort (25) = 0.17
• B+deg : f MediumU pperE f f ort (5) = 0
• Cdeg : f HighE f f ort(25) = 0
It is evident that argument C of scenario 1 is the only candidate for inferring an overall index of mental
workload, with a degree of truth of 0.72. In scenario 2 there is more than one candidate argument, thus
multiple workload indexes can be generated. Argument A and B in this specific case have the same degree of
truth. However, arguments can be activated with different degrees of truth, thus a strategy for the accrual of
these degrees is needed in order to infer a unique final index of mental workload that can be used for practical
purposes. Additionally, the Rating Scale Mental Effort workload assessment procedure is a uni-dimensional
instrument based upon just one single workload attribute (‘effort’). Mental workload is strongly believed
being a multi-dimensional construct; multiple attributes can be considered and in turn multiple arguments
can be built. These arguments can interact, conflicting with each other and creating contradictory scenarios.
For this reason they are referred to as defeasible arguments. One of the assumptions behind this thesis is that
83
accounting and understanding the relationships of workload attributes as well as resolving the inconsistencies
that might arise from their interaction is essential in modelling human mental workload. As emerged in the
literature review of defeasible reasoning of chapter 3, the analysis of the interaction of defeasible arguments
is addressed by dialogical models. In the next section, various typologies of argument as well as different
ways of attacking each other are described, leading towards the construction of an argumentation framework:
the dialogical translation of a knowledge-base.
4.4 Layer 2 - Construction of the argumentation graph
Constructing an argumentation framework is addressed by dialogical models aimed at formalising the inter-
action among different arguments and complementing monological models. From the illustrative scenario of
example 11 (page 76), each argument is aimed at tentatively inferring mental workload because it has a given
claim in its conclusion part (a workload dichotomy). However, argument e is somehow contradics argument
c. Both have high mental workload within their premises, but the former claims overload while the latter
claims underload. Argument e might be rewritten also as: ‘e1: high past knowledge→ not c’. In this case,
the fact the user has a high degree of past knowledge mitigates argument ‘c’ that is no longer valid: e1 attacks
what is claimed by argument c. According to a previous study (Matt et al., 2010), arguments can be divided
into 2 classes:
• forecast arguments when they are in favour or against a certain claim (workload dichotomy), but justi-
fication is not infallible. This coincides with definition 15 of argument.
• mitigating arguments when defeating forecast or other mitigating arguments, undermining their justifi-
cation.
4.4.1 Forecast and mitigating arguments
Forecast arguments are tentative defeasible inferences and they can be seen as justified claims concerning the
expected or the anticipated behaviour of the target (mental workload assessment). They represents hints or
clues given by a designer under uncertainty and not mathematical proofs, in line with (Krause et al., 1995). In
turn the validity of these arguments has to be carefully evaluated by a mental workload designer. A forecast
argument ‘P1, ...,Pn→ c’ can be read as ‘there is a reason to believe c from P1, ...,Pn’ or ‘c is what reasonably
follows from P1, ...,Pn’. As anticipated, the definition of forecast argument coincides with the definition 15
of argument (page 80).
Mitigating arguments are used to express the uncertainties of a designer concerning the validity of forecast
arguments or other mitigating arguments. In other words, they have the effect of undermining the validity of
other arguments. Different from forecast arguments, mitigating arguments link a set of premises to another
argument, negating its conclusion or challenging its inference link. In other words, the set of premises of a
mitigating argument undermine what is claimed by another argument, either forecast or mitigating. Mitigating
arguments are useful for modelling special cases and conflicts that might arise during the reasoning process
followed by a designer, to shape mental workload.
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Definition 17 (Mitigating argument)
A mitigating argument A is an undermining inference⇒ that links a set of premises P1, ...,Pn to argument B
A : P1, ...,Pn⇒ B
where each premise PX represents a given workload attribute X and it is modelled with a membership function
fX ∈MFX and B is either a forecast argument or another mitigating argument. 
Notation 2 (Sets of forecast and mitigating arguments)
For the reminder of this thesis, the sets of forecast arguments and mitigating arguments are respectively
referred to as ARF and ARM .
Mitigating arguments are forms of conflicts and, as emerged in the literature review of defeasible reasoning
of chapter 3, conflicts can be modelled as attack relations between arguments.
4.4.2 Rebutting and undercutting attack relations
Attack relations between arguments (as mentioned in the literature review of section 3.3, page 56), can be
rebuttal, undercutting or undermining. The first type occurs between two forecast arguments contradicting
each other because they support contradicting claims. In other words, arguments affected by a rebutting attack
cannot coexist because they support conflicting knowledge. These arguments follow a bi-directional attack:
given two contradicting forecast arguments, they both attack each other. An undercutting attack occurs when
a mitigating argument challenges the claim of a forecast or another mitigating argument. It attacks the link of
the target argument by claiming that there is a special case that does not allow the application of its inference
link from premises to conclusion. The third type is the undermining attack: an argument can be attacked
on one of its premises by another argument having a conclusion that negates those premises. Undercutting
and undermining attacks are uni-directional (not symmetrical). These can be used by a workload designer,
either to undermine what is claimed by a forecast argument, or by challenging the attack of another mitigating
argument. In this thesis, only the notion of undercutting attacks is adopted. The rationale for this is to keep
the formalism as simple as possible. An undercutting attack is always generated by a mitigating argument.
Definition 18 (Rebutting attack)
Let A, B ∈ ARF with A 6= B be two distinct forecast arguments. A is a rebuttal of B if they logically contradict
each other. This attack is denoted as (A,B). 
Property 3
A rebuttal attack is symmetrical so it holds that
• iff (A,B) then ∃(A,B)
Definition 19 (Undercutting attack)
Let A ∈ ARM be a mitigating argument that challenges some or all of the information used to construct
a different argument B ∈ ARF ∪ ARM , either forecast or mitigating with A 6= B. A : P1, ...,Pn ⇒ B is an
undercutting of B if P1, ...,Pn attacks the inference link of B (→ if B ∈ ARF or ⇒ if B ∈ ARM) by claiming
there is a special case that does not allow the application of such an inference. This attack is denoted as
(A,B). 
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Note 5
In the definitions of rebutting and undercutting attacks (18, 19), the attacker and the attacked arguments
must be distinct. As a consequence, this excludes situations of self-defeating in which an argument
attacks itself. In this thesis is it assumed that a workload designer does not deal with self-defeating
propositions and pieces of knowledge.
Notation 3
For clarification purposes, the following notations are adopted for the typologies of argument and attacks:
• forecast argument: a 1-border circle;
• mitigating argument: a 2-borders circle;
• rebutting attack: a directed arrow line. As a rebutting attack is always symmetrical, 2 directed arrow
lines exist. Another notation can be interchangeably used: a single double-direction line (with two
arrows);
• undercutting attack: a 1-dashed-line.
4.4.3 Preferentiality of arguments and attacks
According to the literature of chapter 2, preferentiality of workload attributes is an important property for
assessing mental workload. A designer may prefer one workload attribute to another, thus one attribute may
have a greater influence on the overall assessment. Preferentiality, in argumentation theory (as discussed in
section 3.4.1, page 58), can be implemented in two ways:
• explicitly preferring arguments to others
• adding a strength to the attack relations between arguments
In the former case, preferentiality is usually implemented as a preference-list of arguments, total or partial.
This list can either be a simple ranking list, hence without any indication of the relative difference between two
arguments, or a list with an explicit numerical strength attached to arguments. In the latter case, preferentiality
is achieved by adding a numerical value on the attacks relation between two arguments indicating its strength.
Preferentiality of arguments
Preferentiality of arguments, in the context of mental workload modelling, and according to what has emerged
in the literature review of mental workload assessment techniques of chapter 2, can originate from:
• the reasoning process followed by a workload designer, while considering a set of attributes believed to
influence mental workload;
• the subjective judgements of workload attributes quantified by raters (example through a questionnaire).
In the former case, a workload designer provides static preferences, extracted from their own knowledge-
base, that do not change during the assessment of mental workload. In other words, a workload designer and
expert already knows the importance of some arguments before mental workload assessment. In the latter
case, preferences are dynamically quantified during the assessment of mental workload, thus being different
for a given task performed by a given user. For example, in the NASA-TLX (Hart and Staveland, 1988),
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end-users are provided with a given task, and after its execution, they are required to perform a pair-wise
comparison of 6 workload attributes. This comparison is a boolean preference of two attributes, for each
possible pair of attributes, which eventually generates an absolute preference list of the 6 workload attributes
(details in section 2.4.2, 33 and appendix A.1.1, 173). Regardless of the method employed for preferentiality,
sometimes it is not always intuitive and straightforward to build a complete preference list among those
workload attributes believed to influence the assessment of mental workload. For this reason, in this study,
the proposal is to implement the idea of preferentiality as a partial preference list of those workload attributes
a designer is willing to consider in own representation of mental workload. A partial list is a flexible option
that can become useful in the extreme cases in which preferentiality is either undefined or defined for all the
workload attributes, resulting in an empty list or a total list respectively.
Definition 20 (Attribute preference)
Let AT T R a finite set of workload attributes. fpre f is a partial function that maps an attribute to an importance
value:
fpre f : AT T R→ [0..1] ∈ℜ
If fpre f (x) ≤ fpre f (y) with x 6= y and x,y ∈ AT T R then the attribute y is said to be preferred or it has equal
importance than the attribute x. 
Property 4
fpre f is a partial function so for any x ∈ AT T R, either:
• fpre f (x) = [0..1] ∈ℜ or
• fpre f is undefined
Property 5
It holds that for any defined fpre f (x), fpre f (y), fpre f (z) with x 6= y 6= z, and x,y,z ∈ AT T R
• If fpre f (x)≤ fpre f (y)≤ fpre f (z) then z is preferred to or is equally important than x (transitivity);
The definition of preferentiality as a partial function enables the definition of preferentiality of arguments.
According to definition 15 (page 80), an argument might have different premises built upon different workload
attributes. If the premise of an argument contains just one attribute, then the importance of that argument
coincides with the importance of that attribute. In the case where multiple attributes are employed in the
premise of an argument, the average of their importance is proposed to be the overall importance of that
argument.
Definition 21 (Argument importance)
Let A : P1, ...,Pn→C be an argument, AT T R the finite set of workload attributes a designer is accounting for
in own knowledge-base, fpre f the preference partial function over the attributes in AT T R and each of the n
premises of A is built upon an attribute xi ∈ AT T R. The importance of argument A is
Aimp =

1
n
n
∑
i=1
fpre f (xi), if ∀xi ∈ AT T R, fpre f (xi) 6= unde f ined
unde f ined, otherwise. 
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According to the above definition, the importance of an argument is defined if and only if the importance
of every single attribute embedded in its premise is defined as well in the preference list. If there exists
even one single attribute within the premise of that argument that has an undefined importance, then it is not
possible to assign a clear importance to that argument.
Preferentiality of attacks
An alternative method for implementing preferentiality, in the field of argumentation theory, is to assign
weights to attack relations. A weighted attack underlines the strength of the attack, thus having an influence
on the attacked (target) argument. In this study, it is argued that the method of attaching a value to an attack
relation might not be straightforward and intuitive, and it adds a burden to a mental designer, while modelling
mental workload. In addition, a designer might not have a meaningful number to assign to each attack relation,
or he might not even have any clue about the strength of an attack. For these reasons, the proposal is to provide
a designer only with the aforementioned idea of importance of arguments, and implicitly assume the strength
of attack relations by employing such a idea. It turns out that the importance of arguments is a primitive notion,
as computed by considering the explicit preferences of workload attributes, while the weights of attacks is a
derived notion, as implicitly inferred by considering the importance of arguments. In this study, it is believed
that this design choice would minimise the burden on a workload designer imposed by the reasoning process
of translating own knowledge-base into interactive defeasible arguments.
4.4.4 Argumentation graph
Implementation of preferentiality is the last step for the translation of a designer’s knowledge-base into inter-
active defeasible arguments, completing the layer A of the schema of figure 4.1. The output of this layer is
an argumentation graph where each node is an argument and each link is an attack relation. The argumen-
tation graph can now be elicited with a quantification of each workload attribute. Example 15 illustrates an
argumentation graph with 3 arguments employing the terms of notations 3 (page 86.
Example 15
AT T R = {‘skill′, ‘completion time′, ‘interruptions′}
ARGS = { A : high skill→ underload, B : high completion time→ overload, C : high interruptions⇒ B }
with A,B ∈ ARF and C ∈ ARM
AT TACKS = {(A,B),(B,A),(C,A)}
A B C
Fig. 4.9: Argumentation graph with forecast, mitigating arguments and rebutting, undercutting attacks
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4.5 Layer 3 - Reduction of the argumentation graph
The third layer of the argumentative schema of figure 4.2 (page 73) is the first step towards the assessment
of a final index of mental workload. In this layer, the knowledge-base of a designer, previously translated
into interactive defeasible arguments organised in a graph, has to be activated with objective inputs (the
quantification of the workload attributes) gathered from a given user who interacted on a given task. These
inputs activate designed arguments with certain degrees of truth, making them more or less credible. As a
consequence, the attacks starting from these arguments can also be more or less credible. According to this,
few questions arise:
• What are the arguments that should be really accounted in the assessment of mental workload?
• What are the attacks that should be considered valid for assessing mental workload?
• When is an attack, from a less credible attacker to a more credible attacked argument, still valid?
The following sections are aimed at answering these questions by providing formal means for instantiating
arguments and attack relations, forming a new graph of interconnected arguments, equal or smaller than the
argumentation graph which emerged from the second layer of the schema of figure 4.2 (page 73).
4.5.1 Evaluating the importance of arguments and strength of attacks
It is important to note that the arguments designed so far have two associated notions: degree of truth and
importance. The former refers to the activation of the argument, which means the degree to which the argu-
ment is instantiated according to the given inputs, evaluated by the membership functions for each attribute
in its premise. The latter refers to the importance, if any, of the attributes accounted in the premises, in-
dependently of their degree of activation. The former is context-dependent, based on the inputs objectively
gathered in a given context. The latter can either be knowledge-dependent, in which case, importance is stat-
ically assigned by a workload designer, or user-dependent, in the case where end-users (raters) subjectively
express the importance of the workload attributes. The two notions are distinct but both play an important
role for the consideration of an argument (and its outgoing and incoming attacks) within an argumentation
graph. The issue now is how to consider an argument is strong enough to be part of an argumentation graph
and how to determine the minimum strength required by an attack for it to succeed. The proposal here is
to use the degree of truth of an argument, as in definition 16 (page 83) for the two problems. In particular,
two reluctancy thresholds are designed: one for the degree of truth of an argument and one for the degree
of truth of the two arguments involved in an attack relation. This notion of reluctancy threshold is similar to
the inconsistency budget proposed in (Dunne et al., 2011) that allows a finer investigation of the interaction
of arguments, generating different solutions. These thresholds respectively indicate how reluctant a designer
would be to disregard:
• an argument (and all its outgoing and incoming attacks)
• an attack relation, either rebutting or undercutting.
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Definition 22 (Argument reluctancy threshold)
The argument reluctancy threshold ReluctthArg indicates the minimum degree of truth that an argument must
have in order to be activated and thus included in an argumentation graph.
ReluctthArg : [0..1] ∈ℜ

A value of 1 indicates that just those arguments with a full degree of truth are activated and included
in an argumentation graph. 1 is indeed too strict and restrictive. On the other hand, a value of 0 indicates
no reluctancy at all, thus all the arguments will be considered in an argumentation graph, independently of
their degree of truth. The application of the argument reluctancy threshold defines a new argument set that is
referred to as the set of activated arguments.
Definition 23 (Set of activated arguments)
Let Args be a set of arguments and ReluctthArg the argument reluctancy threshold. The set of activated argu-
ments is:
Argact =
A|A ∈ Args∧ (1≥ Adeg ≥ ReluctthArg), if A ∈ ARFA|A,B ∈ Args∧ (1≥ Adeg, Bdeg ≥ ReluctthArg), if A : P1, ...,Pn⇒ B with B ∈ ARM 
The first line of the formula refers to those forecast arguments whose degree of truth is greater than the
arguments reluctancy threshold and less or equal than the upper limit (1). The second line indicates those
mitigating arguments having a degree of truth of the premises and a degree of truth of the attacked argument,
both greater than the argument reluctancy threshold, and less than or equal to the upper limit (1).
Given the set of activated arguments, now the issue is to determine which attacks are not strong enough
to succeed and hence disregarded. If the degree of truth of the attacker argument is higher than the degree of
truth of the attacked argument, then there is no doubt that the attack can be considered a proper attack. Even
if the difference of their degree of truth is minimal, the attack makes sense because it was conceptualised by
a designer. However, if the attacker has a lower degree of truth than the attacked argument, the issue is now
when to consider it a proper attack and when to disregard it. A new threshold is then designed, similar to
the argument reluctancy threshold, and referred to as attack reluctancy threshold. A value of 0 indicates null
reluctance, that means if an attacker has a lower degree of truth than the attacked argument, the attack can still
be considered a proper attack, regardless of the difference of degrees of truth between the arguments. In this
scenario, every designed attack succeeds because the designer is not reluctant, at all, of the designed attacks.
Intermediate values indicate partial reluctancy, so a value of 0.6, for example, indicates that the designer is
reluctant for 60%, with the willingness to tolerate an attack from an argument with a lower degree of truth
to an argument with an higher degree of truth, if and only if the difference of their degrees of truth is less
than or equal to 1−0.6 = 0.4. In the other case, the attack is disregarded because the attacker has not enough
high degree of truth (not enough credibility) to perform the attack. A value of 1 indicates total reluctance, so
the designer is not willing, at all, to tolerate an attack from an argument with a lower degree of truth to an
argument with an higher degree of truth.
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Definition 24 (Attack reluctancy threshold)
The attack reluctancy threshold ReluctthAtt indicates the reluctancy to tolerate an attack from a less to a more
credible argument.
ReluctthAtt : [0..1] ∈ℜ 
The application of the attack reluctancy threshold along with the degree of truth of arguments define a new
attack set that is referred to as set of activated attacks. This set contains attacks that coincide with the notion
of defeats (as reviewed in section 3.4, page 57). In other words, this set is composed by all those attacks that
logically succeed and are not disregarded because they are considered too weak and not credible.
Definition 25 (Set of activated attacks)
Let Argact the set of activated arguments, Atts the set of attack relations and ReluctthAtt the attack reluctancy
threshold. The set of activated attacks is defined as:
Attackact :
{
{(A,B) | (A,B) ∈ Atts ∧ A,B ∈ Argact if Adeg ≥ Bdeg ∨ 0≤ Abs(Adeg−Bdeg)< 1−ReluctthAtt
with Abs the absolute function. 
This set contains all the attacks that have not been disregarded because either the attacker has a higher
degree of truth than the attacked argument (so its attack is valid as designed), or because the attacker’s degree
of truth is not credible enough to perform the attack (its degree of truth is much lower than the attacked
argument’s degree of truth). Applications of the two thresholds can be found in example 16.
Example 16
• Forecast arguments: Adeg = 0.8, Bdeg = 0.9
• Mitigating arguments: Cdeg = 0.3, Ddeg = 0.2
• rebutting attack: (A, B), (B, A)
• undercutting attack: (C, A), (D, B)
• ReluctthArg = 0.25 • ReluctthAtt = 0.15
A B
C D
Designed
argumentation graph
−→
A B
C
Activated
argumentation graph
Fig. 4.10: Example of activated arguments and attack relations
The arguments with a degree of truth greater than 0.25 are A, B, C, and so, they are activated. A, although
having a lower degree of truth than B, can still attack B because its degree of truth is strong enough compared
to B’s degree of truth (Abs(0.8−0.9)< 0.15). B has a higher degree of truth than A so its attack towards A is
a proper attack as designed. C’s attack towards A is disregarded because A’s degree of truth is much stronger
than C’s degree of truth (Abs(0.3−0.8)> 0.15).
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Given the set of activated arguments as well as the set of activated attack relations, the third step of the
multi-layer argumentative schema of figure 4.2 (page 73) is complete. From this step, a new argumentation
graph emerges, this being a strict sub-set of the graph which emerged from layer 2. This new argumentation
graph coincides with the portion of the knowledge-base of a designer objectively activated with numerical
inputs, gathered from a given user, in a given context, and with a given task. This sub-argumentation frame-
work can now be evaluated by applying acceptability semantics in order to extract consistent and conflict-free
extensions of arguments, and eliminating the inconsistencies that might arise from their interaction.
4.6 Layer 4 - Extraction of credible extensions
In order to investigate the potential inconsistencies that might emerge from the interaction of activated argu-
ments, acceptability semantics (as described in section 3.5.3, page 62), can be applied. The skeptical approach
of the grounded semantics, as proposed by (Dung, 1995), always returns one extension that can be empty. The
more credulous approach of the preferred semantics, instead, might return a set of extensions that can be seen
as different but reasonable points of view from which mental workload can be assessed. In this last case, the
issue is how to select the most credible extension, and so a strategy for quantifying the strength (credibility)
of each computed preferred extension, is needed. In the following section, such a quantification strategy is
introduced.
4.6.1 Computing strength of acceptable extensions
Preferred semantics can produce one or more extensions (set of arguments). In the case where just one
extension is produced, this coincides with the grounded extension, thus there is no need to compute the
strength of that extension. However, in the case where multiple extensions of arguments are computed (as per
definition 10, page 66), quantification of strength is necessary to decide which extension is the most credible.
Here, it is argued that the cardinality of an extension (set of arguments) is an important factor to consider for
computing its credibility. Intuitively, an extension with a higher cardinality might be seen as more credible
than extensions with lower cardinality, as it contains more pieces of evidence that are consistent with each
other (an extension is a conflict-free set of arguments) and that support the same claim (workload dichotomy).
However, considering just the cardinality might be reductive in the case where, for instance, an extension with
several arguments has a combined degree of truth lower than an extension with fewer arguments. For these
reasons the proposal is to use the cardinality of an extension jointly with the degree of truth of its arguments,
for the quantification of its credibility.
Definition 26 (Strength of acceptable extension)
Let Argact be the set of activated arguments and E an acceptable extension, as computed by an acceptability
semantics. The strength of E is defined as:
EStrength :
Card(E)
Card(Argact)
+
1
Card(E) ∑Arg ∈ E
Argdeg
with Card the cardinality function.

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The strength of an acceptable extension is the combination of its cardinality (compared to the cardinality
of the set of activated arguments) with the average of the degrees of truth of its arguments. The cardinality of
the extension is divided by the cardinality of the activated arguments set so it can be normalised on the same
scale as the average of degrees of truth of arguments, which are both in the range [0..1]∈ℜ. Once the strength
of each extension is computed, the strongest extension can be selected or, in the less probable case of multiple
equally stronger extensions, a representative crisp index for overall mental workload can be computed. In the
following section, such a computation is introduced and this computation represents the last step for mental
workload assessment.
4.7 Layer 5 - Assessment of mental workload
Given a set of extensions, as computed by acceptability semantics, the final step towards mental workload
assessment is the identification of the strongest extension, meaning the one that maximises cardinality of
arguments and their degrees of truth. The strongest extension should be unique, but there might be the
case that multiple, equally stronger extensions are computed. In this case, they are all taken into account
to assess a final crisp index of mental workload. According to definition 4.4.1 (page 84), two typologies
of arguments have been designed: forecast and mitigating arguments. Both of them can exist within the
strongest computed extension/s, however, just forecast arguments have a claim (workload dichotomy) that
can be taken into account to infer an overall mental workload index. Mitigating arguments already played
their role, contributing to the identification of the acceptable extensions. In order to infer an index of mental
workload of a single forecast argument, the proposal is to project the degree of truth of the premise of that
argument to its conclusion using the notion of logical consequence. Specifically, the degree of truth of the
argument, as per definition 16 (page 83) is used as the input of the workload dichotomy associated with the
conclusion of that argument.
In addition, each argument in the strongest extension/s might either have an associated numerical impor-
tance, or an ‘undefined’ importance, according to definition 21 (page 87). As a consequence two sub-sets of
arguments within a stronger extension might occur: arguments with ‘defined’ or ‘undefined’ importance. The
former set contains arguments with a numerical value whose aim is to give importance to the computed degree
of truth of the argument itself, while the latter contains arguments where importance is undefined, thus their
computed degree of truth cannot be weighted, and it should intuitively be taken as it is. However, this intuitive
way of operating is equivalent to associating a value of importance of 1 to those arguments with undefined
value. In turn, this is equivalent to say that arguments with ‘undefined’ importance are always more important
than or equally as important as those arguments with an associated importance value, which is always less
than or equal to 1 ([0..1] ∈ ℜ). Clearly, this is not accurate and precise, being counterintuitive. To handle
this issue and mitigate the aforementioned effect, the proposal is to weight the two sub-sets of arguments (de-
fined and undefined importance) by their respective cardinality. If the set ‘defined’ is thus bigger than the set
‘undefined’, its internal arguments contribute more to the final computation of overall mental workload than
the arguments belonging to the set ‘undefined’. These considerations can be summarised as in the following
formal definition.
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Definition 27 (Overall mental workload index)
Let AE a set containing the n acceptable extensions computed by an acceptability semantics, and SE the set
containing the strongest extension/s
SE = {A | A ∈ AE, AStrength = max(E1Strength, ...,EnStrength) with E1, ...,En ∈ AE}
The overall mental workload index is:
MWL = [0..100] ∈ℜ
MWL =
∑
A∈SE
Card(Unde f )Card(A) · ∑arg∈Unde f
argc(argdeg)
Card(Unde f ) +
Card(De f )
Card(A) ·
∑
arg∈De f
argc(argdeg) ·argimp
∑
arg∈De f
argimp

Card(SE)
with argc a workload dichotomy associated to the conclusion of each forecast argument within the extension
A∈ SE, Card the cardinality function and De f ,Unde f ⊆ A respectively the subsets of arguments with defined
and undefined importance. 
The computation of the overall index of mental workload lies in the range [0..100] in line with definition
12 (page 78). This is the last step of the multi-layer schema (figure 4.2, page 73) and it represents the final
mental workload assessment.
The following chapter is firstly devoted to the implementation of the framework for mental workload
representation and assessiment by describing the pseudo-code for mental workload assessments, in line with
the definitions provided in this chapter. Practical uses of the framework follow, demonstrating how the NASA-
TLX assessment procedure (Hart and Staveland, 1988), as well as the Workload Profile WP instrument (Tsang
and Velazquez, 1996), can be translated into two particular instances of the framework itself.
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Chapter 5
Implementation and instantiation
The defeasible framework designed in chapter 4 has been implemented using the programming language Java.
Although the actual code is not provided, the pseudo-code describing the overall methodology for assessing
mental workload is described in this chapter as well as the instantiation of the framework. In detail, two
state-of-the-art subjective mental workload assessment techniques are translated into two instances of the
framework, demonstrating its practical usage. The assessment of mental workload of these two particular
instances will be evaluated in the next chapter.
5.1 The defeasible framework as a formal tuple
As designed in chapter 4, the defeasible framework for human mental workload assessment can be sum-
marised as a 9-tuple:
DEF−MWL : < AT T R, fPre f , MF, RL, DMF, ARGS, AT TACKS, RT, INPUT S >
where
• ATTR is a finite set of workload attributes that a designer wishes to consider in the representation of the
construct of mental workload. They are usually expressed in natural language proposition and AT T R
contains the representative labels.
• fPref is the partial function that assigns importance values to the attributes in AT T R, as per definition 20
(page 87), thus delineating preferences of the attributes themselves. Each attribute in AT T R has at most
one importance value and if fPre f (a)≤ fPre f (b) then attribute b is preferred or is equally important than
attribute a. Transitivity applies to the importance of attributes so if fPre f (a)≤ fPre f (b)≤ fPre f (c) then
c is preferred or has equal importance than a.
• MF is the set of membership functions defined for each attribute in AT T R. Each attribute can be
described by different membership functions and the same membership functions can also be associated
to other attributes as per definition 11 (page 77).
• RL are the two redlines: RedLine f ittingunderload and RedLineoverloadf itting ∈ [0..100]ℵ with RedLine f ittingunderload ≤
RedLineoverloadf itting as per definition 13 (page 79). These are boundaries used for partitioning the overall
mental workload assessment space into 4 dichotomies.
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• DMF is the set containing the strict monotonic functions used for modelling the four workload di-
chotomies that are separated by the redlines as per definition 14 (79).
• ARGS is a finite set of defeasible arguments built according to a designer’s knowledge-base. They can
be forecast or mitigating as per definitions 15 and 17 (pages 80 and 85). Both have a set of premises,
built upon some attribute in AT T R (and modelled with some membership functions in MF). The
former links premises to a workload dichotomy in DMF , while the latter links premises to the negation
of another argument either forecast or another mitigating argument.
• ATTACKS is a finite set of attack relations among arguments in ARGS. It is a binary relation defined
on ARGS×ARGS. Attack can be rebutting as per definition 18 (page 85) or undercutting/undermining
as per definition 19 (page 85). The former occurs when two forecast arguments logically contradict
each other, while the latter occur when a mitigating argument undermines the justification of a forecast
or another mitigating argument.
• RT are the two reluctancy thresholds ReluctthArg and ReluctthAtt : [0..1] ∈ ℜ as per definition 22 and 24
(page 90). They are used to activate a sub-set of arguments in ARGS and a sub-set of attack relations in
AT TACKS.
• INPUTS is a finite set of input values in [0..100] ∈ ℵ, one for each of the attribute in AT T R.
Card(INPUT S) = Card(AT T R): one and only one input value exists for each defined attribute in
AT T R.
The first step of the algorithm towards the assessment of mental workload is to activate some or all of
the arguments in ARGS by using the values in the INPUT S. These values are evaluated by the membership
functions associated to the premises of each argument producing a degree of truth. All the arguments that
satisfy definition 23 (page 90), and meet the argument reluctancy threshold (ReluctthArg ∈ RT ), are activated,
generating a finite set of activated arguments (Argact ).
The second step is to activate attack relations. Given the finite set of activated arguments Argact , their
degree of truth as per definition 16 (page 83), the set of attacks relations AT TACKS as well as the attack
reluctancy threshold ReluctthAtt ∈ RT , those arguments that satisfy definition 25 (page 91) are activated,
generating the set of activated attacks Attackact . This is a finite set containing those attacks that have not
been disregarded and that are considered valid.
Thirdly, given the finite set of activated arguments Argact and the finite set of activated attacks Attackact ,
an abstract argumentation graph < Argact , Attackact > can be defined (in line of Dung’s proposal, as in
section 3.5.2 and definition 1, page 62). This framework is a graph of interconnected arguments that is
abstractly evaluated (not considering the internal representation of arguments) by running the grounded and
the preferred acceptability semantics, as per definitions 8 and 10 (page 65). These acceptability semantics
produce a set acceptable extensions of arguments: one by the grounded semantics (it can be empty) and one
or more by the preferred semantics. Extensions are conflict-free sub-sets of arguments in Argact that are seen
as coherent points of view that can be employed for mental workload assessment.
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The subsequent step, given a finite set of acceptable extensions of arguments, is to compute their strength
according to definition 26 (page 92) and extract the strongest extension/s. Eventually, the last step is to
generate a crisp index, the defeasible assessment of overall mental workload, from the strongest extension/s.
Given the arguments in the strongest extension/s, the overall mental workload index is computed by using the
strategy proposed in definition 27 (page 94).
5.1.1 Pseudo-code of the algorithm towards mental workload assessment
For clarification purpose, the pseudo-code of the algorithm towards the assessment of overall mental workload
is presented in figure 5.1.
1 For each Ai in ARG (Ai of the form P1 Φ P2 Φ, ...,Φ Pn→ c)
2 For each m f jx ∈MF built upon attribute x ∈ AT T R and associated to
premise P j of argument Ai
3 compute degree of truth of premise P j with input
Ix ∈ INPUT S related to attribute x : degTruthP j = m f jx (Ix)
4 Compute degree of truth of argument Ai aggregating all the
degrees of truth of each premise Aideg = degTruthP
1 Φ1 , ...,Φn degTruthPn
5 If Aideg ≥ ReluctthArg then Ai ∈ ArgAct
6 For each (A,B) ∈ AT TACKS
7 If A,B ∈ ArgAct then
8 i f (Adeg ≥ Bdeg ∨ 0≤ Abs(Adeg−Bdeg)< 1−ReluctthAtt) then (A,B) ∈ Attackact
10 Execute acceptability semantics (Grounded and/or Preferred)
on abstract argumentation graph < ArgAct , AttackAct >
11 For each extension E i computed by acceptability semantics
12 compute strength: E iStrength =
n
Card(Argact )
+
(
1
n
n
∑
j=1
Arg jdeg
)
with Arg j ∈ E i
13 Compute strongest extension(s) set: SE = {E i| E iStrength = max(E1Strength, ..,EnStrength)}
14 Compute overall mental workload with arguments in each E i ∈ SE
MWL =
∑
A∈SE
Card(Unde f )Card(A) · ∑arg∈Unde f
argc(argdeg)
Card(Unde f ) +
Card(De f )
Card(A) ·
∑
arg∈De f
argc(argdeg) ·argimp
∑
arg∈De f
argimp

Card(SE)
Fig. 5.1: Pseudo-code of the algorithm for mental workload assessment
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5.2 Instantiation of the framework
In the following sections practical instantiations of the framework designed in chapter 4 are described. Specif-
ically, it is demonstrated how two well-known subjective mental workload assessment techniques can be
translated into two particular instances of the framework, following step-by-step the multi-layer schema of
figure 4.2 )page 73). These are the following:
• The Nasa Task Load Index Hart and Staveland (1988)
• The Workload Profile Tsang and Velazquez (1996)
5.2.1 Translating NASA-TLX as an instance of the framework
Layer 1:
translation of
knowledge-
base
The NASA-TLX mental workload assessment procedure is based upon six attributes: mental (MD), phys-
ical (PD) and temporal demand (TD), effort (EF), performance (PE) and frustration (FR). These are the
workload attributes believe to influence mental workload and form the finite set of attributes AT T R. The
membership functions of figure 5.2 are designed to partition each of the six attributes in four areas (Low,
Medium lower/upper and High).
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Fig. 5.2: A NASA-TLX defeasible translation: membership functions for every attribute
As described in chapter 2 (page 23), in the original NASA-TLX instrument a form of preferentiality of
workload attributes is accounted. This is manifested by a pair-wise comparison of the 6 attributes (appendix
A.1, page 173) generating 15 preferences and thus defining a preference rank of the 6 attributes themselves.
Let us suppose an end-user has expressed the following preferences among the attributes, as conceived in the
pair-wise comparison procedure of the original NASA-TLX instrument:
• MD: 5 preferences;
• PH: 0 preferences;
• TD: 4 preferences;
• EF: 3 preferences;
• PE: 2 preferences;
• FR: 1 preferences;
These preferences need to be re-scaled within the range [0..1] ∈ ℜ according to definition 20 (page 87).
98
Thus the partial function that returns the importance of each attribute is as it follows:
fpre f (x) =

1.0 if x=‘MD’
0.0 if x=‘PH’
0.8 if x=‘TD’
0.6 if x=‘EF’
0.4 if x=‘PE’
0.2 if x=‘FR’
Note 6
In the case of the NASA-TLX, all the attributes have an associated preference, derived from the pair-
wise comparisons of the original instrument. As a consequence, the function fpre f is a full-defined
function, always returning an importance value for any designed workload attribute.
The functions of figure 5.3 model the four workload dichotomies, according to definition 14 (page 79),
divided by the following redlines:
• RedLine f ittingunderload = 33 • RedLineoverloadf itting = 66
x
y
1 33 50 66 100
0
0.5
1
fUNDERLOAD(x) fFIT T ING−(x) fFIT T ING+(x) fOV ERLOAD(x)
RedLine f ittingunderload RedLine
overload
f itting
D
eg
re
e
of
tr
ut
h
Fig. 5.3: A NASA-TLX defeasible translation: workload dichotomies partitioned by redlines
Layer 2:
construction of
argumentation
graph
The forecast arguments that might be designed for the NASA-TLX are those expressed in table 5.1, both
in natural language and formally.
Note 7
The attribute ‘Performance’ has an inversely proportional effect on mental workload, in line with the
original NASA-TLX instrument: decrements in performance correspond to increments in workload.
This is reflected in arguments Q, R, S, T. All the other arguments have a directly proportional effect on
workload. All the arguments in natural language (column 2) imply a certain workload level, thus they
are considered forecast and correctly formalised (column 3) in line with definition 15 (page 80).
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Attribute ∈ AT T R Arguments (natural language) Arguments (formal)
Mental demand (MD)
A: low MD implies underload A: low MD→ fUNDERLOAD
B: medium low MD implies low fit MWL B: medium low MD→ fFIT T ING−
C: medium high MD implies high fit MWL C: medium high MD→ fFIT T ING+
D: high MD implies overload D:high MD→ fOV ERLOAD
Physical demand (PD)
E: low PD implies underload E: low MD→ fUNDERLOAD
F: medium low PD implies low fit MWL F: medium low PD→ fFIT T ING−
G: medium high PD implies high fit MWL H: medium high PD→ fFIT T ING+
H: high PD implies overload H:high PD→ fOV ERLOAD
Temporal demand (TD)
I: low TD implies underload I: low TD→ fUNDERLOAD
J: medium low TD implies low fit MWL J: medium low TD→ fFIT T ING−
K: medium high TD implies high fit MWL K: medium high TD→ fFIT T ING+
L: high TD implies overload L:high TD→ fOV ERLOAD
Effort (EF)
M: low EF implies underload M: low EF→ fUNDERLOAD
N medium low EF implies low fit MWL N: medium low EF→ fFIT T ING−
O: medium high EF implies high fit MWL O: medium high EF→ fFIT T ING+
P: high EF implies overload P:high EF→ fOV ERLOAD
Q: low PE implies overload Q: low PE→ fOV ERLOAD
Performance (PE)
R: medium low PE implies high fit MWL R: medium low PE→ fFIT T ING+
S: medium high PE implies low fit MWL S: medium high PE→ fFIT T ING−
T: high PE implies underload T:high PE→ fUNDERLOAD
U: low FR implies underload U: low FR→ fUNDERLOAD
Frustration (FR)
V: medium low FR implies low fit MWL V: medium low FR→ fFIT T ING−
W: medium high FR implies high fit MWL W: medium high FR→ fFIT T ING+
X: high FR implies overload X:high FR→ fOV ERLOAD
Table 5.1: The NASA-TLX defeasible translation: natural language and formal arguments
In the original NASA-TLX instrument no logical relationship of attributes is taken into account, as a
consequence no interaction of arguments can be designed and, in turn, no rebutting or mitigating attack can be
defined. Indeed the model might be extended in the case a designer is aware of some theoretical relationship
among the six original workload attributes. The resulting argumentation graph containing arguments and
attacks (none) is depicted in figure 5.4.
A E I M T U B F J N S V
D H L P Q X C G K O R W
Arguments supporting underload Arguments supporting fitting low
Arguments supporting overload Arguments supporting fitting high
Fig. 5.4: The NASA-TLX defeasible translation: the argumentation graph (with no attack)
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Given fpre f (x), the importance of each argument can be computed, according to definition 21 (page 87).
As each premises of each designed argument contains one and only one attribute, the importance of an argu-
ment coincides exactly with the importance of each attribute:
• Aimp = Bimp =Cimp = Dimp = 1;
• Eimp = Fimp = Gimp = Himp = 0;
• Iimp = Jimp = Kimp = Limp = 0.8;
• Mimp = Nimp = Oimp = Pimp = 0.6;
• Qimp = Rimp = Simp = Timp = 0.4;
• Uimp =Vimp =Wimp = Ximp = 0.2;
Let us suppose that an end-user has answered the questions associated to the NASA-TLX, as in appendix
A.1, producing the following rates (in the scale 0 to 100):
• MD: 90;
• PD: 0;
• TD: 70;
• EF: 60;
• PE: 72;
• FR: 15;
The degrees of truth of the arguments, according to definition 16 (page 83), using the membership
functions defined in figure 5.2, are listed in table 5.2.
Attribute ∈ AT T R Argument’s degree of truth
Mental demand (MD)
Adeg = f LowMD (90) = 0 Bdeg = f
Medium−
MD (90) = 0,
Cdeg = f Medium
+
MD (90) = 0 Ddeg = f
High
MD (90) = 0.66
Physical demand (PD)
Edeg = f LowPD (0) = 1 Fdeg = f
Medium−
PD (0) = 0,
Gdeg = f Medium
+
PD (0) = 0 Hdeg = f
High
PD (0) = 0
Temporal demand (TD)
Ideg = f LowT D (70) = 0 Jdeg = f
Medium−
T D (70) = 0,
Kdeg = f Medium
+
T D (70) = 0.33 Ldeg = f
High
T D (70) = 0
Effort (EF)
Mdeg = f LowEF (60) = 0 Ndeg = f
Medium−
EF (60) = 0,
Odeg = f Medium
+
EF (60) = 0.66 Pdeg = f
High
EF (60) = 0
Performance (PE)
Qdeg = f LowPE (72) = 0 Rdeg = f
Medium−
PE (72) = 0,
Sdeg = f Medium
+
PE (72) = 0.26 Tdeg = f
High
PE (72) = 0.06
Frustration (FR)
Udeg = f LowFR (15) = 0.5 Vdeg = f
Medium−
FR (15) = 0,
Wdeg = f Medium
+
FR (15) = 0 Xdeg = f
High
FR (15) = 0
Table 5.2: The NASA-TLX defeasible translation: degree of truth of arguments
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Layer 3:
reduction of
argumentation
graph
Let us suppose a designer is willing to initialise the argument and attack reluctancy thresholds as:
• ReluctthArg = 0. Willingness to consider all those arguments whose degree of truth is greater than 0 (def.
22).
• ReluctthAtt = 0. Willingness to tolerate an attack from a less to a more credible argument - no reluctancy
(def. 24).
The set of activated arguments Argact , computed according to definition 23 (page 90) is: {D, E, K, O,
S, T, U} The set of activated attack relations Attackact , according to definition 25 (page 91), is empty, as no
designed attack relation exists. Thus the reduced argumentation graph on which Dung-style grounded and
preferred acceptability semantics, as described in section 3.5.3, can be executed, is the one depicted in figure
5.5.
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Arguments supporting
fitting high
Arguments supporting overload
Fig. 5.5: The NASA-TLX defeasible translation: reduced argumentation graph
The grounded extension produced by the grounded acceptability semantics (definition 8, page 65) coin-
cides exactly with the original abstract framework of figure 5.5, thus containing all the arguments (D, E, K,
O, S, T, U). The preferred extensions produced by the preferred acceptability semantics (definition 10, page
66), in this case coincides with the grounded extension:
• E1: D, E, K, O, S, T, U (grounded extension = preferred extension)
Layer 4:
extraction of
credible
extensions
The strength of the unique extension computed according to definition 26 (page 92) is:
E1Strength =
Card(E1)
Card(Arcact)
+
Ddeg+Edeg+Kdeg+Odeg+Sdeg+Tdeg+Udeg)
Card(E1)
=
7
7
+
0.66+1+0.33+0.66+0.26+0.06+0.5
7
= 0.495
E1 is also the strongest unique extension thus the overall index of mental workload is computed consid-
ering the forecast arguments within this extension, according to definition 27 (page 94). The equations of the
straight lines associated to the four workload dichotomies of figure 5.3 are:
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• funderload : [0..1] ∈ℜ→ [1..32] ∈ℜ funderload(x) =−31(x−1)+1
• f f itting− : [0..1] ∈ℜ→ [33..49] ∈ℜ f f itting−(x) = 16x+33
• f f itting+ : [0..1] ∈ℜ→ [50..66] ∈ℜ f f itting+(x) =−16(x−1)+50
• foverload : [0..1] ∈ℜ→ [67..100] ∈ℜ foverload(x) = 23x+77
Layer 5:
assessment of
mental
workload
The unique stronger extension carries just forecast arguments and as each of them has an associated
preference, the overall mental workload score can be computed just using the right part (within big brackets)
of the formula of definition 27 (page 94) as it follows:
MWL =
Dc(Ddeg) ·Dimp+Ec(Edeg) ·Eimp+Kc(Kdeg) ·Kimp+Oc(Odeg) ·Oimp+
Card(de f )
Card(E1)
· Sc(Sdeg) ·Simp+Tc(Tdeg) ·Timp+Uc(Udeg) ·Uimp
Dimp+Eimp+Kimp+Oimp+Simp+Timp+Uimp
( foverload(0.66) ·1)+( funderload(1) ·0)+( f f itting+(0.33) ·0.8)+( f f itting+(0.66) ·0.6)+
=
7
7
· ( f f itting−(0.26) ·0.4)+( funderload(0.06) ·0.4)+( funderload(0.5) ·0.2)
1+0+0.8+0.6+0.4+0.4+0.2
=
(92.18 ·1)+(1 ·0)+(60.72 ·0.8)+(55.44 ·0.6)+(37.66 ·0.4)+(29.14 ·0.4)+(16.5 ·0.2)
3.4
= 60.00
The overall mental workload score is 60.00 which clearly falls within the workload dichotomy f itting+,
closer to the redline that separates it with the dichotomy overload rather than the optimal middle point of 50.
A designer can interpret this workload score positively, and if a system under examination has to be tested, it
imposed an optimal workload (tending to high) on single the tested end-user. The above assessment can be
repeated several times with different users in order to achieve a better and more robust indication of the actual
workload imposed by the system under evaluation. In the case the average of the computed workload indexes
of all the tested subjects falls significantly within the dichotomies underload or overload, the designer might
structurally modify the system and repeat the workload assessment procedure. In turn, if the new changes will
bring the new average of workload indexes within the optimal ranges (Fitting lower or upper dichotomies),
then the system can be considered workload-optimised to end-user interaction.
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5.2.2 Translating WP as an instance of the defeasible framework
Layer 1:
translation of
knowledge-
base
The Workload Profile (WP)assessment procedure (Tsang and Velazquez, 1996) is based upon 8 attributes
built upon the multiple-resource model of Wickens (Wickens, 2008; Wickens and Hollands, 1999).
• processing stage: perceptual/central (SPPC)
• processing stage: response (SPR)
• processing code: spatial (CPS)
• processing code: verbal (CPV)
• input: visual (IV)
• input: auditory (IA)
• output: manual (OM)
• output: speech (OS)
These attributes form the set AT T R and each of them is modelled with the membership function of figure
5.2. In contrast to the NASA-TLX instrument, in the Workload Profile procedure, preferentiality of attributes
is not taken into account, so each attribute has an ‘undefined’ importance. It turns out that the partial function
that returns the importance of each attribute returns always an undefined value, as per definition 20 (page 87).
fpre f (x) =
{
unde f ined ∀x
The functions of figure 5.3 are used for the four workload dichotomies divided by redlines. All these
functions as well as the two redlines are the same as the ones employed in the translation of the NASA-TLX
instrument into a defeasible instance (5.2.1).
Layer 2:
construction of
argumentation
graph
The forecast arguments that might be designed for the WP are those expressed in table 5.3, both in natural
language and formally.
Note 8
All the designed arguments have a directly proportional effect on mental workload.
In the original WP workload assessment instrument, no theoretical relationship between attributes is con-
sidered, as a consequence no interaction between arguments can be designed and thus no rebutting or miti-
gating attack can be defined. Indeed the model might be extended in the case a designer is aware of further
theoretical relationships among the eight attributes. The resulting graph containing arguments and attacks
(none), is depicted in figure 5.6.
A E I M Q U Y CC B F J N R V Z DD
D H L P T X BB FF C G K O S W AA EE
Arguments supporting underload Arguments supporting fitting low
Arguments supporting overload Arguments supporting fitting high
Fig. 5.6: The Workload Profile defeasible translation: arguments framework (with no attack)
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Attribute ∈ AT T R Arguments (natural language) Arguments (formal)
processing stage:
A: low SPPC implies underload A: low SPPC→ fUNDERLOAD
B: medium low SPPC implies low fit MWL B: medium low SPPC→ fFIT T ING−
perceptual/central (SPPC)
C: medium high SPPC implies high fit MWL C: medium high SPPC→ fFIT T ING+
D: high SPPC implies overload D: high SPPC→ fOV ERLOAD
processing stage:
E: low SPR implies underload E: low SPR→ fUNDERLOAD
F: medium low SPR implies low fit MWL F: medium low SPR→ fFIT T ING−
response (SPPC)
G: medium high SPR implies high fit MWL G: medium high SPR→ fFIT T ING+
H: high SPR implies overload H: high SPR→ fOV ERLOAD
processing code:
I: low CPS implies underload I: low CPS→ fUNDERLOAD
J: medium low CPS implies low fit MWL J: medium low CPS→ fFIT T ING−
spatial (CPS)
K: medium high CPS implies high fit MWL K: medium high CPS→ fFIT T ING+
L: high CPS implies overload L: high CPS→ fOV ERLOAD
processing code:
M: low CPV implies underload M: low CPS CPV fUNDERLOAD
N: medium low CPV implies low fit MWL N: medium low CPV→ fFIT T ING−
verbal (CPV)
O: medium high CPV implies high fit MWL O: medium high CPV→ fFIT T ING+
P: high CPV implies overload P: high CPV→ fOV ERLOAD
input:
Q: low IV implies underload Q: low IV fUNDERLOAD
R: medium low IV implies low fit MWL R: medium low IV→ fFIT T ING−
visual (IV)
S: medium high IV implies high fit MWL S: medium high IV→ fFIT T ING+
T: high IV implies overload T: high IV→ fOV ERLOAD
input:
U: low IA implies underload U: low IA fUNDERLOAD
V: medium low IA implies low fit MWL V: medium low IA→ fFIT T ING−
auditory (IA)
W: medium high IA implies high fit MWL W: medium high IA→ fFIT T ING+
X: high IA implies overload X: high IA→ fOV ERLOAD
output:
Y: low OM implies underload Y: low OM fUNDERLOAD
Z: medium low OM implies low fit MWL Z: medium low OM→ fFIT T ING−
manual (OM)
AA: medium high OM implies high fit MWL AA: medium high OM→ fFIT T ING+
BB: high OM implies overload BB: high OM→ fOV ERLOAD
output:
CC: low OS implies underload CC: low OS fUNDERLOAD
DD: medium low OS implies low fit MWL DD: medium low OS→ fFIT T ING−
speech (OS)
EE: medium high OS implies high fit MWL EE: medium high OS→ fFIT T ING+
FF: high OS implies overload FF: high OS→ fOV ERLOAD
Table 5.3: The Workload Profile defeasible translation: natural language & formal arguments
As mentioned before, in contrast to the NASA-TLX instrument, in the Workload Profile procedure, prefer-
entiality is not accounted. In turn all the designed arguments have an ‘undefined’ importance. Let us suppose
that an end-user has answered the WP questions of appendix A.3 (page 175) with the following values (in the
scale 0 to 100):
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• SPPC: 88;
• SPR: 81;
• CPS: 15;
• CPV: 2;
• IV: 90;
• IA: 75;
• OM: 85;
• OS: 3;
The degrees of truth of each argument, according to definition 16 (page 83), are listed in table 5.4.
Attribute ∈ AT T R Argument’s degree of truth
processing stage: Adeg = f LowSPPC(45) = 0 Bdeg = f
Medium−
SPPC (45) = 0.86
perceptual/central (SP-PC) Cdeg = f Medium
+
SPPC (45) = 0 Ddeg = f
High+
SPPC (45) = 0
processing stage: Edeg = f LowSPR (31) = 0 Fdeg = f
Medium−
S−R (31) = 0.37
response (SP-R) Gdeg = f Medium
+
SPR (31) = 0 Hdeg = f
High+
SPR (31) = 0
processing code: Ideg = f LowCPS (24) = 0.2 Jdeg = f
Medium−
CPS (24) = 0
spatial (CP-S) Kdeg = f Medium
+
CPS (24) = 0 Ldeg = f
High+
CPS (24) = 0
processing code: Mdeg = f Low(CPV )(53) = 0 Ndeg = f
Medium−
(CPV ) (53) = 0
verbal (CP-V) Odeg = f Medium
+
(CPV ) (53) = 0.9 Pdeg = f
High+
(CPV ) (53) = 0
input: Qdeg = f LowIV (59) = 0 Rdeg = f
Medium−
IV (59) = 0
visual (I-V) Sdeg = f Medium
+
IV (59) = 0.7 Tdeg = f
High+
IV (59) = 0
input: Udeg = f LowIA (28) = 0.07 Vdeg = f
Medium−
IA (28) = 0.27
auditory (I-A) Wdeg = f Medium
+
IA (28) = 0 Xdeg = f
High+
IA (28) = 0
output: Ydeg = f Low(OM)(29) = 0.04 Zdeg = f
Medium−
(OM) (29) = 0.31
manual (O-M) AAdeg = f Medium
+
(OM) (29) = 0 BBdeg = f
High+
(OM) (29) = 0
output: CCdeg = f Low(OS)(45) = 0 DDdeg = f
Medium−
(OS) (45) = 0.86
speech (O-S) EEdeg = f Medium
+
(OS) (45) = 0 FFdeg = f
High+
(OS) (45) = 0
Table 5.4: The Workload Profile defeasible translation: degree of truth of arguments
Layer 3:
reduction of
argumentation
graph
Let us initialise the argument and attack reluctancy thresholds as:
• ReluctthArg = 0. Willingness to consider all the arguments whose degree of truth is greater than 0 (def.
16).
• ReluctthAtt = 0. Willingness to tolerate an attack from a less to a more credible argument - no reluctancy
(def. 24).
The set of activated arguments Argact , computed according to definition 23 (page 90) are: B, F, I, O, S, U,
V, Y, Z, DD. The set of activated attack relations Attackact , according to definition 25 (page 91), is empty, as
no designed attack relation exists. Thus the abstract argumentation graph on which Dung-style grounded and
preferred acceptability semantics, as described in section 3.5.3, can be executed, is as in figure 5.7.
106
IU
Y
V
F
B
Z
DD
SO
Ar
gu
me
nts
su
pp
ort
ing
un
de
rlo
ad
Arguments supporting fitting low
Arguments supporting fitting high
Fig. 5.7: The Workload Profile defeasible translation: reduced argumentation graph
The grounded extension produced by the grounded acceptability semantics (definition 8, page 65) coin-
cides exactly with the reduced graph of figure 5.7, thus containing all the arguments (B, F, I, O, S, U, V, Y, Z,
DD). The preferred extensions produced by the preferred acceptability semantics (definition 10, page 66), in
this case coincides with the grounded extension:
• E1: B, F, I, O, S, U, V, Y, Z, DD (grounded extension = preferred extension)
Layer 4:
extraction of
credible
extensions
The strength of the unique extension computed according to definition 26 (page 92) is:
E1Strength =
Card(E1)
Card(Arcact)
+
Bdeg+Fdeg+ Ideg+Odeg+Sdeg+Udeg+Vdeg+Ydeg+Zdeg+DDdeg
Card(E1)
=
10
10
+
0.86+0.37+0.2+0.9+0.7+0.07+0.27+0.04+0.31+0.86
10
= 0.458
E1 is also the strongest unique extension thus the overall index of mental workload is computed
considering the forecast arguments within that extension, as in definition 27 (page 94). The equations of the
straight lines associated to the four workload dichotomies are the same as the one used in the translation of
the NASA-TLX, as in figure 5.3.
Layer 5:
assessment of
mental
workload
The unique strongest extension carries just forecast arguments and as each of them do not have an as-
sociated preference, the overall mental workload score can be computed just using the left part (within big
brackets) of the formula of definition 27 (page 94) as it follows:
MWL =
f f itting−(0.86)+ f f itting−(0.37)+ funderload(0.2)+ f f itting+(0.9)+ f f itting+(0.7)
=
Card(Unde f )
Card(E1)
· funderload(0.07)+ f f itting−(0.27)+ funderload(0.04)+ f f itting−(0.31)+ f f itting−(0.86)
Card(Unde f )
=
10
10
+
46.76+38.92+25.8+51.6+54.8+29.83+37.32+30.76+37.96+46.76
10
= 36.97
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The overall mental workload score is 36.97 which clearly falls within the workload dichotomy f itting−.
A designer might interpret this workload score as not really optimal, as it is closer to the redline that
separates the dichotomy fitting low and underload. This means that the system under examination imposed a
moderately fit workload on the tested end-user, and although not generating underload situations, it could be
better optimised, according to that user.
In the next section, the goal is to show how to create a brand new instance of the defeasible framework that
accounts for a wider set of workload attributes MWLNIde f . This is subsequently extended into another instance
MWLde f , by adding theoretical and logical interaction of designed arguments in form of attack relations.
5.2.3 Definition of a brand new instance of the defeasible framework
A new instance of the defeasible framework is built according to the knowledge-base of the author of this
thesis, driven by his subjective interpretation of the literature of mental workload and his beliefs. Each pieces
of evidence in this knowledge-base is defeasible thus open to invalidation by other evidence. In addition it
does not aim to be fully exhaustive and the final ultimate set of pieces of evidence to consider for representing
mental workload, but just a subjective proposal open to criticisms that can be extended, reduced or discarded
as a whole. This knowledge-base is summarised with the following natural language propositions, classified
as endogenous and exogenous factors. The former refers to those variables inherent in a person’s ability and
skills, while the latter refers to those variables inherent in the situation.
Layer 1:
translation of
knowledge-
base
• task demands (exogenous factors) - from the NASA-TLX (Hart, 2006; Reid and Nygren, 1988)
1. mental demand has a direct relationship with mental workload: the higher the perceived mental
demand of the task, the higher the mental workload.
2. temporal demand has a direct relationship with mental workload: the higher the perceived tempo-
ral demand of the task, the higher the mental workload.
3. physical demand has a direct relationship with mental workload: the higher the perceived physical
demand of the task the higher the mental workload.
• task features/complexity and interaction with the user (exogenous factors) - from the MRT (Tsang and
Velazquez, 1996; Wickens, 2008; Wickens and Hollands, 1999)
4. solving and deciding are notions that have a direct relationship with mental workload: the higher
the degree of attention required for decision-making, problem-solving and remembering, the
higher the mental workload.
5. selection of response is a notion that has a direct relationship with mental workload: the higher
the degree of attention required for selecting the proper response channel, the higher the mental
workload.
6. task and space are notions that have a direct relationship with mental workload: the higher the
degree of attention required for spatially paying attention around, the higher the mental workload.
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7. verbal material is a notion that has a direct relationship with mental workload: the higher the
degree of attention required for processing linguistic material or listening to verbal conversation
or reading, the higher the mental workload.
8. visual resources is a notion that has a direct relationship with mental workload: the higher the de-
gree of attention required for the execution of the task based on the information visually received,
the higher the mental workload.
9. auditory resources is a notion that has a direct relationship with mental workload: the higher
the degree of attention required for the execution of the task based on the information auditorily
received, the higher the mental workload.
10. manual response is a notion that has a direct relationship with mental workload: the higher the
degree of attention required for manually respond to the task, the higher the mental workload.
11. speech response is a notion that has a direct relationship with mental workload: the higher the
degree of attention required for producing the speech response, the higher the mental workload.
• user’s state (endogenous factors)
12. psychological stress has been thought having a direct relationship with mental workload: the
higher the stress felt by the user the higher the mental workload (Hart, 2006; Hart and Staveland,
1988; Reid and Nygren, 1988). However, here the belief is that the psychological stress perceived
by the user influences mental workload only when it is too low or too high. In these two cases
the operator’s state is significantly affected. In the former case, mental workload is at a minimum
level, underlying underload, while in the latter case, it is at a maximum level, denoting overload.
13. arousal has a complex relationship with performance, following a curve that changes due to task
differences. For simple or well-learned tasks, the relationship can be considered linear with im-
provements in performance as arousal increases. For complex/difficult or unfamiliar tasks, the
relationship between arousal and performance becomes inverse, with declines in performance as
arousal increases (Yerkes and Dodson, 1908). The effect of task complexity/difficulty leads to
the hypothesis that the Yerkes-Dodson law (as depicted in figure 2.7) might be sliced into two
distinct parts. The upward part of the inverted ‘U’ curve might be believed to be as the energising
effect of arousal while the downward part is caused by the negative effects of arousal on cognitive
processes like attention, memory and problem-solving.
• user intentions (endogenous factors)
14. effort has a direct relationship with mental workload: the higher the effort exerted by the user the
higher the mental workload (Hart, 2006; Hart and Staveland, 1988).
15. motivation is related to effort and performance: the higher the user’s motivation to attend to the
task the higher is the willingness to exert effort to improve task performance. When motivation is
moderate, here it is believed it does not have a significant influence on mental workload. On the
other hand, when motivation is too low, it might have a direct relationship with mental workload.
In this case, the user’s state is affected and workload is hypothesised to be at a minimum level.
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• context/domain (exogenous factors)
16. parallelism has a direct relationship with mental workload: the higher the parallelism regarding
the execution of multiple tasks, the higher the mental workload. In addition harder tasks are
harder to perform in parallel as they require more attention and cognitive resources. On the other
hand, easier tasks can be concurrently executed more easily. Analogously, tasks which are similar
to each other are harder to be executed in parallel than more distinct ones. Similarity of tasks
could be measured by employing the dimensions accounted in the multiple resource theory, as
previously mentioned (Tsang and Velazquez, 1996; Wickens, 2008; Wickens and Hollands, 1999).
17. context bias has a direct relationship with mental workload, when bias are not too low: the higher
the bias and distraction degree is, the higher the mental workload. Here it is believed that when
bias are too low, workload is not influenced. On the other hand, when a moderate or high degree
of bias and interruptions occurs during primary task, users can take longer time to complete the
task, committing more errors and experiencing even double negative effects with a significative
increment in mental workload (Bailey and Konstan, 2006). In addition, it is reasonable to assume
that when the degree of context bias is too high, the psychological stress of a subject is likely not
to be low.
• user’s features (endogenous factors)
18. past knowledge has an inverted relationship with mental workload: the higher the user’s knowl-
edge of the task or the context/domain, the lower the mental workload. This is related to the notion
of learning as described by Kahneman whose model explains why learning helps, as it makes ex-
ecution of tasks easier (Kahneman, 1973). When past knowledge is too low, the user has likely
never dealt with the task under consideration, thus the mental workload is likely to be high. On
the other hand, when past knowledge is high, the user has already learnt the task or similar ones
in the past, thus the resulting mental workload is likely to be low. Past knowledge is an important
factor that contributes to develop the skill of a person. In addition, if past knowledge is too low, it
is very unlikely that a subject exerted no effort to perform a task. Similarly, if past knowledge is
too high, it is unlikely that a subject exerted high effort to perform a task.
19. skill has an inverted relationship with mental workload: the higher the user’s skill the lower the
mental workload. Skills incorporate the notion of strategy (heuristic) used for dealing with more
difficult and complex tasks in the same context/domain. Heuristic might be seen as mental short-
cuts which could provide a reasonable performance without investing too much effort (Wickens
and Hollands, 1999). User’s skill is important when it is too low or too high. In the former case,
the user is not skilled enough to perform the task, experiencing high workload, while in the latter
case, the user’s skill play a significant role in reducing mental workload on task. Skill is related
to past knowledge: if a subject has already dealt with a task or similar tasks, the degree of skill is
likely not to be low. In addition, if the degree of skill is too low, it is very unlikely that a subject
exerted no effort to perform a task. Similarly, if the degree of skill is too high, it is unlikely that a
subject exerted high effort to perform a task.
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20. performance has an inverted relationship with mental workload: the higher the performance per-
ceived by the user the lower the mental workload and vice-versa (Hart, 2006; Hart and Staveland,
1988; O’ Donnel and Eggemeier, 1986).
The above knowledge-base was in practice quantified by designing a subjective questionnaire as in
appendix appendix A.5. During the completion of this questionnaire of appendix by experimental volunteers
(as described in the next chapter), it has been noted that subjects could better indicate low levels rather than
high levels of a workload attribute. In other words, they could better move the sliders of figure 6.2 towards the
extreme left side, to indicate a low degree, than moving it towards the extreme right side, to indicate a high de-
gree. This means that in general, subjects could easily quantify the null impact of a workload attribute rather
than the full impact, showing more uncertainty in indicating higher levels. This tendency can be understood
by taking a closer look at the distributions of the answers of volunteers for each attribute (appendix C, section
C.1.3). In these distributions, the frequencies between 66 and 100 tend to be closer to 66. For these reasons,
the membership functions for each workload attribute introduced in section 5.2.3, are designed as in figure 5.8.
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Fig. 5.8: The new defeasible instance: membership functions used for every MWL attribute
These membership functions are generalised Bell curves or Gaussian curves commonly used in Fuzzy
Logic FL. In order to model the ‘low’ and ‘high’ subsets of each attributes, a composite function has been
adopted, that depends on other two Gaussian functions, each with two parameters sig and c as given by:
f (x,sig,c) = e
−(x−c)2
2sig2
The first function, specified by sig1 and c1, determines the shape of the left-most curve. The second
function specified by sig2 and c2 determines the shape of the right-most curve. In the case c1 < c2, the total
function reaches a maximum value of 1 else the maximum value is less than 1.
f1(x,sig1,c1) =
 e
−(x−c)2
2∗sig2 if x≤ c1
1 otherwise
f2(x,sig2,c2) =

1 if x≤ c2
e
−(x−c2)2
2∗sig22 otherwise
f (x,sig1,c1,sig2,c2) = f1(x,sig1,c1)∗ f2(x,sig2,c2)
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f Lowattribute : [0..32] ∈ℵ→ [0..1] ∈ℜ f Lowattribute = f (x,10,1,12,8)
f Highattribute : [67..100] ∈ℵ→ [0..1] ∈ℜ f Highattribute = f (x,10,80,1,100)
As it is possible to see, the extreme left part of the membership function for the ‘low’ subset returns 1
for inputs less than 8: in these cases there is no doubt the interviewed subjects wanted to rate the attribute
under examination as really low. Similarly, the extreme right part of the membership function for the ‘high’
subset returns 1 for inputs greater than 80: in these cases there is no doubt the subjects wanted to rate the
attribute under examination as really high. The extreme right part is more extended than the extreme left part
because of the aforementioned issue of subjects being able to indicate ‘low’ levels better than ‘high’ levels
for a workload attribute.
The function used for the middle subsets of an attribute (lower and upper parts) is a generalised Bell-
shaped membership function as follows:
f (x,a,b,c) =
1
1+ |x− c
a
|
2
b
with a controlling the width of the curve at f (x) = 0.5, b controlling the slope of the curve at x = c− a and
x = c+a, and c represents the centre of the curve.
f Medium
−
attribute , : [33..50] ∈ℵ→ [0..1] ∈ℜ f Medium
−
attribute = f (x,5,1,50)
f Medium
+
attribute , : [51..66] ∈ℵ→ [0..1] ∈ℜ f Medium
+
attribute = f (x,5,1,50)
In this new defeasible instance, the designer (author of this thesis) is not willing to specify any preference
of considered attributes, thus the function that returns the importance of each attribute is undefined, as per
definition 20 (page 87).
fpre f (x) =
{
unde f ined ∀x
The workload dichotomies the author is willing to define for the new instance are the same functions used
in section 5.2.1 and depicted in figure 5.3, partitioned by the following redlines:
• RedLine f ittingunderload = 33 • RedLineoverloadf itting = 66
Layer 2:
construction of
argumentation
graph
The forecast arguments that might be designed for the aforementioned knowledge-base are as it follows:
1. mental demand:
• MD1: [ low mental demand→UNDERLOAD ]
• MD2: [ medium lower mental demand→ FIT T ING− ]
• MD3: [ medium upper mental demand→ FIT T ING+]
• MD4: [ high mental demand→ OV ERLOAD ]
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2. temporal demand:
• TD1: [ low temporal demand→UNDERLOAD ]
• TD2: [ medium lower temporal demand →
FIT T ING−]
• TD3: [ medium upper temporal demand →
FIT T ING+]
• TD4: [ high temporal demand→ OV ERLOAD ]
3. physical demand:
• PD1: [ low physical demand→UNDERLOAD ]
• PD2: [ medium lower physical demand→ FIT T ING−]
• PD3: [ medium upper physical demand→ FIT T ING+]
• PD4: [ high physical demand→ OV ERLOAD ]
4. solving and deciding:
• SD1: [ low solving/deciding degree→UNDERLOAD ]
• SD2: [ medium lower solving/deciding degree →
FIT T ING− ]
• SD3: [ medium upper solving/deciding degree →
FIT T ING+ ]
• SD4: [ high solving/deciding degree→ OV ERLOAD ]
5. selection of response:
• SR1: [ low selection of response degree →
UNDERLOAD ]
• SR2: [ medium lower selection of response degree →
FIT T ING− ]
• SR3: [ medium upper selection of response degree →
FIT T ING+ ]
• SR4: [ high selection of response degree →
OV ERLOAD]
6. task and space:
• TS1: [ low task/space degree→UNDERLOAD ]
• TS2: [ medium lower task/space degree→ FIT T ING−]
• TS3: [ medium upper task/space degree→ FIT T ING+]
• TS4: [ high task/space degree→ OV ERLOAD ]
7. verbal material:
• VM1: [ low verbal material degree→UNDERLOAD ]
• VM2: [ medium lower verbal material degree →
FIT T ING− ]
• VM3: [ medium upper verbal material degree →
FIT T ING+ ]
• VM4: [ high verbal material degree→ OV ERLOAD ]
8. visual resources:
• VR1: [ low visual resources degree→UNDERLOAD ]
• VR2: [ medium lower visual resources degree →
FIT T ING− ]
• VR3: [ medium upper visual resources degree →
FIT T ING+ ]
• VR4: [ high visual resources degree→ OV ERLOAD ]
9. auditory resources:
• AR1: [ low auditory resources degree →
UNDERLOAD]
• AR2: [ medium auditory resources degree →
FIT T ING− ]
• AR3: [ medium auditory resources degree →
FIT T ING+ ]
• AR4: [ high auditory resources degree→ OV ERLOAD]
10. manual response:
• MR1: [ low manual response degree→UNDERLOAD]
• MR2: [ medium lower manual response degree →
FIT T ING− ]
• MR3: [ medium upper manual response degree →
FIT T ING+ ]
• MR4: [ high manual response degree→ OV ERLOAD ]
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11. speech response:
• SP1: [ low speech response degree→UNDERLOAD ]
• SP2: [ medium lower speech response degree →
FIT T ING− ]
• SP3: [ medium upper speech response degree →
FIT T ING+ ]
• SP4: [ high speech response degree→ OV ERLOAD ]
12. psychological stress:
• PS1: [ low psychological stress→UNDERLOAD ] • PS2: [ high psychological stress→ OV ERLOAD ]
13. arousal: none
14. effort:
• EF1: [ low effort→UNDERLOAD ]
• EF2: [ medium lower effort→ FIT T ING− ]
• EF3: [ medium upper effort→ FIT T ING+ ]
• EF4: [ high effort→ OV ERLOAD ]
15. motivation:
• MV1: [ low motivation→UNDERLOAD ]
16. parallelism:
• PA1: [ low parallelism degree→UNDERLOAD ]
• PA2: [ medium lower parallelism degree→
FIT T ING−]
• PA3: [ medium upper parallelism degree →
FIT T ING+]
• PA4: [ high parallelism degree→ OV ERLOAD ]
17. context bias:
• CB1: [ low context bias degree→UNDERLOAD ]
• CB2: [ medium lower context bias degree→
FIT T ING−]
• CB3: [ medium upper context bias degree →
FIT T ING+]
• CB4: [ high context bias degree→ OV ERLOAD ]
18. past knowledge:
• PK1: [ low past knowledge→ OV ERLOAD ] • PK2: [ high past knowledge→UNDERLOAD ]
19. skills:
• SK1: [ low skills→ OV ERLOAD ] • SK2: [ high skills→UNDERLOAD ]
20. performance:
• PF1: [ low perceived performance→ OV ERLOAD ]
• PF2: [ medium lower perceived performance →
FIT T ING+ ]
• PF3: [ medium upper perceived performance →
FIT T ING− ]
• PF4: [ high perceived performance→UNDERLOAD ]
The mitigating arguments that might be designed considering the aforementioned knowledge-base are:
13 arousal: (the arguments are built upon the relationships between task difficulty, arousal and perfor-
mance of figure 2.7 and summarised in figure 5.9)
• AD1a: [ low arousal & easy task→ PF4 ]
• AD1b: [ low arousal & easy task→ PF3 ]
• AD1c: [ low arousal & easy task→ PF2 ]
• AD2a: [ low arousal & difficult task→ PF4 ]
• AD2b: [ low arousal & difficult task→ PF3 ]
• AD2c: [ low arousal & difficult task→ PF2 ]
• AD3a: [ medium lower arousal & easy task→ PF1 ]
• AD3b: [ medium lower arousal & easy task→ PF4 ]
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• AD4a: [ medium lower arousal & difficult task→ PF1]
• AD4b: [ medium lower arousal & difficult task→ PF3]
• AD4c: [ medium lower arousal & difficult task→ PF4]
• AD4d: [ medium upper arousal & difficult task→ PF1]
• AD4e: [ medium upper arousal & difficult task→ PF3]
• AD4f: [ medium upper arousal & difficult task→ PF4]
• AD5a: [ medium upper arousal & easy task→ PF1 ]
• AD5b: [ medium upper arousal & easy task→ PF2 ]
• AD5c: [ medium upper arousal & easy task→ PF3 ]
• AD5d: [ high arousal & easy task→ PF1 ]
• AD5e: [ high arousal & easy task→ PF2 ]
• AD5f: [ high arousal & easy task→ PF3 ]
• AD6a: [ high arousal & difficult task→ PF2 ]
• AD6b: [ high arousal & difficult task→ PF3 ]
• AD6c: [ high arousal & difficult task→ PF4 ]
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Fig. 5.9: Arguments extracted from the relationships between task difficulty, arousal and performance
15 motivation:
• MV2: [ low motivation→ EF3 ]
• MV3: [ low motivation→ EF4 ]
• MV4: [ high motivation→ EF1]
• MV5: [ high motivation→ EF2 ]
19 skills:
• DS1 [ difficult task & high skills→ EF4 ]
• DS2 [ difficult task & high skills & low effort→ PF1]
• DS3 [ difficult task & high skills & medium lower effort
→ PF1 ]
• DS4 [ difficult task & high skills & medium upper effort
→ PF1 ]
The rebutting attack relations that might be built from the aforementioned knowledge-base are:
• Rebutting
– The attributes ‘mental demand’ and ‘solving and deciding’ model similar notions, therefore they
contradict each other if they support totally different conclusions (two total opposite workload
dichotomies). In this case rebutting attacks model the inconsistency of the available evidence:
∗ r1: (MD1, SD4) ∗ r2: (MD4, SD1)
– From the knowledge-base (points 18, 19) high skills and low past knowledge (and vice-versa) are
situations that should not occur. Therefore rebutting attacks between these two extreme opposite
degrees of skill and past knowledge are aimed at model such inconsistency:
∗ r3: (PK1, SK4) ∗ r4: (PK4, SK1)
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– From the knowledge-base (points 18, 19) high skills and high effort, low skills and low effort,
are situations that should not occur. Similarly, between high past knowledge and high effort (and
low past knowledge and low effort). These inconsistent cases are modelled with the following
rebutting attacks:
∗ r5: (PK1, EF1)
∗ r6: (PK2, EF4)
∗ r7: (SK1, EF1)
∗ r8: (SK4, EF4)
– From the knowledge-base (point 17) a higher degree of context bias is in contradiction with a
lower degree of psychological stress. Thus to model this inconsistency, the following rebutting
attack might be designed:
∗ r9: (CB4, PS1)
The undercutting attack relations that follow (according to definition 19, page 85) from the designed
mitigating arguments are as it follows:
• Undermining
– um1: (AD1a, PF4), um2: (AD1b, PF3),
um3: (AD1c, PF2)
– um4: (AD2a, PF4), um5: (AD2b, PF3),
um6: (AD2c, PF2)
– um7: (AD3a, PF1), um8: (AD3b, PF4)
– um9: (AD4a, PF1), um10: (AD4b, PF3),
um11: (AD4c, PF4), um12: (AD4d, PF1), um13:
(AD4e, PF3), um14: (AD4f, PF4)
– um15: (AD5a, PF1), um16: (AD5b, PF2),
um17: (AD5c, PF3) um18: (AD5d, PF1),
um19: (AD5e, PF2), um20: (AD5f, PF3)
– um21: (AD6a, PF2), um22: (AD6b, PF3),
um23: (AD6c, PF4)
– uc1: (MV2, EF3), uc2: (MV3, EF4), uc3: (MV4, EF1),
uc4: (MV5, EF2)
– uc5: (DS1, EF4), uc6: (DS2, PF1), uc7: (DS3, PF1),
uc8: (DS4, PF1)
The argumentation graph that results by joining all the forecast and mitigating arguments is part of
an instance of the defeasible framework now on referred to as MWLNIde f (no interactions). Extending this
argumentation graph by adding the designed rebutting and undercutting attacks, a new instance of the
framework emerges, now on referred to as MWLde f . These two instances are treated as different instances of
the defeasible framework because, as described in the following chapter, they are separately evaluated. The
argumentation graph emerged in MWLde f (including interactions) is depicted in figure 5.10.
In addition, as it is possible to see in the list of attributes of list 5.2.3, the attribute arousal is based
on task difficulty for which no question has been designed in the questionnaire of table A.5 of appendix.
As a consequence an explicit mechanism to quantify task difficulty is needed for representing the workload
attribute arousal and also the mitigating arguments designed upon it (list 5.2.3). Here the proposal is to model
task difficulty as the average of the workload attributes accounted in the Workload Profile WP instrument
which can be quantified because an explicit question has been designed for each of them (questionnaire A.5).
Taskdi f f iculty : [0..100] ∈ℜ
Taskdi f f iculty = 18 ((solving/deciding) + (response) + (task/space) + (verbal material) +
(visual resources)+(auditory resources)+(manual response)+(speech response))
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Fig. 5.10: The brand new instance: Knowledge-base translated into an argumentation graph
Layer 3:
reduction of
argumentation
graph
The argument reluctancy threshold and the attack reluctancy threshold are defined as it follows:
• ReluctthArg = 0. Willingness to consider all the arguments whose degree of truth is greater than 0 (def.
16).
• ReluctthAtt = 0.5. Willingness to tolerate an attack from a less to a more credible argument just if their
difference of degree of truth is not more than 0.5 (def. 24).
The instance MWLde f can be summarised with the following tuple using an illustrative set of inputs
(answers of the questionnaire of table A.5 in appendix) is used:
MWLde f = {AT T R, fPre f , MF, RL, DMF, ARGS, AT TACKS, RT, INPUT S}
with
• ATTR: { Mental demand, temporal demand, effort, performance, frustration, solving and deciding,
selection of response, task and space, verbal material, visual resources, auditory resources, manual
response, speech response, context bias, past knowledge, skill, motivation, parallelism, arousal, task
difficulty}.
• Pref: fpre f (x) is unde f ined (no preferentiality considered)
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• MF: the membership function for the attributes are the ones defined in figure 5.8
• RL: { RedLine f ittingunderload = 33, RedLineoverloadf itting = 66 }
• DMF: workload dichotomies of figure 5.3
• ARGS: the designed arguments built upon the attributes in AT T R are the ones listed in section 5.2.3
(page 112)
• ATTACKS: the designed attack relationships are the ones defined in page 115
• RT: { ReluctthArg = 0, ReluctthAtt = 0.5 }
• INPUTS: {70, 15, 78, 76, 12 18, 17, 14, 78, 82, 9, 13, 0, 9, 71, 64, 16, 7, 21, 30}
Note 9
The instance MWLNIde f coincides with the above tuple describing the instance MWLde f with the only
difference that the AT TACK set is empty.
Note 10
The values in the INPUTS set are random and just for illustrative purposes. These values are the inputs
responsible for the activation of the argumentation graph behind the instances MWLNIde f and MWLde f
The instances MWLNIde f and MWLde f can now be evaluated by applying the algorithm of section 5.1,
starting with the activation of arguments and attacks relations (using the values in the INPUT S set of the
tuple). Table 5.5 lists which arguments are activated with the correspondent degree of truth (according to
definition 23, page 90).
Argument Internal representation Degree of truth
MD4 high mental demand→ OV ERLOAD 0.606
TD1 low temporal demand→UNDERLOAD 0.843
EF4 high effort→ OV ERLOAD 0.980
PF4 high perceived performance→UNDERLOAD 0.923
PS1 low psychological stress→UNDERLOAD 0.945
SD1 low solving/deciding degree→UNDERLOAD 0.706
SR1 low selection of response degree→UNDERLOAD 0.754
TS1 low task and space degree→UNDERLOAD 0.882
VM4 high verbal material degree→ OV ERLOAD 0.980
VR4 high visual resources degree→ OV ERLOAD 1.000
AR1 low auditory resources degree→UNDERLOAD 0.996
MR1 low manual response degree→UNDERLOAD 0.916
SP1 low speech response degree→UNDERLOAD 0.916
MV1 low motivation→UNDERLOAD 0.800
PA1 low parallelism degree→UNDERLOAD 1.000
CB1 low context bias degree→UNDERLOAD 0.996
PK2 high past knowledge→UNDERLOAD 0.666
MV3 low motivation→ EF4 0.800
ADa1 low arousal and easy task→ PF4 0.371
Table 5.5: An illustrative scenario: activated arguments and degree of truth for MWLde f
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Table 5.6 lists the activated attacks (according to definition 25, page 91). The union of the set of activated
arguments and the set of activated attacks forms the argumentation graph depicted in figure 5.11 that can now
be evaluated by applying the Dung’s preferred semantic, as described in section 3.5.3.
Attack Internal representation
uc2 (MV3, EF4)
r2 (MD4, SD1)
r6 (PK2, EF4)
Table 5.6: An illustrative scenario: activated attack relations for MWLde f
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Fig. 5.11: An illustrative scenario: activated arguments and attack relations for MWLde f
Layer 4:
extraction of
credible
extensions
Multiple extensions of arguments might be computed by the preferred semantic, as per definition 10 (page
66). In this case, their strength is separately computed as per definition 26 (page 92). From the reduced
argumentation graph of figure 5.11, two preferred extensions are computed (with the values in the INPUT S
set of the tuple), and according to definition 26 (page 92) their strength is as it follows:
• Extension 1: 1.673 • Extension 2: 1.679
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Fig. 5.12: An illustrative scenario: computed preferred extensions for MWLde f
As a consequence, extension 2, although really similar to extension 1, is the strongest preferred extension
that can be used to compute the final index of mental workload, according to definition 27 (page 94).
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Layer 5:
assessment of
mental
workload
The degree of truth of each forecast argument in the stronger extension (ex. 2) is used as the input of the
workload dichotomy supported by the argument itself to compute a partial workload score. The average of
these scores represents the final index of mental workload, which in this case is 16.81.
Note 11
It is important to recall that definition 27 (page 94) can handle multiple strongest extensions, and it ac-
counts for the importance associated to each arguments that, however, it is undefined in the instance
MWLde f ( fpre f (x) = unde f ined).
The two created instances built for the translation of the NASA-TLX and the WP instruments, (sections
5.2.1 and 5.2.2), as well as the brand new instances MWLde f and MWLNIde f (with and without interaction of
arguments) will be part of the evaluation strategy of the defeasible framework, as described in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6
Evaluation
This chapter is devoted to the description and execution of a user study for the evaluation of the defeasible
framework for mental workload representation and assessment designed in chapter 4. The first goal, as stated
in objective 4 of the introduction chapter, is to evaluate the capacity of the proposed framework to reproduce
the NASA-TLX and the Workload profile WP assessment procedures. The hypothesis is that the assessments
produced by these two state-of-the-art original instruments, which are then used as the baseline, can be repli-
cated by the two defeasible instances of the framework (NASA−T LXde f and WPde f ), as constructed in the
previous chapter 5. This capacity is tested by investigating the convergent validity of the two instances with
the two original instruments. The second goal of the introduction chapter, as stated in objective 5, is to in-
vestigate the quality of the assessments produced by the brand new instances of the defeasible framework
MWLde f and MWLNIde f , as built in previous chapter 5. The hypothesis is that the assessments produced by
MWLde f have a similar sensitivity, but a better diagnosticity and validity than the original NASA-TLX and
the original Workload Profile WP instruments. Additionally, MWLde f is hypothesised to overperform the
other instance MWLde f NI , showing how interaction of arguments can actually play a significant role in the
assessment of mental workload.
Defeasible framework
NASA−T LXde f WPde f MWLNIde f MWLde f
NASA− T LX WP
Baseline
Sensitivity,
diagnosticity,
validity
=⇒: comparison (Obj 4)
−→: comparison (Obj 5)
−→: instance of
Fig. 6.1: Evaluation strategy schema
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6.1 Resolution of objectives and experimental studies
The concept of mental workload has been applied in computer science with an increasing focus in the WWW
domain because it is believed to be an important construct for analysing user experience over web-based tasks
as well as a design criterion (Albers, 2011; Gwizdka, 2009, 2010; Kokini et al., 2012; Longo et al., 2012b;
Schultheis and Jameson, 2004; Tremoulet et al., 2009; Wiebe et al., 2010). For these reasons the WWW
domain has been selected as the context for conducting experimental studies, the WWW being part of the
wider field of HCI. The evaluation of the framework is the last step for answering the research question of
section 1.5, and it deals with objectives 4 and 5 defined in the introduction chapter:
4 investigation of the capacity of the designed framework to reproduce state-of-the-art workload assess-
ment techniques
5 investigation of the quality of the assessments produced by brand new instances of the defeasible frame-
work in the field of HCI
The hypothesis behind objective 4 is that the workload assessments (crisp scores) computed by the two
selected baseline instruments (NASA−T LX and WP) can be replicated by their correspondent translations,
the instances of the defeasible framework NASAT LXde f and WPde f , as built in chapter 5. The expectation is
to obtain a high convergent validity between the outcomes of the baseline instruments and the correspondent
translations, over a set of designed web-tasks. In other words, the defeasible instances of the framework
have to detect high workload when the correspondent base-line instruments assess high workload, and low
workload when the correspondent baseline instruments assess low workload. Statistically speaking, the out-
comes (workload assessment) of the defeasible instances and the baseline instruments have to highly correlate.
In order to solve objective 5 and to demonstrate that the defeasible framework can be used for enhancing
the quality of mental workload assessments, the proposal is to investigate the sensitivity, the diagnosticity
capacity and the validity of the brand new instances of the framework MWLde f and MWLNIde f , as designed in
chapter 5. These criteria are in line with those criteria which emerged in the literature review and are listed
in section 2.2 (page 16). Sensitivity refers to the reliability of an instance of the framework to detect changes
in resource demand, task difficulty, user features and environmental influence, as well as its discriminatory
capacity between significant variations of workload. Diagnosticity refers to the capacity of the instance of
the framework to indicate the sources that cause variations in workload, and to quantify the contributions to
the workload by the type, resource demand or the capabilities of the human operator. Validity refers to the
extent to which a measure, produced by an instance of the framework, is actually measuring the construct
in question. In the literature of mental workload, different types of validity have emerged (Rubio et al.,
2004; Zhang and Luximon, 2005). Here the focus is on the convergent validity between different workload
scores produced by different assessment techniques, and the concurrent validity between workload scores and
objective performance measures. As already described in chapter 5, the brand new instance MWLde f is an
extension of the instance MWLNIde f (no interaction of arguments). These instances incorporate the workload
attributes considered both in the NASA-TLX instrument (appendix A.1, page 173) and the Workload Profile
instrument (WP - appendix A.2, page 174), as well as a new set of attributes believed, by the author of this
thesis, to influence mental workload. The former instance extends the latter by adding relationships (in the
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form of attacks) among designed arguments built according to the theoretical knowledge which emerged from
the literature review of mental workload of chapter 2, and according to the author’s understanding of it. The
hypothesis is that MWLNIde f will underperform, in general, with regards to the original NASA-TLX and WP,
but MWLde f will show a better sensitivity, a higher diagnosticity capacity, a high convergent validity, and
a better concurrent validity than the two baseline assessment instruments over a set of designed web-tasks.
In turn, this will confirm the positive impact of adding interactions of arguments, meaning the interaction of
pieces of knowledge in the representation and assessment of mental workload. Objectives 4 and 5 and the
aforementioned hypotheses are summarised in table 6.1.
Objective 4
Description
Investigation of the capacity of the designed framework to reproduce state-of-the-art
workload assessment techniques
Method
• Translation of the NASA-TLX and WP into instances of the defeasible framework
(NASA-T LXde f and WPde f ) for the investigation of the convergent validity over a set of
designed web-tasks
Hypothesis
1 - high convergent validity between NASA-TLX & NASA-T LXde f
2- high convergent validity between WP & WPde f
Objective 5
Description
Investigation of the quality of the assessments produced by new instances of the
defeasible framework in the field of HCI
Method
• creation of an instance of the framework (MWLNIde f ) with no interaction among
arguments
• extension of MWLNIde f to MWLde f by adding interactions of arguments
• comparison of the sensitivity and the validity of MWLNIde f m NASA-T LX and WP over a
set of designed web-tasks
• comparison of sensitivity, diagnosticity, validity of MWLde f , NASA-T LX and WP over
a set of designed web-tasks
Hypothesis
1 - higher sensitivity of MWLde f over NASA-T LX and WP
2 - higher diagnosticity of MWLde f over NASA-T LX and WP
3 - positive convergent validity of MWLde f , NASA-T LX and WP
4 - better concurrent validity (with time) of MWLde f over NASA-T LX and WP
5 - worse sensitivity and concurrent validity (with time) of MWLNIde f over NASA-T LX ,
WP and MWLde f
Table 6.1: Evaluation objectives and hypothesis
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6.2 Design of experiments
A set of 11 web-tasks has been defined (table 6.2) on three popular websites: google, wikipedia, youtube.
Tasks were designed with different levels of objective difficulty, as shown in table 6.3, manipulating task
demands, time pressure, resource demands, duality and concurrency, forming different task conditions. Par-
ticipants where divided into two groups (A and B) and each person executed the 11 tasks over 2 or 3 sessions,
spread over different days. The order of tasks was kept the same for each volunteer. The difference between
the 2 groups is that, if people in group A executed a task on the original web-interface, people in group B
executed the same task on an altered version of the same web-interface. The details of this experimental de-
sign are depicted in table 6.3, with references to screenshots of the interfaces used along with the typology of
task, according to the categorisation provided in (Kellar et al., 2006). Task were mainly information seeking
tasks, where information had to be found using different cognitive modalities (eyes, touch, ears), in line with
modern technologies and web-sites. People in both the groups were exposed to the use of some original and
some modified interface, altered at run-time through CSS and HTML manipulation. Original web-interfaces
were modified because, as it is going to be shown in the next chapter, the aim was to study the impact of the
structural changes of each interface on imposed mental workload on end-users. This also explains why people
were divided into two groups.
Task Description Notes Web-site
T1 Find out how many people live in Sidney Wikipedia
T2
Read the content of simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grammar No time imposed
(user can exit at any time)
Wikipedia
T3
Using youtube.com play your favourite song and while listening to it,
search the related lyrics
90 seconds limit Youtube +
Google
T4
Find out the difference (in years) between the year of the foundation of
the Apple Computer Inc. and the year of the 14th FIFA world cup
Google
T5
Find out the difference (in years) between the foundation of the Microsoft
Corporation and the year of the 23rd Olympic games
Google
T6
Find out the year of birth of the 1st wife of the founder of playboy 2 minutes available. Each 30 seconds
the participant is warned of how much
time is left
Google
T1
Find out the name of the man (interpreted by Johnny Deep) in the video
www.youtube.com/watch?v=FfTPS-TFQ_c
Participant can replay the video if re-
quired
Youtube
T1
a) Play the following song www.youtube.com/watch?v=
Rb5G1eRIj6c and while listening to it, b) find out the result of
the polynomial equation p(x), with x = 7 contained in the wikipedia
article http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polinomi
The song is extremely irritating Wikipedia
T1
Find out how many times Stewie jumps in the video www.youtube.
com/watch?v=TSe9gbdkQ8s
Participant is distracted twice by ex-
aminer & can replay the video
Youtube
T10
a) find out (using google.com) the difference (in years) between the
foundation of the Alfa Romeo and the year of the 15th New York City
marathon b) find out (using wikipedia.com) the capital of Namibia c)
find out the two common words that appear in the titles of every ref-
erenced paper of the author Longo L. within the wikipedia article en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Collaborative_search_engine
Every 30 seconds the participant is
forced to switch to the subsequent task
(in a different browser’s tab) in a loop
until the three tasks are completed
Google +
Wikipedia
T11
Find out the age of the blue fish in the video www.youtube.com/
watch?v=H4BNbHBcnDI
150 seconds available. Participant can
replay the video. There is no answer.
Youtube
Table 6.2: List of experimental tasks
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Task Typology of tasks, features and task conditions Web-site
Group A
interface
Group B
interface
Appendix
screenshots
T1 Fact finding: simple search Wikipedia altered B.1
T2 Browsing: not goal-oriented + time limit Wikipedia altered B.2
T3 Browsing: goal-oriented task Youtube altered B.3
T4 Fact finding: dual task + arithmetic Google altered B.4
T5 Fact finding: dual task + arithmetic Google altered B.5
T6 Fact finding: single task + time pressure Google altered B.6
T7 Fact finding: constant demand on visual + auditory re-
source
Youtube altered B.7
T8 Fact finding: Simultaneous demand on auditory resource
+ visual resource + arithmetic
Youtube +
Wikipedia
altered B.8
T9 Fact finding: Single tasks on visual resource + external
interference
Youtube altered B.9
T10 Fact finding: Multiple concurrent tasks + time pressure
Google +
Wikipedia
altered B.10
T11 Fact finding: demands on auditory + visual resources +
verbal processing
Youtube altered B.11
Table 6.3: Interfaces used in experimental tasks by the two groups
6.2.1 Participants and procedure
A sample of 40 people volunteered to participate in the study, 20 for each group. Ages ranges from 20 to 35
years (Total - Mean: 28.6, Standard deviation 3.98; Group A - Mean 28.35, Standard deviation: 4.22; Group
B - Mean: 28.85, Standard deviation: 3.70). 20 were females and 20 males, all with an Internet daily usage of
at least 2 hours. Native languages of participants were English, German, French, Polish, Portuguese, Spanish,
Chinese, Italian, Arabian, Thai, Armenian, Czech, Hindi, as detailed in table 6.4, and all were relatively fluent
in English, so it was assumed they could understand administered questionnaires without major problems.
Subjects were instructed about the study and they were required to sign a consent form (see appendix C,
page 188) both for data protection and for obtaining detailed study information. Participants were required to
execute the tasks of table 6.2 as naturally as they could, over 2 or 3 sessions of approximately 45/70 minutes
each, in different days, not consecutive. This experimental design was dictated by subjects unavailability to
execute all tasks in one session and also to minimise the learning effect generated by the experiment itself.
The subjects in group A were all different than the subjects in group B. Participants could not interact with
examiners during the task and a printed version of the instructions was available to them at all time. The order
of the tasks administered over the sessions was the same for all the participants:
• 8, 1, 3, 10, 9, 6, 11, 4, 5, 2, 7
In each session, mental workload measures were taken immediately after the task was completed.
Specifically, participants were asked to fill in the questionnaires associated respectively to the NASA-TLX
and the Workload Profile WP) instruments, (appendix A.1 and A.3, pages 173 and 175). In addition, other 6
questions were administered, aimed at modelling other attributes believed to be related to mental workload
(by the author of this thesis), consistently with the attributes accounted in the knowledge-base of the brand
new instances MWLde f and MWLNIde f constructed in chapter 5. The overall set of questions administered
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to participants is summarised in table A.5 (appendix, page 177). The web-based tasks were executed on
an iMac with 21.5-inch screen, using Mozilla Firefox as browser. Data were collected in a laboratory of
the Department of Computer Science and Statistics at Trinity College Dublin. Questions were administered
through a desktop software and the order of the questionnaires (NASA-TLX, WP, new 6 questions) was
random. Since questions were administered in English and not all the participants were native speakers, each
volunteer was invited to ask clarifications to examiners at any time while answering them. Each question had
to be rated with a numerical value within the range 0 to 100, by moving a slider. The default value was 50
and the range of values were divided in three parts of equal size, guided by two separation lines, generating 3
regions (low, medium, high), aimed at orientating the user, as in figure 6.2.
Group A Group B
Native language males females males females
English 1 5 1
German 2 2
French 2 3 1
Polish 1
Portuguese 1 2 2
Spanish 1 1
Chinese 1 1
Italian 2 1 4 1
Arabian 1
Thai 1
Armenian 1
Czech 1
Hindi 1
Table 6.4: Demographics of volunteers for the user-study
Low Medium High
Fig. 6.2: The scale of the answer used for experimental questionnaire
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6.3 Evaluating the convergent validity of the NASA-TLX, WP instru-
ments and their defeasible translations
The first step towards the resolution of objective 4 is to investigate the capacity of the designed defeasi-
ble framework to reproduce two state-of-the-art workload assessment techniques. In detail, these are the
NASA-TLX and the WP mental workload assessment instruments. Chapter 5 demonstrated how these two
instruments, here used as baseline, can be translated into particular instances of the defeasible framework,
namely the NASA−T LXde f and the WPde f . The goal is to investigate whether the baseline instruments and
the respective defeasible translations have a convergent validity over the set of defined web-tasks of table
6.2. In other words, the goal is to investigate whether the workload assessments produced by the baseline in-
struments and the correspondent defeasible instances of the framework have a significant convergent validity.
Convergent validity is a parameter often used in psychology, sociology and other behavioural sciences that
indicates the degree to which two measures of constructs, that are supposed to be theoretically related, are in
fact related. The parameter can be measured by using the Pearson Correlation Coefficient ρ1. The hypothesis
is to obtain a high convergent validity across any comparison.
6.3.1 Results and discussion
Experiments with the 40 volunteers who executed the 11 designed tasks, generated 440 cases (220 cases for
each group). Each case was evaluated individually with each of the following computational models:
• NASATLX (baseline model as described in subsection 2.4.2 )
• WP (baseline model as described in subsection 2.4.1)
• NASAT LXde f (NASA-TLX defeasible translation as designed in 5.2.1)
• WPde f (Workload Profile defeasible translation as designed in 5.2.2)
The Pearson’s correlation coefficient can be applied if few assumptions are met:
• continuity: the variables under consideration should be measured at the interval or ratio level. In other
words, they have to be continuous;
• linearity: the variables have to show a linear relationship;
• outliers: the outliers, that means single data points within the dataset that do not follow the usual
pattern, should be removed;
• normality: the variables under consideration should be approximately normally distributed.
Instead of taking them for granted, they are verified as it follows. The assumption of continuity is met
because the mental workload assessment of each tested instrument (computational model) is a value in the
range [0..100] ∈ ℜ. The assumption of linearity is checked by analysing the scatterplots of section C.1.2
(appendix C): all the points are close to the straight line, both in the total scatterplots and in the individual
1 The Pearson correlation coefficient is a measure of the strength of the linear dependence (correlation) between two variables X and
Y returning a value in the range [−1..1] ∈ℜ. A value of −1 indicates perfect negative relationship with one variable increasing and the
other decreasing, while a value of +1 indicates a perfect positive relationship with both the variables behaving the same way, either both
increasing or decreasing. Values closer to 0 imply there is no linear correlation between the two variables. ρ = ∑
n
i=1(Xi−X)(Yi−Y )√
∑ni=1(Xi−X)2
√
∑ni=1(Yi−Y )2
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scatterplots for each group of users (A and B). The third assumption is met as there are not significant
outliers in the scatterplots. The final assumption of normality is checked by analysing the distributions of the
computed workload scores of section C.1.1 (Appendix C). All of them look normally distributed and this is
formally confirmed by the Shapiro-Wilk 2 tests of table 6.5, run with a 95% confidence interval. Here, the
significance value for each instrument is greater than 0.05, underlying the normality of the data. In the case it
would have been below 0.05, the data would significantly have deviated from a normal distribution.
Total Group A Group B
Model Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
NASAT LX 0.995 440 0.163 0.995 220 0.720 0.990 220 0.158
NASAT LXde f 0.995 440 0.164 0.995 220 0.656 0.991 220 0.196
WP 0.995 440 0.140 0.993 220 0.277 0.988 220 0.067
WPde f 0.995 440 0.176 0.992 220 0.418 0.991 220 0.167
Table 6.5: Shapiro-Wilk normality test of NASAT LX , WP and their defeasible translations
The descriptive statistics for each computational model are described in table 6.6. The Pearson coefficients
are listed in table 6.7 and the comparisons of the mean of each instrument are shown in figures 6.3 and 6.4.
Total Group A Group B
Model Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max Mean Std
NASAT LXde f 0.98 99.9 46.4 19.2 0.98 99.9 46.9 18.8 1.4 99.3 45.9 19.6
NASAT LX 0.80 99.9 46.2 19.6 0.80 99.9 46.6 19.3 1.4 99.3 45.7 19.8
WPde f 0.97 77.3 38.9 14.3 0.97 77.3 39.6 15.3 4.6 66.6 38.2 13.1
WP 1.00 77.0 38.3 14.7 1.00 77.0 38.9 15.9 4.7 67.5 37.6 13.4
Table 6.6: Descriptive statistics for the baseline instruments NASAT LX , WP and their defeasible translations
All the Pearson’s correlation coefficients of table 6.7 are statistically significant (p< 0.001) and extremely
positive. Several authors have offered guidelines toward the interpretation of a correlation coefficient, how-
ever each criterion is arbitrary and context-dependent 3. The obtained correlations are nearly perfect (close to
1) and this can be considered extremely positive and encouraging, underlining the nearly perfect convergent
validity of the assessments produced by baseline instruments (NASA-TLX, WP) and the correspondent
instances of the defeasible framework (NASAT LXde f , WPde f ). It can be also noted that the assessments
of the sbaseline instruments moderately correlate to each other (Total 0.584) and as a consequence their
defeasible translations (Total 0.585). This underlines the positive face validity 4 of the original instruments
and the correspondent defeasible translations. In this respect, figures 6.3 and 6.4 demonstrate face validity
2The Shapiro-Wilk Test is more appropriate when the sample sizes is small (< 50 samples) rather than the classical Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Test
3 Generally, in social and behavioural sciences, there may be a greater contribution from complicating factors, as in the case of
subjective ratings, thus correlations above 0.5 are regarded as very high (Cohen, 1988, page 82). Similarly, values within 0.1 and 0.3 are
regarded as small correlations and values within 0.3 and 0.5 as medium correlation (ranges apply symmetrically to negative correlations)
4Face validity is the extent to which each instrument is viewed as covering and representing mental workload, the construct it purports
to measure
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NASAT LXde f NASAT LX WPde f WP
Model Cases ρ pval ρ pval ρ pval ρ pval
NASAT LXde f
Total 1 0.000 0.995∗∗ 0.000 0.585∗∗ 0.000 0.586∗∗ 0.000
Group A 1 0.000 0.994∗∗ 0.000 0.536∗∗ 0.000 0.537∗∗ 0.000
Group B 1 0.000 0.996∗∗ 0.000 0.645∗∗ 0.000 0.648∗∗ 0.000
NASAT LX
Total 1 0.000 0.582∗∗ 0.000 0.584∗∗ 0.000
Group A 1 0.000 0.536∗∗ 0.000 0.537∗∗ 0.000
Group B 1 0.000 0.638∗∗ 0.000 0.643∗∗ 0.000
WPde f
Total 1 0.000 0.992∗∗ 0.000
Group A 1 0.000 0.992∗∗ 0.000
Group B 1 0.000 0.991∗∗ 0.000
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Table 6.7: Pearson correlation coefficient for the baseline instruments NASAT LX , WP and their defeasible
translations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Workload score
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
NASA−T LX
NASA−T LXde f
WP
WPde f
Task
Fig. 6.3: Comparisons of the means of the workload scores produced by the baseline instruments NASAT LX ,
WP and their defeasible translations - Group A
by plotting the means of the mental workload indexes, computed by each instrument, for each task and for
each group of volunteers. A further note is that preferentiality among workload attributes is considered in the
original NASA-TLX but not in the WP instrument: this difference is coherently accounted in the defeasible
translations and coherently supported by the high convergent validity of the computed workload scores and
the correspondent scores assessed by the original instruments.
Having a nearly perfect convergent validity suggests that the defeasible framework designed in chapter
4 can be successfully employed to abstract the two baseline mental workload assessment instruments that
can be now represented with a common underlying structure employing the notion of defeasible interactive
arguments.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Workload score
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
NASA−T LX
NASA−T LXde f
WP
WPde f
Task
Fig. 6.4: Comparisons of the means of the workload scores produced by the baseline instruments NASAT LX ,
WP and their defeasible translations - Group B
6.4 Evaluating the sensitivity, diagnosticity and validity of the brand
new defeasible instances
The last step for completing the evaluation of the defeasible framework is to accomplish objective 5 by
investigating the quality of the assessments produced by the brand new instances of the defeasible framework
MWLde f . The goal is to demonstrate how this new instance, as previously constructed in chapter 5, can
achieve a better sensitivity and diagnosticity than the baseline NASA-TLX and WP instruments, and is able
to achieve a positive convergent validity with these two but a better concurrent validity with task completion
time, being this a performance objective measure. Before introducing the results, each of these properties is
clarified with a detailed description along with the formal procedure to measure it, as in table 6.8.
Property/Method Description/Goal
Sensitivity The reliability of a model to detect changes in resource demand, task difficulty, user features and
environmental influence
ANOVA + PostHoc
comparisons
To find out to what extent the global indices of mental workload varied as a function of objective
changes and manipulation of tasks
Diagnosticity The capacity of the model to quantify the contributions to workload by the type or resource demand
or the capabilities of the human operator
Multinomial logistic regression To determine to what extent mental workload attributes allow discrimination between tasks.
Validity The capacity of the model to measure mental workload.
Pearson/Spearman correlations Convergent validity: to determine to what extent the model measures what is supposed to measure;
Concurrent validity: to determine to what extent the model is able to explain objective performance
measure.
Table 6.8: Definition of mental workload properties and statistical methods applied
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6.4.1 Results and discussion
The instance MWLde f of the framework, as built in section 5.2.3, is elicited multiple times, with different
sets of inputs (answers of questionnaire A.5 of appendix) provided by each volunteer who participated in
the study. As stated in objective 5, the aim is to compare the sensitivity and the diagnosticity capacities of
the designed defeasible instance MWLde f against the baseline instruments NASA-TLX and WP, as well as
comparing their validity.
Sensitivity
In order to test the sensitivity of the new instance MWLde f , a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is
adopted to determine whether there are any significant differences between the means of the independent
tasks designed in table 6.2. This statistical procedure has a set of assumptions that have to be met before
proceeding with the actual test. Instead of taking them as valid, they are explicitly tested.
• continuity: the dependent variables should be measured at the interval or ratio level. In other words,
they have to be continuous;
• independency of variables: the independent variable should consist of two or more categorical, inde-
pendent groups;
• independency of observations: there should be no relationship between the observations in each group
or between the group themselves;
• outliers: there should be no outliers, that means single data points within the dataset that do not follow
the usual pattern. In case these exist, they should be removed;
• normality: the dependent variables under consideration should be approximately normally distributed
for each category of the independent variable.
• homogeneity of variance: there is the need of having homogeneity of variances.
The assumption of continuity is met because the indexes of mental workload computed by the new instance
MWLde f , the NASA-TLX and the WP baseline instruments are in the scale [0..100] ∈ ℜ. The assumption
of independency of variables is met because there are more than 2 groups for the independent variables,
represented by the task of table 6.2 (11 for group A and 11 for group B of volunteers, for a total of 22
groups). The assumption of independency of observation is met, despite the fact that each participant is in
each cluster (task). The study conducted was not designed as a repeated measure study, because each task
(each cluster) is different and independent to each other. So each participant did not execute the same task
in different conditions, but each executed 11 different tasks in one unique condition. This was more a study
design issue because of the difficulty of recruiting volunteers. Hence the study has been designed to gather
more data with a less amount of volunteers. The assumption of no significant outliers is met by removing
few outliers from the distributions of the computed mental workload scores for each instrument, as depicted
in the box plots of section C.4 (appendix C). Here the circles outside a box plot, one for each task, has been
removed from the dataset. In addition, if the resulting box plots still presented other outliers, the process was
repeated until no outliers were found. The assumption of normality is met by conducting, for each distribution
of the mental workload scores produced by each instrument, each task and group of volunteers, a Shapiro-
Wilk normality test, with a 95% confidence interval. Results are listed in table C.3 (appendix C) and as it is
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possible to observe, the significance value for each instrument, each task and each group is greater than 0.05,
underlying the normality of the data. In the case it would have been below 0.05, the data would significantly
have deviated from a normal distribution. Eventually, in order to check the assumption of homogeneity of
variances, the Levene’s test has been employed for each workload assessment instrument: results are listed in
table 6.9. The test of homogeneity of variances test the null hypothesis that all the tasks have same variance:
H0 : δ 2T1 = δ
2
T2 = δ
2
T3 = δ
2
T4 = δ
2
T5 = δ
2
T6 = δ
2
T7 = δ
2
T8 = δ
2
T9 = δ
2
T10 = δ
2
T11
To interpret the outcomes of the Levene’s test, the Sig. value (p-value) has been used. In the case it is less
than or equal to the α = 0.05 level for this test, then the hypothesis H0 that the variances are equal can be
rejected. On the other hand, if the Sig. value is greater than α = 0.05 level, then the hypothesis H0 cannot
be rejected thus this increases the confidence that the variances are equal and the homogeneity of variance
assumption has been met. From table 6.9 it is possible to note that for the NASA-TLX instrument, the
null hypothesis has to be rejected, both for group A and group B, while for the WP and the new instances
MWLNIde f and MWLde f of the defeasible framework , the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, confirming that
the assumption of homogeneity of variances is reasonably satisfied. In the first case (NASAT LX), a Welch
F-test 5 is added to the ANOVA procedure and the Games-Howell6 post-hoc tests are carried out instead
of the Tukey post-hoc tests 7. In the other three cases (WP, MWLNIde f and MWLde f ) the classical ANOVA
procedure is adopted, and the Tukey post-hoc test is conducted as all the assumptions are met.
Group A Group B
model Statistic df1 df2 Sig. Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
NASAT LX 1.899 10 206 0.047 4.054 10 203 0.000
WP 0.566 10 209 0.840 1.852 10 204 0.054
MWLNIde f 1.141 10 207 0.333 1.196 10 203 0.295
MWLde f 1.261 10 207 0.254 1.443 10 205 0.164
Table 6.9: Levene’s tests of homogeneity of variances of the mental workload assessment instruments
Tables 6.10 and 6.11 shows the results of the analysis of variance of the four workload assessment in-
struments, for both the groups of volunteers. As it is possible to note, there was a statistically significant
difference between tasks as determined by one-way ANOVA for any mental workload instruments and for
both the groups. All the Sig. values are really small (< 0.000) thus the null hypothesis of equal variances has
to be rejected. Despite the ANOVA test underlines an overall difference between tasks, it does not tell which
specific tasks are different. For this reason, as mentioned above, post-hoc tests are employed to confirm where
the differences occurred between groups. For the NASA-TLX, the Games-Howell post-hoc tests are run, for
the WP and the two instances MWLNIde f , MWLde f of the defeasible framework, the standard Tukey’s HSD is
used.
5The Welch statistics is based on the usual ANOVA F test, but it is applied when the variances of the groups under examination are
significantly different.
6The Games-Howell post-hoc test is used when variances of groups under examination are unequal. It takes into account unequal
group sizes as well and it is based on Welch’s correction to degrees of freedom.
7The Tukey’s HSD (honestly significant difference) test is a single-step multiple comparison procedure and statistical test. It is usually
adopted along with an ANOVA to find significant differences of means.
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Group A
NASAT LX Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between groups 30796.056 10 3079.606 F = 13.467 < 0.000
Within groups 47107.517 206 228.677
Total 77903.573 216
Welch df1=10, df2=82.329 13.106∗ < 0.000
WP
Between groups 11118.296 10 1111.830 F = 5.182 < 0.000
Within groups 44842.045 209 214.555
Total 55960.341 219
MWLNIde f
Between groups 19503.159 10 1950.316 F = 11.289 < 0.000
Within groups 35762.100 207 172.764
Total 55265.259 217
MWLde f
Between groups 23548.588 10 2354.859 F = 12.146 < 0.000
Within groups 40121.481 207 2354.859
Total 63680.068 217
* Asymptotically F distributed
Table 6.10: Analysis of variances, Welch tests and significance values of the mental workload assessment
instruments - Group A
Group B
NASAT LX Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between groups 21110.294 10 2111.029 F = 7.212 < 0.000
Within groups 59418 203 292.700
Total 80528.495 213
Welch df1=10, df2=81.065 10.316∗ < 0.000
WP
Between groups 8005.668 10 204 F = 5.649 < 0.000
Within groups 28909.109 204 141.711
Total 36914.777 214
MWLNIde f
Between groups 12434.883 10 1247.488 F = 5.962 < 0.000
Within groups 42341.084 203 208.577
Total 54775.968 213
MWLde f
Between groups 18428.857 10 1842.886 F = 9.895 < 0.000
Within groups 38180.637 205 186.247
Total 56609.494 215
* Asymptotically F distributed
Table 6.11: Analysis of variances, Welch tests and significance values of the mental workload assessment
instruments - Group B
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The post-hoc results are presented in section C.5 (appendix C, page 188). Tables C.9 to C.24 (pages
204-219) are detailed explanations of each comparison of each pair of tasks, while tables C.25 to C.26
(pages 220-221) are summaries of the statistically significant differences spotted by each instrument, both
with a 95% and 99% confidence interval. In general, the ratio between-groups (tasks) and within-groups
(participants) is higher with the NASA-TLX (F(10, 206) = 13.467, F(10,81.065)=10.316) and the instance
MWLde f (F(10, 207) = 12.146, F(10,205)=9.895), underlying higher variance. The Workload Profile
instrument is the assessment instrument with the lowest variance (F(10,209)=5.182, F(10,204)=5.649)
followed by the instance MWLNIde f . The defeasible instance MWL
NI
de f showed mixed outcomes for the groups.
In group A it behaved similarly than the NASA-TLX and the defeasible instance MWLde f , outperforming
the WP instruments. However, in group B, it significantly under-performed the NASA-TLX and the instance
MWLde f showing how the addition of the attack relations among arguments, from MWLNIde f (no interactions)
to MWLde f (interaction of arguments), had an important impact in increasing the sensitivity capacity.
From the summary of detected statistically significant differences of tables C.25 and C.26 (pages 220,
221), the WP instrument was the lowest in sensitivity, followed by the instance MWLNIde f , NASA-TLX and
the instance MWLde f . Table 6.12 summaries the number of detected statistically significance differences
spotted among tasks. WP is the lowest in sensitivity, detecting half of the statistically significant differences
spotted by the other instruments. For group A, the two defeasible instances MWLNIde f and MWLde f behaved
very analogously, demonstrating similar sensitivity with the NASA-TLX but a higher sensitivity for group B,
using a confidence interval of 95%. However, when increasing the confidence interval to 99% the instance
MWLde f was clearly superior than the NASA-TLX and MWLNIde f underlying a higher degree of robustness
and being more stable in detecting differences among tasks in both the groups.
Group A Group B
Model α = 0.05 α = 0.01 α = 0.05 α = 0.01
NASAT LX 22 13 14 10
WP 9 5 8 6
MWLNIDe f 21 17 11 7
MWLDe f 21 18 18 13
Table 6.12: Statistically significant differences detected by each workload assessment instrument
In summary, according to the number of detected statistical significant differences of table 6.12, out of
all the possible detectable differences (110 - 55 for each group), the instance MWLde f of the defeasible
framework shows 39.9% and 36.3% of sensitivity more than the WP instrument and 5.45% and 14.5% of
sensitivity more than the NASA-TLX instrument, respectively at significance levels of 0.05 and 0.01. Addi-
tionally, MWLde f shows 12.7% and 12.7% more than the other instance MWLNIde f (where no interaction of
arguments was considered), respectively at significance levels of 0.05 and 0.01 (for the tasks of table 6.2).
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Diagnosticity
In order to test the diagnosticity of the new instances of the defeasible framework, stepwise multinomial
logistic regression has been used to investigate the differences between tasks on the basis of the workload
attributes of the cases, indicating which attributes contributed the most to task separation. This technique is
aimed at analysing relationships between a non-metric dependent variable (task) and metric independent vari-
ables (workload attributes) and it extends logistic regression as it compares multiple groups (tasks) through a
combination of binary logistic regressions. Differently than other studies that employed discriminant analysis
to assess the diagnosticity of some subjective mental workload assessment instruments (Rubio et al., 2004;
Tsang and Velazquez, 1996), the rationale behind adopting multinomial logistic regression lies in the fact that
it does not impose all the assumptions required by discriminant analysis. These include normality, linearity
and homogeneity of variance for the independent variables. Section C.7 of appendix C shows how not all
the distributions of the independent variables follow a clear normal distribution (Significance of the Shapiro-
Wilk test is lower than the significance level of 0.05), justifying the choice of adopting multinomial logistic
regression. The goal here is to compare the diagnosticity capacity of the defeasible instances MWLde f and
MWLNIde f , against the one of the NASA-TLX and WP baseline instruments, by adopting stepwise multinomial
logistic regression and by determining the impact of multiple independent mental workload attributes to pre-
dict the membership of one or other of the 22 tasks (11 for group A and 11 for group B). Multinomial logistic
regression has a set of assumptions that should be met for inferring trustworthy results:
• sample size: the minimum number of cases per independent variable is suggested to be 10, according
to multiple studies in the field as suggested in (Peduzzi et al., 1996);
• multicollinearity: the independent variables should be fairly uncorrelated between each other, as it is
difficult to differentiate each’s variable impact on the dependent variable if they are highly correlated;
The sample size assumption is met as each task has 20 cases for evaluation. The assumption of
multicollinearity is tested by analysing the correlations of the independent variables. Pearson’s correlation
coefficient, one for every pair of mental workload attributes, has been computed, as presented in section C.6
of appendix C. None of the pair of attributes shows a high correlation (ρ < 0.8) thus all the mental workload
attributes are potentially contributors for predicting the tasks.
In multinomial logistic regression, the presence of a relationship between the dependent variable and
combinations of independent variables is built upon the statistical significance of the final model chi-square.
This is based on the reduction in the likelihood values for a model which does not contain any independent
variable and the model that contains the independent variables. In turn, this difference in likelihood follows
a chi-square distribution and its significance is the statistical evidence used for assessing the presence of
a relationship between the task and the combination of mental workload attributes. Stepwise multinomial
logistic regression is slightly different than the standard (ordinal) procedure because one independent variable
is entered in turn to the reference model (the empty model). In this study a forward entry method and at
each step has been adopted: the most significant independent variable is added to the model until none of
the stepwise independent variables left out of the model would have a statistically significant contribution if
added to the model.
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22 tasks - 11 Group A, 11 Group B
Fitting criteria Likelihood ratio tests
Model −2log Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig.
Intercept Only 2720.117
NATAT LX attributes
Final 2258.907 461.210 105 0.000
WP attributes
Final 1773.885 946.233 168 0.000
MWLde f & MWLNIde f attributes
Final 1188.568 1531.550 357 0.000
Table 6.13: Model fitting information for each mental workload instrument
Table 6.13 shows the model fitting information and as it is possible to note, every Sig. value for every
set of attributes, considered in each workload instrument, is less than the level of significance (< 0.05).
The null hypothesis of no difference (Chi-square value) between the model without independent variables
(intercept only) and the model with the independent variable (final) is rejected in every test. This underlines
the existence of a relationship between the mental workload attributes and the tasks conducted. However,
it does not tell where exactly these differences occurred as well as the errors associated with the model. In
order to assess the utility of a multinomial logistic regression model, its classification accuracy is computed.
This compares the predicted task membership of the logistic model to the actual (the known one), which is
the value for the dependent variable. In order to evaluate the usefulness of the logistic regression model,
a benchmark of 25% improvement over the rate of accuracy achievable by chance alone is used. In other
words, even if it is assumed that the independent mental workload attributes had no relationship to the tasks
defined by the dependent variable, it is still expected to be correct in the predictions of task membership
some percentage of the time.
The estimate of by-chance accuracy used is the proportional by-chance accuracy rate computed by sum-
ming the squared percentage of cases in each group (20/440 = 4.5%). Thus the proportional by-chance
accuracy criteria is 5.56% (0.0452× 22× 1.25 = 5.56%). Table 6.14 summaries the classification accuracy
rates computed by each logistic regression model. As it is possible to note, all of these rates are above 5.56%
satisfying the criteria for classification accuracy. Section C.9 of appendix C shows the detailed predicted task
memberships with the actual task memberships for any instrument. Using the mental workload attributes of
the NASA-TLX instrument, a prediction accuracy of 19.1% was achieved compared to the 32% achieved with
the attributes of the WP instrument and a 53.2% accuracy achieved with the workload attributes considered
in the two defeasible instances MWLde f and MWLNIde f .
95% CI Prediction accuracy
NASAT LX attributes 19.1%
WP attributes 32.3%
MWLde f & MWLNIde f attributes 53.2%
Table 6.14: Accuracy of each regression model for the workload attributes of each assessment instrument
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These accuracies reflect the combination of a set of attributes for correctly classifying each task consid-
ered in each case. However, they cannot tell anything about the contribution of an individual independent
mental workload attribute to the overall classification. The interpretation for an independent mental workload
attribute focuses on its ability to distinguish between pairs of tasks and the contribution which it makes
to changing the probability of being in one dependent task rather than the other. The significance of an
independent mental workload variable’s role in distinguishing between pairs of tasks should not be interpreted
unless it has also an overall relationship to the dependent variable (task) in the likelihood ratio tests. These
tests are listed in section C.8 of appendix C. From table C.31 it is possible to note how all the attributes
considered in the NASA-TLX show a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable (task)
as all the Sig. values are less than the level of significance (< 0.05). The same interpretation applies for the
attributes considered in the WP instrument whose results are depicted in table C.32. All the Sig. values are
less than the level of significance (< 0.05) supporting the fact that each of them has an influential role in
classifying each case’s task. Regarding the instances of the defeasible framework MWLde f and MWLNIde f ,
table C.33 shows the likelihood ratio tests. Here, the attributes all have a significance value less than 0.05,
but the mental demand and intention attributes are not included, as not considered significant to classify tasks
by the step-wise multinomial logistic regression procedure.
The information associated to the likelihood ratio tests tells which variable has an overall relationship to
the dependent variable, considering all the tasks. However, it does not tell the individual strength of each
workload attribute for classifying tasks. Section C.10 of appendix C lists the step summary tables for each
multinomial logistic regression procedure of each workload assessment instruments. From these it is possible
to analyse in which order and what workload attribute is entered in the empty multinomial logistic regression
model (including just the intercept) and the contributions that each attribute had to the model’s goodness-of-fit.
In the case of the attributes accounted in the original NASA-TLX, temporal demand, effort and
performance were the most significant contributors as their addition, at each step, reduced the chi-square
significantly. Table C.37 shows how temporal demand reduced the chi-square of 2720.117 to 2579.573 in
turn reduced by effort to 2446.946 and in turn reduced by the performance to 2337.516. Psychological stress
and mental demand, although valid contributors, they had a less powerful role in reducing the chi-square.
Regarding the attributes accounted in WP instrument, all had a significant effect in reducing the chi-
square. From table C.38, the attribute auditory resources was the most impact full in reducing the chi-square,
followed by central processing and manual response. The attribute visual resources was the last contributor
to the model’s goodnes-of-fit.
Eventually, the attributes considered in the two instances MWLde f and MWLNIde f of the defeasible
framework, all had a significant role in reducing the chi-square of the intercept model (empty model),
except the attributes mental demand and intention that were not used. From table C.39, the most impact-full
contributor was auditory resources, followed by parallelism, temporal demand and effort. The attributes with
the lowest power in increasing the goodness-of-fit were arousal and central processing.
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In summary, the attributes taken into account in the instances of the defeasible framework show a greater
diagnosticity capacity compared to the one achieved by the attributes of the NASA-TLX and the WP instru-
ments, in terms of ability to classify each case in the right category (one of the web-tasks). Considering the
set of web-tasks listed in table 6.2 the instances of the defeasible framework had an accuracy rate 34.1%
higher than the NASA-TLX instrument and 20.9% higher than the WP instrument confirming its prospective
in assessing subjective mental workload.
Validity
In order to test the validity of the new instances of the defeasible framework, the correlations of the workload
scores computed by the four mental workload instruments (NASA-TLX, WP and MWLde f , MWLNIde f ) and the
correlations of their workload scores again objective performance measure have been computed. The former
is referred to as convergent validity while the latter is referred to as concurrent validity, both assessed using
Pearson’s correlation coefficients and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients 8. The objective performance
measure employed for testing convergent validity is the objective time participants required for completing
each task. Unfortunately, some cases do not have an associated time due to errors in the measurements. Table
6.15 lists the correlations for convergent validity and concurrent validity considering all the tasks used in the
experiments. Similarly table 6.16 shows the correlations excluding those task with imposed time-limit (tasks
3, 6, 11 of table 6.2).
Pearson Spearman
NASAT LX WP MWLNIde f MWLde f Time NASAT LX WP MWL
NI
de f MWLde f Time
NASAT LX Correlation 1 .584 .562 .778 .315 1 .571 .579 .780 .335
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Cases 440 440 440 352 440 440 440 352
WP Correlation 1 .654 .859 .264 1 .658 .854 .259
Sig. .000 000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Cases 440 440 352 440 440 352
MWLNIde f Correlation 1 .713 .272 1 .738 .250
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000
Cases 440 352 440 352
MWLde f Correlation 1 .381 1 .346
Sig. .000 .000
Cases 352 352
Table 6.15: Pearson’s and Spearman correlation coefficients between mental workload scores against each
other and against time
The convergent validity of the mental workload instruments is significant, with the instance MWLde f
highly correlating with the NASA-TLX and WP both according to Pearson and Spearman correlations
coefficients (Pearson: .778, .859 considering all the tasks, .763, .856 not considering time-limit tasks -
Spearman: .780, .854 considering all the tasks. .761, .853 not considering time-limit tasks). The NASA-TLX
and the WP showed a moderate positive correlation (Pearson: .584 considering all the tasks, .590, not
8 The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is a nonparametric measure of statistical dependence between two variables. Likewise
the Pearson’s correlation coefficient, it tells how the relationship between two variables can be described using a monotonic function, but
upon the ranked variables.
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Pearson Spearman
NASAT LX WP MWLNIde f MWLde f Time NASAT LX WP MWL
NI
de f MWLde f Time
NASAT LX Correlation 1 .590 .597 .763 .384 1 .571 .623 .761 .369
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Cases 320 320 320 248 320 320 320 248
WP Correlation 1 .679 .856 .305 1 .681 .853 .286
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Cases 320 320 248 320 320 248
MWLNIde f Correlation 1 .752 .344 1 .779 .333
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000
Cases 320 248 320 248
MWLde f Correlation 1 .447 1 .392
Sig. .000 .000
Cases 248 248
Table 6.16: Pearson’s and Spearman correlation coefficients between mental workload scores against each
other and against time - No time-limit tasks
considering time-limit tasks - Spearman: .571 considering all the tasks, .571 not considering time-limit
tasks).The instance MWLNIde f of the framework with no interaction of arguments only moderately correlated to
the NASA-TLX and WP instruments (Pearson: .562, .654 considering all the tasks, .597, .679 not considering
time-limit tasks - Spearman: .579, .658 considering all the tasks. .623, .681 not considering time-limit
tasks) having less convergent validity than its counterpart with interactions of arguments (MWLde f ). All the
coefficients are statistically significant.
Regarding the concurrent validity, the instance MWLde f of the defeasible framework correlates better
with time, showing a moderate positive correlation (Pearson: .381 considering all the tasks, .447, not
considering time-limit tasks - Spearman: .346 considering all the tasks. .392 not considering time-limit
tasks) than the NASA-TLX (Pearson: .315 considering all the tasks, .384, not considering time-limit tasks
- Spearman: .335 considering all the tasks. .369 not considering time-limit tasks), the WP instrument
(Pearson: .264 considering all the tasks, .305, not considering time-limit tasks - Spearman: .259 considering
all the tasks. .286 not considering time-limit tasks) and the instance MWLNIde f of the defeasible framework
with no interaction of arguments (Pearson: .272 considering all the tasks, .344, not considering time-limit
tasks - Spearman: .250 considering all the tasks. .333 not considering time-limit tasks). All the correlation
coefficients are statistically significant.
In summary, the instance MWLde f , as hypothesised, shows a high convergent validity with the Nasa Task
load Index and the Workload Profile instruments and has a better concurrent validity against the objective time
than the other two baseline instruments and its counterpart MWLNIde f (with no interaction of arguments). The
fact that MWLde f can, in general, correlate with the objective time better than MWLNIde f highlights the impor-
tance of incorporating theoretical relationships of workload attributes within a mental workload assessment
instrument.
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Chapter 7
Discussion
In this chapter the main findings are summarised, showing how the research question behind the thesis can
be positively answered. The assumption of treating mental workload as a defeasible phenomenon, according
to the outcomes of the evaluation chapter, seems to be valid. The impact of argumentation theory for mental
workload representation is supported by the fact that instances of the framework were successfully built to
replicate two well known state-of-the-art subjective mental workload assessment instruments, maintaining the
same assessment capacity. Similarly, the impact of argumentation theory for mental workload assessment is
confirmed by the comparative analysis of the assessments produced by a brand new instance, built with the
framework, against the same two state-of-the-art assessment techniques, in terms of sensitivity, diagnosticity
and validity of assessments. Below we present the advantages and limitations related to the use and application
of this framework. Eventually, a set of illustrative case-studies is provided which aims to show how the
assessments produced by the brand new instance which has been designed could be practically employed in
the field of human-web interaction for supporting A/B testing of interfaces and customisation of systems.
7.1 Impact of argumentation theory for workload representation
The defeasible framework for knowledge representation, designed in chapter 4, has been proved to be appeal-
ing for mental workload representation. Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 have shown how two state-of-the-art subjec-
tive mental workload assessment techniques can be successfully translated into two particular instances of the
defeasible framework. These are the NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX), built by the Human Performance
Group at NASA’s Ames Research Centre (Hart and Staveland, 1988), (Hart, 2006), and the Workload Profile
(WP), designed by psychologists (Tsang and Velazquez, 1996) and based on Wickens’s multiple-resource
theory (Wickens and Hollands, 1999), (Wickens, 2008), as described in section 2.1.2 (page 12). NASA-TLX
and WP are two multi-dimensional instruments that consider multiple workload attributes for shaping mental
workload. However, the former includes a form of preferentiality of attributes leading to a weighted aggrega-
tion of the values carried by each of these attributes. The latter does not take account of preferentiality and
the attributes are simply summed to obtain a mental workload index. These features have been successfully
maintained in the two instances built with the defeasible framework showing how their assessment positively
correlates with the assessment of the respective original instruments. This high convergent validity between
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the original instruments and their defeasible translations was close to 1, indicating how all assess the same
theoretical concept, though this concept was shaped in different ways. Having a nearly perfect convergent
validity suggests that the defeasible framework was useful to build particular instances able to reproduce
the original NASA-TLX and the WP instruments, using the notion of defeasible arguments, thus modelling
these with a common underlying structure that can be better compared. In addition, in example 13 (page
81), it has been shown how the defeasible framework could be also applied for translating the Rating Scale
Mental Effort, a uni-dimensional workload assessment instrument (Zijlstra, 1993), into defeasible arguments.
The main advantage of the defeasible framework, compared to the aforementioned multi-dimensional or uni-
dimensional workload instruments, is represented by its capacity to model workload attributes as defeasible
arguments. These are special structured pieces of evidence, in the form of premises-conclusion, that claim a
workload degree that is open to retraction by other arguments. This retraction is possible because of the in-
teraction of defeasible arguments, manifested as attack relations. This property represents the most important
difference with respect to state-of-the-arts assessment techniques. However, interaction of arguments might
generate inconsistent and contradictory points of view that can be considered for workload assessment. These
inconsistencies are handled by acceptability semantics (section 4.6, page 92), computational procedures that
generate one or more conflict-free sub-sets of the same initial input argument set. A strategy for selecting the
most credible set represents the final step in workload assessment. The overall methodology starting from
knowledge-base translation, into a form of interactive defeasible arguments and their manipulation towards a
mental workload assessment, is appealing because of its modularity and explanatory capacity.
7.2 Impact of argumentation theory for workload assessment
Enhancement in the quality of workload assessment has been proved by designing two new instances of
the defeasible framework (as in section 5.2.3), with and without interaction of arguments. These instances
consider a wider set of workload attributes, compared to the NASA-TLX and WP, these being baselines for
the evaluation of the defeasible framework. In line with the majority of the research aimed at comparing
the psychometric properties of different mental workload assessment instruments, this thesis focused on the
evaluation of the defeasible framework with respect to sensitivity, diagnosticity and validity. In general,
most workload designers assume that in subjective techniques, the intrusiveness of an instrument is not a
significant problem (Rubio et al., 2004). In fact, these techniques usually requires the completion of rating
scales subsequent to task performance, and is therefore not intrusive. In the experimental studies conducted
in this thesis, subjects were required to fill in the questionnaire presented in appendix A.6 which includes
the original NASA-TLX and WP questions plus a few more questions concerning other attributes believed to
influence mental workload (by the author of this thesis). In addition, subjects were required to perform the
pair-wise comparisons of the 6 dimensions accounted for in the NASA-TLX. In terms of number of questions,
in the NASA-TLX 21 overall rates were required (6 questions + 15 comparisons) while for the instance of
the defeasible framework 19 questions were required (no comparisons). As a consequence it can be assumed
that there is no significant difference in gathering rates for quantifying the workload attributes behind each
assessment instrument. In turn intrusiveness is assumed to be the same. However, the questionnaire behind
the WP can be assumed to be less intrusive as just 8 answers are required.
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7.2.1 Sensitivity
Taking into account sensitivity, analysis of variance has been used to assess the capacity of each assessment
instrument to detect changes in resource demands, task difficulty, user features and environmental influence,
these being the different task conditions. The goal was to find out to what extent the global indices of mental
workload varied as a function of objective changes and manipulation of tasks. The instance of the defeasible
framework MWLde f (with interaction of arguments) had an F − ratio similar to the NASA-TLX showing
the same pattern of sensitivity. The WP and the instance of the defeasible framework MWLNIde f (with no
interaction of arguments) showed nearly half of the above sensitivity. However, taking a closer look at each
comparison between tasks, the statistically significant differences spotted by each instrument demonstrated
how MWLde f was always superior to the other three instruments. In fact, this instance of the framework was
more accurate in detecting changes, this being confirmed by the stability in spotting statistically significant
differences between tasks when increasing the confidence interval from 95% to 99%. Quantification of such
stability demonstrated how, considering the tasks used in the experimental studies, MWLde f was from 5.45%
to 39.9% more accurate than the other instruments. In addition, the high variance (F-ratio) of the NASA-TLX
was justified by the computed workload indexes, that were more spread in the range [0..100] ∈ ℜ and not
because the instrument was really able to detect all the differences between tasks.
7.2.2 Diagnosticity
In order to measure the diagnosticity of the designed instance of the defeasible framework MWLde f , which is
still compared to the NASA-TLX and the WP, step-wise multinomial logistic regression has been employed.
A few previous research studies have assessed diagnosticity by adopting discriminant function analysis
(Tsang and Velazquez, 1996) (Rubio et al., 2004). The rationale behind adopting such a different statistical
technique was driven by the fact that multinomial logistic regression does not require all the statistical
assumptions of the underlying data required by discriminant function analysis. The dataset gathered during
the experimental studies justified the use of this tool showing how these statistical assumptions were not
always met. Diagnosticity indicated the capacity of a workload assessment instrument to quantify the
contributions to mental workload. The goal was to determine to what extent the mental workload attributes
taken into account by each assessment instrument allowed discrimination between tasks as well as how
each single attribute contributed to task separation. The former was assessed by investigating the difference
between the multinomial empty logistic model (just with the intercept) and the same model with the workload
attributes. The latter was assessed by using the step-wise method and by analysing what workload attributes
are entered in the empty model and in which order, as well as the contribution that each of these attributes
had to the model’s goodness-of-fit.
Findings underlined the existence of a relationship between the mental workload attributes of each in-
strument and the experimental tasks conducted. However, in order to assess the utility of each multinomial
logistic regression model, its classification accuracy was computed. The aim was to compare the predicted
task membership of the logistic model to the actual (known) one. Results showed how the attributes accounted
for in the instances MWLde f (the same as the instance MWLNIde f ) were clearly superior in discriminating tasks,
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compared to the NASA-TLX and the WP instruments, having 53.2%, 19.1% and 32.3% of accuracy respec-
tively. These figures are in line with expectations. In fact, the attributes taken into account in the instance
MWLde f are a combination of the attributes accounted for in the original NASA-TLX and WP. Thus, it was
reasonable to expect that this hybrid model demonstrated higher diagnosticity capacity. However, in MWLde f ,
six additional workload attributes were included, so in order to test whether each of these additional attributes
contributed to the overall classification, further analyses were performed. These included the investigation
of the likely ratio-tests behind the multinomial logistic regression procedure. Analysis showed how each of
the attributes accounted for in the NASA-TLX and in the WP showed a statistically significant relationship
with the dependent variable (task). However, this was not the case with all the attributes accounted for in the
instance MWLde f : the attributes ‘mental demand’ and ‘intention’ were not considered significant to classify
tasks by the step-wise multinomial logistic regression procedure. However, the new added attributes ‘paral-
lelism’, ‘context bias’, ‘past knowledge’, ‘skills’ and ‘arousal’ all had a role for task separation. This suggests
how additional workload attributes can increase the diagnosticity of mental workload assessment. In turn, it
suggests that the flexibility of the framework in allowing a MWL designer to incorporate new MWL attributes
is a positive and appealing property.
7.2.3 Validity
Regarding the validity of the instances built with the defeasible framework, comparisons with the NASA-TLX
and WP were drawn to assess the capacity to measure mental workload. These two subjective state-of-the-art
instruments were used again as a baseline to measure their convergent validity with the instance MWLde f and
the instance MWLNIde f (where no interaction of arguments was accounted). Results were encouraging, show-
ing how both the instances of the defeasible framework positively correlated with the NASA-TLX and WP,
demonstrating that all of them are able to assess the same theoretical concept. However, the MWLde f (where
interaction of arguments was taken into account) showed a greater validity than its counterpart MWLNIde f
(where no interaction was accounted). This confirms the importance of the consideration of relationships
among those pieces of evidence and knowledge believed to influence overall mental workload, as hypothe-
sised in this thesis. Convergent validity, however, did not say anything about the superiority of the instance
MWLde f to explain objective performance measure. In order to assess whether an assessment technique is
capable of justifying the objective performance related to the execution of tasks, the concurrent validity of
each assessment instrument with the objective time for task completion was investigated. This was assessed
by analysing the correlation of the global workload scores computed by each instrument, and the objective
time of task completion. Results showed how the instance MWLde f was always the most accurate instrument
for justifying objective time, followed by the NASA-TLX, the instance MWLNIde f and the WP, both when all
the tasks were considered and when just the task with no-time limit taken into account. This achievement is
important because it underlines how objective user’s behaviour on tasks can be better explained by building
particular instances of the defeasible framework. In turn, assessments produced by these instances provide
an alternative and accurate way of designing interactive systems and technologies that satisfies end-users and
optimises their experience.
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7.2.4 Summary of findings
The defeasible framework seems to deliver encouraging outcomes according to the preliminary applications
conducted on selected web-based tasks. The instance MWLde f built with this defeasible framework is superior
in terms of sensitivity, diagnosticity and validity compared to the NASA-TLX and WP, these being state-of-
the-art subjective assessment techniques used in the field, as was noted in our review of the literature on
mental workload. However, assessments of MWL with two instruments delivered mixed outcomes according
to the experimental studies conducted in this thesis, as summarised in figure 7.1. The NASA-TLX that
demonstrated a higher sensitivity, is the weakest in term of diagnosticity. Similarly, the WP that showed
the lowest sensitivity, was much better in terms of diagnosticity. The MWLde f out-performed these two
instruments both in sensitivity and diagnosticity. Regarding validity, the three instruments showed a positive
convergent validity, indicating that all assess the same underlying theoretical concept (mental workload). In
term of concurrent validity with objective performance (time), the MWLde f was the best in justifying the
objective time spent on tasks, although this was very similar to the NASA-TLX. The WP demonstrated the
lowest concurrent validity with time. Eventually, the difference between the instances MWLde f and MWLNIde f
became clear, confirming that taking into account relationships of those pieces of knowledge believed to
influence mental workload (built as defeasible arguments), has an important impact on workload assessment.
Thus, we can arrive at an answer to the research question behind this thesis: argumentation theory can enhance
the representation of the construct of mental workload and improve the quality of its assessment in the field
of human-computer interaction. Certainly this statement is confined to this thesis and it cannot be claimed yet
having a general applicability, but it is promising and encouraging, suggesting that tackling mental workload
as a defeasible phenomenon is worthy of further research.
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α = 0.05 α = 0.01
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no time-
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Sensitivity Diagnosticity Concurrent validity
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Fig. 7.1: Comparison of sensitivity, diagnosticity and validity of state-of-the-art subjective mental workload
assessment instruments, and the defeasible instances built with the defeasible framework
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7.3 Advantages and limitations of the defeasible framework
The main advantage of the defeasible framework, designed in Chapter 4, is represented by its flexibility and
extensibility. It allows a workload designer to incorporate those attributes believed to be useful for shaping
mental workload and it provides a methodology for reasoning upon them. This methodology includes the
translation a designer’s knowledge-base and beliefs into interacting defeasible arguments and the resolution
of the inconsistencies and contradictions that might arise from their interaction (by applying formal accept-
ability semantics). This translation process is modular and based upon natural language terms familiar to
a workload designer, aimed at enhancing intuitiveness. In addition, the outcomes of the application of an
acceptability semantics are conflict-free sets of the same input arguments, thus easily interpretable. Another
advantage is that a designer’s knowledge-base, once translated into interactive defeasible arguments, has to
be elicited and activated with objective inputs, related to the user, the task and the context of application. This
elicitation process defines a sub-set of the same input arguments that can be evaluated by applying an accept-
ability semantic. In the event of input being corrupted or missing in a given scenario, the process towards
mental workload assessment is not abandoned as a whole, but simply performed upon those arguments that
are actually activated with available inputs. The defeasible framework does not make any assumption about
the quantification of each workload attribute included in a given knowledge-base. In other words, inputs can
be either quantified through subjective ratings, performance measures such as task completion time, objective
measures such as physiological measurement or combined measures. The defeasible framework allows the
translation of different knowledge-bases, each defining a particular instance and built with the same methodol-
ogy. Each instance represents a proper test aimed at defining and controlling mental workload. These tests can
be compared and they can be seen as attempts to falsify each other. In turn, something that is falsifiable does
not mean it is negative; rather it is a positive quality because it can be tested with empirical experimentation in
different contexts, thus increasing the understanding of mental workload, its representation, assessment and
application.
7.3.1 Differences with machine learning and fuzzy logic
One of the main disadvantages of using such a defeasible framework is that it requires an initial effort for
the translation of a knowledge-base into interactive defeasible arguments. This effort is more acute when
several pieces of evidence need to be taken into account. Argumentation theory AT, has emerged in the AI
community, as a paradigm that contrasts classic Machine Learning (ML) techniques (Longo and Hederman,
2013). The former is a knowledge-based paradigm while the latter techniques are learning-based paradigms.
The main difference is that AT is not capable of learning from examples, a property that instead characterises
ML. AT is an approach for supporting the translation of a knowledge-base and making inferences from it
while ML is instead an approach to automatically learn relationships between pieces of evidence and/or in-
ferring/predicting something from them according to previous examples and cases. Another limitation of the
defeasible framework is that it does not consider mental workload over the time line. In other words, the
assessment of an index of workload refers to a particular instance of time and it does not account for how
it evolved over the execution of the task. The instance MWLde f of the framework designed in chapter 4 is
based upon subjective ratings, inputs explicitly gathered from end-users through the use of a questionnaire
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submitted at the end of a task, just once. In turn, the workload experienced by an end-user is quantified by
this instance just once, with this unique set of subjective ratings. In the event that the questionnaire is submit-
ted multiple times within the execution of a task, multiple indexes of mental workload can be assessed and
combined to consider their evolution over time. For example, this could be done by using the approach pro-
posed in (Xie and Salvendy, 2000b) and described in section 2.4.4 (page 36). However, requiring subjects to
provide explicit ratings multiple times while executing a task can be very intrusive, with evident deterioration
in the quality of workload assessments. Objective performance measures can be used to reduce intrusiveness
and the assessment of mental workload can be done at multiple occasions within the time interval required
for task completion. Multiple assessment is possible because performance measures are usually implicitly
gathered, without requiring the explicit intervention of raters. This property is extremely appealing, above all
in modern human-computer interactive settings, where inputs cannot always be gathered using subjective rat-
ings. However, the evidence implicitly obtainable is usually smaller than the evidence that can be subjectively
provided. Thus the issue is how to assess a meaningful mental workload score with this limited amount of
evidence. The defeasible framework designed in chapter 4 is appropriate to tackle this issue because it can be
applied with any kind and amount of evidence, with no assumptions about how it has been gathered. In order
to clarify how the defeasible framework might be employed only considering measures implicitly gathered
(not subjective ratings), an illustrative design problem is introduced (example 17). In this example, only a
sub-set of the attributes accounted for in the instance MWLde f of the defeasible framework, as proposed in
chapter 6 (page 121), is used.
Example 17
A web-designer wants to investigate how two different interfaces of a web-search system impose mental
workload on end-users. The goal is to choose the interface that minimises imposed workload given a set of
typical search-based tasks. The designer is not willing to use subjective ratings; instead a plug-in for a web-
browser would be developed aimed at automatically gathering end-users actions such as clicking, scrolling,
use of keyboard and timestamp of each of these actions. Information more strictly related to end-users such as
skills, past-knowledge, arousal, frustration and motivation is not available in this context, nor is data related
to environmental factors. However, skills and past knowledge might be subjectively provided by end-users
just once, when registering with the web-search system. The attributes ‘selection of response’, ‘auditory
resources’, ‘speech response’, as considered in the original WP instrument, are assumed to be low and they
can be set to a low degree. The attribute ‘visual resources’, on the other hand, is assumed to be relatively
high, while ‘task/space’ is not taken into account as it is not possible to objectively assess how much spatial
attention an end-user will pay while executing a task.
Other workload attributes that the designer is willing to consider are:
• effort (quantified through an analysis of the usage of keyboard and mouse over time)
• mental demand (quantified according to the degree of difficulty of different designed tasks)
• temporal demand (quantified through an analysis of the objective time spent on task)
• performance (quantified through an analysis of the degree of accomplishment of the task)
• parallelism (quantified by analysing the keyboard/mouse usage on different unrelated parallel tasks)
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• solving/deciding (quantified according to the degree of decision-making/problem-solving/remembering
required by each designed task)
• verbal material (quantified according to the verbal material required by each task to process by end-
users)
• manual response (quantified by independently analysing the usage of mouse and keyboard)
This knowledge-base can be translated into defeasible interactive arguments by using the framework
designed in chapter 4. In turn these interacting arguments are evaluated with objective evidence gathered by
the web-plugin and quantified appropriately according to some criteria or ad-hoc formula decided in advance
by the designer. The activated argumentation framework is abstractly evaluated by running acceptability
semantics for the extraction of consistent and conflict-free extensions of arguments. From these, the
most credible is extracted and the assessment of workload can be performed according to the procedure
summarised in figure 5.1 (page 97).
Example 17 shows how the designed defeasible framework could also be applied in settings where avail-
able evidence is partial and sometimes incomplete. This is an important property that differentiates the so-
lution proposed in the thesis from state-of-the-art subjective assessment techniques. The latter require full
quantification of the workload attributes accounted for by the instrument, while the former can work even if
some attribute cannot be quantified in a given scenario. The main advantages behind the defeasible framework
are multiple and they are summarised as follows.
• inconsistency and incompleteness: the defeasible framework provides a methodology for reasoning
on available evidence, related to mental workload, even if such evidence is partial and inconsistent.
Missing inputs are simply discarded and even if an argument, built upon some workload attribute,
cannot be elicited, the argumentative process can still be executed with the remaining evidence;
• extensibility and updatability: the defeasible framework is an open and extensible solution that allows
the retraction of a workload assessment in the light of new evidence. An argumentation framework that
emerges from the translation of a knowledge-base can be updated with new arguments and evidence,
when available;
• expertise and uncertainty: the defeasible framework captures knowledge in an organised fashion; it is
able to handle the uncertainty and the vagueness associated with the mental workload evidence, usually
expressed with natural language propositions and statements;
• intuitiveness: the defeasible framework is not based on statistics or probability, and it allows to reason
on mental workload similarly to the way humans reason. If a workload designer is anyway inclined to
use statistical evidence, for instance associated with some workload attribute, this can be modelled as an
argument that can be embedded in an argumentation framework. In addition, vague knowledge-bases
can be structured as arguments, built upon the familiar linguistic terms of the workload designer;
• explainability: the defeasible framework leads to explanatory reasoning thanks to the modular and
incremental way of reasoning with available knowledge related to workload;
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• knowledge-bases comparability: the defeasible framework allows comparisons of different subjective
knowledge-bases. Two workload designers can build their own argumentation framework and iden-
tify differences in the definition of their interactive arguments. This property is appealing because it
supports and increases our understanding of the construct of mental workload.
• dataset independency: the defeasible framework does not require a complete dataset to run, and it might
be useful for emerging and not fully structured knowledge, such as in the field of mental workload,
where evidence is fragmented or has not yet been gathered;
The main limitations are summarised as follows:
• knowledge-base translation: the initial translation of the knowledge-base of a workload designer into
interactive defeasible arguments may require considerable effort, particularly when several pieces of
evidence are considered
• lack of learning: the defeasible framework is not a learning-based paradigm. The inference rules un-
derlying each argument as well as the relations between arguments cannot be automatically detected
as in machine learning. However, machine learning often relies on big datasets of evidence to extract
meaningful rules and this process might require valuable time for learning.
• acceptability: the framework has not been tested on other designers, thus its acceptability has not been
proved yet. This is part of the future work and it represents a very important task. The goal is to
maximise operator acceptance without being onerous.
Behind the advantages and limitations of the solution proposed in this thesis, the ultimate goal of assess-
ing mental workload is to have a new metric that can be used for supporting and enhancing the design of
human-computer interactive systems. In the following section, two case studies are presented, based on the
experiments and assessments produced by the brand new instance designed in chapter 6.
7.4 Case-studies - A/B testings
Indexes of mental workload can be applied for many different reasons, as reviewed in 2.5 (page 40). This
section concludes the discussion illustrating few case studies (A/B testings1), based on the experiments con-
ducted in chapter 6, in the field of human-web interaction. The comparison made between two versions of the
same system, in each case study, might be argued to be not to be fully appropriate or meaningful. However,
the goal here is just to illustrate how these different versionss employing mental workload indexes may be
evaluated.
7.4.1 Enhancing web-search
In web-based systems, such as Wikipedia, where a huge amount of content is delivered, the lack of a simple
small search-box might be vital for the success of the system itself. Similar elements that help users to
navigate within the web-site, such as a side-menu, might affect a user’s experience as well. Consider task 1
1 A/B testing is a methodology of using randomised experiments with two variants, A and B. The former is the control while the
latter is the treatment in the controlled experiment. Two versions (A and B) of a system are compared, which are identical except for one
variation that might impact on users’ behaviour.
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on list 6.2 ‘T1: Find out how many people live in Sidney’, performed by two groups of subjects (A and B) on
the original Wikipedia.com and on a slightly modified version, as per screenshots of figures B.1 (Appendix
B). The altered version does not have a search box in the top-right corner and does not have the navigation left-
side menu, with a different background. An independent sample T-test can be run over the indexes computed
by the instance MWLde f of the defeasible framework to determine whether the original Wikipedia interface
(used by subjects in group A) imposed more or less statistically significant mental workload on end-users
than the altered version (used by subjects in group B). The null hypothesis is the equality of workload indexes
computed for the two groups.
H0 : MWLAde f = MWL
B
de f
H1 : MWLAde f 6= MWLBde f
Table 7.1 shows the group statistics, while table 7.2 shows the T-test: the assumptions behind this test are
met2 except the homogeneity of variance (the sig. value of .028 is less than the α = 0.05 level, thus the null
hypothesis of equal variability of the two groups is rejected). As a consequence the T-test of the second row
(equal variance not assumed) is interpreted. The t-value of -1.612 has a significance ≤ 0.0001 which is less
than the α = 0.05, thus the null hypothesis H0 is rejected.
Group N Mean Std. dev. Std. Error mean
A 19 19.68 9.34 2.14
B 2 37.45 15.64 3.49
Table 7.1: Group statistics for the Wikipedia illustrative example
Leven’s Test for
equality of variances
T-test for equality of means
F Sig. t df Sig (2-
tailed)
Mean
diff.
Std. err
diff.
95% confidence
interval of the diff
MWLde f Lower Upper
Equal variances 5.240 .028 -4.278 37 .000 -17.770 4.154 -26.187 -9.353
Not equal variances -4.332 31.3 .000 -17.770 4.102 -26.143 -9.406
Table 7.2: Independent-sample t-test for the Wikipedia illustrative example
The T-test revealed a statistically significant difference between the mental workload scores computed for
Group A of subjects (mean: 19.68, std.dev: 9.34) and the scores for group B (mean: 37.45, std.dev: 15.64),
t(31.209) = 4.332, p≤ 0.001, α = 0.05. Therefore, the structural changes performed over the Wikipedia in-
terface imposed a higher mental workload on end-users. Although this outcome was expected in this scenario,
a metric for evaluating the impact of the removal of a simple search box, or other navigation aids, is likely to
be extremely useful for evaluating end-user experience and for maximising interface design.
2 The assumption of a Ttest are as follows. The dependent variable (index of mental workload) is continuous. The independent
variable (group A and B) consists of two categorical independent groups. Observations of the two groups are independent. The are no
outliers in the distributions of the workload scores of the two groups. The dependent variable is normally distributed for both the groups.
There is homogeneity of variance.
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7.4.2 Supporting customisation
Personalisation is an important property of modern web-technologies that try to accommodate the differences
between individuals to improve user experience during human-computer interaction. Personalisation is also
related to the notion of customisation that includes any manipulation of the information provided to users like
images, text or adaptation of content that is already available to them. Implicit personalisation refers to the
automatic adaptation of the content by the system while explicit personalisation indicates that the interface,
used by humans to interact with a system, is subjectively altered by the humans themselves by using some
features provided by the system itself. Regardless of the typology of personalisation, the adaptation process
produces an altered version of the interface that might impose different levels of mental workload on end-
users, given the same task, compared to the original version. In turn, if these levels fall to within optimal
range the personalisation process is likely to fail, negatively affecting user experience Consider tasks 4 and 5
of list 6.2 (page 124) performed over Google.com
• T4 : Find out the difference (in years) between the year of the foundation of the Apple Computer Inc.
and the year of the 14th FIFA world cup
• T5: Find out the difference (in years) between the foundation of the Microsoft Corporation and the year
of the 23rd Olympic games
These tasks represent typical searches (fact-finding) that can be performed over the Google web-site. They
are slightly more complicated than standard searches because they embed two sub-searches that had to be
executed in order to find out the solution to each task. For this reason they required more time for completion.
Let’s suppose that the designers of the classic results page of Google, as in figures B.4 (b) and B.5 (b)
(appendix B.1) are willing to investigate the impact of the following changes in relation to imposed mental
workload on end-users:
• each result surrounded by a box and a different font (figure B.4 (a),appendix B.1)
• a dark background with no left-side menu (figure B.5 (a),appendix B.1)
As in the previous case-study, independent sample T-tests are run over the mental workload indexes computed
by the instance MWLde f of the defeasible framework to determine whether the original Google interface
imposed statistically significant mental workload on end-users than the altered versions. The null hypotheses
are the equality of workload indexes computed for the two groups of people for both the tasks.
T4−H0 : MWLAde f = MWLBde f H1 : MWLAde f 6= MWLBde f
T5−H0 : MWLAde f = MWLBde f H1 : MWLAde f 6= MWLBde f
Table 7.3 shows the group statistics, while table 7.4 shows the T-tests for both tasks T4 and T5: the
assumptions behind each test are met and there is homogeneity of variance as revealed by the Leven’s test (the
sig. values are all greater than the alpha level α = 0.05). The T-value of .932 for task T4 has a significance of
0.357 > 0.05 thus there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis H0 which is therefore accepted. Similarly
the t-value of .498 for task T5 has a significance of 0.621 > 0.05 thus there is no evidence to reject the null
hypothesis H0.
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Task Group N Mean Std. dev. Std. Error mean
T4 A 20 34.69 12.06 2.69
T4 B 20 30.90 13.61 3.04
T5 A 19 31.60 11.17 2.56
T5 B 20 29.33 16.58 3.70
Table 7.3: Group statistics for the Google illustrative example
Leven’s Test for
equality of variances
T-test for equality of means
F Sig. t df Sig (2-
tailed)
Mean
diff.
Std. err
diff.
95% confidence
interval of the diff
MWLde f - T4 Lower Upper
Equal variances 0.119 .732 .932 38 .357 3.793 4.067 -4.441 12.027
Leven’s Test for
equality of variances
T-test for equality of means
F Sig. t df Sig (2-
tailed)
Mean
diff.
Std. err
diff.
95% confidence
interval of the diff
MWLde f - T5 Lower Upper
Equal variances 3.433 .072 .498 37 .621 2.269 4.553 -6.957 11.495
Table 7.4: Independent-sample t-test for the Google illustrative example
The t-tests failed to reveal a statistically significant difference between the mental workload scores
computed for group A of subjects (T4 - mean: 34.69, std.dev: 12.06; T5 - mean:31.60, std.dev: 11.17) and
the scores for group B (T4 - mean: 30.90, std.dev: 13.61; T5 - mean: 29.33, std.dev: 16.58), t(38) = .932,
p = .357, α = 0.05 for task 4 and t(37) = .498, p = .621, α = 0.05 for task 5. Therefore, the structural
changes performed over the Google results page imposed the same mental workload on end-users as the
original interface. This suggests that the use of a new font and the introduction of a box that wrapped each
result did not really influence user behaviour, nor did the removal of the left-side menu or the addition
of a new dark background. In turn, explicit personalisation might be proposed as a feature in the classic
Google interface and the left-menu might be removed because it was not really an influence. However, the
latter decision should be taken analysing the mental workload of users on more difficult tasks, where the
search-solution is hard to be found.
To conclude, any structural change over a web-page might influence user experience. However, it is very
difficult to assume a-priori end-users’ reactions and behaviour. As a consequence, the use of mental workload
as a metric for tackling such an issue and investigating user experience can be extremely useful. In addition,
not only can components of the interface be considered, but also manipulations of the algorithms for content
delivering can be viewed as structural changes, these being influential elements of the user experience.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
This chapter summarises the thesis, highlighting its main contributions and achievements, as well as its
strengths and limitations. It describes the work that remains to be done and the future directions in the
research of mental workload formalisation and assessment.
8.1 Thesis summary
This thesis described a novel methodology for mental workload representation and assessment based on de-
feasible reasoning (DR). DR is a form of non-monotonic reasoning built upon reasons that can be defeated; a
conclusion, derived from the application of previous knowledge, can be revised in the light of new evidence.
This type of reasoning was formally implemented by designing a modular framework, built upon argumen-
tation theory, that not only supports the representation of mental workload, but is also capable of workload
assessments. The framework represents a proof-of-concept and has been empirically evaluated with a user
study involving humans. The following sections summarise the path which has been taken in accomplishing
the aim of the study.
8.1.1 Introduction
The introductory chapter outlined the motivations for this work by stressing how the concept of mental work-
load has progressively acquired importance due to the increasing use of computer- and web-based technolo-
gies that have led the activities of humans to become more cognitively focused. As a consequence, the
assessment of mental workload may exert an important influence in supporting the development of digital
interfaces and in understanding human performance within emerging complex human-computer interactive
systems. Although the construct has been mainly applied, so far, in the automobile and aviation industries, and
principally investigated by psychologists, ergonomists and neuroscientists, it is argued that it can be applied
in the much broader domain of human-computer interaction, where its future impact is likely to be highly sig-
nificant. Despite 40 years of research efforts, no clear definition of mental workload has yet emerged. Several
operational approaches have been proposed, but there appears to be a lack of agreement among them about
its sources, measurement methods and consequences. The literature has suggested that mental workload is
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a multi-faceted construct that involves two main components: a task and a person. This interaction might
be mediated by several other elements such as available cognitive resources, the abilities, skills and state of
a person, the effort exerted and external factors of influence. This supported the reasonable assumption that
mental workload is a complex construct, built upon a network of pieces of evidence. Furthermore, it was
assumed that the interaction of these pieces of evidence is an important aspect for defining and assessing
mental workload. These assumptions are the key components of a defeasible concept, that is a concept built
upon a set of reasons that can be defeated in the light of new evidence. State-of-the-art theoretical models
of defeasible reasoning, in the field of AI, are formally implemented using argumentation theory (AT) and
argument-based computations. This is a multi-disciplinary paradigm that systematically studies how argu-
ments can be formally built, maintained or discarded in a reasoning process and it investigates the validity of
the conclusions reached. These considerations led to the formalisation of the research question which investi-
gates the application of defeasible argumentation theory as a novel technique to support the representation of
the construct of mental workload, and to improve the quality of its assessment.
8.1.2 Literature review: mental workload
The second chapter was focused on a literature review of current state-of-the-art techniques in representing,
defining and measuring mental workload. This review highlighted the complexity in modelling the construct
but also the importance of its application in many domains. The core tenets which were found underlined the
multi-dimensional nature of mental workload: a context-aware, task-specific and user-specific hypothetical
construct. This is thought not to be detectable directly but rather through the measurement and aggregation
of some other factors believed to correlate strongly with it and which interact with each other. These char-
acteristics supported the need for a framework for reasoning upon mental workload that ideally is flexible,
replicable and inconsistency-aware. In other words, this framework should be open and adaptable, enabling
a workload practitioner to incorporate those attributes believed to be useful in shaping mental workload and
in aggregating them towards a meaningful and justifiable assessment. This aggregation should take stock of
inconsistencies and contradictions that might arise from the interaction of evidence which has been noted.
Flexibility should enable falsifiability: each proper use of the framework, aimed at defining and controlling
mental workload, is an attempt to falsify it, thus increasing our understanding of the construct itself. It should
also be replicable in different contexts, showing reliability in the assessments. The implementation of such
an ideal framework was assumed to be achievable by employing defeasible reasoning (DR). However, the
validity of this assumption was actually tested by reviewing the literature on DR.
8.1.3 Literature review: defeasible reasoning
The third chapter was devoted to the introduction of defeasible reasoning and non-monotonic logic - notions
that form the core of this thesis. Subsequently, argumentation theory, based upon these notions, was reviewed,
describing its basic building blocks and elements for knowledge representation. This included monological
models aimed at internally represent arguments, and dialogical models aimed at investigating their conflicts
and resolving possible contradictions arising from their interaction. In addition, various ways of formalising
conflicts between arguments and different methods for evaluating their credibility were described. In turn, it
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was shown how these techniques supported the computation of consistent and conflict-free sets of arguments,
sets of evidence that can be used for making more rational decisions, or for better justifying claims. This re-
view showed how defeasible reasoning and argumentation theory could be considered appropriate candidates
for modelling the construct of mental workload as a defeasible computational concept.
8.1.4 Design
According to the difficulties and issues related to the representation and assessment of mental workload,
(which emerged from the literature review of chapter 2) a formal computational modular framework based
on defeasible reasoning and argument-based computations was designed. This framework was implemented
according to the state-of-the-art techniques in argumentation theory that were presented in chapter 3. The
framework proposes a multi-layer methodology for mental workload representation and assessment. This
methodology starts with a technique for building formal defeasible arguments from vague natural language
propositions in a monological structure, adopting the notion of ‘degree of truth’, borrowed from fuzzy logic.
These defeasible arguments can be connected in a dialogical structure employing the notion of attack. Argu-
ments and attack relations form an instance of the framework, a directed graph that formally represents the
translated knowledge-base of a workload designer into interactive pieces of knowledge. This instance can be
fully or partially elicited through the quantification of the degree of truth of the premises of arguments with
quantitative inputs. The argumentation graph elicited can be evaluated by applying state-of-the-art accept-
ability semantics for the resolution of the potential inconsistencies that might emerge from the interaction
of activated arguments. The output of an acceptability semantics is a single or multiple sub-set of activated
arguments, coherent and conflict-free points of view. Eventually, the sub-set of arguments with the highest
combined degree of truth, that means the most credible, can be used for mental workload assessment.
8.1.5 Implementation and instantiation
The actual implementation of the framework was described in chapter 5 summarising the algorithm for men-
tal workload assessment and some technical details about practical deployment. Subsequently it was demon-
strated how the framework can be employed in practice for translating two of the state-of-the-art subjective
mental workload instruments, namely the NASA Task Load Index Hart (2006) and the Workload Profile
Tsang and Velazquez (1996), into two particular instances as well as for creating two brand new instances
from scratch, with and without interaction of arguments.
8.1.6 Evaluation
The evaluation of the framework included an empirical experimental study involving human participants, who
were required to perform a set of web-based tasks and provided with subjective ratings, inputs for the instances
built in chapter 5. The evaluation strategy included a comparison of the degree of sensitivity, diagnosticity
and validity of the assessments produced by the brand new designed instances against the two original state-
of-the-art subjective mental workload assessment instruments.
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8.1.7 Discussion and applications
The discussion chapter was devoted to a critical interpretation of the results of the evaluation of the defeasible
framework. The findings support the main aspect of the research question, that is a demonstration of
how defeasible argumentation theory can be successfully adopted to support the representation of mental
workload and to enhance the quality of its assessments. Specifically, it was demonstrated how the two
selected state-of-the-art subjective assessment techniques (The NASA Task Load Index and the Workload
Profile) could be successfully translated into two instances of the defeasible framework while still showing
a strong convergent validity. In other words, the indexes of mental workload inferred by the original two
instruments, and those generated by their corresponding translations (instances of the framework), showed
a positive and nearly perfect statistical correlation. Additionally, one of the new designed instances of the
defeasible framework (with interaction of arguments) showed a better sensitivity and a higher diagnosticity
capacity than the two selected state-of-the art techniques. The former technique had a higher convergent
validity with the latter technique, but a better concurrent validity with task completion time, this being a
performance objective measure. The defeasible instance, with interaction of arguments, generated indexes
of mental workload that better correlated with the objective time for task completion compared to the
two selected state-of-the-art instruments. The findings suggest that accounting for interactions between
arguments, that means relationships of pieces of knowledge, significantly enhanced the quality of mental
workload assessments. This suggests that the application of defeasible reasoning in the domain of mental
workload is promising and worthy of further investigation.
A summary of the limitations related to the use of the defeasible framework was presented. The main
weakness of the proposed solution, an area where improvement is needed, is its acceptability. The framework
was employed by just one workload designer, thus its acceptability could not be actually tested. Another
limitation concerns the reliability of the results emerging from the user-study. The experiment conducted
involved 11 tasks and 40 users, clearly not enough to claim a strong reliability for the designed framework.
Improvement of acceptability and reliability will indeed be an objective of future research.
Finally, an example was provided to illustrate how the framework could be also applied in other settings
where the amount of available evidence is limited, partial or not easily acquirable, as with subjective ratings.
The chapter concluded with practical uses of the mental workload indexes and output of the experimental user-
study, demonstrating, through two illustrative A/B testing examples, how to enhance and support web-design
and customisation of web-interfaces.
8.2 Contributions to the body of knowledge
The proposed defeasible framework has been showed to be actually employable to improve mental workload
representation and to enhance the quality of its assessment. This suggests that this novel approach, based
on defeasible reasoning and formally implemented using argumentation theory, is a suitable alternative to
existing techniques. A major contribution was the presentation of a methodology, developed as a formal
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framework, to represent mental workload as a defeasible computational concept. This methodology is based
upon defeasible reasoning, a form of non-monotonic reasoning built upon reasons that can be defeated and a
conclusion, derived from the application of previous knowledge, can be retracted in the light of new evidence.
In addition to this major contribution, this thesis also makes several other minor contributions. Firstly, it
provided further monological models of argumentation by employing the notion of degree of truth, borrowed
from fuzzy logic. Secondly, it linked this new monological structure to dialogical models of arguments, very
often investigated in the field of argumentation theory individually and not conjointly. Thirdly, it showed
how the quality of mental workload assessment can be enhanced by employing the proposed framework.
Eventually, the thesis demonstrated how computed indexes of mental workload could be practically applied
to enhance web-design. These contributions are summarised as follows:
• Major contribution: considering mental workload as a defeasible phenomenon and formally modelling
it adopting defeasible argumentation theory.
• Minor contributions:
– extension of the landscape of formal monological structure of arguments with the notion of degree
of truth, borrowed from fuzzy logic;
– linkage of such a new monological structure to state-of-the-art dialogical models of argumenta-
tion;
– enhancement of the quality of mental workload assessment produced by instances built employing
the defeasible framework;
– application of the assessment of mental workload in the field of human-computer interaction for
supporting and enhancing web-design and customisation.
The publications related to this thesis are as follows:
• (Longo and Barrett, 2010a) and (Longo and Barrett, 2010b) were aimed at understanding the set of those
attributes useful for shaping mental workload and how they could be computationally modelled. These
studies confirmed that reasoning on mental workload and formalising it as a computational concept are
very subjective tasks and that a unique way to address these two problems does not exist. They led
the author to focus on a common and more generally applicable structure that could be employed and
adopted by different mental workload designers.
• (Longo and Kane, 2011) and (Longo et al., 2012b) were focused on ad-hoc applications of the construct
of mental workload in the field of health informatics and web-design, leading the author to focus instead
on a common structure and methodology that can be employed in different fields.
• (Longo et al., 2012a), (Longo and Hederman, 2013) and (Longo and Dondio, 2014) were devoted to
reviewing defeasible reasoning and to applying argumentation theory in more than one field of health-
care. These studies led the author of this thesis to adopt the same paradigms for tackling the construct
of human mental workload.
• (Longo, 2011) and (Longo, 2012) were aimed at proposing and refining the idea behind this thesis at
two top-tier doctoral consortia in the field of human-computer interaction and user-modelling.
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8.3 Future work
The solution proposed in this thesis can be improved in different ways. Firstly, as was already anticipated,
in order to assess the reliability of the defeasible framework which has been designed, further tests have
to be carried out. These include the creation of other instances of such a framework considering the
knowledge-base of other designers, belonging to different domains. These instances have to be applied in
different settings where evidence can be both acquired using subjective ratings of users and via implicit
objective indicators of effort, such as mouse and keyboard usage and other workload influencers. Secondly,
these instances have to be systematically evaluated through comparisons of their assessment capacity in
terms of sensitivity, diagnosticity and validity against current state-of-the-art mental workload assessment
techniques. In addition, the outcomes of these instances have to be systematically correlated with objective
performance measures, such as time or error rates in order to state their superiority and potential usefulness
in justifying and explaining users’ behaviour and performance on a system. Yet, regarding the evaluation
of the capacity of the framework to assess mental workload, a more effective sensitivity analysis can be
performed, with a more focused manipulation of task loads. This will help to achieve a better understanding
of the relationship between the changes in the task loads (input) and the assessed mental workload (output).
Similarly, future work will include a more detailed investigation of the diagnosticity capacity of different
instances of the framework to detect the pool of mental resources being taxed. Eventually, the theoretical
methodology built as a modular framework, will be coupled with a graphical interface in order to assist the
operator in instantiating his/her own expertise and knowledge-base and probably enhancing the acceptability
of the framework itself.
On the theoretical side, the designed methodology can be also enhanced and extended in various ways.
Firstly, an in-depth investigation of the usefulness of the two reluctancy thresholds for argument and attack
activation will be performed. This is aimed at deciding whether they are actually important for the elicitation
of a knowledge-base, with a consequent impact on the quality of the assessments, or whether they can be re-
moved, simplifying the methodology. Secondly, there can be an extension of the accrual of arguments, in the
final layer of the argumentative schema, towards the generation of an index of workload. An alternative to the
currently proposed average of the claims of the arguments, in the most credible acceptable extensions, may be
the adoption of classical fuzzy logic operators (and, or). Different acceptability semantics will be investigated
for the resolution of the inconsistencies that might arise from the interaction of arguments. Moreover, the
experimental study conducted in this thesis suggests that expressing a clear preference over all the accounted
workload attributes might be not-trivial and non-intuitive. In turn, the framework might be simplified, remov-
ing the explicit function that returns the importance of workload attributes and in turn preferentiality could be
implemented using meta-level preference arguments, as emerged in the literature of argumentation theory.
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8.4 Final remark
As the first of its kind, the solution described in this thesis showed how the complex and multi-faceted prob-
lem of mental workload representation and assessment can be tackled from a different perspective. This
novel perspective assumes mental workload to be a defeasible phenomenon that could be formally modelled
using argumentation theory, a paradigm that computationally implements defeasible reasoning, a form of
non-monotonic reasoning. This thesis demonstrated how the proposed solution is a suitable alternative to
conventional instruments for mental workload representation and for enhancements of the quality of mental
workload assessments. The solution proposed was designed for those scholars interested in engaging in the
multi-disciplinary domain of mental workload and it is aimed at increasing its understanding and use, espe-
cially in emerging and modern human-computer interactive systems. The aim behind this thesis is to offer a
new perspective on the formalisation of mental workload, encouraging further research on its representation,
assessment and application in the more general field of human-computer interaction.
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Appendix A
A.1 The Nasa Task Load Index
Dimension Question
Mental demand
How much mental and perceptual activity was required (e.g. thinking, deciding, cal-
culating, remembering, looking, searching, etc.)? Was the task easy or demanding,
simple or complex, exacting or forgiving?
Physical demand
How much physical activity was required (e.g. pushing, pulling, turning, control-
ling, activating, etc.)? Was the task easy or demanding, slow or brisk, slack or
strenuous, restful or laborious?
Temporal demand
How much time pressure did you feel due to the rate or pace at which the tasks or
task elements occurred? Was the pace slow and leisurely or rapid and frantic?
Effort
How hard did you have to work (mentally and physically) to accomplish your level
of performance?
Performance
How successful do you think you were in accomplishing the goals, of the task set
by the experimenter (or yourself)? How satisfied were you with your performance
in accomplishing these goals?
Frustration
How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed and annoyed versus secure, gratified,
content, relaxed and complacent did you feel during the task?
Table A.1: Nasa Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) sub-scales
A.1.1 The Nasa Task Load Index pair-wise comparison
For each pair of the 6 dimensions, select the dimension that represents the more important contributor to
workload for the task.
Examples:
• Effort or Performance •Mental demand or Temporal Demand • Effort or Psychological stress • ....
The combination of the 6 questions generates 15 comparisons.
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A.2 Subjective Workload Assessment Technique
Dimension Possibilities Value
Time load
Often have spare time. Interruptions or overlap among activities occur infrequently or not at
all.
1
Occasionally have spare time. Interruptions or overlap among activities occur infrequently. 2
Almost never have spare time. Interruptions or overlap among activities are very frequent, or
occur all the time.
3
Mental Effort Load
Very little conscious mental effort or concentration required. Activity is almost automatic,
requiring little or no attention
1
Moderate conscious mental effort or concentration required. Complexity of activity is mod-
erately high due to uncertainty, unpredictability, or unfamiliarity. Considerable attention re-
quired
2
Extensive mental effort and concentration are necessary. Very complex activity required total
attention
3
Psychological stress load
Little Confusion, risk, frustration, or anxiety exists and can be easily accommodated 1
Moderate stress due to confusion, frustration, or anxiety noticeably adds to workload.
2
Significant compensation is required to maintain adequate performance
High to very intense stress due to confusion, frustration, or anxiety. High extreme determina-
tion and self-control required
3
Table A.2: Subjective Workload Assessment Technique (SWAT) dimensions
A.2.1 Hypothetical weighting schemes for the SWAT procedure
Rank order TES TSE ETS EST STE SET
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1
3 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 1
4 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1
5 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1
6 1 2 3 1 3 2 2 1 3 3 1 2 2 3 1 3 2 1
7 1 3 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 3 1
8 1 3 2 1 2 3 3 1 2 2 1 3 3 2 1 2 3 1
9 1 3 3 1 3 3 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 3 1 3 3 1
10 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
11 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2
12 2 1 3 2 3 1 1 2 3 3 2 1 1 3 2 3 1 2
13 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2
14 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
15 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 2
16 2 3 1 2 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 3 3 1 2 1 3 2
17 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 2
18 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 2
19 3 1 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 1 3
20 3 1 2 3 2 1 1 3 2 2 3 1 1 2 3 2 1 3
21 3 1 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 3 1 3
22 3 2 1 3 1 2 2 3 1 1 3 2 2 1 3 1 2 3
23 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 3
24 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 3
25 3 3 1 3 1 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 3 1 3 1 3 3
26 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 3
27 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Table A.3: Six hypothetical weighting schemes of the original SWAT procedure
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A.3 Workload Profile
Dimension Question MRT Area
Perceptual/central processing
How much attention was required for activities like remembering, problem-
solving decision-making, perceiving (detecting, recognising and identifying
objects)?
Processing stages
Response processing How much attention was required for selecting the proper response channel
(manual - keyboard/mouse, or speech - voice) and its execution?
Processing stages
Spatial processing
How much attention was required for spatial processing (spatially pay atten-
tion around you)?
Processing codes
Verbal processing
How much attention was required for verbal material (eg. reading, process-
ing linguistic material, listening to verbal conversations)?
Processing codes
Visual processing
How much attention was required for executing the task based on the infor-
mation visually received (eyes)?
Input modality
Auditory processing
How much attention was required for executing the task based on the infor-
mation auditorily received (ears)?
Input modality
Manual Responses
How much attention was required for manually respond to the task (eg. key-
board/mouse usage)?
Output modality
Speech responses
How much attention was required for producing the speech response (eg.
engaging in a conversation, talk, answering questions)?
Output modality
Table A.4: Workload Profile (WP) questionnaire
A.4 Cooper-Harper rating scale
Fig. A.1: Cooper-Harper rating scale
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A.5 Bedford Rating Scale
Fig. A.2: Bedford rating scale
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A.6 Questionnaire used for experimental studies
Dimension Question
Mental demand
How much mental and perceptual activity was required (e.g., thinking, deciding, calculating, remembering,
looking, searching, etc.)? Was the task easy (low mental demand) or complex (high mental demand)?
Temporal demand
How much time pressure did you feel due to the rate or pace at which the tasks or task elements occurred? Was
the pace slow and leisurely (low temporal demand) or rapid and frantic (high temporal demand)?
Effort
How much conscious mental effort or concentration was required? Was the task almost automatic (low effort) or
it required total attention (high effort)?
Performance
How successful do you think you were in accomplishing the goal of the task? How satisfied were you with your
performance in accomplishing the goal?
Frustration
How secure, gratified, content, relaxed and complacent (low psychological stress) versus insecure, discouraged,
irritated, stressed and annoyed (high psychological stress) did you feel during the task?
Solving and deciding
How much attention was required for activities like remembering, problem-solving, decision-making and per-
ceiving (eg. detecting, recognizing and identifying objects)?
Selection of response
How much attention was required for selecting the proper response channel and its execution?(manual - key-
board/mouse, or speech - voice)
Task and space How much attention was required for spatial processing (spatially pay attention around you)?
Verbal material
How much attention was required for verbal material (eg. reading or processing linguistic material or listening
to verbal conversations)?
Visual resources
How much attention was required for executing the task based on the information visually received (through
eyes)?
Auditory resources How much attention was required for executing the task based on the information auditorily received (ears)?
Manual Response How much attention was required for manually respond to the task (eg. keyboard/mouse usage)?
Speech response
How much attention was required for producing the speech response(eg. engaging in a conversation or talk or
answering questions)?
Context bias
How often interruptions on the task occurred? Were distractions (mobile, questions, noise, etc.) not important
(low context bias) or did they influence your task (high context bias)?
Past knowledge How much experience do you have in performing the task or similar tasks on the same website?
Skill Did your skills have no influence (low) or did they help to execute the task (high)?
Motivation Were you motivated to complete the task?
Parallelism
Did you perform just this task (low parallelism) or were you doing other parallel tasks (high parallelism) (eg.
multiple tabs/windows/programs)?
Arousal
Were you aroused during the task? Were you sleepy, tired (low arousal) or fully awake and activated (high
arousal)?
Table A.5: Experimental study questionnaire
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Appendix B
B.1 Screenshots of web-interfaces used in experimental studies
(a) Task 1 a
(b) Task 1 b
Fig. B.1: Web-interfaces used for task 1 of experimental study
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(a) Task 2 a
(b) Task 2 b
Fig. B.2: Web-interfaces used for task 2 of experimental study
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(a) Task 3 a
(b) Task 3 b
Fig. B.3: Web-interfaces used for task 3 of experimental study
(a) Task 4 a (b) Task 4 b
Fig. B.4: Web-interfaces used for task 4 of experimental study
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(a) Task 5 a
(b) Task 5 b
Fig. B.5: Web-interfaces used for task 5 of experimental study
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(a) Task 6 a
(b) Task 6 b
Fig. B.6: Web-interfaces used for task 6 of experimental study
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(a) Task 7 a
(b) Task 7 b
Fig. B.7: Web-interfaces used for task 7 of experimental study
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(a) Task 8 a/b - subtask a
(b) Task 8 a - subtask b
(c) Task 8 b - subtask b
Fig. B.8: Web-interfaces used for task 8 of experimental study
184
(a) Task 9 a
(b) Task 9 b
Fig. B.9: Web-interfaces used for task 9 of experimental study
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(a) Task 10 a/b - Sub-task a
(b) Task 10 a - Sub-task b/c
(c) Task 10 b - Sub-task b/c
Fig. B.10: Web-interfaces used for task 10 of experimental study
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(a) Task 11 a
(b) Task 11 b
Fig. B.11: Web-interfaces used for task 11 of experimental study
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Appendix C
C.1 Results of experiments
C.1.1 Distributions of workload scores
(a) NASATLX -Total (b) NASATLX - Group A (c) NASATLX - Group B
Fig. C.1: Mental workload scores computed by the NASA Task Load Index
(a) NASAT LXde f - Total (b) NASAT LXde f - Group A (c) NASAT LXde f - Group B
Fig. C.2: Mental workload scores computed by the defeasible translation of the NASA Task Load Index
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(a) WP - Total (b) WP - Group A (c) WP - Group B
Fig. C.3: Mental workload scores computed by the Workload Profile instrument
(a) WPde f - Total (b) WPde f - Group A (c) WPde f - Group B
Fig. C.4: Mental workload scores computed by the defeasible translation of the Workload Profile Instrument
C.1.2 Scatterplots of NASA-TLX, WP and their defeasible translations
Fig. C.5: Scatterplots of NASAT LXde f vs NASATLX, WPde f vs WP for all the 440 cases
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Fig. C.6: Scatterplots of NASAT LXde f vs NASATLX, WPde f vs WP for group A (220 cases)
Fig. C.7: Scatterplots of NASAT LXde f vs NASATLX, WPde f vs WP for group B (220 cases)
C.1.3 Distributions of mental workload attributes
(a) Mental (b) Temporal
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(c) Frustration (d) Performance
(e) Effort (f) Solving/deciding
(g) Selection of response (h) Task and space
191
(i) Verbal material (j) Visual resources
(k) Auditory resources (l) Manual response
(m) Speech response (n) Context bias
192
(o) Past knowledge (p) Skill
(q) Motivation (r) Parallelism
(s) Arousal
Fig. C.8: Distributions of subjective ratings provided by users for mental workload attributes
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C.2 Descriptive statistics of mental workload scores
GROUP A 95% Conf. Int. for mean
Task Id N Mean Std Std. Error Lower bound Upper bound Min Max
T1 20 22.3835 14.23515 3.18308 15.7212 29.0458 .80 47.67
T2 20 41.9630 17.81143 3.98276 33.6270 50.2990 8.47 89.40
T3 20 35.5200 18.57778 4.15412 26.8253 44.2147 5.33 78.67
T4 20 44.2465 14.15502 3.16516 37.6217 50.8713 19.67 66.00
T5 20 44.5535 13.02741 2.91302 38.4565 50.6505 20.33 71.80
T6 20 51.0930 14.36992 3.21321 44.3677 57.8183 25.27 82.53
T7 20 42.0540 12.74580 2.85005 36.0888 48.0192 21.00 62.13
T8 20 49.0345 19.54758 4.37097 39.8859 58.1831 14.93 78.87
T9 20 54.8530 13.70973 3.06559 48.4366 61.2694 25.93 93.33
T10 20 57.4260 17.02675 3.80730 49.4572 65.3948 21.73 93.33
T11 20 70.1705 16.19270 3.62080 62.5921 77.7489 33.67 99.93
GROUP B 95% Conf. Int. for mean
Task Id N Mean Std Std. Error Lower bound Upper bound Min Max
T1 20 45.5730 25.31065 5.65963 33.7272 57.4188 9.00 99.33
T2 20 41.3795 15.70743 3.51229 34.0282 48.7308 11.13 60.80
T3 20 25.4370 13.32720 2.98005 19.1997 31.6743 1.40 58.87
T4 20 41.0825 14.47343 3.23636 34.3087 47.8563 9.13 66.53
T5 20 35.3625 17.92141 4.00735 26.9750 43.7500 6.33 69.93
T6 20 45.5575 16.45863 3.68026 37.8546 53.2604 10.07 71.80
T7 20 46.3535 14.13385 3.16042 39.7387 52.9683 12.13 65.33
T8 20 54.1705 24.12045 5.39350 42.8818 65.4592 2.00 98.00
T9 20 49.7290 20.81553 4.65450 39.9870 59.4710 3.67 82.40
T10 20 55.2400 14.05001 3.14168 48.6644 61.8156 35.33 81.20
T11 20 63.7870 12.60606 2.81880 57.8872 69.6868 39.60 87.33
Total 440 46.2259 19.62278 .93548 44.3873 48.0645 .80 99.93
Table C.1: Descriptive statistics for workload scores computed by the Nasa Task Load Index
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GROUP A 95% Conf. Int. for mean
Task Id N Mean Std Std. Error Lower bound Upper bound Min Max
T1 20 26.7935 14.12071 3.15749 20.1848 33.4022 3.00 55.25
T2 20 30.8945 12.90877 2.88649 24.8530 36.9360 7.38 50.38
T3 20 33.1820 17.42789 3.89700 25.0255 41.3385 1.00 67.50
T4 20 39.2440 12.73285 2.84715 33.2848 45.2032 15.50 59.88
T5 20 37.9245 12.90701 2.88610 31.8838 43.9652 15.62 55.88
T6 20 34.7510 13.99764 3.12997 28.1999 41.3021 9.62 62.62
T7 20 46.4370 13.19099 2.94959 40.2634 52.6106 21.12 67.88
T8 20 37.6435 17.72304 3.96299 29.3489 45.9381 9.50 70.75
T9 20 43.1815 16.98279 3.79747 35.2333 51.1297 15.25 72.88
T10 20 49.0570 14.10191 3.15328 42.4571 55.6569 18.38 77.00
T11 20 49.5985 13.79522 3.08471 43.1421 56.0549 28.62 71.25
GROUP B 95% Conf. Int. for mean
Task Id N Mean Std Std. Error Lower bound Upper bound Min Max
T1 20 37.4550 9.78412 2.18780 32.8759 42.0341 20.25 54.25
T2 20 27.4190 9.39676 2.10118 23.0212 31.8168 6.75 48.75
T3 20 29.6370 13.97368 3.12461 23.0971 36.1769 4.75 56.00
T4 20 36.6115 13.01407 2.91003 30.5207 42.7023 11.00 61.75
T5 20 34.5610 13.54298 3.02830 28.2227 40.8993 7.62 53.75
T6 20 35.7325 12.53252 2.80236 29.8671 41.5979 6.88 59.88
T7 20 43.2125 12.18143 2.72385 37.5114 48.9136 18.12 64.25
T8 20 36.8250 15.42298 3.44868 29.6068 44.0432 7.62 66.75
T9 20 40.3575 13.50702 3.02026 34.0360 46.6790 15.38 57.75
T10 20 47.3745 12.14539 2.71579 41.6903 53.0587 16.38 67.50
T11 20 45.0740 9.54769 2.13493 40.6055 49.5425 22.12 61.62
Total 440 38.3167 14.77397 .70432 36.9324 39.7009 1.00 77.00
Table C.2: Descriptive statistics for workload scores computed by the Workload Profile instrument
195
GROUP A 95% Conf. Int. for mean
Task Id N Mean Std Std. Error Lower bound Upper bound Min Max
T1 20 21.3485 11.74392 2.62602 15.8522 26.8448 3.13 52.92
T2 20 30.8630 13.82903 3.09227 24.3908 37.3352 5.84 57.85
T3 20 29.5770 16.19947 3.62231 21.9954 37.1586 1.27 57.05
T4 20 34.6975 12.06062 2.69684 29.0530 40.3420 9.27 53.90
T5 20 33.3425 13.37591 2.99094 27.0824 39.6026 10.01 66.43
T6 20 35.5295 13.89124 3.10618 29.0282 42.0308 19.30 70.63
T7 20 41.9060 12.91155 2.88711 35.8632 47.9488 21.18 67.38
T8 20 40.6505 18.04984 4.03607 32.2029 49.0981 15.72 70.83
T9 20 49.3355 15.68105 3.50639 41.9965 56.6745 24.64 81.44
T10 20 53.8735 14.53974 3.25118 47.0687 60.6783 25.93 80.19
T11 20 54.7720 13.01265 2.90972 48.6819 60.8621 28.39 74.21
GROUP B 95% Conf. Int. for mean
Task Id N Mean Std Std. Error Lower bound Upper bound Min Max
T1 20 37.4575 15.64352 3.49800 30.1361 44.7789 14.68 73.41
T2 20 23.5040 10.03791 2.24455 18.8061 28.2019 1.74 44.93
T3 20 23.2470 11.42698 2.55515 17.8990 28.5950 6.02 44.03
T4 20 30.9045 13.61943 3.04540 24.5304 37.2786 4.99 53.33
T5 20 29.3320 16.58838 3.70927 21.5684 37.0956 1.60 67.43
T6 20 34.1395 15.57406 3.48247 26.8506 41.4284 4.04 71.81
T7 20 38.0055 12.72641 2.84571 32.0494 43.9616 9.31 56.36
T8 20 39.5910 19.34804 4.32635 30.5358 48.6462 3.08 83.04
T9 20 44.5445 15.28606 3.41807 37.3904 51.6986 20.36 71.81
T10 20 52.3905 14.36866 3.21293 45.6658 59.1152 24.79 78.87
T11 20 48.3145 11.05157 2.47121 43.1422 53.4868 25.26 67.11
Total 440 37.6057 16.97698 0.80935 36.0151 39.1964 1.27 83.04
Table C.3: Descriptive statistics for workload scores computed by the new instances of the defeasible frame-
work (MWLde f )
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GROUP A 95% Conf. Int. for mean
Task Id N Mean Std Std. Error Lower bound Upper bound Min Max
T1 20 21.4905 11.63171 2.60093 16.0467 26.9343 2.13 49.34
T2 20 32.5410 11.47619 2.56616 27.1700 37.9120 11.79 52.37
T3 20 30.8270 14.67742 3.28197 23.9578 37.6962 7.50 59.29
T4 20 35.5680 12.39429 2.77145 29.7673 41.3687 8.50 55.97
T5 20 34.9070 13.27832 2.96912 28.6926 41.1214 9.52 66.30
T6 20 35.7520 13.06679 2.92182 29.6366 41.8674 18.92 66.24
T7 20 40.3765 12.00162 2.68364 34.7596 45.9934 19.32 63.24
T8 20 40.4600 17.29922 3.86822 32.3637 48.5563 16.66 64.67
T9 20 48.1935 14.46117 3.23362 41.4255 54.9615 25.22 76.47
T10 20 53.1445 13.13388 2.93682 46.9977 59.2913 25.52 78.46
T11 20 54.2205 12.65252 2.82919 48.2989 60.1421 28.20 74.63
GROUP B 95% Conf. Int. for mean
Task Id N Mean Std Std. Error Lower bound Upper bound Min Max
T1 20 36.4205 15.35523 3.43353 29.2340 43.6070 13.18 70.27
T2 20 25.5215 9.38281 2.09806 21.1302 29.9128 8.30 47.68
T3 20 22.8010 11.87626 2.65561 17.2427 28.3593 5.31 46.95
T4 20 31.8315 13.80714 3.08737 25.3696 38.2934 4.44 53.16
T5 20 29.2900 16.64239 3.72135 21.5011 37.0789 1.05 63.95
T6 20 34.0240 15.10134 3.37676 26.9564 41.0916 3.33 66.48
T7 20 38.7985 12.98923 2.90448 32.7194 44.8776 9.02 57.38
T8 20 40.0460 19.31031 4.31792 31.0085 49.0835 2.54 81.60
T9 20 43.4750 15.12126 3.38122 36.3980 50.5520 19.90 68.49
T10 20 52.3685 14.33612 3.20565 45.6590 59.0780 22.25 78.87
T11 20 48.1560 10.14175 2.26777 43.4095 52.9025 24.07 66.88
Total 440 37.7370 16.31292 0.77769 36.2085 39.2654 1.05 81.60
Table C.4: Descriptive statistics for workload scores computed by the new instances of the defeasible frame-
work (MWLNIde f )
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C.3 Tests of normality of distributions of computed workload scores
Group A Group A - no outliers Group B Group B - no outliers
Task Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
T1 0.953 20 0.416 0.953 20 0.416 0.953 20 0.418 0.953 20 0.418
T2 0.956 20 0.465 0.959 19 0.557 0.887 20 0.024 0.956 16 0.590
T3 0.966 20 0.660 0.966 20 0.660 0.951 20 0.382 0.951 20 0.382
T4 0.960 20 0.549 0.960 20 0.549 0.979 20 0.923 0.979 20 0.923
T5 0.982 20 0.959 0.982 20 0.959 0.966 20 0.663 0.966 20 0.663
T6 0.983 20 0.969 0.983 20 0.969 0.911 20 0.066 0.911 20 0.066
T7 0.927 20 0.132 0.927 20 0.132 0.901 20 0.042 0.963 18 0.654
T8 0.940 20 0.245 0.940 20 0.245 0.976 20 0.874 0.976 20 0.874
T9 0.936 20 0.198 0.971 18 0.812 0.970 20 0.746 0.970 20 0.746
T10 0.938 20 0.936 0.938 20 0.936 0.947 20 0.325 0.947 20 0.325
T11 0.977 20 0.894 0.977 20 0.894 0.987 20 0.990 0.987 20 0.990
Table C.5: Shapiro-Wilk normality tests of the workload scores computed by the Nasa Task Load Index
Group A Group A - no outliers Group B Group B - no outliers
Task Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig
T1 0.968 20 0.703 0.968 20 0.703 0.976 20 0.864 0.976 20 0.864
T2 0.950 20 0.365 0.950 20 0.365 0.986 20 0.986 0.983 18 0.972
T3 0.983 20 0.966 0.983 20 0.966 0.968 20 0.712 0.968 20 0.712
T4 0.948 20 0.343 0.948 20 0.343 0.973 20 0.823 0.973 20 0.823
T5 0.928 20 0.138 0.928 20 0.138 0.936 20 0.198 0.936 20 0.198
T6 0.979 20 0.926 0.979 20 0.926 0.956 20 0.475 0.973 19 0.838
T7 0.967 20 0.696 0.967 20 0.696 0.957 20 0.490 0.957 20 0.490
T8 0.964 20 0.617 0.964 20 0.617 0.970 20 0.746 0.970 20 0.746
T9 0.973 20 0.818 0.973 20 0.818 0.930 20 0.157 0.930 20 0.157
T10 0.971 20 0.779 0.971 20 0.779 0.969 20 0.727 0.983 19 0.971
T11 0.921 20 0.105 0.921 20 0.105 0.974 20 0.835 0.977 19 0.905
Table C.6: Shapiro-Wilk normality tests of the workload scores computed by the Workload Profile instrument
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Group A Group A - no outliers Group B Group B - no outliers
Task Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig
T1 0.942 20 0.262 0.940 19 0.259 0.958 20 0.506 0.958 20 0.506
T2 0.984 20 0.972 0.984 20 0.972 0.985 20 0.980 0.985 20 0.980
T3 0.971 20 0.767 0.971 20 0.767 0.929 20 0.145 0.929 20 0.145
T4 0.971 20 0.780 0.971 20 0.780 0.968 20 0.706 0.968 20 0.706
T5 0.970 20 0.746 0.981 19 0.954 0.973 20 0.815 0.973 20 0.815
T6 0.907 20 0.057 0.907 20 0.057 0.979 20 0.915 0.975 19 0.867
T7 0.952 20 0.393 0.952 20 0.393 0.930 20 0.155 0.942 18 0.319
T8 0.931 20 0.161 0.931 20 0.161 0.960 20 0.534 0.938 19 0.238
T9 0.963 20 0.610 0.963 20 0.610 0.954 20 0.437 0.954 20 0.437
T10 0.976 20 0.879 0.976 20 0.879 0.986 20 0.989 0.986 20 0.989
T11 0.967 20 0.688 0.967 20 0.688 0.970 20 0.761 0.970 20 0.761
Table C.7: Shapiro-Wilk normality tests of the workload scores computed by the instance MWLde f of the
defeasible framework
Group A Group A - no outliers Group B Group B - no outliers
Task Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig
T1 0.944 20 0.287 0.944 20 0.287 0.960 20 0.537 0.960 20 0.537
T2 0.966 20 0.675 0.966 20 0.675 0.948 20 0.343 0.948 20 0.343
T3 0.966 20 0.679 0.966 20 0.679 0.942 20 0.258 0.942 20 0.258
T4 0.975 20 0.848 0.975 20 0.848 0.966 20 0.659 0.959 18 0.577
T5 0.976 20 0.876 0.981 19 0.956 0.976 20 0.872 0.976 19 0.880
T6 0.933 20 0.177 0.933 20 0.177 0.979 20 0.921 0.979 20 0.921
T7 0.971 20 0.766 0.971 20 0.766 0.920 20 0.099 0.929 18 0.186
T8 0.910 20 0.065 0.910 20 0.065 0.953 20 0.410 0.955 19 0.487
T9 0.961 20 0.562 0.961 20 0.562 0.953 20 0.420 0.953 20 0.420
T10 0.964 20 0.636 0.964 20 0.636 0.990 20 0.998 0.990 20 0.998
T11 0.981 20 0.942 0.981 20 0.942 0.968 20 0.711 0.968 20 0.711
Table C.8: Shapiro-Wilk normality tests of the workload scores computed by the instance MWLNIde f of the
defeasible framework
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C.4 Boxplots of the computed mental workload scores
(a) Group A
(b) Group B
Fig. C.9: Boxplots of the mental workload scores computed by the Nasa Task Load Index
200
(a) Group A
(b) Group B
Fig. C.10: Boxplots of the mental workload scores computed by the Workload Profile isntrument
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(a) Group A
(b) Group B
Fig. C.11: Boxplots of the mental workload scores computed by the instance MWLde f of the defeasible
framework
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(a) Group A
(b) Group B
Fig. C.12: Boxplots of the mental workload scores computed by the instance MWLNIde f of the defeasible
framework
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C.5 Post-hoc Anova results
NASAT LX - Games-Howell 95% Confidence Interval
(I) task (J) task Mean Diff. (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 2 -17.08282 ∗ 4.56407 .023 -32.7258 -1.4398
3 -13.13650 5.23342 .333 -31.1146 4.8416
4 -21.86300 ∗ 4.48890 .001 -37.2204 -6.5056
5 -22.17000 ∗ 4.31482 .000 -36.9388 -7.4012
6 -28.70950 ∗ 4.52291 .000 -44.1833 -13.2357
7 -19.67050 ∗ 4.27256 .002 -34.2985 -5.0425
8 -26.65100 ∗ 5.40716 .001 -45.2558 -8.0462
9 -31.93872 ∗ 3.77014 .000 -44.9947 -18.8827
10 -35.04250 ∗ 4.96261 .000 -52.0529 -18.0321
11 -47.78700 ∗ 4.82101 .000 -64.2970 -31.2770
2 3 3.94632 5.28730 1.000 -14.2209 22.1135
4 -4.78018 4.55160 .992 -20.3811 10.8207
5 -5.08718 4.38001 .983 -20.1156 9.9412
6 -11.62668 4.58514 .318 -27.3410 4.0876
7 -2.58768 4.33838 1.000 -17.4793 12.3040
8 -9.56818 5.45932 .798 -28.3521 9.2157
9 -14.85591 ∗ 3.84458 .020 -28.2310 -1.4808
10 -17.95968 ∗ 5.01939 .035 -35.1765 -.7428
11 -30.70418 ∗ 4.87944 .000 -47.4308 -13.9776
3 4 -8.72650 5.22254 .840 -26.6702 9.2172
5 -9.03350 5.07369 .783 -26.5141 8.4471
6 -15.57300 5.25180 .143 -33.6093 2.4633
7 -6.53400 5.03780 .963 -23.9051 10.8371
8 -13.51450 6.03010 .492 -34.1478 7.1188
9 -18.80222 ∗ 4.61938 .013 -34.9832 -2.6213
10 -21.90600 ∗ 5.63491 .015 -41.1929 -2.6191
11 -34.65050 ∗ 5.51061 .000 -53.5247 -15.7763
4 5 -.30700 4.30162 1.000 -15.0298 14.4158
6 -6.84650 4.51032 .905 -22.2774 8.5844
7 2.19250 4.25923 1.000 -12.3888 16.7738
8 -4.78800 5.39663 .998 -23.3601 13.7841
9 -10.07572 3.75503 .252 -23.0765 2.9251
10 -13.17950 4.95114 .256 -30.1526 3.7936
11 -25.92400 ∗ 4.80920 .000 -42.3950 -9.4530
5 6 -6.53950 4.33710 .908 -21.3861 8.3071
7 2.49950 4.07535 1.000 -11.4434 16.4424
8 -4.48100 5.25272 .998 -22.6136 13.6516
9 -9.76872 3.54509 .219 -22.0061 2.4686
10 -12.87250 4.79387 .246 -29.3414 3.5964
11 -25.61700 ∗ 4.64713 .000 -41.5600 -9.6740
6 7 9.03900 4.29506 .581 -5.6679 23.7459
8 2.05850 5.42495 1.000 -16.6017 20.7187
9 -3.22922 3.79562 .998 -16.3783 9.9199
10 -6.33300 4.98199 .968 -23.4065 10.7405
11 -19.07750 ∗ 4.84096 .013 -35.6535 -2.5015
7 8 -6.98050 5.21806 .955 -25.0093 11.0483
9 -12.26822 ∗ 3.49353 .043 -24.3191 -.2173
10 -15.37200 4.75587 .081 -31.7212 .9772
11 -28.11650 ∗ 4.60792 .000 -43.9339 -12.2991
8 9 -5.28772 4.81533 .988 -22.1930 11.6176
10 -8.39150 5.79663 .927 -28.2455 11.4625
11 -21.13600 ∗ 5.67588 .024 -40.5951 -1.6769
9 10 -3.10378 4.31016 1.000 -18.1431 11.9356
11 -15.84828 ∗ 4.14634 .022 -30.2841 -1.4125
10 11 -12.74450 5.25411 .378 -30.7225 5.2335
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level
Table C.9: ANOVA Post-hoc tests for the Nasa Task Load Index - Group A - 95% Confidence Interval
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NASAT LX - Games-Howell 99% Confidence Interval
(I) task (J) task Mean Diff. (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 2 -17.08282 4.56407 .023 -35.5629 1.3973
3 -13.13650 5.23342 .333 -34.3980 8.1250
4 -21.86300 ∗∗ 4.48890 .001 -39.9901 -3.7359
5 -22.17000 ∗∗ 4.31482 .000 -39.6062 -4.7338
6 -28.70950 ∗∗ 4.52291 .000 -46.9740 -10.4450
7 -19.67050 ∗∗ 4.27256 .002 -36.9426 -2.3984
8 -26.65100 ∗∗ 5.40716 .001 -48.6704 -4.6316
9 -31.93872 ∗∗ 3.77014 .000 -47.4383 -16.4391
10 -35.04250 ∗∗ 4.96261 .000 -55.1387 -14.9463
11 -47.78700 ∗∗ 4.82101 .000 -67.2837 -28.2903
2 3 3.94632 5.28730 1.000 -17.5410 25.4337
4 -4.78018 4.55160 .992 -23.2108 13.6505
5 -5.08718 4.38001 .983 -22.8502 12.6758
6 -11.62668 4.58514 .318 -30.1905 6.9371
7 -2.58768 4.33838 1.000 -20.1925 15.0171
8 -9.56818 5.45932 .798 -31.7994 12.6630
9 -14.85591 3.84458 .020 -30.7693 1.0574
10 -17.95968 5.01939 .035 -38.3064 2.3870
11 -30.70418 ∗∗ 4.87944 .000 -50.4659 -10.9425
3 4 -8.72650 5.22254 .840 -29.9490 12.4960
5 -9.03350 5.07369 .783 -29.7354 11.6684
6 -15.57300 5.25180 .143 -36.9006 5.7546
7 -6.53400 5.03780 .963 -27.1141 14.0461
8 -13.51450 6.03010 .492 -37.8708 10.8418
9 -18.80222 4.61938 .013 -38.1174 .5129
10 -21.90600 5.63491 .015 -44.6762 .8642
11 -34.65050 ∗∗ 5.51061 .000 -56.9405 -12.3605
4 5 -.30700 4.30162 1.000 -17.6884 17.0744
6 -6.84650 4.51032 .905 -25.0604 11.3674
7 2.19250 4.25923 1.000 -15.0238 19.4088
8 -4.78800 5.39663 .998 -26.7707 17.1947
9 -10.07572 3.75503 .252 -25.5082 5.3567
10 -13.17950 4.95114 .256 -33.2327 6.8737
11 -25.92400 ∗∗ 4.80920 .000 -45.3755 -6.4725
5 6 -6.53950 4.33710 .908 -24.0685 10.9895
7 2.49950 4.07535 1.000 -13.9582 18.9572
8 -4.48100 5.25272 .998 -25.9748 17.0128
9 -9.76872 3.54509 .219 -24.2743 4.7368
10 -12.87250 4.79387 .246 -32.3495 6.6045
11 -25.61700 ∗∗ 4.64713 .000 -44.4599 -6.7741
6 7 9.03900 4.29506 .581 -8.3273 26.4053
8 2.05850 5.42495 1.000 -20.0232 24.1402
9 -3.22922 3.79562 .998 -18.8420 12.3836
10 -6.33300 4.98199 .968 -26.5020 13.8360
11 -19.07750 4.84096 .013 -38.6509 .4959
7 8 -6.98050 5.21806 .955 -28.3602 14.3992
9 -12.26822 3.49353 .043 -26.5479 2.0115
10 -15.37200 4.75587 .081 -34.7136 3.9696
11 -28.11650 ∗∗ 4.60792 .000 -46.8160 -9.4170
8 9 -5.28772 4.81533 .988 -25.4895 14.9141
10 -8.39150 5.79663 .927 -31.8387 15.0557
11 -21.13600 5.67588 .024 -44.1272 1.8552
9 10 -3.10378 4.31016 1.000 -21.0226 14.8151
11 -15.84828 4.14634 .022 -33.0298 1.3333
10 11 -12.74450 5.25411 .378 -33.9664 8.4774
** The mean difference is significant at the 0.01 level
Table C.10: ANOVA Post-hoc tests for the Nasa Task Load Index - Group A - 99% Confidence Interval
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NASAT LX - Games-Howell 95% Confidence Interval
(I) task (J) task Mean Diff. (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 2 -2.38075 6.06702 1.000 -23.8482 19.0867
3 20.13600 6.39626 .105 -2.1751 42.4471
4 4.49050 6.51962 1.000 -18.1645 27.1455
5 10.21050 6.93472 .919 -13.6736 34.0946
6 .01550 6.75098 1.000 -23.3123 23.3433
7 -4.39422 6.06090 1.000 -25.8402 17.0517
8 -8.59750 7.81801 .989 -35.3481 18.1531
9 -4.15600 7.32774 1.000 -29.2823 20.9703
10 -9.66700 6.47314 .911 -32.1911 12.8571
11 -18.21400 6.32274 .180 -40.3257 3.8977
2 3 22.51675 ∗ 3.69566 .000 9.7535 35.2800
4 6.87125 3.90528 .794 -6.6456 20.3881
5 12.59125 4.56465 .224 -3.3319 28.5144
6 2.39625 4.28037 1.000 -12.4848 17.2773
7 -2.01347 3.07902 1.000 -12.6715 8.6445
8 -6.21675 5.81954 .990 -26.7698 14.3363
9 -1.77525 5.14214 1.000 -19.8259 16.2754
10 -7.28625 3.82719 .710 -20.5214 5.9489
11 -15.83325 ∗ 3.56691 .004 -28.1382 -3.5283
3 4 -15.64550 ∗ 4.39940 .036 -30.7029 -.5881
5 -9.92550 4.99395 .658 -27.0967 7.2457
6 -20.12050 ∗ 4.73551 .006 -36.3641 -3.8769
7 -24.53022 ∗ 3.68562 .000 -37.2336 -11.8268
8 -28.73350 ∗ 6.16202 .003 -50.1796 -7.2874
9 -24.29200 ∗ 5.52676 .005 -43.4018 -5.1822
10 -29.80300 ∗ 4.33022 .000 -44.6200 -14.9860
11 -38.35000 ∗ 4.10199 .000 -52.3863 -24.3137
4 5 5.72000 5.15100 .988 -11.9499 23.3899
6 -4.47500 4.90085 .997 -21.2583 12.3083
7 -8.88472 3.89578 .469 -22.3486 4.5791
8 -13.08800 6.28998 .598 -34.8977 8.7217
9 -8.64650 5.66907 .901 -28.1845 10.8915
10 -14.15750 4.51045 .097 -29.5894 1.2744
11 -22.70450 ∗ 4.29181 .000 -37.4044 -8.0046
5 6 -10.19500 5.44088 .729 -28.8174 8.4274
7 -14.60472 4.55653 .093 -30.4899 1.2805
8 -18.80800 6.71927 .200 -41.9123 4.2963
9 -14.36650 6.14192 .430 -35.4073 6.6743
10 -19.87750 ∗ 5.09205 .015 -37.3586 -2.3964
11 -28.42450 ∗ 4.89944 .000 -45.3028 -11.5462
6 7 -4.40972 4.27170 .993 -19.2473 10.4278
8 -8.61300 6.52948 .959 -31.1323 13.9063
9 -4.17150 5.93369 1.000 -24.5373 16.1943
10 -9.68250 4.83885 .649 -26.2618 6.8968
11 -18.22950 ∗ 4.63573 .014 -34.1546 -2.3044
7 8 -4.20328 5.81317 1.000 -24.7330 16.3265
9 .23822 5.13492 1.000 -17.7828 18.2592
10 -5.27278 3.81749 .945 -18.4525 7.9070
11 -13.81978 ∗ 3.55651 .016 -26.0599 -1.5796
8 9 4.44150 7.12419 1.000 -19.9634 28.8464
10 -1.06950 6.24179 1.000 -22.7409 20.6019
11 -9.61650 6.08568 .878 -30.8516 11.6186
9 10 -5.51100 5.61556 .995 -24.8864 13.8644
11 -14.05800 5.44150 .299 -32.9180 4.8020
10 11 -8.54700 4.22087 .634 -22.9976 5.9036
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level
Table C.11: ANOVA Post-hoc tests for the Nasa Task Load Index - Group B - 95% Confidence Interval
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NASAT LX - Games-Howell 99% Confidence Interval
(I) task (J) task Mean Diff. (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 2 -2.38075 6.06702 1.000 -28.1325 23.3710
3 20.13600 6.39626 .105 -6.4428 46.7148
4 4.49050 6.51962 1.000 -22.4487 31.4297
5 10.21050 6.93472 .919 -18.0702 38.4912
6 .01550 6.75098 1.000 -27.6496 27.6806
7 -4.39422 6.06090 1.000 -30.1202 21.3317
8 -8.59750 7.81801 .989 -40.1747 22.9797
9 -4.15600 7.32774 1.000 -33.8454 25.5334
10 -9.66700 6.47314 .911 -36.4680 17.1340
11 -18.21400 6.32274 .180 -44.5881 8.1601
2 3 22.51675 ∗∗ 3.69566 .000 7.3844 37.6491
4 6.87125 3.90528 .794 -9.1714 22.9139
5 12.59125 4.56465 .224 -6.3782 31.5607
6 2.39625 4.28037 1.000 -15.3030 20.0955
7 -2.01347 3.07902 1.000 -14.6636 10.6367
8 -6.21675 5.81954 .990 -30.8489 18.4154
9 -1.77525 5.14214 1.000 -23.3447 19.7942
10 -7.28625 3.82719 .710 -22.9881 8.4156
11 -15.83325 ∗∗ 3.56691 .004 -30.4146 -1.2519
3 4 -15.64550 4.39940 .036 -33.4219 2.1309
5 -9.92550 4.99395 .658 -30.2416 10.3906
6 -20.12050 ∗∗ 4.73551 .006 -39.3173 -.9237
7 -24.53022 ∗∗ 3.68562 .000 -39.5774 -9.4830
8 -28.73350 ∗∗ 6.16202 .003 -54.2544 -3.2126
9 -24.29200 ∗∗ 5.52676 .005 -46.9617 -1.6223
10 -29.80300 ∗∗ 4.33022 .000 -47.2936 -12.3124
11 -38.35000 ∗∗ 4.10199 .000 -54.9192 -21.7808
4 5 5.72000 5.15100 .988 -15.1631 26.6031
6 -4.47500 4.90085 .997 -24.2944 15.3444
7 -8.88472 3.89578 .469 -24.8531 7.0837
8 -13.08800 6.28998 .598 -38.9952 12.8192
9 -8.64650 5.66907 .901 -31.7883 14.4953
10 -14.15750 4.51045 .097 -32.3730 4.0580
11 -22.70450 ∗∗ 4.29181 .000 -40.0648 -5.3442
5 6 -10.19500 5.44088 .729 -32.1805 11.7905
7 -14.60472 4.55653 .093 -33.5235 4.3141
8 -18.80800 6.71927 .200 -46.1441 8.5281
9 -14.36650 6.14192 .430 -39.2176 10.4846
10 -19.87750 5.09205 .015 -40.5449 .7899
11 -28.42450 ∗∗ 4.89944 .000 -48.4120 -8.4370
6 7 -4.40972 4.27170 .993 -22.0497 13.2302
8 -8.61300 6.52948 .959 -35.2950 18.0690
9 -4.17150 5.93369 1.000 -28.2468 19.9038
10 -9.68250 4.83885 .649 -29.2657 9.9007
11 -18.22950 4.63573 .014 -37.0631 .6041
7 8 -4.20328 5.81317 1.000 -28.8071 20.4005
9 .23822 5.13492 1.000 -21.2932 21.7696
10 -5.27278 3.81749 .945 -20.8966 10.3510
11 -13.81978 3.55651 .016 -28.3081 .6685
8 9 4.44150 7.12419 1.000 -24.3823 33.2653
10 -1.06950 6.24179 1.000 -26.8287 24.6897
11 -9.61650 6.08568 .878 -34.9177 15.6847
9 10 -5.51100 5.61556 .995 -28.4725 17.4505
11 -14.05800 5.44150 .299 -36.4570 8.3410
10 11 -8.54700 4.22087 .634 -25.6095 8.5155
** The mean difference is significant at the 0.01 level
Table C.12: ANOVA Post-hoc tests for the Nasa Task Load Index - Group B - 99% Confidence Interval
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WP - Tukey HSD 95% Confidence Interval
(I) task (J) task Mean Diff. (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 2 -4.10100 4.63201 .998 -19.1771 10.9751
3 -6.38850 4.63201 .952 -21.4646 8.6876
4 -12.45050 4.63201 .213 -27.5266 2.6256
5 -11.13100 4.63201 .370 -26.2071 3.9451
6 -7.95750 4.63201 .825 -23.0336 7.1186
7 -19.64350 ∗ 4.63201 .002 -34.7196 -4.5674
8 -10.85000 4.63201 .409 -25.9261 4.2261
9 -16.38800 ∗ 4.63201 .021 -31.4641 -1.3119
10 -22.26350 ∗ 4.63201 .000 -37.3396 -7.1874
11 -22.80500 ∗ 4.63201 .000 -37.8811 -7.7289
2 3 -2.28750 4.63201 1.000 -17.3636 12.7886
4 -8.34950 4.63201 .777 -23.4256 6.7266
5 -7.03000 4.63201 .912 -22.1061 8.0461
6 -3.85650 4.63201 .999 -18.9326 11.2196
7 -15.54250 ∗ 4.63201 .037 -30.6186 -.4664
8 -6.74900 4.63201 .932 -21.8251 8.3271
9 -12.28700 4.63201 .229 -27.3631 2.7891
10 -18.16250 ∗ 4.63201 .006 -33.2386 -3.0864
11 -18.70400 ∗ 4.63201 .004 -33.7801 -3.6279
3 4 -6.06200 4.63201 .966 -21.1381 9.0141
5 -4.74250 4.63201 .995 -19.8186 10.3336
6 -1.56900 4.63201 1.000 -16.6451 13.5071
7 -13.25500 4.63201 .143 -28.3311 1.8211
8 -4.46150 4.63201 .997 -19.5376 10.6146
9 -9.99950 4.63201 .537 -25.0756 5.0766
10 -15.87500 ∗ 4.63201 .030 -30.9511 -.7989
11 -16.41650 ∗ 4.63201 .020 -31.4926 -1.3404
4 5 1.31950 4.63201 1.000 -13.7566 16.3956
6 4.49300 4.63201 .997 -10.5831 19.5691
7 -7.19300 4.63201 .900 -22.2691 7.8831
8 1.60050 4.63201 1.000 -13.4756 16.6766
9 -3.93750 4.63201 .999 -19.0136 11.1386
10 -9.81300 4.63201 .565 -24.8891 5.2631
11 -10.35450 4.63201 .483 -25.4306 4.7216
5 6 3.17350 4.63201 1.000 -11.9026 18.2496
7 -8.51250 4.63201 .756 -23.5886 6.5636
8 .28100 4.63201 1.000 -14.7951 15.3571
9 -5.25700 4.63201 .988 -20.3331 9.8191
10 -11.13250 4.63201 .370 -26.2086 3.9436
11 -11.67400 4.63201 .299 -26.7501 3.4021
6 7 -11.68600 4.63201 .297 -26.7621 3.3901
8 -2.89250 4.63201 1.000 -17.9686 12.1836
9 -8.43050 4.63201 .767 -23.5066 6.6456
10 -14.30600 4.63201 .080 -29.3821 .7701
11 -14.84750 4.63201 .058 -29.9236 .2286
7 8 8.79350 4.63201 .718 -6.2826 23.8696
9 3.25550 4.63201 1.000 -11.8206 18.3316
10 -2.62000 4.63201 1.000 -17.6961 12.4561
11 -3.16150 4.63201 1.000 -18.2376 11.9146
8 9 -5.53800 4.63201 .982 -20.6141 9.5381
10 -11.41350 4.63201 .332 -26.4896 3.6626
11 -11.95500 4.63201 .266 -27.0311 3.1211
9 10 -5.87550 4.63201 .973 -20.9516 9.2006
11 -6.41700 4.63201 .951 -21.4931 8.6591
10 11 -.54150 4.63201 1.000 -15.6176 14.5346
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level
Table C.13: ANOVA Post-hoc tests for Workload Profile instrument - Group A - 95% Confidence Interval
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WP - Tukey HSD 99% Confidence Interval
(I) task (J) task Mean Diff. (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 2 -4.10100 4.63201 .998 -21.4971 13.2951
3 -6.38850 4.63201 .952 -23.7846 11.0076
4 -12.45050 4.63201 .213 -29.8466 4.9456
5 -11.13100 4.63201 .370 -28.5271 6.2651
6 -7.95750 4.63201 .825 -25.3536 9.4386
7 -19.64350 ∗∗ 4.63201 .002 -37.0396 -2.2474
8 -10.85000 4.63201 .409 -28.2461 6.5461
9 -16.38800 4.63201 .021 -33.7841 1.0081
10 -22.26350 ∗∗ 4.63201 .000 -39.6596 -4.8674
11 -22.80500 ∗∗ 4.63201 .000 -40.2011 -5.4089
2 3 -2.28750 4.63201 1.000 -19.6836 15.1086
4 -8.34950 4.63201 .777 -25.7456 9.0466
5 -7.03000 4.63201 .912 -24.4261 10.3661
6 -3.85650 4.63201 .999 -21.2526 13.5396
7 -15.54250 4.63201 .037 -32.9386 1.8536
8 -6.74900 4.63201 .932 -24.1451 10.6471
9 -12.28700 4.63201 .229 -29.6831 5.1091
10 -18.16250 ∗∗ 4.63201 .006 -35.5586 -.7664
11 -18.70400 ∗∗ 4.63201 .004 -36.1001 -1.3079
3 4 -6.06200 4.63201 .966 -23.4581 11.3341
5 -4.74250 4.63201 .995 -22.1386 12.6536
6 -1.56900 4.63201 1.000 -18.9651 15.8271
7 -13.25500 4.63201 .143 -30.6511 4.1411
8 -4.46150 4.63201 .997 -21.8576 12.9346
9 -9.99950 4.63201 .537 -27.3956 7.3966
10 -15.87500 4.63201 .030 -33.2711 1.5211
11 -16.41650 4.63201 .020 -33.8126 .9796
4 5 1.31950 4.63201 1.000 -16.0766 18.7156
6 4.49300 4.63201 .997 -12.9031 21.8891
7 -7.19300 4.63201 .900 -24.5891 10.2031
8 1.60050 4.63201 1.000 -15.7956 18.9966
9 -3.93750 4.63201 .999 -21.3336 13.4586
10 -9.81300 4.63201 .565 -27.2091 7.5831
11 -10.35450 4.63201 .483 -27.7506 7.0416
5 6 3.17350 4.63201 1.000 -14.2226 20.5696
7 -8.51250 4.63201 .756 -25.9086 8.8836
8 .28100 4.63201 1.000 -17.1151 17.6771
9 -5.25700 4.63201 .988 -22.6531 12.1391
10 -11.13250 4.63201 .370 -28.5286 6.2636
11 -11.67400 4.63201 .299 -29.0701 5.7221
6 7 -11.68600 4.63201 .297 -29.0821 5.7101
8 -2.89250 4.63201 1.000 -20.2886 14.5036
9 -8.43050 4.63201 .767 -25.8266 8.9656
10 -14.30600 4.63201 .080 -31.7021 3.0901
11 -14.84750 4.63201 .058 -32.2436 2.5486
7 8 8.79350 4.63201 .718 -8.6026 26.1896
9 3.25550 4.63201 1.000 -14.1406 20.6516
10 -2.62000 4.63201 1.000 -20.0161 14.7761
11 -3.16150 4.63201 1.000 -20.5576 14.2346
8 9 -5.53800 4.63201 .982 -22.9341 11.8581
10 -11.41350 4.63201 .332 -28.8096 5.9826
11 -11.95500 4.63201 .266 -29.3511 5.4411
9 10 -5.87550 4.63201 .973 -23.2716 11.5206
11 -6.41700 4.63201 .951 -23.8131 10.9791
10 11 -.54150 4.63201 1.000 -17.9376 16.8546
** The mean difference is significant at the 0.01 level
Table C.14: ANOVA Post-hoc tests for Workload Profile instrument - Group A - 99% Confidence Interval
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WP - Tukey HSD 95% Confidence Interval
(I) task (J) task Mean Diff. (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 2 10.07278 3.86761 .253 -2.5188 22.6644
3 7.81800 3.76446 .595 -4.4377 20.0737
4 .84350 3.76446 1.000 -11.4122 13.0992
5 2.89400 3.76446 1.000 -9.3617 15.1497
6 .20395 3.81367 1.000 -12.2120 12.6199
7 -5.75750 3.76446 .908 -18.0132 6.4982
8 .63000 3.76446 1.000 -11.6257 12.8857
9 -2.90250 3.76446 1.000 -15.1582 9.3532
10 -11.55079 3.81367 .094 -23.9668 .8652
11 -8.82711 3.81367 .428 -21.2431 3.5889
2 3 -2.25478 3.86761 1.000 -14.8464 10.3368
4 -9.22928 3.86761 .381 -21.8209 3.3623
5 -7.17878 3.86761 .745 -19.7704 5.4128
6 -9.86883 3.91553 .299 -22.6164 2.8787
7 -15.83028 ∗ 3.86761 .003 -28.4219 -3.2387
8 -9.44278 3.86761 .346 -22.0344 3.1488
9 -12.97528 ∗ 3.86761 .037 -25.5669 -.3837
10 -21.62357 ∗ 3.91553 .000 -34.3711 -8.8760
11 -18.89988 ∗ 3.91553 .000 -31.6475 -6.1523
3 4 -6.97450 3.76446 .747 -19.2302 5.2812
5 -4.92400 3.76446 .967 -17.1797 7.3317
6 -7.61405 3.81367 .652 -20.0300 4.8019
7 -13.57550 ∗ 3.76446 .017 -25.8312 -1.3198
8 -7.18800 3.76446 .710 -19.4437 5.0677
9 -10.72050 3.76446 .148 -22.9762 1.5352
10 -19.36879 ∗ 3.81367 .000 -31.7848 -6.9528
11 -16.64511 ∗ 3.81367 .001 -29.0611 -4.2291
4 5 2.05050 3.76446 1.000 -10.2052 14.3062
6 -.63955 3.81367 1.000 -13.0555 11.7764
7 -6.60100 3.76446 .806 -18.8567 5.6547
8 -.21350 3.76446 1.000 -12.4692 12.0422
9 -3.74600 3.76446 .996 -16.0017 8.5097
10 -12.39429 3.81367 .051 -24.8103 .0217
11 -9.67061 3.81367 .290 -22.0866 2.7454
5 6 -2.69005 3.81367 1.000 -15.1060 9.7259
7 -8.65150 3.76446 .439 -20.9072 3.6042
8 -2.26400 3.76446 1.000 -14.5197 9.9917
9 -5.79650 3.76446 .905 -18.0522 6.4592
10 -14.44479 ∗ 3.81367 .009 -26.8608 -2.0288
11 -11.72111 3.81367 .083 -24.1371 .6949
6 7 -5.96145 3.81367 .896 -18.3774 6.4545
8 .42605 3.81367 1.000 -11.9899 12.8420
9 -3.10645 3.81367 .999 -15.5224 9.3095
10 -11.75474 3.86225 .090 -24.3289 .8194
11 -9.03105 3.86225 .412 -21.6052 3.5431
7 8 6.38750 3.76446 .836 -5.8682 18.6432
9 2.85500 3.76446 1.000 -9.4007 15.1107
10 -5.79329 3.81367 .912 -18.2093 6.6227
11 -3.06961 3.81367 .999 -15.4856 9.3464
8 9 -3.53250 3.76446 .997 -15.7882 8.7232
10 -12.18079 3.81367 .060 -24.5968 .2352
11 -9.45711 3.81367 .323 -21.8731 2.9589
9 10 -8.64829 3.81367 .460 -21.0643 3.7677
11 -5.92461 3.81367 .899 -18.3406 6.4914
10 11 2.72368 3.86225 1.000 -9.8504 15.2978
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level
Table C.15: ANOVA Post-hoc tests for Workload Profile instrument - Group B - 95% Confidence Interval
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WP - Tukey HSD 99% Confidence Interval
(I) task (J) task Mean Diff. (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 2 10.07278 3.86761 .253 -4.4582 24.6037
3 7.81800 3.76446 .595 -6.3254 21.9614
4 .84350 3.76446 1.000 -13.2999 14.9869
5 2.89400 3.76446 1.000 -11.2494 17.0374
6 .20395 3.81367 1.000 -14.1243 14.5322
7 -5.75750 3.76446 .908 -19.9009 8.3859
8 .63000 3.76446 1.000 -13.5134 14.7734
9 -2.90250 3.76446 1.000 -17.0459 11.2409
10 -11.55079 3.81367 .094 -25.8791 2.7775
11 -8.82711 3.81367 .428 -23.1554 5.5012
2 3 -2.25478 3.86761 1.000 -16.7857 12.2762
4 -9.22928 3.86761 .381 -23.7602 5.3017
5 -7.17878 3.86761 .745 -21.7097 7.3522
6 -9.86883 3.91553 .299 -24.5798 4.8422
7 -15.83028 ∗∗ 3.86761 .003 -30.3612 -1.2993
8 -9.44278 3.86761 .346 -23.9737 5.0882
9 -12.97528 3.86761 .037 -27.5062 1.5557
10 -21.62357 ∗∗ 3.91553 .000 -36.3346 -6.9126
11 -18.89988 ∗∗ 3.91553 .000 -33.6109 -4.1889
3 4 -6.97450 3.76446 .747 -21.1179 7.1689
5 -4.92400 3.76446 .967 -19.0674 9.2194
6 -7.61405 3.81367 .652 -21.9423 6.7142
7 -13.57550 3.76446 .017 -27.7189 .5679
8 -7.18800 3.76446 .710 -21.3314 6.9554
9 -10.72050 3.76446 .148 -24.8639 3.4229
10 -19.36879 ∗∗ 3.81367 .000 -33.6971 -5.0405
11 -16.64511 ∗∗ 3.81367 .001 -30.9734 -2.3168
4 5 2.05050 3.76446 1.000 -12.0929 16.1939
6 -.63955 3.81367 1.000 -14.9678 13.6887
7 -6.60100 3.76446 .806 -20.7444 7.5424
8 -.21350 3.76446 1.000 -14.3569 13.9299
9 -3.74600 3.76446 .996 -17.8894 10.3974
10 -12.39429 3.81367 .051 -26.7226 1.9340
11 -9.67061 3.81367 .290 -23.9989 4.6577
5 6 -2.69005 3.81367 1.000 -17.0183 11.6382
7 -8.65150 3.76446 .439 -22.7949 5.4919
8 -2.26400 3.76446 1.000 -16.4074 11.8794
9 -5.79650 3.76446 .905 -19.9399 8.3469
10 -14.44479 ∗∗ 3.81367 .009 -28.7731 -.1165
11 -11.72111 3.81367 .083 -26.0494 2.6072
6 7 -5.96145 3.81367 .896 -20.2897 8.3668
8 .42605 3.81367 1.000 -13.9022 14.7543
9 -3.10645 3.81367 .999 -17.4347 11.2218
10 -11.75474 3.86225 .090 -26.2656 2.7561
11 -9.03105 3.86225 .412 -23.5419 5.4798
7 8 6.38750 3.76446 .836 -7.7559 20.5309
9 2.85500 3.76446 1.000 -11.2884 16.9984
10 -5.79329 3.81367 .912 -20.1216 8.5350
11 -3.06961 3.81367 .999 -17.3979 11.2587
8 9 -3.53250 3.76446 .997 -17.6759 10.6109
10 -12.18079 3.81367 .060 -26.5091 2.1475
11 -9.45711 3.81367 .323 -23.7854 4.8712
9 10 -8.64829 3.81367 .460 -22.9766 5.6800
11 -5.92461 3.81367 .899 -20.2529 8.4037
10 11 2.72368 3.86225 1.000 -11.7871 17.2345
** The mean difference is significant at the 0.01 level
Table C.16: ANOVA Post-hoc tests for Workload Profile instrument - Group B - 99% Confidence Interval
211
MWLNIDe f - Tukey HSD 95% Confidence Interval
(I) task (J) task Mean Diff. (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 2 -11.05050 4.15649 .226 -24.5803 2.4793
3 -9.33650 4.15649 .475 -22.8663 4.1933
4 -14.07750 ∗ 4.15649 .034 -27.6073 -.5477
5 -13.08283 4.27038 .086 -26.9834 .8177
6 -14.26150 ∗ 4.15649 .029 -27.7913 -.7317
7 -18.88600 ∗ 4.15649 .000 -32.4158 -5.3562
8 -18.96950 ∗ 4.15649 .000 -32.4993 -5.4397
9 -26.70300 ∗ 4.15649 .000 -40.2328 -13.1732
10 -31.65400 ∗ 4.15649 .000 -45.1838 -18.1242
11 -32.73000 ∗ 4.15649 .000 -46.2598 -19.2002
2 3 1.71400 4.15649 1.000 -11.8158 15.2438
4 -3.02700 4.15649 1.000 -16.5568 10.5028
5 -2.03233 4.27038 1.000 -15.9329 11.8682
6 -3.21100 4.15649 1.000 -16.7408 10.3188
7 -7.83550 4.15649 .726 -21.3653 5.6943
8 -7.91900 4.15649 .713 -21.4488 5.6108
9 -15.65250 ∗ 4.15649 .010 -29.1823 -2.1227
10 -20.60350 ∗ 4.15649 .000 -34.1333 -7.0737
11 -21.67950 ∗ 4.15649 .000 -35.2093 -8.1497
3 4 -4.74100 4.15649 .988 -18.2708 8.7888
5 -3.74633 4.27038 .999 -17.6469 10.1542
6 -4.92500 4.15649 .984 -18.4548 8.6048
7 -9.54950 4.15649 .440 -23.0793 3.9803
8 -9.63300 4.15649 .426 -23.1628 3.8968
9 -17.36650 ∗ 4.15649 .002 -30.8963 -3.8367
10 -22.31750 ∗ 4.15649 .000 -35.8473 -8.7877
11 -23.39350 ∗ 4.15649 .000 -36.9233 -9.8637
4 5 .99467 4.27038 1.000 -12.9059 14.8952
6 -.18400 4.15649 1.000 -13.7138 13.3458
7 -4.80850 4.15649 .986 -18.3383 8.7213
8 -4.89200 4.15649 .984 -18.4218 8.6378
9 -12.62550 4.15649 .092 -26.1553 .9043
10 -17.57650 ∗ 4.15649 .002 -31.1063 -4.0467
11 -18.65250 ∗ 4.15649 .001 -32.1823 -5.1227
5 6 -1.17867 4.27038 1.000 -15.0792 12.7219
7 -5.80317 4.27038 .957 -19.7037 8.0974
8 -5.88667 4.27038 .952 -19.7872 8.0139
9 -13.62017 4.27038 .060 -27.5207 .2804
10 -18.57117 ∗ 4.27038 .001 -32.4717 -4.6706
11 -19.64717 ∗ 4.27038 .000 -33.5477 -5.7466
6 7 -4.62450 4.15649 .990 -18.1543 8.9053
8 -4.70800 4.15649 .988 -18.2378 8.8218
9 -12.44150 4.15649 .103 -25.9713 1.0883
10 -17.39250 ∗ 4.15649 .002 -30.9223 -3.8627
11 -18.46850 ∗ 4.15649 .001 -31.9983 -4.9387
7 8 -.08350 4.15649 1.000 -13.6133 13.4463
9 -7.81700 4.15649 .729 -21.3468 5.7128
10 -12.76800 4.15649 .084 -26.2978 .7618
11 -13.84400 ∗ 4.15649 .040 -27.3738 -.3142
8 9 -7.73350 4.15649 .742 -21.2633 5.7963
10 -12.68450 4.15649 .088 -26.2143 .8453
11 -13.76050 ∗ 4.15649 .042 -27.2903 -.2307
9 10 -4.95100 4.15649 .983 -18.4808 8.5788
11 -6.02700 4.15649 .934 -19.5568 7.5028
10 11 -1.07600 4.15649 1.000 -14.6058 12.4538
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level
Table C.17: ANOVA Post-hoc tests for the instance MWLNIde f - Group A - 95% Confidence Interval
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MWLNIDe f - Tukey HSD 95% Confidence Interval
(I) task (J) task Mean Diff. (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 2 -11.05050 4.15649 .226 -26.6631 4.5621
3 -9.33650 4.15649 .475 -24.9491 6.2761
4 -14.07750 4.15649 .034 -29.6901 1.5351
5 -13.08283 4.27038 .086 -29.1232 2.9576
6 -14.26150 4.15649 .029 -29.8741 1.3511
7 -18.88600 ∗ 4.15649 .000 -34.4986 -3.2734
8 -18.96950 ∗ 4.15649 .000 -34.5821 -3.3569
9 -26.70300 ∗ 4.15649 .000 -42.3156 -11.0904
10 -31.65400 ∗ 4.15649 .000 -47.2666 -16.0414
11 -32.73000 ∗ 4.15649 .000 -48.3426 -17.1174
2 3 1.71400 4.15649 1.000 -13.8986 17.3266
4 -3.02700 4.15649 1.000 -18.6396 12.5856
5 -2.03233 4.27038 1.000 -18.0727 14.0081
6 -3.21100 4.15649 1.000 -18.8236 12.4016
7 -7.83550 4.15649 .726 -23.4481 7.7771
8 -7.91900 4.15649 .713 -23.5316 7.6936
9 -15.65250 ∗ 4.15649 .010 -31.2651 -.0399
10 -20.60350 ∗ 4.15649 .000 -36.2161 -4.9909
11 -21.67950 ∗ 4.15649 .000 -37.2921 -6.0669
3 4 -4.74100 4.15649 .988 -20.3536 10.8716
5 -3.74633 4.27038 .999 -19.7867 12.2941
6 -4.92500 4.15649 .984 -20.5376 10.6876
7 -9.54950 4.15649 .440 -25.1621 6.0631
8 -9.63300 4.15649 .426 -25.2456 5.9796
9 -17.36650 ∗ 4.15649 .002 -32.9791 -1.7539
10 -22.31750 ∗ 4.15649 .000 -37.9301 -6.7049
11 -23.39350 ∗ 4.15649 .000 -39.0061 -7.7809
4 5 .99467 4.27038 1.000 -15.0457 17.0351
6 -.18400 4.15649 1.000 -15.7966 15.4286
7 -4.80850 4.15649 .986 -20.4211 10.8041
8 -4.89200 4.15649 .984 -20.5046 10.7206
9 -12.62550 4.15649 .092 -28.2381 2.9871
10 -17.57650 ∗ 4.15649 .002 -33.1891 -1.9639
11 -18.65250 ∗ 4.15649 .001 -34.2651 -3.0399
5 6 -1.17867 4.27038 1.000 -17.2191 14.8617
7 -5.80317 4.27038 .957 -21.8436 10.2372
8 -5.88667 4.27038 .952 -21.9271 10.1537
9 -13.62017 4.27038 .060 -29.6606 2.4202
10 -18.57117 ∗ 4.27038 .001 -34.6116 -2.5308
11 -19.64717 ∗ 4.27038 .000 -35.6876 -3.6068
6 7 -4.62450 4.15649 .990 -20.2371 10.9881
8 -4.70800 4.15649 .988 -20.3206 10.9046
9 -12.44150 4.15649 .103 -28.0541 3.1711
10 -17.39250 ∗ 4.15649 .002 -33.0051 -1.7799
11 -18.46850 ∗ 4.15649 .001 -34.0811 -2.8559
7 8 -.08350 4.15649 1.000 -15.6961 15.5291
9 -7.81700 4.15649 .729 -23.4296 7.7956
10 -12.76800 4.15649 .084 -28.3806 2.8446
11 -13.84400 4.15649 .040 -29.4566 1.7686
8 9 -7.73350 4.15649 .742 -23.3461 7.8791
10 -12.68450 4.15649 .088 -28.2971 2.9281
11 -13.76050 4.15649 .042 -29.3731 1.8521
9 10 -4.95100 4.15649 .983 -20.5636 10.6616
11 -6.02700 4.15649 .934 -21.6396 9.5856
10 11 -1.07600 4.15649 1.000 -16.6886 14.5366
** The mean difference is significant at the 0.01 level
Table C.18: ANOVA Post-hoc tests for the instance MWLNIde f - Group A - 99% Confidence Interval
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MWLNIDe f - Tukey HSD 95% Confidence Interval
(I) task (J) task Mean Diff. (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 2 6.87050 4.69217 .930 -8.4064 22.1474
3 -.03400 4.56702 1.000 -14.9035 14.8355
4 2.39800 4.56702 1.000 -12.4715 17.2675
5 8.12900 4.56702 .791 -6.7405 22.9985
6 4.31650 4.56702 .997 -10.5530 19.1860
7 -6.19350 4.56702 .957 -21.0630 8.6760
8 -13.43476 4.62672 .129 -28.4986 1.6291
9 -6.59244 4.76425 .951 -22.1040 8.9192
10 -15.98200 ∗ 4.56702 .024 -30.8515 -1.1125
11 -7.37100 4.56702 .875 -22.2405 7.4985
2 3 -6.90450 4.69217 .928 -22.1814 8.3724
4 -4.47250 4.69217 .997 -19.7494 10.8044
5 1.25850 4.69217 1.000 -14.0184 16.5354
6 -2.55400 4.69217 1.000 -17.8309 12.7229
7 -13.06400 4.69217 .172 -28.3409 2.2129
8 -20.30526 ∗ 4.75030 .001 -35.7714 -4.8391
9 -13.46294 4.88434 .183 -29.3655 2.4397
10 -22.85250 ∗ 4.69217 .000 -38.1294 -7.5756
11 -14.24150 4.69217 .092 -29.5184 1.0354
3 4 2.43200 4.56702 1.000 -12.4375 17.3015
5 8.16300 4.56702 .786 -6.7065 23.0325
6 4.35050 4.56702 .997 -10.5190 19.2200
7 -6.15950 4.56702 .959 -21.0290 8.7100
8 -13.40076 4.62672 .132 -28.4646 1.6631
9 -6.55844 4.76425 .953 -22.0700 8.9532
10 -15.94800 ∗ 4.56702 .024 -30.8175 -1.0785
11 -7.33700 4.56702 .878 -22.2065 7.5325
4 5 5.73100 4.56702 .975 -9.1385 20.6005
6 1.91850 4.56702 1.000 -12.9510 16.7880
7 -8.59150 4.56702 .729 -23.4610 6.2780
8 -15.83276 ∗ 4.62672 .030 -30.8966 -.7689
9 -8.99044 4.76425 .725 -24.5020 6.5212
10 -18.38000 ∗ 4.56702 .004 -33.2495 -3.5105
11 -9.76900 4.56702 .551 -24.6385 5.1005
5 6 -3.81250 4.56702 .999 -18.6820 11.0570
7 -14.32250 4.56702 .070 -29.1920 .5470
8 -21.56376 ∗ 4.62672 .000 -36.6276 -6.4999
9 -14.72144 4.76425 .080 -30.2330 .7902
10 -24.11100 ∗ 4.56702 .000 -38.9805 -9.2415
11 -15.50000 ∗ 4.56702 .033 -30.3695 -.6305
6 7 -10.51000 4.56702 .437 -25.3795 4.3595
8 -17.75126 ∗ 4.62672 .008 -32.8151 -2.6874
9 -10.90894 4.76425 .445 -26.4205 4.6027
10 -20.29850 ∗ 4.56702 .001 -35.1680 -5.4290
11 -11.68750 4.56702 .278 -26.5570 3.1820
7 8 -7.24126 4.62672 .895 -22.3051 7.8226
9 -.39894 4.76425 1.000 -15.9105 15.1127
10 -9.78850 4.56702 .548 -24.6580 5.0810
11 -1.17750 4.56702 1.000 -16.0470 13.6920
8 9 6.84232 4.82151 .942 -8.8557 22.5403
10 -2.54724 4.62672 1.000 -17.6111 12.5166
11 6.06376 4.62672 .966 -9.0001 21.1276
9 10 -9.38956 4.76425 .669 -24.9012 6.1220
11 -.77856 4.76425 1.000 -16.2902 14.7330
10 11 8.61100 4.56702 .726 -6.2585 23.4805
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level
Table C.19: ANOVA Post-hoc tests for the instance MWLNIde f - Group B - 95% Confidence Interval
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MWLNIDe f - Tukey HSD 95% Confidence Interval
(I) task (J) task Mean Diff. (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 2 6.87050 4.692 6 .930 -10.7598 24.5008
3 -.03400 4.56702 1.000 -17.1941 17.1261
4 2.39800 4.56702 1.000 -14.76 10 19.5581
5 8.12900 4.56702 .791 -9.0311 25.2891
6 4.31650 4.56702 .997 -12.8436 21.4766
7 -6.19350 4.56702 .957 -23.3536 10.9666
8 -13.43476 4.62672 .129 -30.8192 3.9497
9 -6.59244 4.76425 .951 -24.4936 11.3087
10 -15.98200 4.56702 .024 -33.14 10 1.1781
11 -7.37100 4.56702 .875 -24.5311 9.7891
2 3 -6.90450 4.692 6 .928 -24.5348 10.7258
4 -4.47250 4.692 6 .997 -22.1028 13.1578
5 1.25850 4.692 6 1.000 -16.37 7 18.8888
6 -2.55400 4.692 6 1.000 -20.1843 15.0763
7 -13.06400 4.692 6 .172 -30.6943 4.5663
8 -20.30526 ∗ 4.75030 .001 -38.1540 -2.4565
9 -13.46294 4.88434 .183 -31.8154 4.8895
10 -22.85250 ∗ 4.692 6 .000 -40.4828 -5.2222
11 -14.24150 4.692 6 .092 -31.87 7 3.3888
3 4 2.43200 4.56702 1.000 -14.7281 19.5921
5 8.16300 4.56702 .786 -8.9971 25.3231
6 4.35050 4.56702 .997 -12.8096 21.5106
7 -6.15950 4.56702 .959 -23.3196 11.0006
8 -13.40076 4.62672 .132 -30.7852 3.9837
9 -6.55844 4.76425 .953 -24.4596 11.3427
10 -15.94800 4.56702 .024 -33.1081 1.2121
11 -7.33700 4.56702 .878 -24.4971 9.8231
4 5 5.73100 4.56702 .975 -11.4291 22.8911
6 1.91850 4.56702 1.000 -15.24 5 19.0786
7 -8.59150 4.56702 .729 -25.75 5 8.5686
8 -15.83276 4.62672 .030 -33.2172 1.5517
9 -8.99044 4.76425 .725 -26.89 5 8.9107
10 -18.38000 ∗ 4.56702 .004 -35.5401 -1.2199
11 -9.76900 4.56702 .551 -26.9291 7.3911
5 6 -3.81250 4.56702 .999 -20.9726 13.3476
7 -14.32250 4.56702 .070 -31.4826 2.8376
8 -21.56376 ∗ 4.62672 .000 -38.9482 -4.1793
9 -14.72144 4.76425 .080 -32.6226 3.1797
10 -24.11100 ∗ 4.56702 .000 -41.2711 -6.9509
11 -15.50000 4.56702 .033 -32.6601 1.6601
6 7 -10.51000 4.56702 .437 -27.6701 6.6501
8 -17.75126 ∗ 4.62672 .008 -35.1357 -.3668
9 -10.90894 4.76425 .445 -28.8101 6.9922
10 -20.29850 ∗ 4.56702 .001 -37.4586 -3.1384
11 -11.68750 4.56702 .278 -28.8476 5.4726
7 8 -7.24126 4.62672 .895 -24.6257 10.1432
9 -.39894 4.76425 1.000 -18.3001 17.5022
10 -9.78850 4.56702 .548 -26.9486 7.3716
11 -1.17750 4.56702 1.000 -18.3376 15.9826
8 9 6.84232 4.82151 .942 -11.2740 24.9586
10 -2.54724 4.62672 1.000 -19.93 6 14.8372
11 6.06376 4.62672 .966 -11.3207 23.4482
9 10 -9.38956 4.76425 .669 -27.2907 8.5116
11 -.77856 4.76425 1.000 -18.6797 17.1226
10 11 8.61100 4.56702 .726 -8.5491 25.7711
** The mean difference is significant at the 0.01 level
Table C.20: ANOVA Post-hoc tests for the instance MWLNIde f - Group B - 99% Confidence Interval
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MWLDe f - Tukey HSD 95% Confidence Interval
(I) task (J) task Mean Diff. (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 2 -11.17616 4.46065 .308 -25.6961 3.3437
3 -9.89016 4.46065 .495 -24.4101 4.6297
4 -15.01066 ∗ 4.46065 .036 -29.5306 -.4908
5 -11.91421 4.51747 .237 -26.6191 2.7907
6 -15.84266 ∗ 4.46065 .020 -30.3626 -1.3228
7 -22.21916 ∗ 4.46065 .000 -36.7391 -7.6993
8 -20.96366 ∗ 4.46065 .000 -35.4836 -6.4438
9 -29.64866 ∗ 4.46065 .000 -44.1686 -15.1288
10 -34.18666 ∗ 4.46065 .000 -48.7066 -19.6668
11 -35.08516 ∗ 4.46065 .000 -49.6051 -20.5653
2 3 1.28600 4.40309 1.000 -13.0465 15.6185
4 -3.83450 4.40309 .999 -18.1670 10.4980
5 -.73805 4.46065 1.000 -15.2580 13.7818
6 -4.66650 4.40309 .993 -18.9990 9.6660
7 -11.04300 4.40309 .306 -25.3755 3.2895
8 -9.78750 4.40309 .491 -24.1200 4.5450
9 -18.47250 ∗ 4.40309 .002 -32.8050 -4.1400
10 -23.01050 ∗ 4.40309 .000 -37.3430 -8.6780
11 -23.90900 ∗ 4.40309 .000 -38.2415 -9.5765
3 4 -5.12050 4.40309 .986 -19.4530 9.2120
5 -2.02405 4.46065 1.000 -16.5440 12.4958
6 -5.95250 4.40309 .958 -20.2850 8.3800
7 -12.32900 4.40309 .165 -26.6615 2.0035
8 -11.07350 4.40309 .302 -25.4060 3.2590
9 -19.75850 ∗ 4.40309 .001 -34.0910 -5.4260
10 -24.29650 ∗ 4.40309 .000 -38.6290 -9.9640
11 -25.19500 ∗ 4.40309 .000 -39.5275 -10.8625
4 5 3.09645 4.46065 1.000 -11.4235 17.6163
6 -.83200 4.40309 1.000 -15.1645 13.5005
7 -7.20850 4.40309 .864 -21.5410 7.1240
8 -5.95300 4.40309 .958 -20.2855 8.3795
9 -14.63800 ∗ 4.40309 .041 -28.9705 -.3055
10 -19.17600 ∗ 4.40309 .001 -33.5085 -4.8435
11 -20.07450 ∗ 4.40309 .000 -34.4070 -5.7420
5 6 -3.92845 4.46065 .998 -18.4483 10.5915
7 -10.30495 4.46065 .431 -24.8248 4.2150
8 -9.04945 4.46065 .629 -23.5693 5.4705
9 -17.73445 ∗ 4.46065 .005 -32.2543 -3.2145
10 -22.27245 ∗ 4.46065 .000 -36.7923 -7.7525
11 -23.17095 ∗ 4.46065 .000 -37.6908 -8.6510
6 7 -6.37650 4.40309 .934 -20.7090 7.9560
8 -5.12100 4.40309 .986 -19.4535 9.2115
9 -13.80600 4.40309 .070 -28.1385 .5265
10 -18.34400 ∗ 4.40309 .002 -32.6765 -4.0115
11 -19.24250 ∗ 4.40309 .001 -33.5750 -4.9100
7 8 1.25550 4.40309 1.000 -13.0770 15.5880
9 -7.42950 4.40309 .840 -21.7620 6.9030
10 -11.96750 4.40309 .199 -26.3000 2.3650
11 -12.86600 4.40309 .123 -27.1985 1.4665
8 9 -8.68500 4.40309 .668 -23.0175 5.6475
10 -13.22300 4.40309 .100 -27.5555 1.1095
11 -14.12150 4.40309 .057 -28.4540 .2110
9 10 -4.53800 4.40309 .994 -18.8705 9.7945
11 -5.43650 4.40309 .978 -19.7690 8.8960
10 11 -.89850 4.40309 1.000 -15.2310 13.4340
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level
Table C.21: ANOVA Post-hoc tests for the instance MWLde f of the defeasible framework - Group A - 95%
Confidence Interval
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MWLDe f - Tukey HSD 99% Confidence Interval
(I) task (J) task Mean Diff. (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 2 -11.17616 4.46065 .308 -27.9312 5.5789
3 -9.89016 4.46065 .495 -26.6452 6.8649
4 -15.01066 4.46065 .036 -31.7657 1.7444
5 -11.91421 4.51747 .237 -28.8827 5.0543
6 -15.84266 4.46065 .020 -32.5977 .9124
7 -22.21916 ∗∗ 4.46065 .000 -38.9742 -5.4641
8 -20.96366 ∗∗ 4.46065 .000 -37.7187 -4.2086
9 -29.64866 ∗∗ 4.46065 .000 -46.4037 -12.8936
10 -34.18666 ∗∗ 4.46065 .000 -50.9417 -17.4316
11 -35.08516 ∗∗ 4.46065 .000 -51.8402 -18.3301
2 3 1.28600 4.40309 1.000 -15.2529 17.8249
4 -3.83450 4.40309 .999 -20.3734 12.7044
5 -.73805 4.46065 1.000 -17.4931 16.0170
6 -4.66650 4.40309 .993 -21.2054 11.8724
7 -11.04300 4.40309 .306 -27.5819 5.4959
8 -9.78750 4.40309 .491 -26.3264 6.7514
9 -18.47250 ∗∗ 4.40309 .002 -35.0114 -1.9336
10 -23.01050 ∗∗ 4.40309 .000 -39.5494 -6.4716
11 -23.90900 ∗∗ 4.40309 .000 -40.4479 -7.3701
3 4 -5.12050 4.40309 .986 -21.6594 11.4184
5 -2.02405 4.46065 1.000 -18.7791 14.7310
6 -5.95250 4.40309 .958 -22.4914 10.5864
7 -12.32900 4.40309 .165 -28.8679 4.2099
8 -11.07350 4.40309 .302 -27.6124 5.4654
9 -19.75850 ∗∗ 4.40309 .001 -36.2974 -3.2196
10 -24.29650 ∗∗ 4.40309 .000 -40.8354 -7.7576
11 -25.19500 ∗∗ 4.40309 .000 -41.7339 -8.6561
4 5 3.09645 4.46065 1.000 -13.6586 19.8515
6 -.83200 4.40309 1.000 -17.3709 15.7069
7 -7.20850 4.40309 .864 -23.7474 9.3304
8 -5.95300 4.40309 .958 -22.4919 10.5859
9 -14.63800 4.40309 .041 -31.1769 1.9009
10 -19.17600 ∗∗ 4.40309 .001 -35.7149 -2.6371
11 -20.07450 ∗∗ 4.40309 .000 -36.6134 -3.5356
5 6 -3.92845 4.46065 .998 -20.6835 12.8266
7 -10.30495 4.46065 .431 -27.0600 6.4501
8 -9.04945 4.46065 .629 -25.8045 7.7056
9 -17.73445 ∗∗ 4.46065 .005 -34.4895 -.9794
10 -22.27245 ∗∗ 4.46065 .000 -39.0275 -5.5174
11 -23.17095 ∗∗ 4.46065 .000 -39.9260 -6.4159
6 7 -6.37650 4.40309 .934 -22.9154 10.1624
8 -5.12100 4.40309 .986 -21.6599 11.4179
9 -13.80600 4.40309 .070 -30.3449 2.7329
10 -18.34400 ∗∗ 4.40309 .002 -34.8829 -1.8051
11 -19.24250 ∗∗ 4.40309 .001 -35.7814 -2.7036
7 8 1.25550 4.40309 1.000 -15.2834 17.7944
9 -7.42950 4.40309 .840 -23.9684 9.1094
10 -11.96750 4.40309 .199 -28.5064 4.5714
11 -12.86600 4.40309 .123 -29.4049 3.6729
8 9 -8.68500 4.40309 .668 -25.2239 7.8539
10 -13.22300 4.40309 .100 -29.7619 3.3159
11 -14.12150 4.40309 .057 -30.6604 2.4174
9 10 -4.53800 4.40309 .994 -21.0769 12.0009
11 -5.43650 4.40309 .978 -21.9754 11.1024
10 11 -.89850 4.40309 1.000 -17.4374 15.6404
** The mean difference is significant at the 0.01 level
Table C.22: ANOVA Post-hoc tests for the instance MWLde f of the defeasible framework - Group A - 99%
Confidence Interval
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MWLDe f - Tukey HSD 95% Confidence Interval
(I) task (J) task Mean Diff. (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 2 13.95350 4.31563 .053 -.0959 28.0029
3 14.21050 ∗ 4.31563 .045 .1611 28.2599
4 6.55300 4.31563 .912 -7.4964 20.6024
5 8.12550 4.31563 .728 -5.9239 22.1749
6 5.30066 4.37205 .981 -8.9324 19.5337
7 -3.53972 4.43389 .999 -17.9741 10.8947
8 .15329 4.37205 1.000 -14.0798 14.3864
9 -7.08700 4.31563 .862 -21.1364 6.9624
10 -14.93300 ∗ 4.31563 .027 -28.9824 -.8836
11 -10.85700 4.31563 .302 -24.9064 3.1924
2 3 .25700 4.31563 1.000 -13.7924 14.3064
4 -7.40050 4.31563 .826 -21.4499 6.6489
5 -5.82800 4.31563 .958 -19.8774 8.2214
6 -8.65284 4.37205 .664 -22.8859 5.5802
7 -17.49322 ∗ 4.43389 .005 -31.9276 -3.0588
8 -13.80021 4.37205 .066 -28.0333 .4329
9 -21.04050 ∗ 4.31563 .000 -35.0899 -6.9911
10 -28.88650 ∗ 4.31563 .000 -42.9359 -14.8371
11 -24.81050 ∗ 4.31563 .000 -38.8599 -10.7611
3 4 -7.65750 4.31563 .794 -21.7069 6.3919
5 -6.08500 4.31563 .945 -20.1344 7.9644
6 -8.90984 4.37205 .623 -23.1429 5.3232
7 -17.75022 ∗ 4.43389 .004 -32.1846 -3.3158
8 -14.05721 4.37205 .056 -28.2903 .1759
9 -21.29750 ∗ 4.31563 .000 -35.3469 -7.2481
10 -29.14350 ∗ 4.31563 .000 -43.1929 -15.0941
11 -25.06750 ∗ 4.31563 .000 -39.1169 -11.0181
4 5 1.57250 4.31563 1.000 -12.4769 15.6219
6 -1.25234 4.37205 1.000 -15.4854 12.9807
7 -10.09272 4.43389 .454 -24.5271 4.3417
8 -6.39971 4.37205 .930 -20.6328 7.8334
9 -13.64000 4.31563 .066 -27.6894 .4094
10 -21.48600 ∗ 4.31563 .000 -35.5354 -7.4366
11 -17.41000 ∗ 4.31563 .004 -31.4594 -3.3606
5 6 -2.82484 4.37205 1.000 -17.0579 11.4082
7 -11.66522 4.43389 .240 -26.0996 2.7692
8 -7.97221 4.37205 .765 -22.2053 6.2609
9 -15.21250 ∗ 4.31563 .022 -29.2619 -1.1631
10 -23.05850 ∗ 4.31563 .000 -37.1079 -9.0091
11 -18.98250 ∗ 4.31563 .001 -33.0319 -4.9331
6 7 -8.84038 4.48882 .670 -23.4536 5.7728
8 -5.14737 4.42775 .986 -19.5618 9.2670
9 -12.38766 4.37205 .153 -26.6207 1.8454
10 -20.23366 ∗ 4.37205 .000 -34.4667 -6.0006
11 -16.15766 ∗ 4.37205 .012 -30.3907 -1.9246
7 8 3.69301 4.48882 .999 -10.9202 18.3062
9 -3.54728 4.43389 .999 -17.9817 10.8871
10 -11.39328 4.43389 .272 -25.8277 3.0411
11 -7.31728 4.43389 .858 -21.7517 7.1171
8 9 -7.24029 4.37205 .856 -21.4734 6.9928
10 -15.08629 ∗ 4.37205 .028 -29.3194 -.8532
11 -11.01029 4.37205 .300 -25.2434 3.2228
9 10 -7.84600 4.31563 .768 -21.8954 6.2034
11 -3.77000 4.31563 .999 -17.8194 10.2794
10 11 4.07600 4.31563 .997 -9.9734 18.1254
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level
Table C.23: ANOVA Post-hoc tests for the instance MWLde f of the defeasible framework - Group B - 95%
Confidence Interval
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MWLDe f - Tukey HSD 99% Confidence Interval
(I) task (J) task Mean Diff. (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
1 2 13.95350 4.31563 .053 -2.2594 30.1664
3 14.21050 4.31563 .045 -2.0024 30.4234
4 6.55300 4.31563 .912 -9.6599 22.7659
5 8.12550 4.31563 .728 -8.0874 24.3384
6 5.30066 4.37205 .981 -11.1242 21.7255
7 -3.53972 4.43389 .999 -20.1969 13.1175
8 .15329 4.37205 1.000 -16.2716 16.5782
9 -7.08700 4.31563 .862 -23.2999 9.1259
10 -14.93300 4.31563 .027 -31.1459 1.2799
11 -10.85700 4.31563 .302 -27.0699 5.3559
2 3 .25700 4.31563 1.000 -15.9559 16.4699
4 -7.40050 4.31563 .826 -23.6134 8.8124
5 -5.82800 4.31563 .958 -22.0409 10.3849
6 -8.65284 4.37205 .664 -25.0777 7.7720
7 -17.49322 ∗∗ 4.43389 .005 -34.1504 -.8360
8 -13.80021 4.37205 .066 -30.2251 2.6247
9 -21.04050 ∗∗ 4.31563 .000 -37.2534 -4.8276
10 -28.88650 ∗∗ 4.31563 .000 -45.0994 -12.6736
11 -24.81050 ∗∗ 4.31563 .000 -41.0234 -8.5976
3 4 -7.65750 4.31563 .794 -23.8704 8.5554
5 -6.08500 4.31563 .945 -22.2979 10.1279
6 -8.90984 4.37205 .623 -25.3347 7.5150
7 -17.75022 ∗∗ 4.43389 .004 -34.4074 -1.0930
8 -14.05721 4.37205 .056 -30.4821 2.3677
9 -21.29750 ∗∗ 4.31563 .000 -37.5104 -5.0846
10 -29.14350 ∗∗ 4.31563 .000 -45.3564 -12.9306
11 -25.06750 ∗∗ 4.31563 .000 -41.2804 -8.8546
4 5 1.57250 4.31563 1.000 -14.6404 17.7854
6 -1.25234 4.37205 1.000 -17.6772 15.1725
7 -10.09272 4.43389 .454 -26.7499 6.5645
8 -6.39971 4.37205 .930 -22.8246 10.0252
9 -13.64000 4.31563 .066 -29.8529 2.5729
10 -21.48600 ∗∗ 4.31563 .000 -37.6989 -5.2731
11 -17.41000 ∗∗ 4.31563 .004 -33.6229 -1.1971
5 6 -2.82484 4.37205 1.000 -19.2497 13.6000
7 -11.66522 4.43389 .240 -28.3224 4.9920
8 -7.97221 4.37205 .765 -24.3971 8.4527
9 -15.21250 4.31563 .022 -31.4254 1.0004
10 -23.05850 ∗∗ 4.31563 .000 -39.2714 -6.8456
11 -18.98250 ∗∗ 4.31563 .001 -35.1954 -2.7696
6 7 -8.84038 4.48882 .670 -25.7039 8.0232
8 -5.14737 4.42775 .986 -21.7815 11.4868
9 -12.38766 4.37205 .153 -28.8125 4.0372
10 -20.23366 ∗∗ 4.37205 .000 -36.6585 -3.8088
11 -16.15766 4.37205 .012 -32.5825 .2672
7 8 3.69301 4.48882 .999 -13.1706 20.5566
9 -3.54728 4.43389 .999 -20.2045 13.1099
10 -11.39328 4.43389 .272 -28.0505 5.2639
11 -7.31728 4.43389 .858 -23.9745 9.3399
8 9 -7.24029 4.37205 .856 -23.6652 9.1846
10 -15.08629 4.37205 .028 -31.5112 1.3386
11 -11.01029 4.37205 .300 -27.4352 5.4146
9 10 -7.84600 4.31563 .768 -24.0589 8.3669
11 -3.77000 4.31563 .999 -19.9829 12.4429
10 11 4.07600 4.31563 .997 -12.1369 20.2889
** The mean difference is significant at the 0.01 level
Table C.24: ANOVA Post-hoc tests for the instance MWLde f of the defeasible framework- Group B - 99%
Confidence Interval
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task 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 NASA∗ NASA∗∗∗ NASA∗∗∗ NASA∗∗∗ NASA∗∗∗ NASA∗∗∗ NASA∗∗∗ NASA∗∗∗ NASA∗∗∗
WP∗∗∗ WP∗ WP∗∗∗ WP∗∗∗
de f −NI∗ de f −NI∗ de f −NI∗∗∗ de f −NI∗∗∗ de f −NI∗∗∗ de f −NI∗∗∗ de f −NI∗∗∗
de f ∗ de f ∗ de f ∗∗∗ de f
∗
∗∗ de f
∗
∗∗ de f
∗
∗∗ de f
∗
∗∗
2 NASA∗ NASA∗ NASA∗∗∗
WP∗ WP∗∗∗ WP∗∗∗
de f −NI∗∗∗ de f −NI∗∗∗ de f −NI∗∗∗
de f ∗∗∗ de f
∗
∗∗ de f
∗
∗∗
3 NASA∗ NASA∗ NASA∗∗∗
WP∗ WP∗
de f −NI∗∗∗ de f −NI∗∗∗ de f −NI∗∗∗
de f ∗∗∗ de f
∗
∗∗ de f
∗
∗∗
4 NASA∗∗∗
de f −NI∗∗∗ de f −NI∗∗∗
de f ∗ de f ∗∗∗ de f
∗
∗∗
5 NASA∗∗∗
de f −NI∗∗∗ de f −NI∗∗∗
de f ∗∗∗ de f
∗
∗∗ de f
∗
∗∗
6 NASA∗
de f −NI∗∗∗ de f −NI∗∗∗
de f ∗∗∗ de f
∗
∗∗
7 NASA∗ NASA∗∗∗
de f −NI∗
8 NASA∗
de f −NI∗
9
NASA∗
10
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01
Table C.25: Post-hoc results of the ANOVA procedure for the mental workload assessment instruments -
Group A
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task 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1
de f −NI∗
de f ∗ de f ∗
2 NASA∗∗∗ NASA∗∗∗
WP∗∗∗ WP∗ WP∗∗∗ WP∗∗∗
de f −NI∗∗∗ de f −NI∗∗∗
de f ∗∗∗ de f
∗
∗∗ de f
∗
∗∗ de f
∗
∗∗
3 NASA∗ NASA∗∗∗ NASA∗∗∗ NASA∗∗∗ NASA∗∗∗ NASA∗∗∗ NASA∗∗∗
WP∗ WP∗∗∗ WP∗∗∗
de f −NI∗
de f ∗∗∗ de f
∗
∗∗ de f
∗
∗∗ de f
∗
∗∗
4 NASA∗∗∗
de f −NI∗ de f −NI∗∗∗
de f ∗∗∗ de f
∗
∗∗
5 NASA∗ NASA∗∗∗
WP∗∗∗
de f −NI∗∗∗ de f −NI∗∗∗ de f −NI∗
de f ∗ de f ∗∗∗ de f
∗
∗∗
6 NASA∗
de f −NI∗∗∗ de f −NI∗∗∗
de f ∗∗∗ de f
∗
7 NASA∗
8
de f ∗
9
10
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01
Table C.26: Post-hoc results of the ANOVA procedure for the mental workload assessment instruments -
Group B
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C.6 Multicollinearity of each mental workload attribute
m
en
ta
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an
ce
ef
fo
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ce
nt
ra
l
re
sp
on
se
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su
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au
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sp
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l
ve
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an
ua
l
sp
ee
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sa
l
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as
in
te
nt
io
n
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ow
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dg
e
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m
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ill
mental 1 .29 .31 -.07 .63 .55 .35 .33 .09 .27 .31 .22 .03 .06 .11 .03 -.17 .21 -.02
temporal .29 1 .40 -.21 .27 .31 .29 .16 .13 .19 .09 .22 .07 .04 .13 .09 -.03 .31 .02
psychological .31 .40 1 -.20 .28 .33 .33 .23 .14 .29 .14 .26 .11 -.03 .24 -.09 -.01 .16 .04
performance -.07 -.21 -.20 1 -.15 -.13 .00 .11 -.35 -.09 -.14 .17 -.16 .13 -.13 .28 .17 -.02 .28
effort .63 .27 .28 -.15 1 .59 .28 .24 .24 .19 .31 .11 .16 .15 .18 .08 -.14 .05 -.05
central .55 .31 .33 -.13 .59 1 .47 .38 .18 .37 .27 .28 .21 .07 .26 .03 -.03 .29 .09
response .35 .29 .33 .00 .28 .47 1 .20 .08 .34 .13 .51 .15 -.11 .08 .08 .12 .28 .22
visual .33 .16 .23 .11 .24 .38 .20 1 -.03 .23 .18 .31 .09 .22 .10 .00 .11 .18 .18
auditory .09 .13 .14 -.35 .24 .18 .08 -.03 1 .13 .39 -.16 .27 .00 .12 .06 -.17 .07 -.12
spatial .27 .19 .29 -.09 .19 .37 .34 .23 .13 1 .11 .17 .15 -.09 .38 -.12 -.09 .23 -.09
verbal .31 .09 .14 -.14 .31 .27 .13 .18 .39 .11 1 .03 .13 .05 -.01 .00 -.09 .02 -.08
manual .22 .22 .26 .17 .11 .28 .51 .31 -.16 .17 .03 1 .07 .00 -.05 .09 .19 .31 .34
speech .03 .07 .11 -.16 .16 .21 .15 .09 .27 .15 .13 .07 1 -.07 .14 -.04 .02 .09 .04
arousal .06 .04 -.03 .13 .15 .07 -.11 .22 .00 -.09 .05 .00 -.07 1 .08 .14 .12 .11 .13
bias .11 .13 .24 -.13 .18 .26 .08 .10 .12 .38 -.01 -.05 .14 .08 1 -.14 -.05 .21 -.06
intention .03 .09 -.09 .28 .08 .03 .08 .00 .06 -.12 .00 .09 -.04 .14 -.14 1 .00 .07 .16
knowledge -.17 -.03 -.01 .17 -.14 -.03 .12 .11 -.17 -.09 -.09 .19 .02 .12 -.05 .00 1 -.01 .50
parallelism .21 .31 .16 -.02 .05 .29 .28 .18 .07 .23 .02 .31 .09 .11 .21 .07 -.01 1 .08
skill -.02 .02 .04 .28 -.05 .09 .22 .18 -.12 -.09 -.08 .34 .04 .13 -.06 .16 .50 .08 1
Table C.27: Inter-correlations among mental workload attributes - Group A
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mental 1 .22 .28 -.22 .73 .72 .35 .41 .16 .18 .42 .28 .17 -.04 .30 .23 -.13 .25 -.13
temporal .22 1 .30 -.18 .26 .19 .23 .25 .23 .18 .03 .14 .27 -.03 .17 .16 -.08 .20 -.12
psychological .28 .30 1 -.39 .35 .29 .21 .30 .17 .34 .15 .09 .20 -.06 .37 .04 -.19 .12 -.18
performance -.22 -.18 -.39 1 -.21 -.21 -.08 -.09 -.35 -.19 -.20 .06 -.22 .14 -.20 .09 .22 .06 .31
effort .73 .26 .35 -.21 1 .58 .19 .43 .25 .16 .37 .12 .17 .09 .30 .20 -.23 .16 -.21
central .72 .19 .29 -.21 .58 1 .39 .41 .13 .26 .23 .30 .21 -.01 .37 .26 -.18 .27 -.08
response .35 .23 .21 -.08 .19 .39 1 .34 -.11 .23 .15 .56 .10 -.04 .24 .16 -.16 .36 -.05
visual .41 .25 .30 -.09 .43 .41 .34 1 .07 .30 .17 .29 .12 .01 .33 .24 -.17 .21 -.07
auditory .16 .23 .17 -.35 .25 .13 -.11 .07 1 .26 .25 -.22 .24 .06 .16 .14 -.17 -.06 -.26
spatial .18 .18 .34 -.19 .16 .26 .23 .30 .26 1 .06 .18 .42 -.07 .48 .10 -.02 .29 -.06
verbal .42 .03 .15 -.20 .37 .23 .15 .17 .25 .06 1 .01 .09 .17 .08 .23 -.10 .05 -.20
manual .28 .14 .09 .06 .12 .30 .56 .29 -.22 .18 .01 1 .01 -.08 .10 .21 -.01 .37 .09
speech .17 .27 .20 -.22 .17 .21 .10 .12 .24 .42 .09 .01 1 .04 .31 .05 -.01 .27 -.05
arousal -.04 -.03 -.06 .14 .09 -.01 -.04 .01 .06 -.07 .17 -.08 .04 1 .05 .19 -.10 .03 -.01
bias .30 .17 .37 -.20 .30 .37 .24 .33 .16 .48 .08 .10 .31 .05 1 .11 -.17 .38 -.19
intention .23 .16 .04 .09 .20 .26 .16 .24 .14 .10 .23 .21 .05 .19 .11 1 -.03 .16 .02
knowledge -.13 -.08 -.19 .22 -.23 -.18 -.16 -.17 -.17 -.02 -.10 -.01 -.01 -.10 -.17 -.03 1 .01 .60
parallelism .25 .20 .12 .06 .16 .27 .36 .21 -.06 .29 .05 .37 .27 .03 .38 .16 .01 1 .04
skill -.13 -.12 -.18 .31 -.21 -.08 -.05 -.07 -.26 -.06 -.20 .09 -.05 -.01 -.19 .02 .60 .04 1
Table C.28: Inter-correlations among mental workload attributes - Group B
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C.7 Shapiro-Wilk test of normality for the mental workload attributes
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Attribute Stat Sig Stat Sig Stat Sig Stat Sig Stat Sig Stat Sig Stat Sig Stat Sig Stat Sig Stat Sig Stat Sig
mental .917 .089 .930 .155 .813 .001 .950 .370 .950 .366 .947 .323 .957 .489 .939 .234 .899 .040 .961 .568 .926 .132
temporal .806 .001 .841 .004 .854 .006 .928 .144 .894 0.32 .963 .611 .863 .009 .908 .058 .946 .316 969 .730 .921 .103
psychological .718 .000 .894 .032 .925 .123 .864 .009 .906 .053 .902 .045 .916 .083 .887 .024 .918 .090 .961 .554 .960 .546
performance .854 .006 .860 .008 .725 .000 .923 .113 .921 .103 .930 .156 .807 .001 .940 .244 .879 .017 .927 .134 .797 .001
effort .894 .032 .915 .078 .905 .050 .894 .032 .959 .528 .909 .060 .871 .012 .934 .182 .965 .643 .974 .838 .895 .033
central .887 .024 .913 .074 .886 .023 .887 .023 .952 .392 .950 .368 .887 .023 .918 .092 .887 .023 .953 .417 .945 .294
response .921 .105 .775 .000 .885 .022 .925 .125 .910 .063 .494 .358 .831 .003 .869 .011 .821 .002 .950 .373 .906 .052
visual .951 .388 .898 .038 .911 .067 .879 .017 .788 .001 .932 .168 .953 .416 .967 .684 .825 .002 .885 .021 .962 .588
auditory .687 .000 .640 .000 .884 .021 .648 .000 .712 .000 .625 .000 .642 .000 .911 .065 .882 .019 .823 .002 .888 .025
spatial .855 .007 .822 .002 .886 .022 .911 .066 .957 .494 .904 .050 .846 .005 .880 .018 .863 .009 .918 .089 .879 .017
verbal .857 .007 .859 .008 .867 .011 .838 .003 .882 .019 .860 .008 .796 .001 .919 .094 .833 .003 .951 .390 .880 .018
manual .921 .103 .882 .019 .935 .196 .926 .129 .949 .346 .932 .167 .809 .001 .854 .006 .782 .000 .914 .076 .878 .016
speech .775 .000 .670 .000 .808 .001 .692 .000 .742 .000 .702 .000 737 .000 .853 .006 .746 .000 .786 .001 .802 .001
arousal .930 .156 .926 .129 .951 .386 .951 .383 .972 .790 .925 .124 .962 .595 .914 .077 .963 .607 .959 .520 .933 .176
bias .653 .000 .810 .001 .721 .000 .711 .000 .708 .000 683 .000 796 .001 .908 .058 .906 .053 .787 .001 797 .001
intention .901 .043 .908 .057 .869 .011 .923 .113 .953 .415 .954 .423 .914 .077 .915 .079 .894 .032 .923 .114 .958 .503
knowledge .812 .001 .874 .014 .822 .002 .932 .171 .933 .175 .801 .001 .903 .046 .872 .013 .927 .132 .937 .213 .926 .129
parallelism .694 .000 .634 .000 .928 .144 .745 .000 .862 .009 .752 .000 .789 .001 .756 .000 .753 .000 .847 .005 .767 .000
skill .930 .157 .897 .036 .884 .020 .951 .390 .927 .138 .958 .506 .926 .131 .876 .015 .912 .068 .957 .479 .936 .199
Table C.29: Shapiro-Wilk normality tests of the mental workload attributes - Group A
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Attribute Stat Sig Stat Sig Stat Sig Stat Sig Stat Sig Stat Sig Stat Sig Stat Sig Stat Sig Stat Sig Stat Sig
mental .947 .331 .941 .252 .876 .015 .894 .032 .917 .085 .919 .096 .846 .005 .950 .368 .883 .020 .872 .013 .898 .038
temporal .949 .345 .850 .005 .904 .049 .888 .025 .845 .004 .910 .063 .915 .778 .929 .149 .914 .076 .904 .049 .946 .309
psychological .927 .136 .831 .003 .769 .000 .888 .024 .844 .004 .887 .024 .918 .090 .922 .108 .933 .180 .903 .048 .974 .837
performance .726 .000 .960 .538 .725 .000 .887 .024 .873 .013 .834 .003 .949 .359 .891 .028 .952 .400 .861 .008 .778 .000
effort .963 .596 .827 .002 .828 .002 .912 .068 .903 .048 .933 .174 .854 .006 .945 .303 .915 .078 .956 .469 .898 .038
central .977 .892 .909 .061 .877 .015 .900 .042 .841 .004 .928 .141 .853 .006 .935 .196 .858 .007 .952 .392 .956 .467
response .947 .319 .931 .160 .919 .095 .931 .160 .922 .108 .935 .190 .854 .006 .903 .047 .916 .085 .954 .437 .869 .011
visual .915 .079 .918 .091 .917 .088 .900 .041 .951 .378 .818 .002 .892 .029 .923 .114 .899 .040 .962 .594 .973 .819
auditory .546 .000 .719 .000 960 .538 .543 .000 .718 .000 541 .000 834 .003 .817 .012 .848 .005 .862 .009 .891 .028
spatial .840 .004 .821 .002 .866 .010 .806 .001 .804 .001 .875 .014 .748 .000 840 .004 .869 .011 .923 .114 .886 .022
verbal .955 .445 .888 .025 .837 .003 .906 .053 .927 .132 .885 .022 .937 .209 .852 .006 .845 .004 .896 .035 .832 .003
manual .952 .395 .794 .001 .960 .535 .927 .137 .905 .052 .912 .069 .692 .000 .944 .285 .893 .030 .939 .233 .942 .266
speech .469 .000 .717 .000 595 .000 .738 .000 .543 .000 .693 .000 .784 .001 .707 .000 .771 .000 .728 .000 .855 .007
arousal .921 .102 .965 .644 .899 .039 .951 .390 .946 .310 .915 .081 .936 .197 .853 .006 .864 .009 .918 .089 .930 .152
bias .538 .000 .730 .000 .753 .000 .744 .000 .604 .000 .690 .000 .833 .003 .843 .004 .889 .025 .805 .001 .727 .000
intention .854 .006 .906 .053 .920 .098 .614 .077 .885 .022 .969 .724 .930 .153 .910 .065 .898 .038 .976 .866 .940 .244
knowledge .895 .034 .935 .192 .836 .003 .928 .138 .810 .001 .836 .003 .842 .004 .866 .010 .867 .011 .853 .006 .910 .064
parallelism .582 .000 568 .000 876 .015 .787 .001 .785 .001 .688 .000 .868 .011 .854 .006 .686 .000 .929 .147 .870 .012
skill .910 .063 .847 .005 .895 .033 .922 .106 .911 .066 .910 .065 .900 .041 .918 .092 .879 .017 .943 .273 .910 .063
Table C.30: Shapiro-Wilk normality tests of the mental workload attributes - Group B
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C.8 Likelihood ratio tests for the multinomial logistic regression
Model fitting criteria Likelihood ratio tests
effect(s) -2Log likelihood
of reduced model
Chi-square df Sig
Intercept 2287.548 28641 21 0.123
effort 2333.009 74.101 21 0.000
psychological 2303.701 44.793 21 0.002
mental 2294.018 35.111 21 0.027
temporal 2376.493 117.586 21 0.000
performance 2360.125 101.217 21 0.000
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final and a reduced model that is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are 0.
Table C.31: Likelihood ratio tests of the multinomial logistic regression with the attributes of the NASATLX
Model fitting criteria Likelihood ratio tests
effect(s) -2Log likelihood
of reduced model
Chi-square df Sig
Intercept 1858.838 84.953 21 0.000
speech 1828.189 54.304 21 0.000
verbal 1856.830 82.945 21 0.000
auditory 2129.535 355.650 21 0.000
response 1832.535 58.504 21 0.000
central 1847.477 73.592 21 0.000
visual 1820.956 47.071 21 0.001
spatial 1831.489 57.604 21 0.000
manual 1843.307 69.423 21 0.000
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final and a reduced model that is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are
0.
Table C.32: Likelihood ratio tests of the multinomial logistic regression with the attributes of the WP
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Model fitting criteria Likelihood ratio tests
effect(s) -2Log likelihood
of reduced model
Chi-square df Sig
Intercept 1228.870 40.302 21 0.000
skill 1227.784 39.216 21 0.009
knowledge 1241.983 53.415 21 0.000
bias 1243.347 54.780 21 0.000
speech 1244.528 55.960 21 0.000
verbal 1250.175 61.607 21 0.000
auditory 1499.734 311.166 21 0.000
response 1245.445 56.877 21 0.000
effort 1270.755 82.187 21 0.000
psychological 1234.922 46.355 21 0.001
temporal 1300.782 112.214 21 0.000
performance 1243.812 55.244 21 0.000
central 1224.444 35.877 21 0.023
visual 1247.265 58.697 21 0.000
spatial 1239.049 50.481 21 0.000
manual 1247.037 58.469 21 0.000
arousal 1226.932 38.364 21 0.012
parallelism 1289.076 100.509 21 0.000
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final and a reduced model that is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are
0.
Table C.33: Likelihood ratio tests the multinomial logistic regression with the attributes of the instances of
the defeasible framework (MWLde f and MWLNIde f )
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C.9 Predictions of the multinomial logistic regressions model
Group A GroupB
Observed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 % correct
G
ro
up
A
1 8 0 2 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 40.0
2 4 0 0 3 2 1 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0.0
3 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 2 10.0
4 2 0 0 5 1 0 4 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 25.0
5 1 0 0 3 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 2 2 0 0 1 25.0
6 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 0 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 3 2 0.0
7 0 0 0 1 1 0 8 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 40.0
8 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 1 3 10.0
9 0 1 0 1 1 2 3 0 5 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 25.0
10 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 4 3 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 3 0 3 0 20.0
11 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 55.0
G
ro
up
B
1 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 2 3 0 2 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 15.0
2 3 2 0 4 0 0 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.0
3 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 9 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 45.0
4 1 0 1 3 1 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 5.0
5 4 0 0 5 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 15.0
6 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 3 1 0 3 0 0 0 2 1 15.0
7 1 1 0 0 2 0 3 1 4 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 20.0
8 3 0 3 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0.0
9 2 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 3 0 5.0
10 0 0 2 0 2 1 0 0 3 2 1 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 4 0 20.0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 6 30.0
Tot. % 10.2 1.6 3.6 6.1 5.0 2.0 8.0 5.7 5.7 5.7 8.0 2.3 1.1 6.1 1.6 4.8 4.5 2.7 3.0 1.1 5.7 5.5 19.1%
Table C.34: Predicted task membership by the multinomial logistic regression with the attributes of the
NASATLX
Group A GroupB
Observed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 % correct
G
ro
up
A
1 9 1 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 45.0
2 3 8 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40.0
3 3 1 8 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 40.0
4 1 1 0 2 2 1 0 1 0 3 0 4 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 10.0
5 1 2 1 2 3 2 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 2 0 15.0
6 3 1 0 2 1 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 4 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 15.0
7 0 0 1 0 0 0 10 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 3 50.0
8 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 6 1 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 30.0
9 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 2 1 45.0
10 0 2 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 8 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 40.0
11 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 2 35.0
G
ro
up
B
1 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 3 0 0 1 3 0 1 0 2 0 20.0
2 1 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 12 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 60.0
3 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 65.0
4 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 4 2 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 10.0
5 3 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 3 0 0 2 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 25.0
6 1 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 1 3 6 0 1 0 0 0 30.0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 9 0 1 0 3 45.0
8 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 1 4 1 0 0 0 3 3 0 0.0
9 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 8 1 2 40.0
10 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 1 2 5 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 3 0 15.0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 7 0 1 0 7 35.0
Tot. % 7.0 5.5 4.8 2.3 3.0 3.2 4.3 5.5 4.8 6.6 3.2 5.2 7.0 5.5 3.2 4.8 3.4 5.7 1.6 5.2 4.1 4.3 32.3%
Table C.35: Predicted task membership by the multinomial logistic regression with the attributes of the WP
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Group A GroupB
Observed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 % correct
G
ro
up
A
1 12 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 60.0
2 1 13 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65.0
3 0 0 8 0 0 1 0 4 0 1 0 1 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40.0
4 0 0 0 7 5 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 35.0
5 1 1 0 3 8 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 40.0
6 3 1 1 1 1 6 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 30.0
7 0 0 0 1 0 0 12 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 60.0
8 0 1 1 0 1 0 2 10 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 50.0
9 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 14 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 70.0
10 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 8 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 6 1 40.0
11 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 65.0
G
ro
up
B
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 55.0
2 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 75.0
3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80.0
4 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 7 3 3 0 1 0 0 1 35.0
5 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 8 1 0 1 0 1 0 40.0
6 1 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 7 0 2 0 0 0 35.0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 1 60.0
8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 9 0 1 2 45.0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 12 0 0 60.0
10 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 12 0 60.0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 14 70.0
Tot. % 5.5 4.3 3.9 4.5 4.3 3.0 5.0 5.7 5.5 4.5 4.3 4.5 5.2 5.5 3.2 3.6 4.1 4.3 4.8 4.3 5.0 5.0 53.2 %
Table C.36: Predicted task membership by the multinomial logistic regression with the attributes of the new
instances of the defeasible framework (MWLde f and MWLNIde f )
C.10 Step summaries of the multinomial logistic procedure
Model fitting criteria Likelihood ratio tests
Model Action effect(s) -2Log likelihood of
reduced model
Chi-square a df Sig
0 Entered Intercept 2720.117
1 Entered temporal 2579.573 140.544 21 0.000
2 Entered effort 2446.946 132.627 21 0.000
3 Entered performance 2337.516 109.430 21 0.000
4 Entered psychological 2294.018 43.497 21 0.003
5 Entered mental 2258.907 35.111 21 0.027
Stepwise Method: Forward Entry aThe chi-square for entry is based on the likelihood ratio test.
Table C.37: Step summary of the multinomial logistic regression with the attributes of the NASATLX
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Model fitting criteria Likelihood ratio tests
Model Action effect(s) -2Log likelihood of
reduced model
Chi-square a df Sig
0 Entered Intercept 2720.117
1 Entered auditory 2312.625 407.493 21 0.000
2 Entered central 2190.580 122.044 21 0.000
3 Entered manual 2083.952 106.628 21 0.000
4 Entered verbal 1987.693 96.259 21 0.000
5 Entered spatial 1933.067 54.626 21 0.000
6 Entered response 1872.922 60.144 21 0.000
7 Entered speech 1820.956 51.967 21 0.000
8 Entered visual 1773.885 47.071 21 0.001
Stepwise Method: Forward Entry aThe chi-square for entry is based on the likelihood ratio test.
Table C.38: Step summary of the multinomial logistic regression with the attributes of the WP instrument
Model fitting criteria Likelihood ratio tests
Model Action effect(s) -2Log likelihood of
reduced model
Chi-square a df Sig
0 Entered Intercept 2720.117
1 Entered auditory 2312.625 407.493 21 0.000
2 Entered parallelism 2165.939 146.686 21 0.000
3 Entered temporal 2051.458 114.481 21 0.000
4 Entered effort 1934.399 117.059 21 0.000
5 Entered manual 1839.024 95.375 21 0.000
6 Entered bias 1750.272 88.751 21 0.000
7 Entered verbal 1674.376 75.896 21 0.000
8 Entered knowledge 1617.276 57.099 21 0.000
9 Entered speech 1559.886 57.390 21 0.000
10 Entered performance 1504.388 55.498 21 0.000
11 Entered visual 1444.192 60.196 21 0.000
12 Entered response 1396.445 47.747 21 0.001
13 Entered spatial 1347.588 48.857 21 0.001
14 Entered psychological 1303.836 43.752 21 0.003
15 Entered skill 1262.599 41.237 21 0.005
16 Entered arousal 1224.444 38.154 21 0.012
17 Entered central 1188.568 35.877 21 0.023
Stepwise Method: Forward Entry aThe chi-square for entry is based on the likelihood ratio test.
Table C.39: Step summary of the multinomial logistic regression with the attributes of the instances of the
defeasible framework (MWLde f and MWLNIde f )
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Appendix D
D.1 Consent form
D.1.1 Study Information
The explosion of the Internet as a collaborative, accessible platform and data source is rapidly changing the way in which people access, seek, publish, and
consume information. Emerging applications shape our cognitive development, with fresh modes of interaction evolving new and interesting behaviours
rich in useful data. User exchanges with and through websites and popular communications channels, including Twitter, Facebook, email, and instant
messaging applications, are constantly monitored and mined for pertinent patterns to bring such knowledge to bear in the improvement of services and
more accurately targeted content delivery. Such data is explicit in detailing a user’s interaction with specific web pages or users, but is currently deficient
in elucidating on a user’s original goals or intentions. Use of the internet is, in actuality, a complex cognitive activity involving auditory, tactile, and visual
human modalities rather than the mere external physical channels we presently monitor. The analysis and prediction of a user’s cognitive engagement whilst
involved in such activity is the main focus and inspiration for this study. To this end, we aim to introduce the concept of Human Mental Workload - currently
in use by Psychological, Neuro, and Cognitive Sciences - to the field of Computer Science, as it becomes increasingly connected to Social and Behavioural
research. The objective measurement of human mental workload during task execution online enables aggregate behaviour analysis, useful toward the study
of collective intelligence in large groups of users. In this study your behaviour while surfing the World Wide Web will be monitored, implicitly gathered
by a non-invasive piece of software, and stored in a database for future analysis. The study aims to capture detailed interaction information for performed
actions to automatically assess user engagement. All actions you perform over webpages will be recorded and saved, these include clicking, scrolling, mouse
gestures and movements, and keyboard usage. However, data input in online forms will not be collected. Your job is to naturally interact with the Web. You
will be asked to participate in a subjective questionnaire to obtain feedback on your experience with the execution of online tasks.
You can leave the study or request a break at any time. This study is conducted in accordance with the School of Computer Science and Statistics
at Trinity College Dublin, along with its ethics guidelines. Your rights as a participant, including the right to withdraw at any point without penalty,
are ensured. It is anticipated that the findings of the study will be written up for publication in a peer-reviewed journal and presented at international
conferences. All results will be anonymised and it will not be possible to identify individual participants’ data.
D.1.2 Frequently Asked Questions
1. Is the study anonymous? Yes, the study is totally anonymous, collected data will not be linked to your identity.
2. Will my user experience while surfing the Web be altered by the monitoring technology? No, your experience while surfing the Web will not
change. The monitoring technology will be completely invisible and non-invasive.
3. Will data I input online such as logins and passwords be captured and stored somewhere? No, data entered online such as web-form input, logins,
passwords, or email addresses, will not be recorded.
4. How is my privacy guaranteed? Your personal data will not be stored. Your logins, password, and any data entered into forms or over social
networks, wikis, blogs, or other resources will never be recorded.
5. Will recorded data be linked to me? No, recorded data will never be linked to you. Our software will randomly generate a code to identify your
Web interactions over time, but this code can never be associated with your personal data, computer IP, or computer MAC address as we never store
such info..
6. Is the captured data stored in a public database? No, the captured data will be stored in a local password-protected database behind proxy machines
and firewalls within the Distributed Systems Group’s network at Trinity College Dublin.
7. Who will have access to stored participants’ data, and what about confidentiality? Only the researcher of this study will have access to your
interaction data, exclusively for research purposes. The researcher will never be able to associate any stored data with the identity of a specific user,
as this information is never stored. No one else will have the right to access any stored information.
8. What does the software look like? The software solution is totally transparent. It comes as either a proxy - meaning you need only configure your
browser to point to the proxy - or a plug-in/add-on for your favourite browser (Firefox or Chrome) that is installed only once. Nothing further is
required.
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D.1.3 Consent form
Name of Participant: Sex: Male/Female Date of birth:
Researcher: Luca Longo
I consent to participate in this study. I am satisfied with the instructions I have been given so far and I expect to have any further information
requested regarding the study supplied to me at the end of the experiment. I have been informed that the confidentiality of the data I provide will be
safeguarded. I am free to ask any questions at any time before and during the study. I have been provided with a copy of this form and the participant
information sheet.
I understand that my behaviour while surfing the World Wide Web will be monitored and stored for statistical analysis. The aim of the study is to
capture interaction actions for automatically assessing indexes of user’s engagement. Technically, my web-interaction will be saved and all the actions I
perform over web-pages, such as clicking, scrolling, mouse movements and keyboard usage, will be recorded. All the data I will send through web-forms
will not be saved in anyhow but just the action will be recorded.
I have not been coerced in any way to participate in this study and I understand that I may terminate my participation in the study at any point should I
so wish. I am at least 18 years of age.
D.1.4 Data Protection
I agree to the University processing personal data that I have supplied. I agree to the processing of such data for any purposes connected with the Research
Project as outlined to me.
Also, I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary, that I may refuse to answer any question and may withdraw at any time without prejudice.
I agree to Luca Longo and Trinity College, University of Dublin storing of any data which results from this project. I agree to the processing of such data
for any purposes connected with the research project as outlined to me. I understand that my participation is fully anonymous, no personal details will be
recorded, no images or video will be stored and all information collected will remain confidential. I have been provided with an information letter which
outlines the activities I will take part in, how data will be collected and stored and how I can contact the researcher. I agree that my data is used for scientific
purposes and I have no objection that my data is published in scientific publications in a way that does not reveal my identity. In the extremely unlikely event
that illicit activity is reported, Luca Longo will be obliged to report it to appropriate authorities. I have read this consent form. I have had the opportunity to
ask questions and all my questions have been answered to my satisfaction and understand the description of the research that is being provided to me. I have
received a copy of this agreement.
Date:
Name of participant (print): Signed:
Name of researcher (print): Luca Longo Signed:
Researcher’s Contact details: llongo@cs.tcd.ie
Department of Computer Science and Statistics, Distributed Systems Group. Trinity College Dublin
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